area handbook series 

Ecuador 

a country study 



Ecuador 

a country study 



Federal Research Division <. 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Dennis M. Hanratty 
Research Completed 
December 1 989 




On the cover: Inca gold sun pendant 



Third Edition, First Printing, 1991. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Ecuador : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress ; edited by Dennis M. Hanratty. — 3rd ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) (DA 
pam ; 550-52) 

"Research completed December 1989." 
Rev. ed. of: Area handbook for Ecuador / co-authors, 
Thomas E. Weil . . . [et al.]. 1973. 

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 265-282) and index. 
ISBN 0-8444-0730-5 

1. Ecuador. I. Hanratty, Dennis Michael, 1950- . 
II. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Area 
handbook for Ecuador. IV. Series. V. Series: DA pam ; 



550-52. 
F3708.E383 
986.6— dc20 



1991 



91-9494 
CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 



DA Pam 550-52 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by 
the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under 
the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program sponsored by the 
Department of the Army. The last page of this book lists the other 
published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



in 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of Thomas E. 
Weil, Jan Knippers Black, Howard I. Blutstein, David S. McMorris, 
Mildred Gill Mersereau, Frederick P. Munson, and Kathryn E. 
Parachini, who wrote the 1973 edition of the Area Handbook for Ec- 
uador. Portions of their work were incorporated into the present 
volume. 

The authors are grateful to individuals in various agencies of 
the United States government and private institutions who gave 
their time, research materials, and special knowledge to provide 
information and perspective. These individuals include Ralph K. 
Benesch, who oversees the area handbook program for the Depart- 
ment of the Army. None of these individuals is in any way respon- 
sible for the work of the authors, however. 

The authors also wish to thank those who contributed directly 
to the preparation of the manuscript. These include Sandra W. 
Meditz, who reviewed all drafts and served as liaison with the spon- 
soring agency; Ruth Nieland, who edited the chapters; Martha E. 
Hopkins and Marilyn Majeska, who managed editing and produc- 
tion; and Barbara Edgerton, Janie L. Gilchrist, and Izella Watson, 
who did the word processing. Cissie Coy performed the final pre- 
publication editorial review, and Joan C. Cook compiled the in- 
dex. Malinda B. Neale of the Library of Congress Printing and 
Processing Section performed phototypesetting, under the super- 
vision of Peggy Pixley. 

David P. Cabitto, who was assisted by Sandra K. Ferrell and 
Wayne Home, provided invaluable graphics support. Harriet R. 
Blood, David P. Cabitto, and Greenhorne and O'Mara prepared 
the maps. David P. Cabitto also deserves special thanks for design- 
ing the illustrations for the book's cover and the title page of each 
chapter. 

The authors also would like to thank several individuals who 
provided research support. Arvies J. Staton supplied information 
on military ranks and insignia, and Karen M. Sturges-Vera wrote 
the section on geography in chapter 2. 

Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of the individuals 
and the public and private agencies who allowed their photographs 
to be used in this study. We are indebted especially to those who 
contributed original work not previously published. 



Contents 



Page 



Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xi 

Country Profile xiii 

Introduction xxi 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

James D. Rudolph 

PRE-HISPANIC ERA 4 

DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST 7 

SPANISH COLONIAL ERA 11 

THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE 16 

THE FIRST CENTURY OF THE REPUBLIC 19 

Initial Confusion, 1830-60 19 

The Era of Conservatism, 1860-95 22 

The Rule of the Liberals, 1895-1925 25 

Reform, Chaos, and Debacle, 1925-44 28 

THE POSTWAR ERA, 1944-84 31 

Constitutional Rule, 1948-60 33 

Instability and Military Dominance, 1960-72 35 

Direct Military Rule, 1972-79 41 

Return to Democratic Rule, 1979-84 45 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 51 

Patricia Kluck 

GEOGRAPHY 54 

Natural Regions 54 

Drainage 58 

Climate 59 

POPULATION 62 

MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION 67 

SOCIAL CLASSES 70 

Elite 70 

Middle Class 72 

Peasants 73 

Workers 80 



vii 



ETHNIC GROUPS 83 

Whites and Mestizos 84 

Blacks 86 

Sierra Indians 87 

Oriente Indians 88 

FAMILY AND KIN 90 

RELIGION 93 

SOCIAL WELFARE 96 

Education ; . . . 96 

Health and Social Security 97 

Chapter 3. The Economy 101 

Edmundo Flores and Tim Merrill 

GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE 

ECONOMY 104 

RECENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 107 

ROLE OF GOVERNMENT Ill 

Fiscal Policies 112 * 

Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies 115 

Government Budget Process 117 

HUMAN RESOURCES AND INCOME 118 

Composition of Labor Force 118 

Employment Indicators and Benefits 118 

Organized Labor 119 

AGRICULTURE 120 

Land Use and Tenure 120 

Crops 123 

Livestock and Poultry 128 

Fishing 129 

Forestry 130 

NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY 130 

Petroleum and Natural Gas 130 

Mining and Minerals 133 

Electric Power 133 

MANUFACTURING 134 

SERVICES 136 

Financial System 137 

Tourism 139 

Communications 139 

Transportation 142 

EXTERNAL SECTOR 145 

External Debt 145 

Trade and Balance of Payments 148 



viii 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 153 

Rex A. Hudson 

CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 156 

GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE 161 

The Executive 162 

The Legislature 166 

The Judiciary 170 

Public Administration 173 

Local Government 174 

The Electoral Process 175 

POLITICAL DYNAMICS 177 

Political Parties 177 

Political Forces and Interest Groups 188 

The Media 195 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 197 

The United States 198 

Other Nations and International Organizations 200 

Chapter 5. National Security 205 

Jean R. Tartter 

MILITARY HERITAGE 208 

STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE 210 

INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT ... 212 

ARMED FORCES 214 

Army 217 

Navy 220 

Air Force 223 

Military Justice 225 

Ranks, Insignia, and Uniforms 226 

RECRUITMENT AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE 226 

DEFENSE BUDGET 230 

CIVIL DEFENSE 232 

CIVIC ACTION 233 

FOREIGN INFLUENCE 233 

Military Relations with the United States 234 

Equipment Sources 236 

INTERNAL SECURITY 237 

Police 239 

The Administration of Justice 244 

The Penal System 246 

Appendix. Tables 249 

Bibliography 265 

Glossary 283 



IX 



Index 285 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Ecuador, 1989 xx 

2 Territory Disputed by Ecuador and Peru 32 

3 Topography and Drainage 56 

4 Projected Population by Age and Sex, 1990 62 

5 Selected Demographic Indicators, at Five- Year 

Intervals, 1950-2000 63 

6 Life Expectancy at Birth, by Five- Year 

Intervals, 1950-2000 64 

7 Total Fertility Rate, at Five-Year Intervals, 1950-2000 65 

8 Population Distribution by Region, Census Years, 

1950-82 66 

9 Population Density, 1986 68 

10 Percentage of School- Aged Population Enrolled in 

School, Divided by Urban-Rural Residence, 1982 98 

11 Petroleum and Mineral Resources, 1988 106 

12 Rise in Consumer Prices, 1980-89 108 

13 Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth Rate, 

1980-89 109 

14 Foreign Debt, 1975-89 114 

15 Transportation System, 1989 144 

16 Organization of the Ecuadorian Government, 1989 164 

17 Organization of National Security, 1989 216 

18 Major Military Installations and Deployments, 1989 218 

19 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1989 228 

20 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1989 229 

21 Organization of the National Police, 1988 241 



x 



Preface 



Like the 1973 Area Handbook for Ecuador, this study is an attempt 
to treat in a compact and objective manner the dominant social, 
political, economic, and military aspects of contemporary Ecua- 
dor. Sources of information included scholarly books, journals, and 
monographs; official reports of governments and international or- 
ganizations; numerous periodicals; and interviews with individ- 
uals having special competence in Ecuadorian and Latin American 
affairs. Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; brief 
comments on sources recommended for further reading appear at 
the end of each chapter. Measurements are given in the metric sys- 
tem; a conversion table is provided to assist readers unfamiliar with 
metric measurements (see table 1, Appendix). A glossary is also in- 
cluded. 

Although there are numerous variations, Spanish surnames 
generally consist of two parts: the patronymic name followed by 
the matronymic. In the instance of Rodrigo Borja Cevallos, for 
example, Borja is his father's name, Cevallos, his mother's maiden 
name. In informal use, the matronymic is often dropped. Thus, 
after the first mention, we have usually referred simply to Borja. 
A minority of individuals use only the patronymic. For purposes 
of clarity, some individuals with common patronymics, such as 
Gabriel Garcia Moreno, are referred to with both patronymics and 
matronymics. Special rules govern discussion of Galo Plaza Lasso, 
who is referred to by Ecuadorian historians and throughout this 
book as Galo Plaza to differentiate him from his father, Leonidas 
Plaza Gutierrez. 



xi 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Republic of Ecuador (Republica del Ecuador). 

Short Form: Ecuador. 

Term for Citizens: Ecuadorian(s). 

Capital: Quito. 

Geography 

Size: Approximately 280,000 square kilometers. 

Topography: Divided into three continental regions — the Costa, 
Sierra, and Oriente — and one insular region — the Galapagos Is- 
lands. Costa, located between Pacific Ocean and Andes Mountains, 



xui 



consists of coastal lowlands and mountains. Sierra composed of two 
major chains of Andes Mountains — Cordillera Occidental (Western 
Chain) and Cordillera Oriental (Eastern Chain) — and intermontane 
basin or plateau between the two chains. Cordillera Occidental con- 
tains Ecuador's highest peak, 6,267-meter Mount Chimborazo. 
Oriente consists of Andean piedmont and eastern lowlands. Gala- 
pagos are islands of varied size located 1,000 kilometers west of 
Ecuadorian coast. 

Climate: Tropical climate throughout Costa, although variations 
in temperature and rainfall result from proximity to warm or cool 
ocean currents. Sierra climate ranges from tropical to frozen, de- 
pending on altitude; notable rainfall variations also occur. Tropi- 
cal climate and abundant rainfall prevail in Oriente. Galapagos 
climate varies from tropical and desert-like at sea level to cold and 
wet at highest point. 

Society 

Population: Estimates of total population in 1989 ranged from 10.8 
to 11 million; annual growth rate estimated at 2.3 to 2.8 percent. 

Ethnic Groups: Indians and mestizos, 40 percent each; whites, 
10 to 15 percent; blacks, 5 percent. 

Languages: Spanish (official) and Quichua (a Quechua dialect). 

Religion: Approximately 94 percent Roman Catholic. Beginning 
in late 1960s, significant gains made by Protestant evangelical and 
Pentecostal churches. 

Education and Literacy: School attendance theoretically compul- 
sory for children between ages six and fourteen. Primary and sec- 
ondary schools each offered six-year programs. Higher education 
consisted of twelve state and five private universities as well as var- 
ious polytechnic schools and teachers' colleges. Estimated 85 per- 
cent literacy rate in mid-1980s. 

Health: Infant mortality rate estimates in early 1980s ranged from 
70 to 76 per 1,000 live births; the infant mortality rate was ap- 
proximately 63 per 1 ,000 live births in 1985. Infant mortality varied 
significantly by region and socioeconomic status. Life expectancy 
at birth in mid-1980s sixty-four years. Ministry of Public Health 
operated four- tiered system of health care, but lack of trained profes- 
sionals hampered public health care. Maternal mortality remained 
high, especially in rural areas. Some tropical diseases, including 
malaria, continued to be of concern to health officials. 



xiv 



Economy 



Gross Domestic Product (GDP): US$9.4 billion in 1989, or 
US$940 per capita. Substantial economic growth in 1970s follow- 
ing discovery of new petroleum fields in Oriente and international 
price increases for petroleum. Increased external debt, lowered 
petroleum prices, devastation from floods and earthquake, and eco- 
nomic mismanagement combined to produced serious economic 
problems during 1980s. GDP declined by 5.2 percent in 1987, in- 
creased by 8 percent in 1988, and grew by only 1 percent in 1989. 

Agriculture: Including livestock raising, forestry, and fishing, 
almost 18 percent of GDP in 1987. Sector employed about 35 per- 
cent of nation's workforce in 1987. 

Natural Resources and Energy: Petroleum and mining accounted 
for 8 percent of GDP in 1987. Nation had 1.6 million barrels of 
proven oil reserves, vast majority of which found in Oriente. Abun- 
dant natural gas reserves in Oriente and in Gulf of Guayaquil. 

Industry: About 17 percent of GDP in 1987. Food processing and 
textile manufacturing most important components of industry sec- 
tor. Nearly 10 percent of labor force employed in industry in 1987. 
Vast majority of firms had fewer than five workers. 

Services: Accounted for nearly 50 percent of GDP and 24 percent 
of labor force in 1987. Wholesale and retail trade, financial ser- 
vices, and transportation and communications most important 
segments. 

Imports: Totalled almost US$2.1 billion in 1987. Imports con- 
sisted primarily of raw materials and capital goods for industry, 
foods and lubricants, transportation equipment, durable consumer 
goods, and non-durable consumer goods. Major suppliers of im- 
ports were United States, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany 
(West Germany), and Brazil. 

Exports: Totalled US$2.3 billion in 1989. Petroleum generated 
half of all export revenues; other major exports included shrimp, 
bananas, coffee, and cocoa. Over 60 percent of exports in 1987 
destined for United States. 

Balance of Payments: Chronic current- account deficits during late 
1980s, although deficit reduced from nearly US$1.2 billion in 1987 
to US$500 million in 1989. External debt reached US$11.3 bil- 
lion in 1989. 



xv 



Exchange Rate: Sucre (S/) pegged to United States dollar during 
1980s but devalued numerous times during 1980s. Official rate aver- 
aged S/526 = US$1 in 1989. 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Fiscal Policy: Upon assuming presidency in 1988, Rodrigo Borja 
Cevallos (1988- ) inherited a rapidly deteriorating economy charac- 
terized by growing fiscal deficit, rapid monetary expansion, capi- 
tal flight, and excessive government spending. Borja implemented 
economic austerity measures that included sharp currency devalu- 
ation, tax increases, import restrictions, government spending 
reductions, and substantial increases in fuel prices and electricity 
rates. 

Transportation and Communications 

Roads: Approximately 28,000 kilometers of roads in 1989, of which 
3,600 paved, 17,400 gravel and improved earth, and 7,000 dirt 
roads. Pan American Highway most heavily traveled route. Few 
all-weather highways located in Oriente. 

Railroads: Totalled 965 kilometers in 1989. Service on principal 
line between Quito and Guayaquil only partially restored follow- 
ing floods in early 1980s. 

Airports: One hundred seventy-nine airports, of which forty- three 
had permanent surface runways. Quito and Guayaquil only in- 
ternational airports and handled largest volume of air traffic. 

Ports: Country's five ports carried 95 percent of all imports and 
exports in late 1980s. Sixty percent of this trade passed through 
two Guayaquil ports. The national merchant marine consisted of 
130 vessels. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Democratic and unitary state with republican, pres- 
idential, elective, and representative government. Under 1979 Con- 
stitution, chief executive is president of republic, elected to four-year 
term by majority popular vote. Reelection of incumbent not per- 
mitted. President's varied executive duties include enforcement of 
Constitution; approval of laws; maintenance of domestic order and 
national security; determination of foreign policy; and assumption 
of emergency powers during times of crisis. Principle of "legisla- 
tive coparticipation" also allows president to share in formation of 
laws as well as in the execution and application of laws. Unicameral 



xvi 



National Congress enacts legislation; reforms and interprets Con- 
stitution; establishes revenues; approves public treaties; appoints 
high-level government officials from lists submitted by president; 
and reviews executive branch budget. Judiciary is responsible for 
technical matters. 

Politics: Political parties suffered from factionalism and weak or- 
ganization; were often overshadowed by personalist movements. 
Persistent regional rivalries between Quito and Guayaquil also con- 
tributed to contentious political debates. In May 1988, Borja, leader 
of Social Democratic party, the center-left Democratic Left (Iz- 
quierda Democratica-ID), defeated Abdala Bucaram Ortiz of 
populist Ecuadorian Roldosist Party (Partido Roldosista Ecua- 
toriano-PRE) in second round of presidential elections and assumed 
presidency in August 1988, succeeding longtime rival and conser- 
vative-turned-populist Leon Febres Cordero Ribadeneyra (1984- 
88). 

International Relations: Borja administration maintained good 
relations with United States. In contrast to Febres Cordero adminis- 
tration, also pursued more active relations with Third World, multi- 
lateral organizations, Western Europe, and socialist countries. 
Protracted border dispute with Peru strained relations between the 
two countries. 

International Agreements and Membership: Party to Inter- 
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (Rio Treaty). 
Member of numerous regional and international organizations, in- 
cluding Organization of American States, United Nations and its 
specialized agencies, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, 
Inter-American Development Bank, Andean Pact, Latin Ameri- 
can Economic System, Latin American Energy Organization, Latin 
American Integration Association, Nonaligned Movement, and Or- 
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Included army, navy, and air force with total 
strength estimated at 49,000 in 1988. Country divided into four 
army theaters of operation (defense zones), three naval zones, and 
two air zones. Army operational zones consisted of five infantry 
brigades, two jungle brigades, one special forces brigade, and ar- 
mored, logistics, engineering, and army aviation commands. Navy 
organized into destroyer division; fast-missile craft, corvette, and 
submarine squadrons; auxiliary vessels and transports; a naval avi- 
ation unit; coast guard; and marines. Air Force operations consisted 



xvn 



of fighter and fighter-ground attack squadrons; light attack squad- 
ron; and air defense group. 

Equipment: Major ground forces armaments included French- 
origin light tanks, four-wheeled reconnaissance vehicles, and ar- 
mored personnel carriers; Brazilian armored cars and wheeled per- 
sonnel carriers; and tracked personnel carriers from the United 
States. Naval equipment included West German missile attack craft 
and two small submarines; Italian corvettes equipped with Exocet 
missiles; and one Gearing-class destroyer from United States. Air 
Force equipment included British Jaguars; United States Cessnas; 
and Israeli Kfirs. 

Police: Subordinate to Ministry of Government and Justice. Es- 
timated 18,000 members organized into technical operations and 
support directorates and four operational units. 



xvin 



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89 



Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Ecuador, 1989 



xx 



Introduction 



AS THE 1990s began, deep-rooted sociological, geographical, eco- 
nomic, and political features continued to define Ecuador. Despite 
such post-World War II developments as widespread migration, 
the growth of import-substitution (see Glossary) industrialization, 
and the emergence of an urban middle class, Ecuador remained 
strongly influenced by its history. Four key themes dominated the 
historical landscape and remained essential to an understanding 
of contemporary Ecuador. First, the nation had a highly skewed 
social structure that could be traced to its colonial past. Second, 
persistent regional rivalries often determined the outcome of key 
national issues. Third, the economy continued to be subject to the 
fortunes of a single commodity. Finally, the political system lacked 
strong, stable institutions. 

Spanish social structures and values took hold most completely 
in the sixteenth century in the Sierra (Andean highlands). Not coin- 
cidentally, the Sierra was also that Ecuadorian region where the 
Inca conquerors had been most successful fifty years earlier. Spanish 
officials adapted the prevailing Inca hierarchical social system and 
established a tripartite, semifeudal structure consisting of small 
numbers of white elites, (both peninsulares — Spanish-born persons 
residing in the New World — and criollos — persons of pure Spanish 
descent born in the New World), a somewhat larger group of 
mestizo artisans, and a large Indian underclass. Since Ecuador 
lacked the mineral riches found in other Spanish colonies, such as 
Peru and Mexico, land became the critical commodity. Through 
the encomienda system, elites received tracts of Sierra land along with 
the right to extract labor from Indians living on that land. Colonists 
also adapted the Inca concept of obligatory public service (mita) 
and required Indians to toil in textile sweatshops scattered through 
the highlands. Debts incurred through the Spanish mita often trans- 
formed what was supposed to be a transitory labor obligation into 
a peonage system passed across generations. 

The successful struggle for independence in the 1820s resulted 
in the transfer of power from peninsulares to criollos. It did little, 
however, to change other aspects of the social system, which by 
then had become dominated by haciendas with a resident Indian 
labor force. These residents, known as huasipungueros, typically 
worked the hacienda fields for four days per week in exchange for 
the right to own a small plot of land (minifundio) . 



xxi 



The huasipungo system survived in isolated pockets of the Sierra 
until finally being abolished by the 1964 Agrarian Reform Law. 
This law and a successor measure in 1973, however, did not affect 
the basic distribution of landowner ship, which remained highly in- 
equitable. In the 1980s, only 5 percent of all farms exceeded fifty 
hectares, yet these same farms represented over 55 percent of land 
under cultivation. By contrast, 80 percent of all farms encompassed 
fewer than ten hectares and accounted for only 1 5 percent of farm- 
land. 

Until the 1970s, landless Sierra peasants in search of work typi- 
cally migrated to the Costa (coastal region). At independence, the 
Costa contained less than 20 percent of the national population. 
Nonetheless, it represented the most dynamic force in Ecuador's 
economy. This dynamism was centered in the port city of Guaya- 
quil, which had established itself during the colonial period as an 
important shipbuilding and trade center. 

An intense rivalry between Guayaquil and Quito — the national 
capital and most important Sierra city — dominated nineteenth- 
century Ecuadorian politics. By the 1850s, a clear dichotomy had 
emerged between the Catholic, conservative Sierra and the anti- 
clerical, liberal Costa, with regional leadership in the hands of 
Gabriel Garcia Moreno and Jose Maria Urbina, respectively. 
Garcia Moreno played a critical role in the late 1850s and early 
1860s in pulling Ecuador back from the brink of permanent disso- 
lution. However, during a rule that lasted until his assassination 
in 1875, Garcia Moreno polarized the religious issue through the 
enactment of legislation granting broad powers to the Roman 
Catholic Church. Following a twenty-year transitional period, Jose 
Eloy Alfaro Delgado seized power on behalf of Guayaquil Liberals 
and established a permanent separation of church and state. 

The removal of the religious issue from the national agenda did 
little to alter regional tensions. Costa elites long resented what they 
perceived to be a transfer of their wealth to the less industrious 
Sierra. In addition, economic stagnation in the Sierra and dyna- 
mism in the Costa combined to produce a massive population shift 
in the twentieth century. By the early 1980s, the population of 
Guayaquil easily outdistanced that of Quito. Despite the presence 
of large squatter communities in both cities, regional rather than 
class identification remained the most important determinant of 
voting behavior. For example, a majority of Costa voters supported 
the second-round presidential candidates from their region in both 
the 1984 and 1988 elections, even though the political ideologies 
of these candidates varied widely. 



xxii 



On three separate occasions over the last hundred years, a sin- 
gle export product offered the prospect of a solid financial future. 
In each case, however, Ecuadorian hopes were dashed by a cruel 
dose of fiscal reality. Ideal growing conditions north of Guayaquil 
and the latter' s excellent port facilities enabled Ecuador by 1900 
to become the world's leading exporter of cocoa. Customs duties 
from cocoa exports filled government coffers. The cocoa boom also 
had an important sociological impact as Costa growers sought to 
attract Sierra peasants through sharecropping and wage-labor ar- 
rangements. By the mid- 1920s, however, crop disease and com- 
petition from other producing nations had devastated Ecuadorian 
cocoa production. Lowered world demand resulting from the Great 
Depression dealt a further crushing blow to Ecuador's export ef- 
fort. From 1928 to 1932, the total value of Ecuadorian exports 
declined by two-thirds. 

Following World War II, Ecuador had a second commodity 
bonanza, this time in the form of bananas. Taking advantage of 
crop diseases in Central America and the unleashing of pent-up 
demands in the United States after the war, the value of Ecuador's 
banana exports grew tenfold from 1948 to 1952. Once again, cus- 
toms duties allowed ambitious public works spending. As was the 
case with cocoa, bananas were grown in the Costa. Besides stimulat- 
ing the regional economy, the banana boom set off another migra- 
tion wave from* the Sierra. By the mid-1960s, however, Ecuador 
experienced a substantial drop in the volume and value of banana 
exports. Economic stagnation once more became the order of the 
day. 

The discovery in 1967 of vast amounts of petroleum in the sparsely 
populated Oriente (eastern region) created conditions for a third eco- 
nomic boom. Five years later, petroleum began flowing through the 
503-kilometer Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline, bound for foreign indus- 
trialized markets. Largely as a result of petroleum exports, Ecuador's 
foreign exchange earnings climbed eightfold between 1971 and 1974. 

Several noteworthy features distinguished the petroleum boom 
from the earlier cocoa and banana booms. First of all, the locus 
of economic activity occurred outside of the Costa. Nevertheless, 
although the Oriente was the actual source of the petroleum wealth 
and received important infrastructural development, the bulk of 
the revenues flowed directly to the national treasury in Quito. The 
government used these revenues to finance an unprecedented level 
of public spending, creating numerous state enterprises and ex- 
panding the scope and activities of previously established national 
agencies. Government funding also supported industrial growth 



xxm 



in Quito. Finally, industrialization and public- sector expansion 
allowed for the emergence of an urban middle class. 

Unfortunately, petroleum proved to be as illusive a treasure as 
the earlier golden commodities. In the first half of the 1970s, the 
income from petroleum made possible the purchase of a wide range 
of imports. When revenues stagnated around 1975, the military 
government that had assumed power three years earlier resorted 
to massive foreign borrowing. Between 1976 and 1979, Ecuador's 
foreign debt increased by over 400 percent. Although the civilian 
administrations that came to power in 1979 succeeded in slowing 
the debt growth rate, it still had doubled by X986 and totalled nearly 
US$9 billion. 

Ecuador was unprepared for the economic calamities that befell 
it in the 1980s. During that decade, Ecuador experienced two sharp 
drops in the market price for petroleum, a global recession, a dra- 
matic increase in international interest rates, widespread crop 
damage resulting from flooding, and an earthquake that severed 
the oil pipeline for five months and cost the nation US$700 mil- 
lion in lost revenues. In order to qualify for additional loans and 
renegotiation of scheduled interest payments, Ecuadorian govern- 
ments adopted various austerity packages that included reductions 
in public expenditures, currency devaluations, and increases in in- 
terest rates. Although necessary, these measures increased unem- 
ployment and underemployment nationwide. 

Stronger political institutions might have enabled Ecuador to 
weather its varied economic storms. Unfortunately, national po- 
litical structures historically exacerbated rather than ameliorated 
the fiscal picture. Except for a brief period during the 1880s and 
early 1890s, nineteenth-century Ecuadorian governments were 
authoritarian rather than democratic. Most of the heads of those 
governments were forcibly removed from office. Although the 
Liberal Party held power from 1895 to 1925, those years were hardly 
a model of stability. For the first half of that period, Alfaro and 
Leonidas Plaza Gutierrez waged a bitter rivalry that only ended 
when the former unsuccessfully staged a coup and was murdered 
by a government-sponsored mob. In the second half, liberal poli- 
ticians surrendered key financial decisions to Guayaquil banking 
interests. The printing of national currency by private banks gener- 
ated runaway inflation and contributed heavily to the economic 
chaos of the late 1920s. 

On three occasions in the twentieth century — 1925, 1963, and 
1972 — the military seized direct political control. In each case, it 
was unsuccessful in carrying out espoused socioeconomic reforms. 
The last period of military rule — 1972 to 1979 — was both the most 



xxiv 



ambitious and disappointing of the three. Although one of the moti- 
vations for intervention was to prevent civilian politicians from dis- 
sipating the new-found petroleum wealth, the military's principal 
legacy was that of ever-increasing foreign debt obligations. 

The 1979 Constitution is the seventeenth such document since 
independence in 1830. It is both an impressive and hopeful sign 
that as of the early 1990s Ecuador had had democratically elected 
governments since the inception of this Constitution and two non- 
violent transfers of power. Nonetheless, the maturation of Ecuador's 
political institutions remained open to debate. Ecuador had a stag- 
gering number of political parties, most of which had rather shal- 
low roots and were often little more than electoral labels for their 
leaders. Party identification and ideology remained weak, whereas 
personalism remained strong. 

Perhaps most disturbing was the deteriorating level of political 
discourse. This was particularly true during the presidency of Leon 
Febres Cordero Ribadeneyra (1984-88). Febres Cordero's disdain 
for the give and take of the democratic process led to his adoption 
of an authoritarian style that resulted in acrimonious debates with 
the National Congress and threats of impeachment. In an incident 
that both typified the tumultuous years of the Febres Cordero ad- 
ministration and painfully exposed the potential threats to the 
democratic process, paratroop commandos kidnapped the presi- 
dent in 1987 and forced him to honor a congressional amnesty previ- 
ously granted to Lieutenant General Frank Vargas Pazzos. Febres 
Cordero had dismissed Vargas as armed forces chief of staff after 
the latter had accused both the defense minister and an army com- 
mander of corruption. Following his dismissal, Vargas attempted 
two unsuccessful revolts against the government. In the bewilder- 
ing interplay of Ecuadorian politics, Vargas ran for the presidency 
in 1988 and received over 12 percent of the vote. 

Ecuador thus faced many challenges in the years ahead. Observ- 
ers believed that it needed to design social structures that would 
allow a more equitable distribution of income and opportunities. 
It also needed to identify creative strategies of economic growth. 
Most important, Ecuador required strong, democratic political 
leadership. 



August 1, 1991 Dennis M. Hanratty 



xxv 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 



Winged god cast in gold and platinum (La Tolita culture) 



THROUGHOUT ITS HISTORY, Ecuador has displayed a con- 
tinuity in traditional cultural and economic patterns as well as in 
social and political interaction among the country's highly heter- 
ogeneous social groupings. Modern patterns overlay the traditional, 
making present-day Ecuador a veritable living museum of its varied, 
rich heritage. Pre-Columbian Ecuador is reflected in the persis- 
tence of native languages, customs, and economic activities among 
a considerable, though diminishing, number of communities in the 
Sierra (Andean highlands) and the Oriente (eastern region). The 
legacy of three centuries of Spanish colonial rule is also pervasive 
and includes a social inequality that largely coincides with race, 
rural land tenure patterns, and the nation's dominant European 
cultural expressions. 

Analysts of Ecuador's postindependence political history have 
pointed to a number of persistent ingredients. Regionalism is es- 
pecially prominent, particularly as expressed in the struggle for 
power between the Sierra, represented by Quito, and the Costa 
(coastal region), represented by Guayaquil. Regionalism has coin- 
cided with the party struggle between the Quito-based Conserva- 
tives and the Guayaquil-based Liberals. Personalism, from the 
political prominence of military caudillos in the early years of the 
republic to the civilian dictators and the populists of more recent 
times, has been another persistent theme since independence. 

Perhaps the most consistent element of Ecuador's republican his- 
tory has been its political instability. In just over a century and 
a half, there have been no fewer than eighty- six changes of govern- 
ment, making for an average of 1.75 years in power for each re- 
gime. The 1979 Constitution is Ecuador's seventeenth national 
charter. Ecuador's political instability is a product of the struggles 
mentioned above combined with the important political role main- 
tained by the nation's armed forces. The longest periods of civilian, 
constitutional rule were between 1912 and 1925 and again between 
1948 and 1961. Governmental institutions, as a result, have had 
little opportunity to mature into established expressions of civilian, 
democratic rule. 

Ecuadorian economic history has displayed marked cycles of 
"boom" and "bust" based on the rise and fall of particular ex- 
port products. The longest-lasting "boom," between the last years 
of the nineteenth century and the early 1920s, resulted from 
Ecuador's near monopoly on the production and exportation of 



3 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

cocoa. An on- again, off- again banana boom punctuated the de- 
cades of the 1950s and 1960s, whereas the oil boom — the most 
pronounced as well as the shortest of all the boom periods — lasted 
from 1972 until 1979. The sudden end of the oil expansion coin- 
cided with the onset of a foreign debt crisis bred by massive for- 
eign borrowing by two successive military governments (1972-79) 
and by Jaime Roldos Aguilera's regime (1979-81). 

Although petroleum revenues brought about significant social 
change by generating a sizable middle class, the widely anticipated 
political changes were less apparent. The populist Roldos and Con- 
servative Leon Febres Cordero Ribadeneyra (1984-88) represented 
traditional elements, although other prominent postboom person- 
alities, such as President Osvaldo Hurtado Larrea (1981-84), did 
espouse more modern, center-leftist ideologies. Still, prosperity from 
petroleum strengthened the state's traditionally weak fiscal hand 
and promised to tilt the regional balance of power significantly 
toward the nation's capital. 

The intensity of the political struggle, commonly played out be- 
tween the president and Congress during periods of civilian rule, 
did not seem to diminish after 1979. Perhaps the central unanswered 
question of the 1980s, however, was whether the armed forces would 
persist in their historically active political role, or would be con- 
tent to operate from the sidelines without directly intervening in 
the political process. 

Pre-Hispanic Era 

Ecuador offers little archeological evidence of its pre-Hispanic 
civilizations. Nonetheless, its most ancient artifacts — remnants of 
the Valdivia culture found along the coast north of the modern city 
of Santa Elena in Guayas Province — date from as early as 3500 
B.C. (see fig. 1). Other major coastal archaeological sites are found 
in the provinces of Manabi and Esmeraldas; major sites in the Sierra 
are found in Carchi and Imbabura provinces in the north, Tun- 
gurahua and Chimborazo provinces in the middle of the Andean 
highlands, and Cafiar, Azuay, and Loja provinces in the south. 
Nearly all of these sites are dated in the last 2,000 years. Large 
parts of Ecuador, including almost all of the Oriente, however, re- 
main unknown territory to archaeologists. 

Knowledge of Ecuador before the Spanish conquest is limited 
also by the absence of recorded history within either the Inca or 
pre-Inca cultures as well as by the lack of interest taken in Ecua- 
dor by the Spanish chroniclers. Before the Inca conquest of the 
area that comprises modern-day Ecuador, the region was populated 
by a number of distinct tribes that spoke mutually unintelligible 



4 



Historical Setting 



languages and were often at war with one another. Four cultur- 
ally related Indian groups, known as the Esmeralda, the Manta, 
the Huancavilca, and the Puna, occupied the coastal lowlands in 
that order from north to south. They were hunters, fishermen, 
agriculturalists, and traders. Trade was especially important among 
different coastal groups, who seem to have developed considerable 
oceanic travel, but the lowland cultures also traded with the peo- 
ples of the Sierra, exchanging fish for salt. 

The Sierra was populated by elements, from north to south, of 
the Pasto, the Cara, the Panzaleo, the Puruha, the Canari, and 
the Palta cultures. These people lived mostly on mountainsides and 
in widely dispersed villages located in the fertile valleys between 
the Cordillera Occidental (Western Chain) and the Cordillera 
Oriental (Eastern Chain) of the Andes. The Sierra natives were 
a sedentary, agricultural people, cultivating corn, quinoa, beans, 
and many varieties of potatoes and squashes. The use of irriga- 
tion was prevalent, especially among the Canari. A wide variety 
of fruits, including pineapples and avocados, was grown in the 
lower, warmer valleys. Historians believe that political organiza- 
tion centered around local chieftains who collaborated with one 
another in confederations or were subjected to "kings." Such local 
chiefs had considerable authority; they could raise armies, for ex- 
ample, and administer communal lands. 

The Inca expansion northward from modern-day Peru during 
the late fifteenth century met with fierce resistance by several Ecua- 
dorian tribes, particularly the Canari, in the region around modern- 
day Cuenca; the Cara in the Sierra north of Quito; and the Quitu, 
occupants of the site of the modern capital, after whom it was to 
be named. The conquest of Ecuador began in 1463 under the leader- 
ship of the ninth Inca, the great warrior Pachacuti Inca Yupan- 
qui. In that year, his son Topa took over command of the army 
and began his march northward through the Sierra. After defeat- 
ing the Quitu, he moved southward along the coast, and from there 
he launched an extensive ocean journey that took him, depending 
on the account, to the Galapagos Islands or to the Marquesas Is- 
lands in Polynesia. Upon his return, he tried unsuccessfully to sub- 
due the populations around the Gulf of Guayaquil and the island 
of Puna. By 1500 Topa's son, Huayna Capac, overcame the re- 
sistance of these populations and that of the Cara, and thus incor- 
porated all of modern-day Ecuador into Tawantinsuyu, as the Inca 
empire was known. 

The influence of these conquerors based in Cuzco (modern-day 
Peru) was limited to about a half century, or less in some parts 
of Ecuador. During that period, some aspects of life remained 



5 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

unchanged. Traditional religious beliefs, for example, persisted 
throughout the period of Inca rule. In other areas, however, such 
as agriculture, land tenure, and social organization, Inca rule had 
a profound effect despite its relatively short duration. Farming re- 
mained the major form of subsistence, but the Inca introduced a 
variety of new crops, including yucca, sweet potatoes, coca, and 
peanuts. The use of llamas and irrigation was expanded consider- 
ably. Largely in private hands previously, land became, in theory 
at least, the property of the Inca emperor. In practice, most land 
was held collectively by the ayllu, an agrarian community group 
headed by a curaca, which was the basic social grouping under the 
Inca. Within the ayllu, each domestic family unit was allotted a 
small plot of arable land to grow food for its own consumption. 
The state and the clergy also held a substantial amount of land, 
which was worked by the emperor's subjects as part of their ob- 
ligatory public service. 

Emperor Huayna Capac became very fond of Quito, making 
it a secondary capital of Tawantinsuyu and living out his elder years 
there before his death in about 1527. He preferred to rule through 
local curacas as long as they were willing to accept the divine authority 
of the Inca and to pay tribute. When he met opposition, the em- 
peror dispersed large parts of local populations to other areas of 
the empire and replaced them with colonists who were brought from 
as far away as Chile. This wholesale movement of populations 
helped spread Quechua, the language of Cuzco, into Ecuador. A 
standing army, a large bureaucracy, and a temporally important 
clergy further enforced the rule of the emperor. 

Huayna Capac 's sudden death from a strange disease, described 
by one Spanish chronicler as "probably smallpox or measles," 
precipitated a bitter power struggle between Huascar, a son borne 
by Huayna Capac 's sister and thus the legitimate heir, and Ata- 
hualpa, a son who, although borne by a lesser wife, was reputedly 
his father's "favorite." This struggle raged during the half-decade 
before the arrival of Francisco Pizarro's conquering expedition in 
1532. The key battle of this civil war was fought on Ecuadorian 
soil, near Riobamba, where Huascar' s northbound troops were met 
and defeated by Atahualpa's southbound troops. Atahualpa's final 
victory over Huascar in the days just before the Spanish conquerors 
arrived resulted in large part from the loyalty of two of Huayna 
Capac 's best generals, who were based in Quito along with 
Atahualpa. The victory remains a source of national pride to Ecu- 
adorians as a rare case when "Ecuador" forcefully bettered a 
"neighboring country." 



6 



Ruins of Ingapirca, an Inca sun temple in Canar Province 
Courtesy Embassy of Ecuador, Washington 



Discovery and Conquest 

The discovery and conquest of Ecuador by Spanish forces in the 
early sixteenth century are adjuncts to the history of the conquest 
of Peru, the richest of the New World prizes won for the Spanish 
crown. The central figure of that history is Pizarro, an illiterate 
adventurer from Trujillo in the Spanish region of Extremadura, 
who had accompanied Vasco Nunez de Balboa in his crossing of 
the Isthmus of Panama to discover the Pacific in 1513. Eleven years 
later, Panamanian governor Pedro Arias de Avila ("Pedrarias") 
authorized Pizarro, in partnership with an equally questionable 
character, a Castilian named Diego de Almargo, and a priest named 
Fernando de Luque, to explore southward down the west coast of 
South America. Their first two voyages, in 1524 and 1526, ended 
in failure; not until the third voyage, launched in 1531, would the 
Peruvian prize be won and the Inca be conquered. 

The first European to set foot on the territory of modern-day 
Ecuador was probably Bartolome Ruiz de Estrada, the pilot for 
Pizarro on his second voyage, who pushed southward while Pizarro 
explored the Colombian coast and Almargo returned to Panama 
for supplies. Pizarro himself landed on the Ecuadorian coast later 



7 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

during his exploratory voyage and traveled as far as Tumbes in 
the extreme north of present-day Peru, in defiance of official orders 
to return to Panama. 

Having thus lost the favor of the king's representatives in Pan- 
ama, Pizarro was forced to return to the royal court in Spain to 
petition King Charles I personally for authorization of a third 
voyage. Flush with the success of Hernan Cortes in Mexico and 
tantalized by the gold pieces brought by Pizarro from Tumbes and 
growing fables of great wealth in the South American interior, 
Charles granted Pizarro authorization and much more: the titles 
of governor and captain- general of Peru, a generous salary, and 
extensive territorial concessions. Almargo was granted important, 
although less generous, titles and privileges; his resentment of this 
slight would affect relationships for the rest of the conquest. At the 
time that Charles granted various titles to Pizarro and Almargo, 
he named de Luque Bishop of Tumbes. Before returning to Pan- 
ama in 1530, Pizarro recruited for the conquest several immedi- 
ate family members, including two full brothers named Gonzalo 
and Juan as well as two half-brothers. The participation of so many 
of Pizarro 's relatives further strained relations between the two part- 
ners in conquest. 

Pizarro then embarked from Panama with some 1 80 men while 
Almargo remained there to gather additional recruits. After thir- 
teen days at sea, Pizarro landed once again on the coast of Ecua- 
dor, where he procured some gold, silver, and emeralds, which 
were dispatched to Panama and put to good use in Almargo 's ef- 
forts. Although the capture of the Inca stronghold of Tumbes was 
Pizarro 's first objective, he was forced to spend several months in 
Ecuador, first nursing a rash of ulcers and then fighting the fierce 
warriors of the island of Puna. By the time the conquerors arrived 
in Tumbes, it had been destroyed by the Puna warriors and its 
population dispersed. Just to the south, they founded the first Span- 
ish settlement in Peru, San Miguel de Tangarara. Upon their fateful 
departure to Cajamarca on September 24, 1532, Pizarro left a lieu- 
tenant, Sebastian de Benalcazar, in charge of protecting and de- 
veloping San Miguel as a Spanish base of operations. Two years 
later, Benalcazar would lead the conquering forces that moved 
northward into Ecuador. 

Meanwhile, Atahualpa was resting near Cajamarca, in the Sierra 
of northern Peru, following the defeat and capture of his brother. 
He had known of the arrival of foreign invaders for several months; 
it is not clear why he did not order their obliteration before they 
could penetrate into the heart of the empire. After a march of al- 
most two months, Pizarro arrived in Cajamarca and summoned 



8 



Historical Setting 



Atahualpa from the nearby thermal baths known today as the Banos 
del Inca. Reluctantly, accompanied by several thousands of his best 
troops, Atahualpa went to Cajamarca's central plaza, where he was 
met, not by the conquistadors, but by their chaplain, Fray Vicente 
de Valverde, who called upon the Inca emperor to submit to the 
representatives of the Spanish crown and the Christian god. Ata- 
hualpa replied disparagingly, and, upon his throwing a Christian 
prayer book to the ground in contempt, concealed Spanish soldiers 
opened fire, killing thousands of Atahualpa' s defenders and tak- 
ing the Inca emperor captive. This slaughter, called "the decisive 
battle" of the conquest of Peru by historian Hubert Herring, took 
place on November 16, 1532. 

A panic-stricken Atahualpa, fearing that Pizarro might be plan- 
ning to depose him in favor of his rival brother, summoned Huas- 
car, at this time imprisoned in Cuzco, to Cajamarca, then ordered 
him to be executed along with hundreds of Huascar's nearest of 
kin. It served the Spaniards' purposes to allow Atahualpa the free- 
dom, from his cell, to command his forces. Thus continued the 
rapid annihilation, through a vicious civil war that now overlapped 
with the Spanish conquest, of the army and leadership of one of 
the great polities of modern history. Pizarro was not planning to 
depose Atahualpa, of course, but to execute him. First, however, 
he had Atahualpa fill his cell, once with gold, then twice with sil- 
ver (estimated at 4,850 kilograms of gold and 9,700 kilograms of 
silver), supposedly as ransom for his release. Instead the Spaniards 
garrotted Atahualpa on August 29, 1533, following a mock trial 
at which he was convicted of every charge that Pizarro could in- 
vent for the occasion. Having deprived the Inca empire of leader- 
ship, Pizarro and another conquistador, Hernando de Soto, moved 
south to Cuzco, the heart of Tawantinsuyu, which they captured 
in November 1533; they then led their men in an orgy of looting, 
pillaging, and torture in search of more precious metals. 

Benalcazar, Pizarro' s lieutenant and fellow Extremaduran, had 
already departed from San Miguel with 140 foot soldiers and a few 
horses on his conquering mission to Ecuador. At the foot of Mount 
Chimborazo, near the modern city of Riobamba, he met and de- 
feated the forces of the great Inca warrior Ruminahui with the aid 
of Canari tribesmen who, happy to throw off the yoke of their Inca 
rulers, served as guides and allies to the conquering Spaniards. 
Ruminahui fell back to Quito, and, while in pursuit of the Inca 
army, Benalcazar encountered another, quite sizable, conquering 
party led by Guatemalan Governor Pedro de Alvarado. Bored with 
administering Central America, Alvarado had set sail for the south 
without the crown's authorization, landed on the Ecuadorian coast, 



9 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

and marched inland to the Sierra. Pizarro had heard of this com- 
peting expedition some time earlier and had sent Almargo north 
to reinforce Benalcazar. Together, Pizarro 's two representatives 
managed to convince Alvarado, with the help of a handsome 
amount of gold, to call off his expedition and allow the "legal" 
conquest to proceed as planned. Most of Alvarado's men joined 
Benalcazar for the siege of Quito. 

Ruminahui left Quito in flames for the approaching con- 
quistadors. It was mid-1534, and, after the customary orgy of vio- 
lence, in December the Spanish established the city of San Francisco 
de Quito on top of the ruins of the secondary Inca capital. Benal- 
cazar was soon off on more conquests in Colombia to the north; 
it was not until December 1 540 that Quito received its first captain- 
general in the person of Gonzalo Pizarro, the brother of Francisco. 

Benalcazar had also founded the city of Guayaquil in 1533, but 
it had subsequently been retaken by the local Huancavilca tribes- 
men. Francisco de Orellana, yet another lieutenant of Francisco 
Pizarro from the Spanish city of Trujillo, put down the native re- 
bellion and in 1537 reestablished this city, which a century later 
would become one of Spain's principal ports in South America. 

Orellana is chiefly remembered, however, for being the first Eu- 
ropean to travel the length of the Amazon River. This journey, 
one of the great adventure tales of Spain's conquest of America, 
began in February 1541, when the lure of spices, particularly cin- 
namon, led Pizarro 's brother Gonzalo to set off from Quito to the 
eastern jungle with a party that included 210 Spaniards and some 
4,000 Indians. Orellana was second in command. After several 
months of hardship and deprivation during a crossing of the Cor- 
dillera Oriental of the Andes that cost the lives of nearly half the 
party, Gonzalo Pizarro placed Orellana in charge of building a 
brigantine in the Coca River in present-day Ecuador. Together 
with fifty- seven Spaniards and several hundred Indians, Orellana 
sailed downstream in search of food and friendly natives. The ex- 
plorers never rejoined Pizarro, however, but set out on their own 
in search of neither food nor spices, but gold. "Having eaten our 
shoes and saddles boiled with a few herbs," wrote Orellana in a 
caricature of the ruggedness for which the Extremaduran conquerors 
were noted, ' 'we set out to reach the Kingdom of Gold. ' ' The group 
reached the mouth of the Amazon, a name given by Orellana be- 
cause he believed that they had been attacked by the legendary giant 
female warriors at a point below the Negro River, and sailed north- 
ward along the Atlantic coast as far as Venezuela, then back to 
Spain. The journey completed by the expedition headed by Ore- 
llana was not to be repeated for 100 years. 



10 



Historical Setting 



In the same August 1542, as Orellana reached the Atlantic, Gon- 
zalo Pizarro was stumbling back to Quito with the few surviving 
members of his party. He found Peru in political chaos. Several 
years earlier, Almargo had entered into open rebellion against Fran- 
cisco Pizarro and been defeated in battle, tried, and executed in 
his newly founded capital city of Lima. The resentment among 
Almargo's followers did not end, however, and in June 1541, Fran- 
cisco Pizarro had been assassinated by the remnants of Almargo's 
army. In an attempt to try to control the unruly conquistadors and 
to end the enslavement of the native population of America, the 
Spanish crown had promulgated the New Laws in 1542, which in 
theory though not in practice abolished encomiendas, and two years 
later it sent its first viceroy to head a newly created colonial ad- 
ministrative system. 

Gonzalo, who had little interest in being controlled by anyone, 
defeated and killed the first viceroy on a battlefield near Quito. 
After a brief period of glory, however, the younger Pizarro was 
himself defeated by the forces of a subsequent royal emissary, and 
in 1548 he was tried and hung for treason. It was the end of the 
tumultuous era of the conquistadors and the beginning of two and 
a half centuries of relatively pacific colonial rule. 

Spanish Colonial Era 

Spain's colonies in the New World were, legally, the personal 
patrimony of the king, and he held absolute control over all mat- 
ters in Ecuador. Colonial administration at all levels was carried 
out in the name of the monarch. The king's chief agency in Madrid 
was the Council of the Indies, which devoted most of its energies 
to formulating legislation designed to regulate virtually every aspect 
of colonial life. The House of Trade, seated in Seville, was placed 
in charge of governing commerce between Spain and the colonies. 
In America, the king's major administrative agents were the vice- 
royalty, the audiencia (court), and the municipal council (cabildo). 

Between 1544 and 1563, Ecuador was an integral part of the 
Viceroyalty of Peru, having no administrative status independent 
of Lima. It remained a part of the Viceroyalty of Peru until 1720, 
when it joined the newly created Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada; 
within the viceroyalty, however, Ecuador was awarded its own au- 
diencia in 1563, allowing it to deal directly with Madrid on certain 
matters. The Quito audiencia, which was both a court of justice and 
an advisory body to the viceroy, consisted of a president and several 
judges (pidores). The territory under the jurisdiction of Quito con- 
siderably exceeded that of present-day Ecuador, extending south- 
ward to the port of Paita in the north of present-day Peru, northward 



11 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

to the port of Buenaventura and the city of Cali in the south of 
present-day Colombia, and well out into the Amazon River Basin 
in the east. Quito was also the site of the first (founded in 1547) 
and most important municipal council within the area comprising 
modern-day Ecuador. It consisted of several councilmen (regidores) 
whose extensive responsibilities included the maintenance of pub- 
lic order and the distribution of land in the vicinity of the local 
community. 

The borders of the audiencia (or kingdom as it was also known) 
of Quito were poorly defined, and a great deal of its territory re- 
mained either unexplored or untamed throughout much of the 
colonial era. Only in the Sierra, and there only after a series of 
battles that raged throughout the mid-sixteenth century, was the 
native population fully subjugated by the Spanish. The jungle 
lowlands in both the Oriente and the coastal region of Esmeraldas 
were, in contrast, refuges for an estimated one-quarter of the total 
native population that remained recalcitrant and unconquered 
throughout most or all of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
Despite Orellana's harrowing journey of discovery, the Oriente 
remained terra incognita to the Spanish until its settlement by Jesuit 
missionaries beginning in the mid- seventeenth century, and it con- 
tinued to be largely inaccessible throughout the remainder of the 
colonial period. 

The coastal lowlands north of Manta were conquered, not by 
the Spanish, but by blacks from the Guinean coast who, as slaves, 
were shipwrecked en route from Panama to Peru in 1570. The 
blacks killed or enslaved the native males and married the females, 
and within a generation they constituted a population of zambos 
(mixed black and Indian) that resisted Spanish authority until the 
end of the century and afterwards managed to retain a great deal 
of political and cultural independence. 

The relative autonomy of this coastal region nearest to Quito 
enhanced the effect of the Andes in isolating the Ecuadorian Sierra 
from the rest of the world during most of the nearly three centu- 
ries of colonial rule. Behind these barriers, a social system was es- 
tablished that was essentially a replica of the Spanish feudal system 
at the time of the conquest, with the peninsulares (Spanish-born per- 
sons residing in the New World) being the ruling, landed elite and 
the Indians being the subject people who worked the land. Although 
a few towns, particularly Quito, Riobamba, and Cuenca, grew 
along with the administrative and Roman Catholic bureaucracies 
and the local textile industries, colonial Ecuador was essentially 
a rural society. 



12 



Historical Setting 



The most common form in which the Spanish occupied the land 
was the encomienda. Settlers were granted land, along with its 
inhabitants and resources, in return for taking charge of defend- 
ing the territory, spiritually indoctrinating the native population, 
and extracting the crown's annual tribute (payable half in gold, 
half in local products) from the encomienda' 's Indian population. By 
the early seventeenth century, there were some 500 encomiendas in 
Ecuador. Although many consisted of quite sizable haciendas, they 
were generally much smaller than the estates commonly found else- 
where in South America. A multitude of reforms and regulations 
did not prevent the encomienda from becoming a system of virtual 
slavery of the Indians, estimated at about one-half the total Ecua- 
dorian population, who lived on them. In 1589 the president of 
the audiencia recognized that many Spaniards were accepting grants 
only to sell them and undertake urban occupations, and he stopped 
distributing new lands to Spaniards; however, the institution of 
the encomienda persisted until nearly the end of the colonial period. 

Land that was less desirable was never distributed, but rather 
was left to traditional Indian communities or simply remained open 
public land. In the late sixteenth century, the estimated one-quarter 
of the total native population on such public lands was resettled 
into Indian towns called reducciones in order to facilitate the collec- 
tion of the Indians' tribute, their conversion to Christianity, and 
the exploitation, of their labor. 

Outside the encomienda, Indian labor was most commonly ex- 
ploited through the mita, modeled after the Inca institution of the 
same name. All able-bodied "free" Indians were required to de- 
vote one year of their labor to some public or private Spanish con- 
cern, be it constructing a church, road, or public building, or 
working in a textile mill. Although mitayos were paid for their labor, 
the amount was extremely meager, often less than debts accumu- 
lated through purchases from their employer, thus requiring them 
to continue working, sometimes indefinitely, after their assigned 
period of service. In this way, the mita system disintegrated into 
debt peonage. Debts were commonly passed on to ensuing gen- 
erations, in which cases the mita was, in effect, slavery. Black slaves, 
in comparison, were extremely expensive and were thus used almost 
exclusively in the lowland plantation culture along the hot, humid 
coast, where the Sierra Indians proved unable to adapt. Black slaves 
numbered some 60,000 by the end of the colonial period. 

The best estimates of the size of Ecuador's native population at 
the time of the conquest range between 750,000 and 1 million. Dis- 
eases imported by the Spanish, particularly smallpox and measles, 
virtually wiped out the indigenous coastal population during the 



13 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

sixteenth century and also decimated the Sierra population, 
although not as thoroughly as in the Costa or many other areas 
of Latin America. Despite a succession of deadly earthquakes and 
volcanic eruptions, the native population increased steadily dur- 
ing the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries except in the 1690s, 
when an epidemic of smallpox and diphtheria was reported to have 
killed one-third of Ecuador's population. 

Ecuador's Indians probably owe their relative prosperity dur- 
ing the colonial period to the audiencia's lack of mineral resources. 
The hardships of working in the silver and mercury mines of Peru 
cost the lives of millions of Indian mitayos; Ecuador, in contrast, 
had only small deposits of gold and silver in its southern provinces 
of Cuenca and Loja, and these deposits were depleted by the end 
of the sixteenth century. Its serrano economy was based, instead, 
on agriculture and textiles. Cotton, grown on the eastern slope of 
the Andes in Quijos Province, and wool, from imported merino 
sheep that thrived in the high Andean valleys, provided the raw 
materials for high-quality textiles that were manufactured in 
hundreds of sweatshops, called obrajes, and exported throughout 
Latin America. Indian mitayos, who commonly worked from dawn 
to dusk chained to their looms, provided the labor. As appalling 
as were the preindustrial working conditions in the obrajes, most 
historians agree that they were more bearable than those found 
in the Peruvian mines at the time. 

The coastal economy revolved around shipping and trade. 
Guayaquil, despite being destroyed on several occasions by fire and 
incessantly plagued by either yellow fever or malaria, was a center 
of vigorous trade among the colonies, a trade that was technically 
illegal under the mercantilist philosophy of the contemporary Span- 
ish rulers. The guiding principle of mercantilism in the New World 
was that the colonies existed to serve the commercial needs of Spain. 
Since trade among the colonies would not enrich Spain, it was 
banned. In addition to textiles and other light manufactures from 
the Sierra, hardwoods and cocoa from coastal plantations were ex- 
ported from the port of Guayaquil to points all over Spanish Amer- 
ica, while a wide variety of items were imported, including foods 
and wines from Peru. Guayaquil also became the largest shipbuild- 
ing center on the west coast of South America before the end of 
the colonial period. 

The Ecuadorian economy, like that in the mother country, 
suffered a severe depression throughout most of the eighteenth cen- 
tury. Textile production dropped an estimated 50 to 75 percent 
between 1700 and 1800. Ecuador's cities gradually fell into ruins, 
and by 1790 the elite was reduced to poverty, selling haciendas 



14 



Aerial view of Cuenca 
Courtesy Martie B. Lisowski Collection, 
Library of Congress 

and jewelry in order to subsist. The Indian population, in con- 
trast, probably experienced an overall improvement in its situa- 
tion, as the closing of the obrajes commonly led Indians to work 
under less arduous conditions on either haciendas or traditional 
communal lands. Ecuador's economic woes were, no doubt, com- 
pounded by the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767 by King Charles 
III. Missions in the Oriente were abandoned, and many of the best 
schools and the most efficient haciendas and obrajes lost the key per- 
sonnel that made them outstanding institutions in colonial Ecuador. 

The Bourbon kings were best known for their economic and ad- 
ministrative reforms, which, like the expulsion of the Jesuits, were 
designed to enhance the flagging power of the crown in Spanish 
America. As a result of those reforms, the Quito audiencia was trans- 
ferred in 1720 from the authority of the Peruvian vice royalty to 
the newly created Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada, whose capital 
was in Bogota. In the process, the quiteno authorities gained juris- 
diction over their own political and military affairs, while the 
audiencia' s southern and eastern boundaries were delineated more 
specifically and retracted. A royal decree (cedula) in 1802 further 
shrank the area of the audiencia by transferring the provinces of 
Quijos and Mainas in the Oriente to Peru. Another decree by 



15 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

Charles IV in 1803 transferred the port of Guayaquil to Peru, but 
resistance by port citizens led to its being returned to the jurisdic- 
tion of Quito in 1819. 

Between 1736 and 1745, a French scientific mission with some 
of the best minds in Europe resided in Quito and contributed to 
the development of ideas in Ecuador. While carrying out their scien- 
tific mission — measuring the earth's circumference at the equator — 
the members of the mission disseminated the message of the En- 
lightenment, which stressed nationalism, individualism, and a ques- 
tioning of authority and tradition. Works ofVoltaire, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, and Thomas Paine, introducing such revolutionary con- 
cepts as equality and freedom, managed to elude the censors of 
both the Inquisition and a languishing political authority, and 
penetrated Ecuador's historical cultural isolation. The most famous 
Ecuadorian intellectual of the age, Eugenio de Santa Cruz y Espejo, 
was a physician and a writer who advocated emancipation from 
Spain and a republican, democratic system of government. Hon- 
ored today as the precursor of Ecuadorian independence, Espejo 
was imprisoned for his ideas and died in jail in 1795. 

The coming of independence was also foreshadowed by the 
numerous civil disturbances that rocked the Ecuadorian Sierra from 
the 1760s until the end of the colonial era. In 1765 the quiteno white 
and mestizo or cholo (a person of mixed white and Indian ances- 
try) population revolted against reforms in the colonial tax system. 
Potentially more serious was a subsequent series of Indian rebel- 
lions in Latacunga and Riobamba. Although clearly of a political 
nature, calling for the overthrow of the Spanish regime and the 
expulsion of all the whites from the land in addition to putting an 
end to the odious mita system, these uprisings never led to such 
large-scale insurrections as occurred in Peru at the same time. Iron- 
ically, the passing of the colonial era, according to most historians, 
occasioned a worsening of conditions for the indigenous population. 

The Struggle for Independence 

The struggle for independence in the Quito audiencia was part 
of a movement throughout Spanish America led by criollos (per- 
sons of pure Spanish descent born in the New World). The criollos' 
resentment of the privileges enjoyed by the peninsulares was the fuel 
of revolution against colonial rule. The spark was Napoleon's in- 
vasion of Spain, after which he deposed King Ferdinand VII and, 
in July 1808, placed his brother Joseph Bonaparte on the Spanish 
throne. 

Shortly afterward, Spanish citizens, unhappy at the usurpation 
of the throne by the French, began organizing local juntas loyal 



16 



Historical Setting 



to Ferdinand. A group of Quito's leading citizens followed suit, 
and on August 10, 1809, they seized power from the local represen- 
tatives of Joseph Bonaparte in the name of Ferdinand. Thus, this 
early revolt against colonial rule (one of the first in Spanish America) 
was, paradoxically, an expression of loyalty to the Spanish king. 

It quickly became apparent that Quito's criollo rebels lacked the 
anticipated popular support for their cause. As loyalist troops ap- 
proached Quito, therefore, they peacefully turned power back to 
the crown authorities. Despite assurances against reprisals, the 
returning Spanish authorities (Bonaparte's men) proved to be mer- 
ciless with the rebels and, in the process of ferreting out participants 
in the Quito revolt, jailed and abused many innocent citizens. Their 
actions, in turn, bred popular resentment among quitehos, who, after 
several days of street fighting in August 1810, won an agreement 
to be governed by a junta to be dominated by criollos, although 
with the president of the Audiencia of Quito acting as its figure- 
head leader. 

In spite of widespread opposition within the rest of the Quito 
audiencia, the junta called for a congress in December 1811 in which 
it declared the entire area of the audiencia to be independent. Two 
months later, the junta approved a constitution for the state of Quito 
that provided for democratic governing institutions but also granted 
recognition to the authority of Ferdinand should he return to the 
Spanish throne. Shortly thereafter, the junta elected to launch a 
military offensive against the Spanish, but the poorly trained and 
badly equipped troops were no match for those of the viceroy of 
Peru, which finally crushed the quiteho rebellion in December 1812. 

The second chapter in Ecuador's struggle for emancipation from 
Spanish colonial rule began in Guayaquil, where independence was 
proclaimed in October 1820 by a local patriotic junta under the 
leadership of the poet Jose Joaquin Olmedo. By this time, the forces 
of independence had grown continental in scope and were organized 
into two principal armies, one under the Venezuelan Simon Bolivar 
Palacios in the north and the other under the Argentine Jose de 
San Martin in the south. Unlike the hapless Quito junta, the Guaya- 
quil patriots were able to appeal to foreign allies, Argentina and 
Venezuela, each of whom soon responded by sending sizable con- 
tingents to Ecuador. Antonio Jose de Sucre Alcala, the brilliant 
young lieutenant of Bolivar who arrived in Guayaquil in May 1821 , 
was to become the key figure in the ensuing military struggle against 
the royalist forces. 

After a number of initial successes, Sucre's army was defeated 
at Ambato in the central Sierra, and he appealed for assistance from 



17 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

San Martin, whose army was by now in Peru. With the arrival 
from the south of 1 ,400 fresh soldiers under the command of Andres 
de Santa Cruz Calahumana, the fortunes of the patriotic army were 
again reversed. A string of victories culminated in the decisive Battle 
of Pichincha, on the slopes of the volcano of that name on the 
western outskirts of Quito, on May 24, 1822. A few hours after 
the victory by the patriots, the last president of the Audiencia of 
Quito signed a formal capitulation of his forces before Marshal 
Sucre. Ecuador was at last free of Spanish rule. 

Two months later, Bolivar, the liberator of northern South Amer- 
ica, entered Quito to a hero's welcome. Later that July, he met 
San Martin in Guayaquil and convinced the Argentine general, 
who wanted the port to return to Peruvian jurisdiction, and the 
local criollo elite in both major cities of the advantage of having 
the former Quito audiencia join with the liberated lands to the north. 
As a result, Ecuador became the District of the South within the 
Confederation of Gran Colombia, which also included present-day 
Venezuela and Colombia and had Bogota as its capital. This sta- 
tus was maintained for eight tumultuous years. 

They were years in which warfare dominated the affairs of Ec- 
uador. First, the country found itself on the front lines of Bolivar's 
war to liberate Peru from Spanish rule between 1822 and 1825; 
afterward, in 1828 and 1829, Ecuador was in the middle of an 
armed struggle between Peru and Gran Colombia over the loca- 
tion of their common border. After a campaign that included the 
near destruction of Guayaquil, the forces of Gran Colombia, under 
the leadership of Sucre and Venezuelan General Juan Jose Flores, 
proved victorious. The Treaty of 1829 fixed the border on the line 
that had divided the Quito audiencia and the Viceroyalty of Peru 
before independence. 

The population of Ecuador was divided during these years among 
three segments: those favoring the status quo, those supporting 
union with Peru, and those advocating autonomous independence 
for the former audiencia. The latter group was to prevail following 
Venezuela's withdrawal from the confederation during an 1830 con- 
stitutional congress that had been called in Bogota in a futile effort 
to combat growing separatist tendencies throughout Gran Colom- 
bia. In May of that year, a group of Quito notables met to dis- 
solve the union with Gran Colombia, and in August a constituent 
assembly drew up a constitution for the State of Ecuador, so named 
for its geographic proximity to the equator, and placed General 
Flores in charge of political and military affairs. He remained the 
dominant political figure during Ecuador's first fifteen years of in- 
dependence. 



18 



Historical Setting 

The First Century of the Republic 

Before the year 1830 drew to a close, both Marshal Sucre and 
Simon Bolivar would be dead; the former, murdered (on orders 
from a jealous General Flores, according to some historians), and 
the latter, from tuberculosis. Heartbroken at the dissolution of Gran 
Colombia, Bolivar is quoted as saying shortly before his death, 
"America is ungovernable. Those who have served the revolution 
have plowed the sea." These words would seem prophetic during 
the chaotic first thirty years in the life of the Republic of Ecuador. 

Initial Confusion, 1830-60 

Independence did not occasion a revolutionary liberation of the 
masses of Ecuadorian peasants. On the contrary, as bad as the 
peasants' situation was, it probably worsened with the loss of the 
Spanish royal officials who had protected the indigenous popula- 
tion against the abuses of the local criollos. This criollo elite, which 
had spearheaded the struggle for independence, was to be its prin- 
cipal beneficiary. The early battle to define the political parameters 
of the new state was fought, to a great extent, among the various 
sectors — Ecuadorians and foreigners, military personnel and ci- 
vilians — of this elite. 

Flores was of the foreign military variety. Born in Venezuela, 
he had fought in the wars for independence with Bolivar, who had 
appointed him governor of Ecuador during its association with Gran 
Colombia. Although of humble origins with little formal educa- 
tion, Flores married into the quiteno elite, gaining acceptance, ini- 
tially at least, within the local criollo upper class. As a leader, 
however, he appeared primarily interested in maintaining his 
power. Military expenditures, from the independence wars and 
from an unsuccessful campaign to wrest Cauca Province from 
Colombia in 1832, kept the state treasury empty while other mat- 
ters were left unattended. 

In 1833 four intellectuals who had begun publishing El Quiteno 
Libre to denounce the "pillaging of the national treasury by foreign- 
ers" were killed by the authorities at a time when Flores was ab- 
sent from Quito. Although not directly responsible for the killings, 
Flores inevitably became associated with them, and criticism of his 
regime grew. In 1834 opponents staged a rebellion in an effort to 
place Jose Vicente Rocafuerte y Rodriguez de Bejarano, a mem- 
ber of the Guayaquil aristocracy who had recently returned from 
fourteen years abroad, into the presidency. The rebels' effort failed; 
Flores then coopted his opponent and sponsored Rocafuerte as a 
presidential candidate. For four years following this Machiavellian 



19 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

political move — in effect the nation's first coup d'etat — Flores con- 
tinued to wield considerable power from behind the scenes as com- 
mander of the military. 

President Rocafuerte's most lasting contribution was to begin 
development of a public school system. Although he had previously 
condemned Flores 's violations of civil liberties, Rocafuerte argued 
that "the backwardness of Ecuador makes enlightened despotism 
necessary." At the end of his term in 1839, Rotafuerte returned 
to his native Guayaquil as provincial governor, while in Quito Flores 
was again inaugurated into the presidency. After four years in office, 
Flores summoned a constitutional convention that wrote a new con- 
stitution, dubbed "the Charter of Slavery" by his opponents, and 
elected him to a new eight-year term of office. 

After 1843 the opposition to Flores often manifested itself in un- 
pleasant ways: in reference to the dark skin of Flores and his fel- 
low Venezuelan and Colombian soldiers, Rocafuerte (by now exiled 
in Lima) wrote that "the white oppressors of the peninsula were 
less oppressive than the Negro vandals who have replaced them." 
A young student named Gabriel Garcia Moreno — later to become 
the most infamous of all of Ecuador's nineteenth-century dictators — 
tried unsuccessfully to assassinate Flores. Discontent had become 
nationwide by 1845, when an insurrection in Guayaquil forced 
Flores from the country. Because their movement triumphed in 
March (marzo), the anti-Flores coalition members became known 
as marcistas. They were an extremely heterogeneous lot that included 
liberal intellectuals, conservative clergymen, and representatives 
from Guayaquil's successful business community. 

The next fifteen years constituted one of the most turbulent peri- 
ods in Ecuador's century and a half as a nation. The marcistas fought 
among themselves almost ceaselessly and also had to struggle against 
Flores 's repeated attempts from exile to overthrow the government. 
The first marcista president was a businessman, Vicente Ramon 
Roca, who served a full four-year term of office. The most signifi- 
cant figure of the era, however, was General Jose Maria Urbina, 
who first came to power in 1851 through a coup d'etat, remained 
in the presidency until 1856, and then continued to dominate the 
political scene until 1860. During this decade and the one that fol- 
lowed, Urbina and his archrival, Garcia Moreno, would define the 
dichotomy — between Liberals from Guayaquil and Conservatives 
from Quito — that remained the major sphere of political struggle 
in Ecuador in the 1980s (see Political Parties, ch. 4). 

Liberalism under Urbina took on anticlerical, ethnic, and re- 
gional dimensions. In 1852 he accused a group of Jesuit priests — 
admitted by his predecessor, Diego Noboa, only a year earlier — 



20 



Juan Jose Flores 
Courtesy Prints and 
Photographs Division, 
Library of Congress 



Gabriel Garcia Moreno 
Courtesy Prints and 

Photographs Division, 
Library of Congress 



of political meddling and expelled them. Urbina freed the nation's 
slaves exactly one week after his coup of 1851 , and six years later, 
his successor and life-long friend, General Francisco Robles, fi- 
nally put an end to three centuries of required annual payments 
of tribute by the Indian population. Henceforth, liberalism asso- 
ciated itself with bettering the position of Ecuador's non-white popu- 
lation. Urbina' s and Robles 's favoring of the Guayaquil business 
classes over the Quito landowners reinforced the regional aspect 
of the political dichotomy. 

Opposition against Robles intensified after his signing, in 1857, 
of an unpopular contract aimed at alleviating the burdensome for- 
eign debt. By 1859 — known by Ecuadorian historians as the Ter- 
rible Year — the nation was on the brink of anarchy. Local caudillos 
had declared several regions autonomous of the central government. 
One of these caudillos, Guayaquil's Guillermo Franco, signed the 
Treaty of Mapasingue ceding the southern provinces of Ecuador 
to an occupying Peruvian army led by General Ramon Castilla. 
This action was outrageous enough to unite some previously 



21 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

disparate elements. Garcia Moreno, putting aside both his project 
to place Ecuador under a French protectorate and his differences 
with General Flores, got together with the former dictator to put 
down the various local rebellions and force out the Peruvians. This 
effort opened the last chapter of Flores 's long career and marked 
the entrance to power of Garcia Moreno. 

The Era of Conservatism, 1860-95 

Garcia Moreno is the father of Ecuadorian conservatism and no 
doubt the most controversial figure in the nation's history, con- 
demned by Liberal historians as Ecuador's worst tyrant but exalted 
by Conservatives as the nation's greatest nation-builder. In the end, 
both appraisals may be accurate; the man who possibly saved Ec- 
uador from disintegration in 1859 and then ruled the nation with 
an iron fist for the subsequent decade and a half was, in fact, an 
extremely complicated personality. Born and raised under modest 
circumstances in Guayaquil, he studied in Quito, where he mar- 
ried into the local aristocracy, then traveled to Europe in the after- 
math of the 1848 revolutionary uprisings and studied under the 
eminent Catholic theologians of the day. 

Garcia Moreno's religious education had a profound impact on 
the future president. In the words of historian Frederick B. Pike: 

His personal experiences seem to have influenced his attitudes 
toward governing his country. In his own case, liberalism and 
religious indifference had gone hand-in-hand with personal 
debauchery and lack of self- control, while religious fervor had 
been intertwined with a life of rigorous self-control and spar- 
tan discipline. After coming to the presidency, Garcia Moreno 
set out to rekindle religious fervor among Ecuadorians in the 
expectation that the entire country could be made to undergo 
a transformation paralleling his own. 

President Garcia Moreno saw Roman Catholicism as the ingre- 
dient of Ecuadorian culture that, through its emphasis on order, 
hierarchy, and discipline, could unite the nation and save it from 
the multiple crises and disorder of the 1850s. Catholicism thus held 
a prominent position in each of the two new constitutions that he 
introduced: the charter of 1861 named Catholicism as the exclu- 
sive religion, and its replacement in 1869, in addition to provid- 
ing for a six-year presidential term and unlimited reelection, made 
citizenship dependent on one's adherence to the Roman Catholic 
religion. In 1863 Garcia Moreno promulgated Ecuador's first con- 
cordat with the Vatican, bestowing vast powers on the Ecuadorian 
Roman Catholic Church, especially with respect to education. A 



22 



Historical Setting 



decade later, the dictator's puppet congress dedicated the republic 
to the Sacred Heart of Jesus. 

Despite such proclerical measures that have led many histori- 
ans to dub his regime a theocracy, the local clergy believed Garcia 
Moreno to be fanatical and criticized him for it. The president, 
in turn, replaced many local clergymen with foreign priests in an 
effort to revitalize the Roman Catholic Church in Ecuador, which 
he considered degenerate and dissolute. 

The highly anticlerical Liberals were, of course, livid. Urbina 
organized an invasion in 1864, which was defeated with the help, 
once again, of General Flores. Garcia Moreno was ruthless in his 
repression of the captured rebels, as he was commonly with less 
formidable opponents as well. Nor did he hesitate to manipulate 
the presidential succession. Finding his hand-picked successor defi- 
cient after two years in office, in 1867 Garcia Moreno presided 
over the installation of a second puppet, whom he also overthrew 
in 1869, when it appeared that the Liberals might win scheduled 
elections. In 1869 Garcia Moreno also formally established the Con- 
servative Party (Partido Conservador — PC). 

Shortly after the onset of his third presidential term in 1875, 
Garcia Moreno was hacked to death with a machete on the steps 
of the presidential palace. The exact motives of the assassin, a 
Colombian, remain unknown, but the dictator's most outstand- 
ing critic, the liberal journalist Juan Montalvo, exclaimed, "My 
pen killed him!" 

Although maligned for his highly proclerical and dictatorial ways, 
Garcia Moreno made a number of vital contributions to the de- 
velopment of the nation. Perhaps the most important advances were 
in education. The establishment of many new schools at all levels, 
from primary to the poly technical training school in Quito, elicited 
universal praise, despite the fact that the Jesuits were largely respon- 
sible for these accomplishments. Transportation links with Quito 
were also vastly improved with the building of roads to Esmeral- 
das and to Babahoyo, near Guayaquil, as well as the first portion 
of the railroad linking Quito with Riobamba and Guayaquil. These 
public works not only promoted national unity but also helped Quito 
begin a long-delayed effort to overcome the geographic barriers 
that had historically caused its isolation, an isolation that had hin- 
dered the nation's integration into the world economy. 

Between 1852 and 1890, Ecuador's exports grew in value from 
slightly more than US$1 million to nearly US$10 million. Produc- 
tion of cocoa, the most important export product in the late 
nineteenth century, grew from 6.5 million kilograms to 18 million 
kilograms during the same period. The agricultural export interests, 



23 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

centered in the coastal region near Guayaquil, became closely as- 
sociated with the Liberals, whose political power also grew steadily 
during the interval. After the death of Garcia Moreno, it took the 
Liberals twenty years to consolidate their strength sufficiently to 
assume control of the government in Quito. 

Five different presidents governed during the two decades of tran- 
sition between Conservative and Liberal rule. The first, Antonio 
Borrero, tried valiantly to return the nation to the rule of law, but, 
after only ten months in office, he was overthrown by the only mili- 
tary dictator of the period, Ignacio de Veintemilla. Although he 
came to power with the help of the old Liberal General Urbina, 
Veintemilla later evolved into a populist military dictator rather 
than a politician with any party or ideological affiliation. He was 
extremely popular with his troops and able to woo the masses with 
employment on public works programs and large-scale public fes- 
tivals and dances during holiday periods. In office until 1883, Vein- 
temilla enjoyed a period of relative prosperity resulting primarily 
from increased maritime activity while Peru, Bolivia, and Chile 
were mired in the War of the Pacific. 

Jose Maria Placido Caamafio, a Conservative, then served as 
president until 1888, and he remained a powerful figure during 
the administrations of the duly elected Progressive Party (Partido 
Progresista) presidents who followed him, Antonio Flores Jijon and 
Luis Cordero Crespo. Flores, who was the son of President Juan 
Jose Flores, intended progressivism to represent a compromise po- 
sition between liberalism and conservatism. The Progressive pro- 
gram called for support for the Roman Catholic Church, rule by 
law, and an end to dictatorship and military rule. Although neither 
Caamafio, Flores, nor Cordero was able to curtail the growing ani- 
mosity between Conservatives and Liberals, their periods in office 
were, for the most part, characterized by relative political stability 
and prosperity. The latter resulted more from favorable interna- 
tional circumstances for cocoa exports than from astute govern- 
ment policy making. 

In 1895, midway through his term in office, Cordero fell victim 
to scandal and charges of "selling the flag" over an agreement made 
with Chile. Cordero allowed the warship Esmeralda, which Chile 
was selling to Japan, to fly the Ecuadorian flag briefly in order to 
protect Chile's neutrality in the conflict between Japan and China. 
Bribes were apparendy involved and, tremendously weakened by 
the scandal and also challenged by the outbreak of several mili- 
tary rebellions, the president resigned in April. In June the Liber- 
als seized power in Guayaquil in the name of their most popular 
caudillo, General Jose Eloy Alfaro Delgado. Three months later, 



24 



Scenes of Quito and the gathering of cacao pods in 1907 
Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress 



' 'the old battler' ' (a name Alfaro had earned during his armed strug- 
gle against Garcia Moreno) returned after a decade of exile in Cen- 
tral America and marched triumphantly into Quito. It was the end 
of Ecuador's brief experiment with progressivism and the begin- 
ning of three stormy decades of rule by the Radical Liberal Party 
(Partido Liberal Radical — PLR), commonly referred to as the 
Liberal Party (Partido Liberal). 

The Rule of the Liberals, 1895-1925 

Eloy Alfaro is the outstanding standard-bearer for Ecuador's 
Liberals, much as Garcia Moreno is for the Conservatives. Some 
Marxist groups have also looked to Alfaro; although his political 
program was in no way socialist, it did prove to be revolutionary 
in the extent to which it stripped the Roman Catholic Church of 
the power and privileges previously granted to it by Garcia More- 
no. Catholic officials and their Conservative allies did not give up 
without a fight, however. During the first year of Alfaro' s presi- 
dency, Ecuador was ravaged by a bloody civil war in which clergy- 
men commonly incited the faithful masses to rise in rebellion against 



25 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

the "atheistic alfaristas" and were, just as commonly, themselves 
victims of alfarista repression. The foreign-born Bishops Pedro 
Schumacher of Portoviejo and Arsenio Andrade of Riobamba led 
the early resistance to Alfaro. A full-fledged bloodbath may well 
have been averted only through the magnanimous efforts of the 
outstanding historian and Archbishop Federico Gonzalez Suarez, 
who urged the clergy to abandon the pursuit of politics. 

This final ecclesiastical struggle for control of Ecuador was in 
vain, however. By the end of the Liberals' rule in 1925, Roman 
Catholicism was no longer the constitutionally mandated state 
religion, official clerical censorship of reading material had been 
suppressed, many powerful foreign clergy had been expelled, edu- 
cation had been secularized, civil marriage as well as divorce had 
been instituted, the concordat with the Vatican had been broken, 
most of the church's rural properties had been seized by the state, 
and the republic was no longer dedicated to the Sacred Heart of 
Jesus. The Roman Catholic Church in Ecuador would never again 
hold prerogatives as extensive as those it enjoyed during the late 
nineteenth century. 

The other accomplishment for which the three decades of PLR 
rule are remembered is the completion, in 1908, of the Guayaquil- 
Quito railroad. At the time, however, Alfaro was condemned by 
his critics for "delivering the republic to the Yankees" through 
a contract signed with North American entrepreneurs to complete 
the project begun by Garcia Moreno. Although the criticism did 
not halt Alfaro on this project, a similar nationalistic outcry did 
force him to end negotiations with the United States, which wanted 
to protect the soon-to-be-completed Panama Canal, over military 
base rights in Ecuador's Galapagos Islands. Alfaro 's affinity for 
the United States was also evident in 1910, when war between Peru 
and Ecuador over their perennial boundary dispute was narrowly 
averted through the mediation of the United States, together with 
Brazil and Argentina. 

The Liberals can be credited with few further accomplishments 
of major proportions. The system of debt peonage that lingered 
in the Sierra came under government regulations, albeit weak ones, 
and imprisonment for debts was finally outlawed in 1918. These 
and other limited social benefits gained by the Indians and the 
mixed-blood montuvio (coastal mestizo) working class were over- 
shadowed by the ruinous economic decline world wide and the se- 
vere repression of the nascent labor movement at the hands of the 
Liberals during the early 1920s. Furthermore, Liberal rule did lit- 
tle to foster the development of stable democracy. On the contrary, 



26 



Historical Setting 



the first half of the period saw even more illegal seizures of power 
and military-led governments than in previous decades. 

A major cause of the instability of the period was the lack of unity 
within the PLR itself. Alfaro and a second military strongman, 
General Leonidas Plaza Gutierrez, maintained a bitter rivalry over 
party leadership for almost two decades. Following Alfaro 's first 
period in the presidency, Plaza was elected to a constitutional term 
of office that lasted from 1901 until 1905. In 1906, shortly after 
a close associate of Plaza had been elected to succeed him, however, 
Alfaro launched a coup d'etat and returned to the presidency. 
Alfaro, in turn, was overthrown in 191 1 after refusing to hand power 
over to his own hand-picked successor, Emilio Estrada. Four months 
later, Estrada's death from a heart attack precipitated a brief civil 
war that climaxed the rivalry between Alfaro and Plaza. Alfaro 
returned from his exile in Panama to lead the Guayaquil garrison 
in its challenge to the Quito-based interim government, which was 
under the military authority of General Plaza. The rebellion was 
quickly defeated, however; Alfaro was captured and transported to 
Quito via the same railroad that he had done so much to complete. 
Once in the capital, Alfaro was publicly and unceremoniously mur- 
dered, along with several of his comrades, by a government-instigated 
mob. 

Shortly thereafter, Plaza was inaugurated into his second presi- 
dential term in office. It was the first of four consecutive consti- 
tutional changes of government: following Plaza (1912-16) came 
Alfredo Baquerizo Moreno (1916-20), then Jose Luis Tamayo 
(1920-24), and Gonzalo S. Cordova (1924-25). Real power dur- 
ing this second half of the period of Liberal rule was held, not by 
the government, but by a plutocracy of coastal agricultural and 
banking interests, popularly known as la argolla (the ring), whose 
linchpin was the Commercial and Agricultural Bank of Guayaquil 
led by Francisco Urbina Jado. This bank gained influence by loan- 
ing vast quantities of money to the free-spending government as 
well as to private individuals. According to Ecuadorian historian 
Oscar Efren Reyes, the bank was influential "to the point that can- 
didates for president and his ministers, senators, and deputies had 
to have the prior approval of the bank. ' ' Many of the private loans 
were to members of the Association of Agriculturists of Ecuador, 
an organization that also received government funds intended to 
promote an international cartel of cocoa growers, but which in- 
stead were used to line members' pockets. 

All parties involved in la argolla, from the government officials 
to the bankers and the growers, were professed militants of the 
Liberal cause. It was not only the political fortunes of the party 



27 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

that fell victim to their financial activities, however, but also the 
national economy, which experienced runaway inflation as a result 
of the printing of money by the private banks. The severe economic 
problems during the final years of Liberal rule were also partially 
caused by factors beyond the control of the politicians. A fungal 
disease that ravaged Ecuador's cacao trees and the growth of com- 
petition from British colonies in Africa abruptly ended conditions 
that had favored Ecuador's exportation of cocoa for over a cen- 
tury. What was left of the nation's cocoa industry fell victim to 
the sharp decline in world demand during the Great Depression. 

Ecuador's economic crisis of the early 1920s was especially dev- 
astating to the working class and the poor. With real wages, for 
those lucky enough to have jobs, eaten away by inflation, workers 
responded with a general strike in Guayaquil in 1922 and a peasant 
rebellion in the central Sierra the following year. Both actions were 
aimed at improving wages and working conditions; both were put 
down only after massacres of major proportions. 

President Cordova, closely tied to la argolla, had come to office 
in a fraudulent election. Popular unrest, together with the ongoing 
economic crisis and a sickly president, laid the background for a 
bloodless coup d'etat in July 1925. Unlike all previous forays by 
the military into Ecuadorian politics, the coup of 1925 was made 
in the name of a collective grouping rather than a particular caudillo. 
The members of the League of Young Officers who overthrew Cor- 
dova came to power with an agenda, which included a wide variety 
of social reforms, the replacement of the increasingly sterile Liberal- 
Conservative debate, and the end of the rule of the Liberals, who 
had become decadent after three decades in power. 

Reform, Chaos, and Debacle, 1925-44 

The reformist officers initially named a governing junta consisting 
of prominent opponents of the Liberal plutocracy, but neither it 
nor a succeeding junta was able to consolidate the power neces- 
sary to govern effectively. In 1926 they named as provisional presi- 
dent Isidro Ayora, a dedicated reformer who, although married 
into one of the wealthiest coastal families, possessed a social con- 
science and the vision to see that reform would help preserve 
the status of the upper classes. Ayora quickly assumed dictatorial 
powers, with which he set out to institute reforms that were partly 
of his own making and partly the making of the League of Young 
Officers. 

An advisory mission from Princeton University, headed by 
Edwin W. Kemmerer, was invited to propose measures to re- 
organize Ecuador's fiscal and monetary structures. Its major 



28 



Historical Setting 



accomplishment was the creation of the Central Bank of Ecuador 
(Banco Central), which replaced the private banks' authority in 
the issuing of currency; in addition, the Kemmerer mission also 
reorganized the state budgeting and customs agencies. The ap- 
propriation of these functions, which were previously under the 
control of la argolla, brought a revenue windfall to the government 
during the next half-decade. In addition to building state fiscal and 
social agencies, the funds were used to initiate a number of pro- 
grams, including pensions for state workers, that enhanced the secu- 
rity of the middle and lower economic sectors of the population. 
A range of social legislation — quite progressive for its day — intended 
to protect the working class from unscrupulous employers and to 
improve working conditions emerged from the enactment of the 
1929 constitution. 

The same constitution, Ecuador's thirteenth in just under a cen- 
tury as a republic, also provided for a powerful legislative body 
with authority to censure presidential ministers. This diminution 
of executive power, the appearance of a wide variety (socialist, com- 
munist, and populist) of new groupings in political competition with 
the traditional parties and with the military, and the devastating 
effects of the Great Depression combined to make Ecuador's po- 
litical record especially unstable during subsequent years. Ayora 
was the first of fourteen chief executives during the 1930s. 

World demand for cocoa and other Ecuadorian export crops 
dropped precipitously in the wake of the 1929 Wall Street crash: 
export crop value fell from US$15 million in 1928 to US$7 mil- 
lion in 1931 and US$5 million in 1932, causing widespread un- 
employment and misery. Few objections were voiced in 1931 when 
Ayora was the victim of a military coup. Neptali Bonifaz Ascazubi 
was then elected with the help of a quasi-fascist grouping of the 
serrano lower classes called the Consolidation of National Workers 
(Compactacion Obrera Nacional). In August 1932, after various 
Liberal and leftist elements in Congress blocked Bonifaz 's assump- 
tion of power, the Compactacion fought a bloody four-day civil 
war against other paramilitary forces amassed by opponents of the 
president-elect. The latter were victorious, largely because the great 
majority of the government military forces remained in their bar- 
racks rather than defend Bonifaz. 

Another election two months later brought victory for the Liberal 
candidate, Juan de Dios Martinez Mera, but soon accusations arose 
that the election had been fraudulent. The congressional opposi- 
tion censured virtually every minister as soon as he was named 
and also encouraged the Compactacion to lead demonstrations 
against the president in the streets of Quito. The campaign against 



29 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

Martinez was led by the charismatic president of the Chamber of 
Deputies, Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra, who at the time professed 
a "total lack of presidential ambitions." In September 1934, less 
than a year after Martinez was forced to resign, Velasco assumed 
the presidency after having won popular elections by an overwhelm- 
ing margin. 

The first of Velasco 's five periods as president lasted only eleven 
months. He was overthrown by the military after attempting to 
assume dictatorial powers by dissolving Congress and jailing his 
congressional opponents. Shortly thereafter, the military placed Fed- 
erico Paez in the presidential palace. An engineer and former sen- 
ator, Paez ruled precariously for two years, first with the political 
support of the socialist left and then with that of the right, and he 
tried to advance the reforms undertaken by Ayora a decade ear- 
lier. Ongoing fiscal difficulties severely limited Paez's efforts, 
however, and in September 1937 he was overthrown by his minister 
of national defense, General Alberto Enriquez Gallo. Although he 
ruled for less than a year, Enriquez achieved note as a social re- 
former by his promulgation of the Labor Code of 1938. 

Enriquez is also remembered for having initiated a protracted 
confrontation with the United States-based South American De- 
velopment Company over the terms of its Ecuadorian concession 
and the wages it paid its Ecuadorian employees. The company re- 
fused to comply with Enriquez 's entreaty that more of the profits 
from its mining operations stay in Ecuador, and it won the sup- 
port of the United States Department of State. The Ecuadorian 
government continued its demands despite United States pressure. 
In 1940 the United States, hoping to obtain Ecuadorian coopera- 
tion in its anticipated war effort, ended its support for the mining 
firm. Ecuadorian president Carlos Alberto Arroyo del Rio, in turn, 
proved generous in his cooperation with the Allies, allowing the 
United States to build a naval base on the Galapagos Islands and 
an air base at Salinas on the Ecuadorian mainland. 

In addition to being a genuine friend and admirer of the United 
States, Arroyo del Rio was the leader of the PLR and a representa- 
tive of the Guayaquil -based ''plutocracy." He came to power con- 
stitutionally in November 1939 upon the death of his predecessor, 
but he continued in office in January 1940 through fraudulent elec- 
tions that were universally believed to have been won by Velasco, 
and continued in power later, through repression. Despite such anti- 
popular methods of ruling, he managed to remain in office for almost 
four years, thanks to economic support by the United States and 
the recuperation of Ecuador's export markets as worldwide economic 
depression gave way to recovery during World War II. 



30 



Historical Setting 



Arroyo del Rio's undoing was the disastrous 1941 war with Peru. 
Although the prior sequence of events — the breakdown of talks 
aimed at resolving the boundary issues in 1938, followed by repeated 
border skirmishes — had given ample warning of a possible outbreak 
of large-scale hostilities, Ecuador was unprepared to meet the July 5 
Peruvian invasion. Furthermore, the president's fear of being left 
unprotected from his opponents led him to keep the nation's best 
fighting forces in Quito while Peruvian troops continuously attacked 
the nation's southern and eastern provinces until a cease-fire went 
into effect on July 31. 

Peru's occupation ended only after January 1942, when the two 
nations signed the Protocol of Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries 
while attending the Third Conference of Foreign Ministers of the 
American Republics in Rio de Janeiro. Under the terms of the Rio 
Protocol, the informal name of the agreement, Ecuador renounced 
its claim to some 200,000 square kilometers of territory. Shortly 
afterward, the Rio Protocol was ratified by a bare plurality of the 
Ecuadorian legislature (see fig. 2). 

The Ecuadorian government quickly regretted having become 
a party to the Rio Protocol. The protocol became the focus of a 
surge of Ecuadorian national pride and concomitant opposition to 
Arroyo in a new coalition — the Democratic Alliance. The coali- 
tion brought together a wide array of Ecuadorian politicians dedi- 
cated to replacing the "president who had been unable to defend 
the national honor." Arroyo's rejoinder that he would remain in 
office the full four years, 4 'neither one day more nor one day less, ' ' 
and his being prominently hailed in Washington as "the Apostle 
of Pan- Americanism" only increased his political isolation. A per- 
sistent inflation that whittled away at the purchasing power of 
salaried workers was a further cause of popular resentment against 
Arroyo. 

In May 1944, following an uprising in Guayaquil that pitted the 
military and civilian supporters of Velasco against Arroyo's police, 
the president finally resigned. The military handed power to the 
Democratic Alliance, which in turn named Velasco, whose elec- 
toral candidacy had recently been vetoed by Arroyo, as the popu- 
larly acclaimed president of the republic. The populist master 
returned triumphantly from exile in Colombia, greeted by throngs 
of enthusiasts during a three-day journey to Quito, to assume the 
presidency for the second time. 

The Postwar Era, 1944-84 

The quiteno multitudes standing in the pouring rain on May 3 1 , 
1944, to hear Velasco promise a "national resurrection," with social 



31 



Ecuador: A Country Study 




Historical Setting 



justice and due punishment for the "corrupt Liberal oligarchy" 
that had been responsible for "staining the national honor," be- 
lieved that they were witnessing the birth of a popular revolution. 
Arroyo partisans were promptly jailed or sent into exile, while 
Velasco verbally baited the business community and the rest of the 
political right. The leftist elements within Velasco 's Democratic 
Alliance, which dominated the constituent assembly that was con- 
vened to write a new constitution, were nonetheless destined to be 
disappointed. 

In May 1945, after a year of growing hostility between the presi- 
dent and the assembly, which was vainly awaiting deeds to substan- 
tiate Velasco 's rhetorical advocacy of social justice, the mercurial 
chief executive condemned and then repudiated the newly com- 
pleted constitution. After dismissing the assembly, Velasco held 
elections for a new assembly, which in 1946 drafted a far more con- 
servative constitution that met with the president's approval. For 
this brief period, Conservatives replaced the left as Velasco 's base 
of support. 

Rather than attending to the nation's economic problems, Ve- 
lasco aggravated them by financing the dubious schemes of his as- 
sociates. Inflation continued unabated, as did its negative impact 
on the national standard of living, and by 1947 foreign-exchange 
reserves had fallen to dangerously low levels. In August, when Ve- 
lasco was ousted by his minister of defense, nobody rose to defend 
the man who, only three years earlier, had been hailed as the na- 
tion's savior. During the following year, three different men briefly 
held executive power before Galo Plaza Lasso, running under a 
coalition of independent Liberals and socialists, narrowly defeated 
his Conservative opponent in presidential elections. His inaugu- 
ration in September 1948 initiated what was to become the long- 
est period of constitutional rule since the 1912-24 heyday of the 
Liberal plutocracy. 

Constitutional Rule, 1948-60 

Galo Plaza differed from previous Ecuadorian presidents. The 
son of former President Plaza Gutierrez, he had been born in the 
United States, where he also attended several universities. His ties 
to the United States grew even closer as a result of serving there 
as ambassador under President Arroyo del Rio. These links, as Pike 
points out, "rendered him vulnerable to charges by Velasco Ibarra 
and other demagogic opponents of being the lackey of U.S. im- 
perialism." Galo Plaza was not a professional politician, but a gen- 
tleman farmer with a sizable cattle ranch near Quito, where he 
customarily spent weekends throughout his four years as president. 



33 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

Galo Plaza brought a developmentalist and technocratic emphasis 
to Ecuadorian government. He invited a wide variety of foreign 
experts in economic development and in governmental adminis- 
tration to recommend and catalog reforms in both areas. In large 
part because of a lack of political will within either the executive 
or the legislature, however, virtually none of the recommended re- 
forms was enacted. Nevertheless, the economy experienced a 
marked improvement, with inflation finally slowing down and both 
government budget and foreign currency accounts balancing for 
the first time in many years. This achievement was even more 
remarkable in light of the series of major earthquakes, landslides, 
and floods suffered by Ecuador in 1949 and 1950. 

No doubt Galo Plaza's most important contribution to Ecua- 
dorian political culture was his commitment to the principles and 
practices of democracy. Galo Plaza endorsed such democratic 
guarantees as freedom of the press and the freedom of opponents 
to voice their opinions, to assemble for political purposes without 
fear of being jailed or worse, and to be elected to the legislature 
without fear of being defrauded or arbitrarily dismissed. Galo Plaza 
was able to create a mystique around the idea of his completing 
his term in office, something no president had accomplished since 
1924, and this mystique no doubt helped him achieve his goal. 

As Galo Plaza readily admitted, however, his greatest asset, both 
politically and economically, was the onset of the nation's banana 
boom, as diseases plaguing plantations in Central America turned 
Ecuador into an alternative supplier to the huge United States mar- 
ket. Ecuador's banana exports grew from US$2 million to US$20 
million between 1948 and 1952. During these years, Ecuador also 
benefited from sizable price increases — generated by the Korean 
War — for its commodity exports. 

A proof of the politically stabilizing effect of the banana boom 
of the 1950s is that even Velasco, who in 1952 was elected presi- 
dent for the third time, managed to serve out a full four-year term. 
He continued to spend as before — building bridges, roads, and 
schools at will and rewarding his political supporters (including, 
this time, the military) with jobs, salary increases, and weapons — 
but, in contrast to his previous times in office, there were now suffi- 
cient funds to pay for everything. 

Always the master populist, Velasco (who by now liked to be 
known as ''the National Personification") again came to power 
with the support of the common man, this time through the vehi- 
cle of the Guayaquil-based Concentration of Popular Forces (Con- 
centration de Fuerzas Populares — CFP). Once in office, however, 
he arrested and deported the CFP boss, Carlos Guevara Moreno, 



34 



Historical Setting 



together with several other party leaders. Guevara Moreno re- 
assumed control of the CFP in 1955 following a three-year exile. 
Velasco's subsequent party support during the 1950s came from 
the Conservatives, the conservative Social Christian Movement 
(Movimiento Social Cristiano — MSC), and the highly nation- 
alistic, anticommunist, quasi-fascist Ecuadorian Nationalist 
Revolutionary Action (Accion Revolucionaria Nacionalista Ecua- 
toriana— ARNE). 

On repeated occasions, members of ARNE acted as thugs and 
shock troops, attacking students, labor unions, and the press. In 
1955 Velasco also chose to pick a fight with the United States. In 
the opening round of what would later become known as the "tuna 
war," Ecuadorian officials seized two fishing boats carrying the 
United States flag, charging them with fishing inside the 200- 
nautical-mile limit claimed by Ecuador as territorial seas under its 
sovereignty (see The United States, ch. 4). 

In 1956 Camilo Ponce Enriquez, the MSC founder who had 
served in Velasco's cabinet, assumed the presidency after a close 
election replete with allegations of fraud. Although late support from 
Velasco proved crucial to Ponce's victory, shortly afterward "the 
National Personification" became the principal opponent of the 
new chief executive. In a display of statesmanship and political acu- 
men, Ponce co-opted the Liberal opposition by including it, along 
with Conservatives and the MSC, in his cabinet. 

Although Ponce did not enact the Social Christian reforms of 
which he spoke vaguely during the campaign, the relative politi- 
cal calm that prevailed during his four years in office was, in it- 
self, an accomplishment given the worsening economic situation. 
Ponce's term saw the end of the banana boom that had sustained 
more than a decade of constitutional rule. Falling export prices led 
to rising unemployment and a social malaise that briefly erupted 
into riots in 1959. By the following year, the effects of the discon- 
tent were ready to be exploited by the populist appeal of the ir- 
repressible Velasco, who was elected with his widest margin of 
victory ever. Velasco's fourth turn in the presidency initiated a 
renewal of crisis, instability, and military domination and ended 
conjecture that the political system had matured or developed a 
democratic mold. 

Instability and Military Dominance, 1960-72 

The instability began immediately. Ponce was so angry over 
Velasco's vicious campaign attacks on his government that he 
resigned on his last day in office rather than preside over the inau- 
guration of his successor. During his campaign, "the National 



35 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

Personification" had promised government support to the masses 
of urban poor, many of whom had recently migrated to Guaya- 
quil and other major cities in search of a decent job and a place 
to live. Velasco's populism continued into his inaugural address, 
when he renounced the hated 1942 Rio Protocol. He thus came 
to power with the adoration of the masses, but he saddled himself 
with expensive commitments to the poor at a time when deficits 
in the state coffers were approaching a critical level. Additionally, 
Velasco threatened Ecuador's shaky economy with what amounted 
to a declaration of hostilities against Peru and the guarantors of 
the Rio Protocol, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United 
States. 

Sensing the direction of the political wind in the wake of the 
Cuban Revolution, Velasco magnified his anti-United States rhe- 
toric and included leftists in his government. Meanwhile, the United 
States encouraged Latin American governments to break diplo- 
matic relations with Cuba. Before long, Ecuador's widening po- 
litical polarization became manifest in outbreaks of violence between 
leftist students and the anticommunist right. 

The rapidly deteriorating economic situation soon brought about 
a split in the velasquista coalition, however, with the left, led by Vice 
President Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy (who was also presi- 
dent of the Chamber of Deputies) openly opposing the government 
in July 1961. By October relations between Velasco's government 
and Congress had deteriorated to the point where legislators and 
progovernment spectators engaged in a gun battle. Although dozens 
of bullet holes were later found in the Chamber, no one was injured. 

A series of new sales taxes imposed during the same month in 
order to raise desperately needed revenues then sparked a general 
strike and a series of demonstrations and riots in several major ci- 
ties. Amid growing chaos, Velasco ordered the arrest of his vice 
president, a move that opened him to charges of violating the con- 
stitution. On November 8, after only fourteen months in office, 
Velasco was ousted by the military and replaced by Arosemena, 
who was his constitutional successor as well as his leading opponent. 

Arosemena came from a well-known Guayaquil family; his father 
had briefly served as president following a previous anti-Velasco 
coup in 1947. In an attempt to allay concerns about his being a 
dangerous leftist (as Velasco's vice president he had expressed warm 
sympathy for Cuban leader Fidel Castro Ruz and made a much- 
criticized trip to the Soviet Union), Arosemena named a cabinet 
that included Liberals and even Conservatives and quickly sent 
former President Galo Plaza on a goodwill trip to Washington. 



36 



Historical Setting 



Arosemena's insistence on maintaining relations with Cuba, 
however, became a major domestic political issue in Ecuador. Po- 
litical opponents labeled Arosemena a dangerous communist, and 
part of the military went into open rebellion in March 1962. The 
following month, Ecuador broke diplomatic relations with Cuba, 
Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The crisis over Cuba proved to be 
very costly for Arosemena, who lost not only much of his local po- 
litical support, but also the self-confidence to pursue his own, in- 
dependent course. Afterward, the government drifted with little 
leadership from the president, who allegedly indulged in frequent 
drinking bouts. 

The brief appearance of a guerrilla movement in the coastal jun- 
gle and a rash of small-scale terrorist incidents (many of which later 
were found to have been staged by right-wing provocateurs) also 
left Arosemena open to accusations of being either unable or un- 
willing to stop communist subversion. By early 1963, military con- 
spiracy was again afoot. On July 11, the high command of the 
armed forces decided, without dissent, to depose Arosemena. 

The four-man military junta that seized power announced its 
intention not to return the nation to constitutional rule until the 
institution of basic socioeconomic reforms, which both Velasco and 
Arosemena had promised but never implemented. This failure by 
their two civilian predecessors, the junta believed, had become a 
source of growing frustration within the lower classes, thus mak- 
ing them more receptive to the lure of communism. The junta com- 
bined its reformist anticommunism with the more traditional 
hard-line variety. After jailing or exiling the entire leadership of 
the communist left, the new government reorganized the nation's 
two leading universities in an effort to eliminate them as sources 
of left-wing political activity. 

In July 1964, the junta decreed the Agrarian Reform Law to 
commemorate the first anniversary of its assumption of power. The 
law abolished the huasipungo system, the feudalistic land tenure ar- 
rangement widely used in the Sierra (see Peasants, ch. 2). However, 
the law resulted in little real improvement in the lives of the long- 
suffering Sierra peasants and died from lack of funding under sub- 
sequent civilian governments. 

Meaningful reform was precluded, in part at least, by the in- 
creasingly cumbersome process of decision making within the po- 
litically heterogeneous, plural executive. Insubordination by the 
air force representative on the junta led to his dismissal and arrest 
in November 1965; thereafter, the junta had only three members. 

In 1965 Ecuador also saw a dramatic drop in its revenue from 
banana exports, and, despite generous development assistance from 



37 




38 



Plowing afield 
Courtesy World Bank 



39 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

the United States government and the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank, the junta suddenly faced an economic crisis of major 
proportions. The announcement of increased taxes on imports 
sparked the opposition of the powerful Guayaquil^Chamber of Com- 
merce, which in March called for a general strike. Long-disgrunded 
student groups and labor unions were only too happy to join in 
the protest, which rapidly spread to other cities. On March 29, 
1966, following a bloody and demoralizing attack on the Central 
University in Quito, the disillusioned military reformers stepped 
down. 

The following day, a small group of civilian leaders named 
Clemente Yerovi Indaburu, a non-partisan banana grower who 
had served as minister of economy under Galo Plaza, to be provi- 
sional president. In October a popularly elected constituent assem- 
bly drafted a new constitution and elected Otto Arosemena Gomez, 
a cousin of Carlos Julio and a political centrist, to act as a second 
provisional president. During his twenty months in office, the new 
constitution went into effect in May 1967, and popular elections 
for president were held in June 1968. Incredibly, Velasco — now 
seventy-five years old — was voted into the presidency for the fifth 
time, a remarkable thirty-four years after his initial victory. 

The weakness of Velasco 's mandate — he managed only a plural- 
ity of barely one-third of the popular vote in a crowded field of 
five candidates — foreshadowed political difficulties that plagued him 
during his final term. His newly formed National Velasquista Fed- 
eration (Federacion Nacional Velasquista — FNV) was far short of 
a majority in either house of Congress, and a failure to build any 
working coalition made for a stalemate in the legislative process. 
Even Velasco 's own vice president, a guayaquileno Liberal named 
Jorge Zavala Baquerizo, turned into a strident and vocal critic. 
Cabinet ministers came and went with astonishing frequency. This 
political impasse soon combined with the fiscal and balance-of- 
payments crises, which by now had become customary under the 
spendthrift habits and administrative mismanagement associated 
with each of Velasco 's terms in office, to spawn a major political 
crisis. The turning point came on June 22, 1970, when Velasco, 
in an action known as an autogolpe (self-seizure of power), dismissed 
Congress and the Supreme Court and assumed dictatorial powers. 

Velasco subsequently decreed a number of necessary, though 
extremely unpopular, economic measures. After devaluing the sucre 
(for value of the sucre — see Glossary) for the first time since 1961 , 
he placed tight controls on foreign exchange transactions and then 
decreed a number of new tax measures, the most controversial 
of which raised import tariffs considerably. Velasco attempted to 



40 



Historical Setting 



compensate for his lost prestige by baiting the United States, seiz- 
ing and fining United States fishing boats found within 200 nauti- 
cal miles of the Ecuadorian coast. The intensification of the "tuna 
war" inflamed tempers in both countries; Ecuador dismissed United 
States military advisers, and the United States withdrew almost 
all economic and military aid to Ecuador. Such nationalistic ad- 
ventures were of only momentary value to Velasco, however. In 

1971, amid mounting civic unrest that verified the extent of the 
opposition, he was forced to cancel a scheduled national plebiscite 
in which he hoped to replace the 1967 constitution, which had a 
charter written under his own auspices in 1946. The constitution, 
Velasco argued, made the president too weak to be effective. 

The president's autogolpe and his continuance in power were pos- 
sible because of support from the armed forces. Velasco 's key ally 
was his nephew and minister of defense, General Jorge Acosta 
Velasco, who continually reshuffled the high command in order 
to retain velasquistas in key posts. In the wake of a failed attempt 
to oust the powerful commandant of the Quito military academy 
in April 1971, however, Acosta himself was forced to resign his 
ministerial portfolio and was summarily dispatched to Madrid as 
ambassador. Having lost the man who was his linchpin in the armed 
forces and the only apparent heir to the velasquista throne, Velasco 
was left to the mercy of the high command. 

Two circumstances proved critical in persuading the military to 
overthrow Velasco before the scheduled completion of his term in 

1972. On the one hand, the state was due very shortly to begin 
reaping vast revenues under a 1964 petroleum concession. On the 
other hand, the overwhelming favorite to win the presidency in 
1972 was Asaad Bucaram Elmhalim, a former street peddler who 
in 1960 had seized the leadership of the CFP from Guevara Moreno 
and later had twice been an extremely popular mayor of Guaya- 
quil (see Constitutional Rule, 1948-60, this ch.; Political Parties, 
ch. 4). Both the military and the business community regarded 
Bucaram as dangerous and unpredictable and unfit to be presi- 
dent, especially at a time when unprecedented income was expected 
to flow into the state coffers. On February 15, 1972, four months 
before the scheduled elections, the military once again overthrew 
Velasco, who was sent into his final period of exile. He was replaced 
by a three-man military junta headed by the Army chief of staff, 
General Guillermo Rodriguez Lara. 

Direct Military Rule, 1972-79 

The military regime called itself ''nationalist and revolutionary," 
but the well-known connections of Rodriguez Lara to the Guayaquil 



41 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

business community signaled disappointment for those who anti- 
cipated that he would head a progressive military regime such as 
was ruling in Peru at the time. It shortly became apparent that, 
ideologically, the Rodriguez Lara regime was'-a hybrid, reflecting 
a tenuous equilibrium among the widely divergent political ten- 
dencies within the Ecuadorian armed forces. Nevertheless, like the 
contemporary Peruvian and Brazilian regimes, the regime of Rod- 
riguez Lara, he promised, would not be an interim government, 
but rather a long-term venture dedicated to introducing structural 
changes thought necessary to unfreeze the development process. 

Rodriguez Lara's regime gave early emphasis to a campaign 
designed in part to exert firm control over the nation's petroleum 
resources and in part to consolidate the government's political 
authority. Several former political leaders, including ex-President 
Otto Arosemena, were tried for corruption in connection with oil 
concessions granted during the 1960s. In addition, a large num- 
ber of functionaries of the Velasco government, supporters of 
Bucaram, as well as drug traffickers, legitimate importers, and cus- 
toms officials were charged with corruption and "illegal enrich- 
ment." Although it thus assailed its major opponents from the start, 
the military regime, however, failed to build its own civilian base 
of political support. 

Promises of a "meaningful agrarian reform" under the auspices 
of Minister of Agriculture Guillermo Maldonado, a dedicated 
reformer, were frustrated by intense opposition from traditional 
elites. Maldonado was eventually forced out, and by the end of 
Rodriguez Lara's four years in office less than 1 percent of Ecua- 
dor's cultivable land had changed hands under the reform. More 
notable achievements came in the areas of building infrastructure 
projects, such as the major oil refinery and petrochemical complex 
in Esmeraldas; various highway and electrification projects; and 
state capitalist enterprises, particularly the Ecuadorian State Petro- 
leum Corporation (Corporacion Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana — 
CEPE). The latter corporation was founded in 1972 and grew to 
become the major actor in Ecuador's exploitation of its oil reserves 
(see Petroleum and Natural Gas, ch. 3). 

Oil policy was the regime's vehicle for its most forceful expres- 
sion of nationalism. Minister of Natural Resources Gustavo Jarrin 
Ampudia presided over Ecuador's 1973 entry into the Organiza- 
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), with all its atten- 
dant prestige and economic benefits. He was also responsible for 
Ecuador's renegotiation of a number of oil concessions, including 
the key Texaco-Gulf concession in the Oriente, on terms much more 
favorable to the state, such as substantial increases in both the 



42 



Historical Setting 



royalties paid by foreign firms and the tax rate they paid on petrol- 
eum exports. These efforts were initially successful in allowing the 
government to retain a larger share of Ecuador's petroleum earn- 
ings. 

The oil companies became increasingly disconcerted, however, 
when Jarnn proposed in late 1974 that the share of stock in the 
Texaco-Gulf subsidiary held by CEPE be increased from 25 to 51 
percent. Claiming that the terms of their concessions negotiated 
with Jarnn had priced Ecuadorian oil beyond the world market 
price, the oil companies cut back drastically on their exports, at 
a cost to the government of hundreds of millions of dollars over 
the following nine months. This intense financial pressure finally 
led to a July 1975 announcement that taxes on the oil companies' 
exports were being reduced. It was thus clear that the military re- 
gime had overplayed its nationalistic oil policy, having failed to 
keep in mind that Ecuador was, after all, a relatively small oil pro- 
ducer and thus not a powerful player within OPEC. 

The moderation of the regime's oil policy, however, did not result 
in the anticipated resolution of mounting economic problems. Oil 
exports rose only slightly, while imports, particularly of luxury 
items, continued to soar, aided by a low- tariff policy that had been 
designed to soak up petroleum earnings, and thus control infla- 
tion. In excess of 22 percent during 1974, inflation was rapidly erod- 
ing the real value of wages within the middle class. 

In August, in an effort to resolve its balance-of-payments difficul- 
ties, the regime decreed a 60 percent duty on imported luxury items. 
The measure was condemned by the Chambers of Commerce in 
Quito and Guayaquil, whose constituents had grown dependent 
on the sale of imports, and caused, a week later, a bloody attempt 
led by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Raul Gon- 
zalez Alvear, to overthrow Rodriguez Lara. Although this coup 
attempt failed, at a cost of twenty-two lives, on January 11, 1976, 
a second, bloodless coup was successful in removing Rodriguez 
Lara. He was replaced by a Supreme Council of Government con- 
sisting of the commanders of the three armed services. 

Virtually the only item on the agenda of the new military tri- 
umvirate was to preside over a return of the government to con- 
stitutional, civilian rule. The bloody September 1975 coup attempt 
had revealed the depth of the breach in the institutional unity of 
the armed forces. Handing the government back to civilians, it was 
hoped, might remove the causes of divisions within the military, 
or at least make it easier to hide them from public view. 

The original timetable, announced in June 1976, called for a 
transition that was to culminate in presidential elections in February 



43 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

1978. First, new government charters and electoral laws were to 
be drafted by appointed commissions, and then a public referen- 
dum would choose between two proposed constitutions. The tran- 
sition was repeatedly slowed down, however, and in the end, instead 
of the less than two years originally scheduled, three years and eight 
months elapsed between the 1976 coup and the inauguration of 
a civilian president. 

Two reasons are commonly cited for the delay: the slowness of 
decision making within the Supreme Council of Government be- 
cause of ongoing disagreement within the military high command 
and repeated maneuverings by the military government to manipu- 
late the electoral process, thereby controlling its outcome. Like the 
Rodriguez Lara government, the Council was particularly interested 
in seeing a poor electoral performance by the CFP and, especi- 
ally, preventing Bucaram from winning the presidency. 

The national referendum to choose the constitution was finally 
held on January 15, 1978. The results saw 23 percent of the vot- 
ing population nullify their ballots, an action that had been advo- 
cated by the traditional right; 31 percent of the population voted 
in favor of a revised version of the 1945 constitution, and a plural- 
ity of 44 percent voted in favor of the newly drafted national charter. 
The charter was the more progressive of the two constitutions, its 
major reforms being the acknowledgement of a role for the state 
in socioeconomic development, the legalization of a worker self- 
managed {autogestional) sector in the economy, a unicameral legis- 
lature, no presidential reelection, and, for the first time in Ecua- 
dor, electoral suffrage for illiterates (see Constitutional Background, 
ch. 4). 

Five candidates then campaigned for the presidency. The con- 
sistent favorite in polls was Rodrigo Borja of the social democratic 
Democratic Left (Izquierda Democratica — ID). Because the Su- 
preme Council of Government made sure that Bucaram was barred 
from running, the CFP strongman named his second in command, 
Jaime Roldos, to be the party's candidate. In order to broaden 
the appeal of the ticket, Osvaldo Hurtado, the leader of the Chris- 
tian Democratic Party (Partido Democrata Cristiano — PDC), was 
tapped to be Roldos 's vice presidential running mate. The tradi- 
tional rightist vote was split between two candidates, and the vari- 
ous parties of the Marxist left coalesced to name one candidate. 
After a lengthy recount, the final results of the July 16 election con- 
firmed the initial tally of a surprise victory by Roldos, with 27 per- 
cent of the national vote. Sixto Duran Ballen, candidate of a 
coalition of rightist parties, finished second with 24 percent. The 



44 



Historical Setting 



electoral law mandated that when no candidate achieved a majority 
vote, a run-off election between the two top finishers be held. 

It was more than nine months before the second-round election 
took place, however. They were months of considerable political 
tension and doubt as to whether the transition would proceed as 
planned. First, widespread problems in organizing the election and 
in the vote count during the first round left serious doubts as to 
the competence and honesty of the electoral authorities. The 
Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Superior Electoral — TSE) 
was, as a result, completely reorganized. Second, the government — 
remembering a campaign slogan calling "Roldos to the govern- 
ment, Bucaram to power" — was understandably dismayed with 
results of the first-round election. By delaying the second round, 
the government sought to give rightists the time to build an anti- 
Roldos coalition under which Duran could emerge as the second- 
round victor. To complicate matters further, Abdon Calderon 
Mufioz, a populist candidate who had won 9 percent of the vote 
in the first round, was murdered under circumstances implicating 
the government. Finally, as a further distraction during this difficult 
period, Velasco returned from exile to bury his wife and died in 
March 1979 at age eighty-six. 

The second round was finally held on April 29, 1979, with the 
Roldos-Hurtado ticket sweeping to an overwhelming 68.5 percent 
victory against a weak performance by Duran. Doubts persisted, 
however, up to the moment that the winners took office three 
months later, that the military would allow them to assume their 
duly elected offices. The size of their popular mandate and, ac- 
cording to political scientist John D. Martz, pressure from the ad- 
ministration of President Jimmy Carter in Washington made it 
difficult for the military to stop the "democratization" process at 
this late date. The military did extract as a price, in any case, un- 
precedented powers to name representatives to the boards of direc- 
tors of major state corporations and to participate directly in the 
naming of the minister of defense. The outgoing government also 
made it clear to Roldos (who had an early campaign slogan of ' 'we 
will not forgive, we will not forget") that it would not tolerate any 
investigation into the behavior of the military with respect to human 
rights. With his autonomy thus diminished, Roldos finally assumed 
the presidency on August 10, and thus Ecuador returned to con- 
stitutional, civilian rule after almost a decade of dictatorship. 

Return to Democratic Rule, 1979-84 

Roldos presided over a nation that had undergone profound 
changes during the seven years of military rule. During the ceremony 



45 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

to pass the mantle of power to Roldos, Admiral Alfredo Poveda 
Burbano pointed proudly to impressive indicators of economic 
growth between 1972 and 1979: the government budget expanded 
some 540 percent, whereas exports as well as per capita income 
increased a full 500 percent. Industrial development had also pro- 
gressed, stimulated by the new oil wealth as well as Ecuador's 
preferential treatment under the provisions of the Andean Com- 
mon Market (Ancom, also known as the Andean Pact) (see Growth 
and Structure of the Economy, ch. 3). 

Past export "booms" in cocoa and bananas were managed by 
and for private coastal interests, but the state controlled the petro- 
leum bonanza and thereby transformed the social landscape. 
Quito — the seat of the bureaucracy and the closest major city to 
the oil fields — reaped the benefits of the economic growth. The cap- 
ital city lost much of its sleepy Sierra character and in the 1980s 
competed with Guayaquil as a center of modern economic endeavor. 
Employment in the public sector grew in excess of 10 percent an- 
nually throughout the late 1970s, creating a new consumption- 
oriented middle class in Quito. But such change highlighted the 
persistence of the traditional rural campesino and the unskilled 
urban subproletariat; petroleum revenues thus widened Ecuador's 
habitual inequality in income distribution (see Social Classes, ch. 2). 

Expectations that the economic and social changes would trans- 
form the traditional political culture were unfulfilled. Customary 
aspects of civilian politics, such as regionalism and personalism, were 
reflected in the proliferation of political parties; and rivalry between 
the executive and legislature persisted during the five years that 
Roldos and his vice president, Osvaldo Hurtado, were in power. 

The most destructive of these traditions was evident in the in- 
tense rivalry that developed between Roldos and Bucaram, the 
strongman of the president's own CFP, who, having twice been 
prevented from running for the presidency, was now determined 
to run the country from his power base in the unicameral legisla- 
ture, the National Congress (Congreso Nacional — hereafter, Con- 
gress). Bucaram 's coalition building secured him the presidency 
of the legislature during the first year of the new government. The 
president, for his part, was determined to retain his independence 
from the autocratic and increasingly conservative party boss. 
Bucaram had no apparent agenda other than blocking the reform- 
ist agenda of the president, who was thus forced to spend most of 
his first year in office scratching together his own political base, 
independent of the CFP, in order to achieve a legislative majority. 

Roldos proved successful in this effort; in August 1980, his can- 
didate for the congressional presidency narrowly defeated the 



46 




Women and children in 
a village near Riobamba 
Courtesy Inter-American 
Foundation (Miguel Sayago) 



bucaramista candidate, and the CFP also suffered major losses in 
the municipal and provincial elections in December. The presi- 
dent was not able to enjoy the fruits of his success, however; on 
May 24, 1981, he was killed, along with his wife and the minister 
of defense, in an airplane crash in the southern province of Loja. 

The death of Roldos generated intense popular speculation. Some 
Ecuadorian nationalists attributed it to the Peruvian government 
because the crash took place near the border where, four months 
previously, the two nations had participated in a bloody flare-up 
in their perpetual border dispute. Many of the nation's leftists, 
pointing to a similar crash that had killed Panamanian president 
Omar Torrijos Herrera less than three months later, blamed the 
United States government. 

Roldos's constitutional successor, Hurtado, immediately faced 
an economic crisis brought on by the sudden end of the petroleum 
boom. Massive foreign borrowing, initiated during the years of 
the second military regime and continued under Roldos, resulted 
in a foreign debt that by 1983 was nearly US$7 billion. The na- 
tion's petroleum reserves declined sharply during the early 1980s 
because of exploration failures and rapidly increasing domestic con- 
sumption. 

The economic crisis was aggravated in 1982 and 1983 by dras- 
tic climatic changes, bringing severe drought as well as flooding, 
precipitated by the appearance of the unusually warm ocean current 



47 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

known as "El Nino" (see Climate, ch. 2). Analysts estimated 
damage to the nation's infrastructure at US$640 million, with 
balance-of-payments losses of some US$300 millicVn. The real gross 
domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) fell to 2 percent in 1982 
and to -3.3 percent in 1983. The rate of inflation in 1983, 52.5 
percent, was the highest ever recorded in the nation's history. 

Although widely considered a center-leftist, Hurtado confronted 
the economic crisis by instituting highly unpopular austerity mea- 
sures aimed at gaining the approval of the International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) and the international financial 
community at large. Hurtado eliminated government subsidies for 
basic foodstuffs — thus contributing to both inflation and the im- 
poverishment of the masses — and substantially devalued the sucre. 
With unemployment increasing to as high as 13.5 percent, the 
United Workers Front (Frente Unitario de Trabaj adores — FUT) 
launched four general strikes during Hurtado 's period in office. 
The most militant of these nationwide strikes, in October 1982, 
was called off after forty-eight hours because of union leaders' fears 
of provoking a coup d'etat. 

Outside observers noted that, however unpopular, Hurtado 
deserved credit for keeping Ecuador in good standing with the in- 
ternational financial community and for consolidating Ecuador's 
democratic political system under extremely difficult conditions. 
The political right, nevertheless, believing that the economic cri- 
sis was caused by presidential policies that were inimical to free- 
enterprise capitalism, bitterly criticized Hurtado. The right united 
for the 1984 elections in order to back Leon Febres Cordero 
Ribadeneyra, a businessman from Guayaquil, with Borja running 
a close second. As Febres Cordero entered office on August 10, 
there was no end in sight to the economic crisis nor to the intense 
struggle that characterized the political process in Ecuador. 

Beginning in the 1960s, Ecuadorian historiography benefited 
from publication of a handful of excellent studies. Nicolas P. Cush- 
ner's Farm and Factory and John Leddy Phelan's The Kingdom of Quito 
in the Seventeenth Century offer some of the best research ever con- 
ducted on colonial Spanish America. On the postindependence pe- 
riod, Osvaldo Hurtado 's Political Power in Ecuador and Agustm 
Cueva's The Process of Political Domination in Ecuador are both excel- 
lent general studies by Ecuadorian scholars and have been trans- 
lated into English. Frederick B. Pike's The United States and the Andean 



48 



Historical Setting 



Republics is also extremely valuable, although the reader interested 
in Ecuador might jump over extensive analyses of Peru and Bolivia. 

A number of political analyses are also useful to the historian 
of the modern period. John Samuel Fitch's The Military Coup d'Etat 
as a Political Process: Ecuador, 1948-1966 is a pioneering, in-depth 
study of the political mindset of the Latin American armed forces. 
John D. Martz's Ecuador: Conflicting Political Culture and the Quest 
for Progress is a more general study that concentrates on the 1960s. 
Literature on the military government of the 1970s remains scarce; 
David W. Schodt's "State Structure and Reformist Politics" pro- 
vides useful information on the public sector during that period, 
however. Crisis, Conflicto y Consenso: Ecuador, 1979-84 by Nick D. 
Mills, Jr. is a valuable study of the turbulent Roldos-Hurtado pe- 
riod. (For further information and complete citations, see Bib- 
liography.) 



49 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 




Ceramic curandero (shaman) (Jama-Coaque culture) 



PROFOUND REGIONAL, ETHNIC, AND social divisions con- 
tinued to characterize Ecuadorian society in the 1980s. The coun- 
try's three main geographic regions, differing in their histories and 
economies, provided one of these divisions, and there were also 
ethnic and social cleavages within the regions. The Oriente (eastern 
region) traditionally was a neglected backwater, isolated geographi- 
cally and culturally from the rest of the nation. Its population was 
limited to dispersed groups of indigenous tropical-forest Indians 
who lived by slash-and-burn agriculture or hunting and gather- 
ing. European intrusion was limited to the occasional missionary 
or trader. Beginning in the 1960s, however, the Oriente experienced 
colonization by land-poor peasants from the Sierra (Andean high- 
lands) and exploration by oil companies. Both colonization and 
exploration had a devastating impact on the indigenous population. 

The Sierra, the region of earliest European settlement, was ruled 
for most of its history by a narrow rural oligarchy whose power 
base lay in the sizeable haciendas they controlled. The haciendas 
dominated both social and economic relations. Most of the popu- 
lation depended to a greater or lesser extent on the largess of the 
white elite who controlled land. This elite ruled virtually without 
challenge until the mid-twentieth century. Between this white elite 
and the mass of Sierra Indians were the mestizos or cholos — persons 
of mixed Spanish and Indian ancestry. In values and identity, they 
were closer to the dominant whites. The Sierra Indians, who stood 
at the bottom of the social pyramid, had very limited opportuni- 
ties for economic security or social advancement. Both mestizos 
and whites regarded Indians as immutably inferior. The latter' s 
only hope for improvement lay in assimilating the norms and values 
of the dominant ethnic groups, thereby changing ethnic affiliation. 

Like the hacendados of the Sierra, the elite of the Costa (coastal 
region) also had its roots in agriculture and the control of land, 
but its attention focused primarily on export crop production and 
commerce. Ethnically more diverse than the Hispanic elite of the 
Sierra, the Costa upper class included successful immigrant fami- 
lies drawn over the years by the region's expanding economy. Most 
of Ecuador's blacks, the descendants of the small numbers of Afri- 
can slaves who came to work on the region's plantations, were also 
costenos (residents of the Costa). 

The twentieth century saw the rise of an Ecuadorian middle class 
whose interests were genuinely distinct from the narrowly based 
rural oligarchy, and the demise of the self-contained, autonomous 



53 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

hacienda. Changes in the hacienda economy createdva mobile, rural- 
based labor force, and by the end of the 1980s, society consisted 
of a small, privileged elite; a more numerous, diverse, and politi- 
cally active middle class; and the mass of impoverished small-scale 
peasants, artisans, and wage earners. The middle class transformed 
Ecuadorian politics. 

Like many other Latin American nations, Ecuador had enacted 
agrarian reform legislation in the 1960s and 1970s. These laws 
brought litde substantive improvement in the lives of most peasants, 
but rather afforded Costa and Sierra landlords an impetus and an 
opportunity to replace their resident and permanent laborers with 
temporary workers. In the Sierra this trend, coupled with increased 
population pressure on land, continued a pattern of migration to 
the Costa and the Oriente that had begun in the 1950s. The volume 
of rural-urban migration grew in both the Costa and Sierra until, 
in the early 1980s, nearly half of all Ecuadorians lived in cities. 

Geography 

Ecuador is one of the smaller countries in South America. Lo- 
cated on the west coast and straddling the equator, Ecuador has a 
total area of about 280,000 square kilometers, which includes the 
Galapagos Islands. Roughly the size of the state of Colorado, Ecua- 
dor encompasses a wide range of natural formations and climates, 
from the desertlike southern coast to the snowcapped peaks of the 
Andes Mountains to the plains of the Amazon River Basin (see fig. 3). 

Ecuador is bounded on the west by the Pacific Ocean, on the 
north by Colombia, and on the east and south by Peru. Ecuador 
continues to contest the boundary with Peru, which was established 
by the Protocol of Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries (Rio Pro- 
tocol) of 1942 and ceded to Peru a large portion of territory east 
of the Andes (see Reform, Chaos, and Debacle, 1925-44, ch. 1). 

Natural Regions 

Ecuador is divided into three continental regions — the Costa, 
Sierra, and Oriente — and one insular region — the Galapagos Is- 
lands. The continental regions extend the length of the country 
from north to south and are separated by the Andes Mountains. 
The Galapagos Islands, officially called the Archipielago de Colon, 
are located 1,000 kilometers west of the Ecuadorian coast within 
1° south of the equator. 

The Costa, located between the Pacific Ocean and the Andes 
Mountains, consists of coastal lowlands, coastal mountains, and roll- 
ing hills that separate river valleys. The widest part of the region 
stretches 150 kilometers from Cabo San Lorenzo in Manabi Province 



54 



! 



i 



The Society and Its Environment 



to the foothills of the Andes Mountains. In the southern part of 
Guayas Province, east of the Gulf of Guayaquil, the narrow coastal 
plain is only fifteen to twenty kilometers wide. The lowlands of the 
Costa do not exceed 200 meters in elevation, whereas the coastal 
mountains extend no higher than 1,000 meters. The coastal moun- 
tain chain, known as the Cordillera Costanera, divides the region 
into the Costa Externa, next to the coast, and the Costa Interna, 
next to the Andes. The Cordillera Costanera reaches from Esmeral- 
das in the north to Guayaquil in the south. North of Portoviejo in 
Manabi Province, the Cordillera Costanera loses its character as 
a mountain chain and becomes a series of hills and small mountains. 

The Sierra consists of two major chains of the Andes mountains, 
known as the Cordillera Occidental (Western Chain) and Cordillera 
Oriental (Eastern Chain), and the intermontane basin or plateau 
between the two chains. Several transversal mountain spurs, known 
as nudos, cut across the plateau. The Nudo del Azuay, at 4,500 
meters the highest of these transversal spurs, divides the Sierra into 
two subregions — the area of modern volcanism to the north and 
the area of ancient volcanism to the south. The former area con- 
sists of newer, higher mountains than those in the ancient volcan- 
ism section, which with time have eroded to lower levels. 

The Sierra has at least twenty- two peaks over 4,200 meters in 
height. Of the two Cordilleras, the Cordillera Oriental is wider and 
generally higher, with peaks averaging over 4,000 meters. The Cor- 
dillera Occidental, however, contains the highest point in Ecua- 
dor, which is Mount Chimborazo at 6,267 meters. The Sierra also 
contains the highest point on the equator, Mount Cayambe at 5,790 
meters. 

The Sierra has at least thirty peaks of volcanic origin, including 
six still active. These peaks, which vary in width from 80 to 130 
kilometers, are located in the area of modern volcanism known as 
the Avenue of the Volcanos. The most active volcano is Mount 
Sangay, 5,230 meters high. Although its last major outpouring of 
lava occurred in 1946, specialists consider Mount Sangay to be in 
a constant state of eruption because of fires and bubbling lava at 
its crater. Mount Cotopaxi, at 5,897 meters the highest active vol- 
cano in the world, last erupted in 1877 and is now listed as * 'steam- 
ing." Its crater is 800 meters in diameter. In addition to the other 
damage caused by eruptions, volcanos in the Sierra have melted 
snowcaps, which in turn generate massive mudslides and ava- 
lanches. Earthquakes and tremors also are common in the region. 

The intermontane plateau between the two Cordilleras is divided 
by the nudos into roughly 10 basins, or hoy as, that range from 2,000 
to 3,000 meters in altitude. The average altitude of the plateau is 
2,650 meters. 



57 



Ecuador: A Country Study v 

The Oriente to the east of the Cordillera Oriental consists of two 
subregions: the Andean piedmont and the Eastern lowlands. The 
piedmont drops from a height of 3,000 meters to the featureless 
lowlands, which spread out at an altitude of 150 to 300 meters. 

The Galapagos Islands consist of a chain of large, medium, and 
small islands that have a combined area of roughly 8,000 square 
kilometers. The largest island is Isabela Island, also known as Albe- 
marle Island, which is 120 kilometers long with an area of 4,275 
square kilometers. All of the islands are of volcanic origin, and some 
have active cones. Santo Tomas, located on Isabela Island, is the 
highest peak of the Galapagos at 1,490 meters. Its crater is ten 
kilometers in diameter. 

Drainage 

Almost all of the rivers in Ecuador rise in the Sierra region and 
flow east toward the Amazon River or west toward the Pacific 
Ocean. The rivers rise from snowmelt at the edges of the snow- 
capped peaks or from the abundant precipitation that falls at higher 
elevations. In the Sierra region, the streams and rivers are narrow 
and flow rapidly over precipitous slopes. Rivers may slow and widen 
as they cross the hoyas yet become rapid again as they flow from 
the heights of the Andes to the lower elevations of the other regions. 
The highland rivers broaden as they enter the more level areas of 
the Costa and the Oriente. 

In the Costa region, the Costa Externa has mostly intermittent 
rivers that are fed by constant rains from December through May 
and become empty riverbeds during the dry season. The few ex- 
ceptions are the longer, perennial rivers that flow throughout the 
Costa Externa from the Costa Interna and the Sierra on their way 
to the Pacific Ocean. The Costa Interna, by contrast, is crossed 
by perennial rivers that may flood during the rainy season, some- 
times forming swamps. 

The Guayas River system, which flows southward to the Gulf 
of Guayaquil, constitutes the most important of the drainage sys- 
tems in the Costa Interna. The Guayas River Basin, including land 
drained by its tributaries, is 40,000 square kilometers in area. The 
sixty-kilometer-long Guayas River forms just north of Guayaquil 
out of the confluence of the Babahoyo and Daule rivers. Briefly con- 
stricted at Guayaquil by hills, the Guayas widens south of the city 
and flows through a deltaic network of small islands and channels. 
At its mouth, the river forms a broad estuary with two channels 
around Puna Island, the deeper of which is used for navigation. 

The second major Costa river system — the Esmeraldas — rises 
in the Hoya de Quito in the Sierra as the Guayllabamba River 
and flows westward to empty into the Pacific Ocean near the city 



58 



Mount Cotopaxi 
Courtesy Martie B. Lisowski Collection, 
Library of Congress 

of Esmeraldas. The Esmeraldas River is 320 kilometers long and 
has a 20, 000- square-kilometer drainage basin. 

Major rivers in the Oriente include the Pastaza, Napo, and Putu- 
mayo. The Pastaza is formed by the confluence of the Chambo and 
the Patate rivers, both of which rise in the Sierra. The Pastaza in- 
cludes the Agoyan waterfall, which at sixty-one meters is the highest 
waterfall in Ecuador. The Napo rises near Mount Cotopaxi and is 
the major river used for transport in the Eastern lowlands. The Napo 
ranges in width from 500 to 1 ,800 meters. In its upper reaches, the 
Napo flows rapidly until the confluence with one of its major tribu- 
taries, the Coca River, where it slows and levels off. The Putumayo 
forms part of the border with Colombia. All of these rivers flow into 
the Amazon River. 

The Galapagos Islands have no significant rivers. Several of the 
larger islands, however, have freshwater springs. 

Climate 

Each region has different factors that affect its climate. The Costa 
is influenced primarily by proximity to warm or cool ocean currents. 
By contrast, climate in the Sierra varies more as a function of alti- 
tude. The Oriente has a fairly uniform climate that varies only 



59 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

slightly between the two subregions. Climate in the Galapagos 
Islands is both moderated by the ocean currents and affected by 
altitude. Throughout Ecuador variation in rainfall primarily deter- 
mines seasons. Temperature is determined by altitude. With each 
ascent of 200 meters in altitude, temperature drops 1 °C. This phe- 
nomenon is particularly significant in the Sierra. 

The Costa has a tropical climate. Temperatures for the region 
as a whole remain fairly constant, ranging from 23°C in the south 
to 26°C in the north. Although seasonal changes in temperature 
are not pronounced, the hottest period occurs during the rainy sea- 
son, especially from February to April. Near Guayaquil, the coolest 
months are August and September. Rainfall in the Costa decreases 
from north to south, with vegetation changing from tropical rain- 
forest in the north to tropical savannah to desert in the south. 

Differences in temperature and rainfall in the Costa are caused 
by the Peruvian Current and periodic appearances of El Nino. The 
Peruvian Current, also formerly known as the Humboldt, is a cold 
ocean current that flows north along the coasts of Chile and Peru. 
At Cabo Blanco, where the Gulf of Guayaquil begins, the main 
current veers to the west; a branch continues northward to Cabo 
Pasado, in Manabi Province, where it also turns westward to merge 
with the main current near the Galapagos Islands. The cold water 
and air temperatures associated with the Peruvian Current inhibit 
rainfall along the coast, creating dry to arid conditions. This ef- 
fect is greatest along the southern coast of Ecuador. 

El Nino occurs periodically every six or seven years. Starting in 
late December, a change in atmospheric pressure shifts ocean cur- 
rents so that warm waters come closer to shore and displace the cold 
waters. During this time, air and water temperatures, tides, sea 
levels and wave heights, and relative humidity all are higher than 
usual. These conditions produce heavy rainfall that generally lasts 
until May in an area that normally experiences nothing more than 
a drizzle. The resulting flooding and landslides can be devastating. 

When the Peruvian Current is dominant, the amount of precipi- 
tation along the coast varies from north to south, with levels rang- 
ing from 300 centimeters to 30 centimeters, respectively. Two rainy 
seasons in the northernmost part of the coast become a single season 
(December through June) not far south. Near Esmeraldas, aver- 
age annual rainfall is 250 centimeters. The rainy season shortens 
farther south, lasting only from January to May at Guayaquil. Very 
little rainfall occurs on the end of the Santa Elena Peninsula west 
of Guayaquil. Arid conditions prevail on the border with Peru south 
of the Gulf of Guayaquil. 

Separated from the effects of ocean currents by the Cordi- 
llera Costanera, the Costa Interna has a hot and humid climate. 



60 



The Society and Its Environment 



Temperatures can surpass 26°C, and the vegetation and cloud cover 
tend to retain and augment the heat. Rain is constant during the 
winter months of December through May, with the heaviest rain- 
fall occurring in February and March. 

Temperatures in the Sierra do not vary greatly on a seasonal 
basis; the hottest month averages 16°C and the coolest month, 13°C 
in the upper elevations. Diurnal temperatures, however, vary dra- 
matically, from cold mornings to hot afternoons. The almost ver- 
tical sun and the rarified air in the higher Sierra region allow the 
land to warm quickly during the day and lose heat quickly at night. 
Mornings typically are bright and sunny, whereas afternoons often 
are cloudy and rainy. In general, rainfall amounts are highest on 
exposed locations at lower altitudes. Rain also can vary on a local 
basis. Sheltered valleys normally receive 50 centimeters per year, 
whereas annual rainfall is 1 50 centimeters in Quito and can reach 
250 centimeters on exposed slopes that catch rain-bearing winds. 
On a seasonal basis, the driest months are June through September. 

Climate in the Sierra is divided into levels based on altitude. 
The tropical level — 400 to 1,800 meters — has temperatures rang- 
ing from 20 °C to 25°C and heavy precipitation. The subtropical 
level— 1,800 to 2,500 meters— has temperatures from 15°C to 20°C 
and moderate precipitation. The temperate level — 2,500 to 3,200 
meters — has a year-round temperature in the range of 10°C to 15°C 
and an annual rainfall of 100 centimeters. The temperate level ex- 
periences rainstorms, hailstorms, and fog. Winter, or the rainy sea- 
son, lasts from January through June, and the dry season, or 
summer, from July through December. Most rain falls in April. 
There also is a short rainy period in early October caused by 
moisture penetrating the Sierra from the Oriente. Quito and most 
other populated areas in the Sierra are located at this temperate level. 
The cold level extends from the temperate zone to 4,650 meters. 
Here, average temperatures are 3°C to 9°C, and the precipitation 
often appears in the form of rain, hail, and thick fog. Above 4,650 
meters is the frozen level, where peaks are constantly capped with 
snow and ice, and temperatures range from below zero to 3°C. 
Precipitation frequently is in the form of snow, fog, and rain. 

The Eastern lowlands in the Oriente experience an equatorial 
climate. Rainfall is abundant, especially in the Andean piedmont, 
sometimes exceeding 500 centimeters per year. Temperatures aver- 
age 25°C in the western parts of this region. The jungle-covered 
plains of the Eastern lowlands register high levels of rainfall and 
temperatures surpassing 28°C. 

Being located on the equator, the Galapagos Islands would have 
an equatorial climate were it not for the modifying effects of the 
Peruvian Current. Instead, climate on the islands follows a pattern 



61 



Ecuador: A Country Study 




900 



600 300 300 
POPULATION IN THOUSANDS 



900 



Source: Based on information from Centro Latinoamericano de Demografta, Ecuador: Es- 
timaciones y Proyecciones de Poblacion, 1950-2000, Quito, 1984, 78-83. 



Figure 4. Projected Population by Age and Sex, 1990 



more like that of the Sierra than the Costa. At sea level, the land 
is desertlike with temperatures of 21°C. The eight summer months 
experience no precipitation, whereas the winter months of Janu- 
ary through April have some fog and drizzle. Above sea level to 
an altitude of 450 meters, the islands have a mixture of tropical, 
subtropical, and temperate climates. In general, temperatures are 
around 17°C. There is constant fog and drizzle in the summer and 
rain in the winter. The cold level above 450 meters has tempera- 
tures below 14°C. 

Population 

The government conducted national censuses in 1950, 1962, 
1974, and 1982 and scheduled another for 1990. In the late 1980s, 
estimates of total population by 1990 ranged from 10.8 to 11 mil- 
lion (see fig. 4). The annual growth rate was an estimated 2.3 to 



62 



The Society and Its Environment 



PER 1,000 POPULATION 
140 




50-55 55-60 60-65 65-70 70-75 75-80 80-85 85-90 90-95 95-2000 



% Crude Death Rate 




Crude Birth Rate 


Infant Mortality Rate 




Total Growth Rate 



Source: Based on information from Centro Latinoamericano de Demografla, Ecuador: Es- 
timaciones y Proyecciones de Poblacion, 1950-2000, Quito, 1984, 48, 62. 

Figure 5. Selected Demographic Indicators, at Five- Year Intervals, 
1950-2000 



2.8 percent. Population growth rates had been high since the onset 
of modern census-taking, with an increase of 3.2 percent annually 
in the 1960s and 3.0 percent in the 1970s. Demographers ex- 
pected the rate to decline to approximately 2.4 percent by the end 
of the century. Their estimates of total population in 2000 ranged 
from 13.6 to 14.2 million, with the lower figure more commonly 
accepted. 

Despite the declining growth rate, a variety of indicators from 
the 1980s showed the country to be in the midst of a population 
explosion that was likely to continue beyond the year 2000 (see 
fig. 5). Between the early 1950s and the mid-1980s, the crude death 
rate fell by nearly 60 percent. The infant mortality rate, which 
dropped by nearly half to approximately 63 per 1,000 live births 
in 1985, accounted for most of the decline. The crude birth rate 
dropped from 47 to 37 per 1 ,000 population during the same time; 



63 



Ecuador: A Country Study 




50-55 55-60 60-65 65-70 70-75 75-80 80-85 85-90 90-95 95-2000 




Source: Based on information from Centro Latinoamericano de Demograffa, Ecuador: Es- 
timaciones y Proyecciones de Poblacion, 1950-2000, Quito, 1984, 48, 62. 



Figure 6. Life Expectancy at Birth, by Five- Year Intervals, 1950-2000 

given the relative youthfulness of the population, however, growth 
rates could be expected to remain high for decades. Only Bolivia 
had a higher population birth rate among South American coun- 
tries. Life expectancy increased by more than 25 percent between 
the 1950s and the mid-1980s (see fig. 6). 

The total fertility rate (the number of children a woman could 
expect to bear during her life) dropped by an estimated one-third 
between 1950 and 1990 (see fig. 7). Socioeconomic background 
had a significant impact on the rate; the mean by region or ethnic 
group varied by as much as 3.5 children per woman. Estimates 
of the rate by the year 2000 ranged from 3.6 to 4.3 children per 
woman. 

The high rate of population growth generated pressure on the 
country's limited resources. Even assuming only moderate growth 



64 



The Society and Its Environment 




50-55 55-60 60-65 65-70 70-75 75-80 80-85 85-90 95-2000 



Total Fertility Rate 



Source: Based on information from Centro Latinoamericano de Demografia, Ecuador: Esti- 
mations y Proyecciones de Poblation, 1950-2000, Quito, 1984, 48, 62. 



Figure 7. Total Fertility Rate, at Five-Year Intervals, 1950-2000 

to the end of the century, the primary and secondary schools' budget 
would have to rise to 70 percent over that of 1980 to keep pace 
with population. Moreover, more than 120,000 new jobs would 
be required each year to maintain employment levels of the early 
1980s. 

Increasingly aware of the high costs of continued population 
growth, the government in the 1970s accepted in principle the need 
for family planning and control of child spacing and attempted to 
incorporate demographic variables into national economic plan- 
ning. Nonetheless, maternal and child health programs were often 
ineffective. A contraceptive practices survey in 1982 found that 65 
percent of the women not using contraceptives nevertheless wanted 
to participate in some form of family planning and would have 



65 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



220 




Sierra Costa Oriente 



Source: Based on information from Ecuador, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos, 
IV Censo Nacional de Poblaciony III de Vivienda, 1982 — Resumen Nacional: Breve Andli- 
sis de los Resultados Definitivos, Quito, 1985, 31. 

Figure 8. Population Distribution by Region, Census Years, 1950-82 



66 



The Society and Its Environment 

participated in family planning if a program were available. Given 
continued high birth rates, many demographers doubted govern- 
ment estimates that 40 percent of women of childbearing age were 
using contraceptives in the mid-1980s. 

Migration and Urbanization 

For most of Ecuador's history, the majority of the population 
lived in the Sierra. Most of the Sierra population was clustered 
in the more habitable hoy as. For example, the capital city, Quito, 
is located in a hoya at the foot of Mount Pichincha (see Geogra- 
phy, this ch.). 

From 1950 to 1974, however, large numbers of land-poor Sierra 
peasants migrated to the Costa; as a result, the Costa grew substan- 
tially faster than the nation as a whole (see table 2, Appendix). 
By the mid-1970s, population figures for the Sierra and the Costa 
were roughly similar. The Costa expanded only at roughly the na- 
tional average during the 1974-82 intercensal period. Nonetheless, 
by 1982 the Costa had become the most populated region in the 
country (see fig. 8). 

Migration (coupled with the high birth rate) transformed the 
country in the twentieth century. Costenos from the central region 
often migrated to Guayaquil and its hinterland following declines 
in export crop production. Serranos (residents of the Sierra) were 
often first "pulled" by the expanding coastal economy and then 
"pushed" by population pressure, agrarian reform, and modern- 
ization. The cocoa-producing areas of Guayas and El Oro pro- 
vinces — strategically located for those escaping the 1960s drought 
in Loja Province — became the most common destinations for serranos 
(see fig. 9). 

The cocoa boom of the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen- 
turies also had initiated a limited pattern of immigration to the 
Costa. Immigrants from Europe and Latin America generally ar- 
rived with capital to exploit the lucrative Costa commercial op- 
portunities. Significant numbers of Lebanese, referred to locally 
as turcos or arabes, also moved to Guayaquil and gained consider- 
able influence in coastal commerce and local politics. The Lebanese 
retained their ethnic identity and married within their own com- 
munity, and both their distinctiveness and their level of prosper- 
ity set them apart and made them the target of prejudice. 

Two distinct migration waves to the Oriente occurred in the twen- 
tieth century. In the early 1900s, some serranos trekked to the Oriente 
to pan gold and stayed to settle on the east slopes of the Andes. 
These migrants acquired land from the indigenous population and 



67 



Ecuador: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Ldnderbericht Ecuador, 1988, Wiesbaden, 1988, 8. 

Figure 9. Population Density, 1986 

set up small, largely subsistence-oriented farming communities. 
Beginning in the 1950s, large numbers of serranos arrived in search 
of available land; most simply went to the Oriente province most 
accessible to their place of origin. Between 1950 and 1982, the 
Oriente experienced a more than fivefold population increase. The 
growth rate averaged approximately 5.6 percent annually, nearly 
double that of the nation as a whole. By the mid-1970s, migrants 
constituted nearly half the region's residents. 

Beginning in the 1950s, large numbers of Ecuadorians also mi- 
grated from the countryside to the cities — a trend apparent in both 
the Costa and the Sierra. This migration changed life not only in 



68 



The Society and Its Environment 



the nation's two largest cities, Guayaquil and Quito, but also in 
intermediate -sized cities. 

Both Guayaquil and Quito reflected their different histories, their 
distinctive regional settings, and their roles in contemporary na- 
tional politics and economic development. Guayaquil was founded 
as a commercial link to Spain (see Spanish Colonial Era, ch. 1). 
The city's contemporary configuration began to take form with 
the beginning of cocoa production in the eighteenth century. Al- 
ways tied to international markets, Guayaquil's development re- 
flected the perturbations of whatever export crop was currently 
profitable. From the colonial era onward, Quito developed prin- 
cipally as an administrative center. As the capital city, Quito 
represented the epitome of the serrano elite's Hispanic values. 

From 1950 to 1982, the population of Guayaquil and Quito ex- 
panded at rates substantially above the national average. Guaya- 
quil's rate of growth was highest in the 1950s — a response to the 
rise in banana cultivation on the coast. Ecuador's oil boom of the 
1970s generated rapid population growth in Quito during that de- 
cade, a trend that continued into the early 1980s. By 1982 Guaya- 
quil's population stood at approximately 1.2 million residents and 
Quito's at roughly 870,000 (see table 3, Appendix). Together, they 
represented 60 percent of the urban population. 

Both cities faced a number of common problems resulting from 
the tremendous influx of migrants. The numbers of the poor em- 
ployed in marginal sectors and occupations increased to the point 
that they defeated the ability of Guayaquil and Quito governments 
to provide basic services and employment. Each city had a central 
core that was ringed with densely populated tenement slums. Much 
of the population of these slums consisted of relatively recent 
migrants. 

Another phenomenon affecting Guayaquil and Quito was the 
emergence of large squatter settlements on previously unoccupied 
marginal lands. The establishment of suburbio (the collective name 
for squatter settlements) in the marshy areas southwest of Guaya- 
quil proper began in the 1960s; by the early 1980s, suburbio had 
pushed into the Guayas River estuary and encompassed half of the 
metropolitan population. Although the older sections of suburbio had 
reasonably well-provisioned water lines, sewage disposal, and streets, 
newer communities lacked basic services. Those who had settled in 
the estuary system faced the added problem of persuading municipal 
authorities to provide landfill and to deal with periodic flooding. 
Quito municipal authorities tried to prevent the spread of squatter 
settlements up the mountainsides to the west of the city by strictly 
limiting the provision of water above certain altitudes. In addition, 



69 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

the government squelched numerous attempts by squatters to take 
over private or public lands. Despite these actions, however, set- 
tlements expanded throughout the 1970s and represented between 
10 and 15 percent of Quito's population by the mid-1980s. 

In contrast to much of Latin America, Ecuador's intermediate- 
sized cities experienced very high rates of growth after 1950. This 
was especially the case in the Costa, where the annual growth rate 
of intermediate-sized cities dwarfed even that of Guayaquil (see 
table 4, Appendix). Expansion of second-tier cities in the Costa 
resulted in part from export growth. In the 1950s and early 1960s, 
for example, the spread of banana cultivation and the increasing 
need for port facilities spurred the growth of cities like Santo Do- 
mingo, Quevedo, Esmeraldas, and Machala. In the 1970s and early 
1980s, Santo Domingo continued to grow as African palm planta- 
tions spread throughout its hinterland. Other coastal cities expanded 
in response to shrimp raising, fishing (and related industries), or 
tourism. 

In general, mid-sized cities in the Sierra were less dynamic than 
their Costa counterparts. From the mid-1950s to the early 1980s, 
only Cuenca — Ecuador's third largest city — achieved growth rates 
roughly comparable to that of Quito (see fig. 1). Agrarian reform 
and the reduction of the resident labor force on haciendas fostered 
expansion primarily of intermediate- sized cities in the Sierra. When 
employment opportunities existed, mid-sized cities drew migrants 
because they were closer to home, less disruptive to ties with the 
countryside, and less threatening than Guayaquil or Quito. 

Social Classes 
Elite 

Ecuador's elite, in the late 1980s, included Sierra latifundistas 
(large landowners), Costa agro-exporters, financiers, and indus- 
trialists. Commercial and industrial interests overlapped with those 
of agriculture, as families in finance and industry often maintained 
at least a token interest in agriculture. Indeed, the purchase of land 
with the profits of commerce had long been considered a critical 
step in improving a family's standing. In addition to this overlap, 
there were strong intragroup ties among the elite; kinship and mar- 
riage contributed to cohesion. Newly rich families tried to turn their 
economic success into social capital by marrying into older, estab- 
lished families. 

Historically, the basis of class in Ecuador lay in the control of 
land and the labor of those who lived on it. The Spanish con- 
quistadors had found the region devoid of valuable minerals and 



70 



The Society and Its Environment 



the ready wealth mining provided, so the combination of land and 
Indians welded together in vast haciendas formed the basis of the 
colonial economy. The few who held land constituted a rural oli- 
garchy. The rest of society depended on this pivotal group, in 
varying degrees, for livelihood, political participation, and social 
identity. Hacienda owners spent much of their time in their urban 
residences; cities existed principally to serve their wants. The small, 
ill-defined middle levels of urban professionals found employment 
serving the commercial and administrative needs of the hacienda. 
Artisans likewise produced mainly for hacendados. 

The hacienda with its resident labor force was the center of the 
Sierra elite family's influence. The landowner's power within his 
domain was nearly absolute. Ideally, the hacendado exercised this 
power beneficently, to protect his followers and dependents. What- 
ever his inclination, everything from private morality to public re- 
ligious observances fell within his purview. He settled land disputes 
among his resident peons, arranged marriages, and dispensed 
favors. 

The Costa elite's lifestyle, values, and economic interests differed 
from its Sierra counterpart. Trade grew on the coast in response 
to the impetus of export agriculture. As a result, the elite on the 
coast had ties to other Latin American seaports and links with world 
commerce. 

The cleavage between the two elite groups, in evidence at in- 
dependence, continued to play a pivotal role in Ecuadorian poli- 
tics in the 1980s (see Return to Democratic Rule, 1979-84, ch. 1; 
Political Dynamics, ch. 4). Governments parceled out political 
offices between the two groups, and region of origin was a critical 
factor in an individual's political career. Economic developments 
since the 1950s reinforced the dichotomies between the Costa and 
Sierra. The banana boom of the 1950s and 1960s revived the Costa 
cocoa elite and funneled money to Guayaquil; in contrast, the oil 
boom of the 1970s benefited Quito. 

Agrarian organization provided the model for other social insti- 
tutions and the exercise of authority in general. Social rank and 
power, in the elite view, were a natural part of the social order. 
Individuals were ranked on the basis of birth, race, wealth, breed- 
ing, and education. The elite (and middle class) often described 
itself as la gente buena (the good people) or la gente decente (the respec- 
table people), contending that it had sufficient breeding, intelli- 
gence, and culture to rule others. The subordination of workers, 
peasants, servants, and all Indians was an essential part of this 
scheme. In the elite view, gains achieved by subordinates came 
not as their natural right but through the beneficence of their betters. 



71 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

Land reform legislation in the 1960s and 1970s left elite hege- 
mony in agriculture and landholding largely unscathed. For one 
thing, Costa and Sierra landholders mounted an intense effort to 
oppose those elements of agricultural reform that threatened their 
diverse interests. For another, the laws were designed to benefit 
resident agricultural laborers, but on most of the coast and on the 
more advanced haciendas of the northern and central Sierra, land- 
owners had already begun switching to wage labor, so there were 
few peons and sharecroppers to receive expropriated land. Instead, 
the legislation merely freed the owners from their customary ob- 
ligations to resident laborers. Land reform eliminated the pater- 
nal obligations landowners had previously assigned toward their 
workers. 

The landed elite benefited in a number of others ways as well. 
The price paid in compensation for expropriated private land was 
often inflated well above market value. Well-connected landlords 
usually fared better in the courts than their less-privileged tenants. 
Those peasants who received land rarely became self-supporting 
and had to supplement their subsistence plots with seasonal wage 
labor elsewhere. Large landowners gained a supply of temporary 
wage laborers with limited political ability to make demands be- 
yond a single season's work. . 

Middle Class 

Ecuador's diverse middle class was concentrated in cities and 
larger towns. A minute, ill-defined group during most of the coun- 
try's history, its numbers grew in the twentieth century. In the late 
1970s, estimates based on income indicated that roughly 20 per- 
cent of the population was middle class. Economic expansion in- 
creased the opportunities available to the able and ambitious. The 
rapid increase in government employment contributed both to the 
size of the middle class in absolute numbers and to the group's 
political awareness. The rise of a middle class whose interests were 
not those of the rural oligarchy transformed national politics. 

Businessmen, professionals, clerical employees, mid-level bureau- 
crats and managers, army officers, and teachers comprised the mid- 
dle levels of society. They constituted a diverse group, often poorly 
defined in terms of both self-identity and criteria for membership. 
At a minimum, an individual had attained a certain level of edu- 
cation (at least a secondary school degree), practiced an occupa- 
tion that did not require manual labor, and manifested proper 
manners and dress to be considered middle class. 

The upper echelons frequently identified with and emulated the 



72 



The Society and Its Environment 



elite. By contrast, the lower levels of the middle class often made 
common cause with the more prosperous segments of the working 
class. The cleavage between these two groups — a prosperous, upper- 
middle class oriented toward the elite and a less economically se- 
cure lower group often allied with the more privileged sectors of 
the working class — was reflected in lifestyle, patterns of associa- 
tion, and political loyalties. 

In addition to the economic division, an ethnic component 
emerged in the ranking of the various levels of the middle class. 
In general, individuals became more "white" and less obviously 
mestizo farther up the social ladder. In addition, the middle class 
was ethnically more diverse than other groups. Over the years, im- 
migrants from southern Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere 
in Latin America arrived to take advantage of expanding economic 
opportunities on the Costa. These immigrants formed the core of 
Ecuador's commercial interests. 

Peasants 

Until the early 1950s, peasant families formed the vast majority 
of the populace. Historically, these families were isolated from na- 
tional society, a pattern reinforced by the nature of traditional rural 
social life. Social arrangements aimed at self-defense limited the 
intrusions of outsiders. The individual "nested" within the pro- 
tective layers of family, kin, neighborhood, and village. 

Peasant links to city, region, and nation were mediated through 
powerful outsiders, such as foremen, landowners, merchants, priests, 
or law enforcement officials. Such relations were typically exploita- 
tive to the peasant, but they were also multistranded. However un- 
even the exchange, the two parties were linked by more than just 
the naked self-interest of the powerful. 

At the center of the peasant family's life and livelihood stood 
access to land. Landholding not only assured the family subsis- 
tence, but also defined its status within the community. Adult par- 
ticipation in village social life demanded land; nonholders remained 
peripheral to the most significant aspects of the community's so- 
cial life, such as participation in justice. 

Elite control over most land, however, left those at the bottom 
of the social pyramid with limited options and created the classic 
latifundio-minifundio (small landholding) complex. Large landhold- 
ers monopolized the most desirable holdings and left marginal 
lands to peasants. Sierra haciendas extended from valley floor to 
mountain crest. The fertile valley bottoms were assigned to haci- 
enda production whereas the steeper lands went to peons. Costa 



73 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



plantation owners reached the same end by controlling riverine land 
with ready access to markets. 

Historically, the traditional Sierra hacienda engaged in mixed 
livestock and crop production and relied on a "captive" labor force. 
On the eve of land reform in the 1960s, about two-thirds of all farm- 
ers owned some land, but still remained dependent to varying 
degrees on haciendas. Haciendas regulated access to land mainly 
through the huasipungo system. The huasipunguero or concierto peon 
was a resident laborer who received a plot of land in return for 
labor on the hacienda and domestic service in the landlord's house- 
hold. Although precise terms of tenure varied from valley to val- 
ley and from time to time, they were typically disadvantageous to 
the peon. The huasipunguero usually had to provide four days of work 
per week to the hacienda as well as domestic service — an especially 
onerous obligation that required both husband and wife to work 
full time at hacienda maintenance for a specified period. Finally, 
peons had to participate in collective work parties during planting 
and harvesting. 

A variety of subsidiary arrangements provided an auxiliary sup- 
ply of laborers. Peasants from neighboring free communities often 
negotiated for the use of hacienda firewood, water, and pastures. 
These peasants, known as yanaperos, typically worked one or two 
days per month and helped out at planting and harvest times. Other 
peasants worked hacienda lands through some type of sharecrop- 
ping arrangement. Some casual wage laborers or skilled specialists 
were employed as production dictated, but these constituted a very 
minor part of the hacienda's total labor force. 

The classic huasipungo system continued in use in the 1960s in 
relatively remote but well-populated valleys. Near towns, where 
other employment was available, smaller holdings and more diverse 
tenure arrangements typically prevailed. Merchants and other 
townsmen frequently owned small parcels of land, which peasants 
worked through sharecropping agreements. Typically, the share- 
cropper had lands of his own nearby; he provided labor, draft 
animals, tools, seed, and fertilizer. The landowner and sharecropper 
split the harvest. 

Landowners who wished to exploit the growing urban market 
(especially for dairy products) found it more profitable to consoli- 
date their holdings and sell the less desirable plots to their peons. 
This process of transferring marginal hacienda land to peasants 
was most evident in Pichincha, Imbabura, and Carchi provinces. 
Elsewhere (in Chimborazo, for example) landlords simply evicted 
peons and refused to compensate them, treatment that fueled peas- 
ant unionization drives. 



74 



A man in Esmeraldas Province 
Courtesy Inter-American 
Foundation (Juan Garcia) 



A hostel for migrant 
workers in Guayaquil 
Courtesy Inter-American 
Foundation (Miguel Sayago) 




Ecuador: A Country Study 

Sharecropping and wage labor arrangements historically pre- 
vailed on the export-oriented Costa plantations. In the late nine- 
teenth and early twentieth centuries, a cocoa boom occurred in the 
Costa. Sharecroppers on cocoa plantations cultivated the crop in 
exchange for advances on the harvest. Plantation owners controlled 
most marketing channels; their economic clout came not merely 
from landholding, but because rental agreements typically obliged 
the sharecropper to sell at terms set by the landlord. 

Landlords' effective control over sharecroppers declined following 
the 1922 blight of the cocoa crop. Sharecroppers either purchased 
their plots, simply assumed control of them, changed the terms of 
their rental agreements, or they moved onto unoccupied land. As 
cocoa prices rose in the 1950s, however, landowners attempted to 
reinstate their control. Tenants responded with efforts to unionize 
and, by the early 1960s, with land invasions and rent strikes. Work- 
ers on banana plantations, which developed in the 1950s employ- 
ing wage labor, also tried to unionize. 

Land reform legislation in the 1960s and the 1970s aimed at 
eliminating minifundio plots under 4.8 hectares and subjected ab- 
sentee landholders to the threat of expropriation. The threat 
prompted some landlords to sell off at least a portion of their hold- 
ings; the main beneficiaries were peasants who could muster suffi- 
cient resources to purchase land. Land reform also eliminated the 
various demands for time that landlords had placed on peasants. 
By 1979, however, when most expropriations were completed, less 
than 20 percent of peasant families and 15 percent of agricultural 
land had been affected by agrarian reform. The legislation did lit- 
tle to change the structure of landholding, which remained roughly 
as concentrated in the mid-1970s as it had been in the mid-1950s 
(see table 5, Appendix). Nearly 350,000 farms contained less than 
five hectares — the minimum experts considered necessary to sup- 
port a family. Almost 150,000 plots were less than one hectare. 

The degree of land fragmentation in the Sierra added to the 
problems of poorer farmers. Andeans had long preferred some dis- 
persion of their lands in order to take advantage of the diversity 
in microclimates in the region and to limit the risks to any given 
field. A family might have as many as twenty to thirty small fields 
scattered around a village. In addition to the poor farmers, there 
were more than 220,000 landless laborers whose situation was even 
more tenuous. 

For the mass of small producers, agrarian reform simply increased 
the amount of time available to work on their own holdings. Most 
had so little land, however, that their own farms could hardly ab- 
sorb the added labor. Some peasants, especially in the northern 



76 



Crowds line the street at the main market in Guayaquil 

Courtesy World Bank 



11 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



Sierra around Otavalo, supplemented their farming with profit- 
able crafts production. Other families produced items such as bricks 
and tiles for which there was a local market. In these instances, 
then, additional time afforded a measure of prosperity. A survey 
of Sierra families in the early 1980s found, however, that fewer 
than 1 percent earned any of their income from traditional rural 
crafts. Instead, families with sufficient resources might purchase 
a small truck and market agricultural products. 

The mass of small farmers were not so fortunate; those who did 
not have any plots to work or whose plots were too small to pro- 
vide subsistence had to seek wage labor, since land reform regula- 
tions had deprived them of the option of working on haciendas as 
peons or sharecroppers. By the mid-1970s, wages, not agricultural 
products, had become the largest portion of small farmers' income. 
As nonagricultural employment expanded during the oil boom, 
peasant laborers increasingly chose urban employment over agricul- 
tural work. Fully one-third of all rural Sierra families surveyed in 
the early 1980s had at least one member working away from the 
family landholdings. Peasant laborers had enjoyed a measure of 
well-being during the economic growth of the 1970s. Both the con- 
struction and the service sectors expanded apace and cushioned 
land-poor peasants. The economic downturn that occurred in the 
1980s, however, hit wage earners particularly hard and severely 
limited employment opportunities. 

In the late 1970s, analysts estimated that between 370,000 and 
570,000 rural Ecuadorian families lived in poverty. The worst levels 
of Sierra poverty were found in Chimborazo Province. Poverty in 
the Sierra correlated with altitude: the higher the family's hold- 
ings, the more limited its production options and the greater its 
poverty. Access to modern transportation was a main determinant 
of farm income in the Costa. The poorest coastal areas were found 
in isolated settlements, fishing towns, and villages in Esmeraldas 
Province. 

The emergence of crafts as a major component in some peasant 
families' livelihood created the potential for intergenerational con- 
flict. Children learned new production techniques in school that 
sometimes increased their own earning power beyond that of their 
parents. As some family members sought wage labor farther from 
home, those remaining relied more heavily on nonfamily wage 
laborers to assist with farming. Cooperative work exchanges de- 
clined in favor of hired casual labor. 

The increased pressure on land also sharpened disputes about 
inheritance and divisions among siblings. Traditionally, inheritance 
provided the main means of access to land. Individuals began 



78 



The Society and Its Environment 



receiving parcels of land from their parents at marriage. Without 
sufficient land, a couple could not fulfill the wider obligations of 
sharing and reciprocity that were part of community-wide fiestas. 
With less land available, moreover, parents tended to favor the 
youngest son — the child who would stay at home and care for them 
in their old age. Older siblings increasingly fended for themselves 
or depended on the largess of the younger sibling. 

The need for wage labor in the Sierra reinforced traditional 
patron-client ties. Former peons found themselves and their chil- 
dren dependent on powerful and influential outsiders as they had 
once been on landowners. Clientalistic bonds linked the powerless 
with those who could help them in finding work, emergency loans, 
and other forms of assistance (see Family and Kin, this ch.). 

Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the government pinned 
most of its hopes for a relief of rural poverty not on land redistri- 
bution but on colonization of relatively underpopulated regions, 
especially the Oriente. By the late 1970s, the Ecuadorian Institute 
of Agrarian Reform and Settlement (Instituto Ecuatoriano de Re- 
forma Agraria y Colonization — IERAC) had awarded 2.5 times 
more land in areas of new settlement than it had redistributed in 
agricultural reform zones. Further, colonists normally received a 
forty- to fifty-hectare parcel in contrast to the minifundio typically 
awarded former sharecroppers or huasipungueros. Land distribution 
in the Oriente was more equal than in either the Costa or the Sierra. 
The average Oriente holding in the mid-1970s was thirty hectares. 
Farms from 10 to 100 hectares — 65 percent of all holdings — ac- 
counted for 83 percent of the agricultural land. 

Migrants to the Oriente were typically males between the ages 
of twenty-five and forty with little land in their home communi- 
ties. They began homesteading with a small amount of savings ac- 
cumulated through agricultural wage labor. Migrants cleared as 
much land as they could on their parcel and brought their families 
to join them as soon as possible. As savings were exhausted, 
migrants had frequent recourse to wage labor either for oil com- 
panies or for more established settlers. 

The Oriente 's poorly developed transport and marketing infra- 
structure severely constrained Sierra migrants (see Transportation, 
ch. 3). Settlements typically consisted of a series of long, narrow 
parcels of land strung along both sides of a road. Roadside land 
was at a premium; as it was claimed, subsequent settlers repeated 
the same pattern of narrow rectangular holdings behind those al- 
ready established. In the more heavily settled areas, homesteads 
stood four to six properties deep by the late 1970s. Colonists at 
farthest remove were six to ten kilometers from an all-weather 



79 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

road — a significant impediment in marketing their crops and in- 
creasing family income. 

Workers 

The urban lower class had its roots, as a distinct social group, 
in the artisans of colonial society. Artisans were ethnically and so- 
cially separate from the mass of Indian laborers employed in the 
textile factories. Typically lower-class Spaniards or mestizos, arti- 
sans provided the urban elite with finished goods, especially lux- 
ury items. They were politically powerless. The local municipal 
council (cabildo) controlled the movement of artisans from their city 
of residence and regulated the details of workshop organization, 
labor practices, prices, and production. 

The urban working class took on its contemporary configura- 
tion with the onset of industrialization in the twentieth century. 
Manufacturing remained heavily in the hands of artisans, but large- 
scale industries such as food processing, textiles, and the railroads 
began to employ significant numbers of workers. 

A renewed industrialization drive beginning in the 1950s, in- 
creased levels of rural to urban migration, and the oil development 
of the 1970s all contributed to the growth and diversity of the con- 
temporary urban working class. Workers in stable, well-established 
enterprises represented the most heavily unionized portion of the 
lower class and counted as an articulate, well-organized voice in 
political affairs. These employees earned steady wages and received 
the benefits of social security and worker protection legislation (see 
Political Forces and Interest Groups, ch. 4). 

Few workers enjoyed such benefits, however; the vast majority 
were classified as artisans or self-employed. Artisan firms ran the 
gamut from small, family-run businesses to middling manufactur- 
ing enterprises employing as many as thirteen workers. Self- 
employment typically offered littie in the way of economic security. 
The mass of street vendors, carpenters, tailors, painters, and the 
like worked long hours for low earnings. In the mid-1970s, nearly 
one-quarter of peddlers were classified as living in poverty; more 
than 30 percent of craftsmen and artisans also fell below the poverty 
line. 

In addition to economic differences, the various segments of the 
working class were divided in other ways. Clerical workers and most 
white-collar workers considered themselves as superior to the rest 
of the working class because of education and, frequently, ethnic 
affiliation. The needs of wage earners for benefits and a living wage 
often conflicted with the interests of the more prosperous artisans, 
who needed to hire cheap labor. 



80 



Selling roasted bananas in Guayaquil 
Courtesy World Bank 



81 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

The volume of permanent and temporary migration from the 
1960s to the 1980s changed the configuration of the urban work- 
ing class. Temporary was a relative concept for many migrants: 
for example, surveys of Quito temporary construction workers in 
the early 1980s found they had worked in the city for an average 
of six years. Migrants followed a well- trod path to urban employ- 
ment, relying on fellow villagers and kin who had made the tran- 
sition earlier. 

The informal sector offered a haven of sorts to many unskilled 
and uneducated migrants and first-time job seekers. Although 
fiercely competitive and usually poorly remunerated, it fit with the 
limited capital commanded by most of these workers. It cost rela- 
tively little to build a kiosk and stock it with secondhand goods, 
clothes, newspapers, and the like. Some ambulatory vendors or 
kiosk sellers obtained higher-cost items on consignment. Only a 
minimal cash outlay was required to repair electrical appliances 
in a corner of one's home or to do laundry or cook and sell food. 
Such endeavors also permitted the use of unremunerated family 
labor and, for women, meshed well with the demands of child care. 
Migrants also gained an entry into the city by selling fruits and 
vegetables from their villages. 

The construction boom fueled by oil development in the 1970s 
generated considerable employment for temporary migrants to 
Quito. Labor contractors congregated at certain well-known meet- 
ing places in the city to gather the workers they needed. Construc- 
tion offered unskilled recent male migrants (and minimally educated 
first-time job seekers in general) positions that were poorly remuner- 
ated, insecure, nonunionized, and untouched by most worker pro- 
tection legislation. Nonetheless, such work provided the beginning 
of an urban livelihood. A fortunate migrant might form compadrazgo 
(the set of relationships between a person or couple, their parents, 
and their godparents) ties with a labor contractor — thus obtaining 
a better chance at regular employment. Some seemingly menial 
jobs, depending on the individual's circumstances, offered signifi- 
cant advantages. To receive a hut on the job premises in order to 
guard the construction materials and tools at night, for example, 
solved the worker's housing dilemma and allowed him to bring his 
wife, who then could earn income by cooking and washing for other 
laborers. Migrants who stayed in the city usually became master 
craftsmen in a construction trade, but some, especially those who 
remained identifiably Indian, often remained in menial employ- 
ment. 

Both temporary and permanent migrants sought to maintain 
ties with families in the countryside. Temporary migrants' work 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



schedules remained tied to the agricultural cycle. Those workers 
returned home for planting and harvest and, whenever possible, 
weekend visits. A migrant's involvement in farm work was a sen- 
sitive barometer of his or her ultimate intentions. An end to rou- 
tine participation in the agricultural cycle marked completion of 
the gradual switch from temporary to permanent city dweller. 
Although most migrants did not send remittances home, those who 
did increased the earnings of a one- to five-hectare plot by an aver- 
age of one-third. Even permanent migrants occasionally returned 
to the village for the local patron saint's feast. If a migrant had 
enough money, he or she bought land — typically leaving the hold- 
ings to be farmed by a relative. 

Workers made some gains during the economic expansion of the 
1970s. Employment was plentiful, and earnings generally kept pace 
with inflation. Even this prosperity was relative, however; in 1975, 
for example, 43 percent of the urban work force received less than 
the minimum wage. The economic crisis of the early and mid-1980s 
hit the working class particularly hard. The number of workers 
totally unemployed reached 10 percent in 1986. Those classified 
as "subemployed by income" rose from 29 percent of the work 
force in 1970 to 40 percent in 1980. By the end of 1986, the aver- 
age worker's salary met roughly half of a family's basic needs. 

Ethnic Groups 

The country's ethnic groups descended from Spanish coloniz- 
ers and South American Indians; indeed, the relationship between 
the two groups defined Ecuador's subsequent pattern of ethnicity. 
The mix of these groups created a third category, described vari- 
ously as mestizos or cholos. The fourth element consisted of descen- 
dants of black slaves who arrived to work on coastal plantations 
in the sixteenth century. Censuses did not record ethnic affiliation, 
which in any event remained fluid; thus, estimates of the numbers 
of each group should be taken only as approximations. In the 1980s, 
Indians and mestizos represented the bulk of the population, with 
each group accounting for roughly 40 percent of total population. 
Whites represented 10 to 15 percent and blacks the remaining 5 
percent. 

The precise criteria for defining ethnic groups varied consider- 
ably. The vocabulary that more prosperous mestizos and whites 
used in describing ethnic groups mixed social and biological charac- 
teristics. Typically, higher-status whites considered their own po- 
sitions as derived from a superior racial background. Nonetheless, 
ethnic affiliation remained dynamic; Indians often became mestizos, 
and prosperous mestizos sought to improve their status sufficiently 



83 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

to be considered whites. Ethnic identity reflected numerous charac- 
teristics, only one of which was physical appearance; others included 
dress, language, community membership, and self-identification. 

No pretense to equality or egalitarianism existed in ethnic rela- 
tions. From the perspective of those in the upper echelons, the rank- 
ing of ethnic groups was undisputed: whites, mestizos, blacks, and 
Indians. As the self-proclaimed standard bearers of civilization, 
whites contended that only they manifested proper behavior, an 
appropriate sense of duty to family and kin, and the values integral 
to the Christian, European culture. 

As with much of social life, this particular view of ethnicity had 
strongly feudal overtones. The conquistadors accepted and lauded 
hierarchy and rank. Their success in subduing the Inca Empire 
made them lords of the land and justified holding Indians as serfs, 
to serve as a cheap source of labor. Although individuals might 
change their position in the hierarchy, social mobility itself was 
not positively viewed. The movement of individuals up and down 
the social scale was regrettable — ideally, a person should be con- 
tent with, and maintain, his or her assigned role in the social order. 

The geography of ethnicity remained well-defined until the surge 
in migration that began in the 1950s. Whites resided primarily in 
larger cities. Mestizos lived in small towns scattered throughout 
the countryside. Indians formed the bulk of the Sierra rural popu- 
lace, although mestizos filled this role in the areas with few Indians. 
Most blacks lived in Esmeraldas Province, with small enclaves found 
in Carchi and Imbabura provinces. Pressure on Sierra land re- 
sources and the dissolution of the traditional hacienda, however, 
increased the numbers of Indians migrating to the Costa, the 
Oriente, and the cities. By the 1980s, Sierra Indians — or Indians 
in the process of switching their ethnic identity to that of mestizos — 
lived on Costa plantations, in Quito, Guayaquil, and other cities, 
and in colonization areas in the Oriente and the Costa. Indeed, 
Sierra Indians residing in the coastal region substantially outnum- 
bered the remaining original Costa inhabitants, the Cayapa and 
Colorado Indians. In the late 1980s, analysts estimated that there 
were only about 4,000 Cayapas and Colorados. Some blacks had 
migrated from the remote region of the Ecuadorian-Colombian 
border to the towns and cities of Esmeraldas. 

Whites and Mestizos 

Whites constituted the most privileged ethnic group and occupied 
the top of Ecuador's social pyramid. Despite their own realization 
that there was an admixture of Indian genes in their heritage, whites 
placed considerable emphasis on their purported purity of blood 



84 



The Society and Its Environment 



and Spanish ancestry. Although whites shared a common cultural 
background, differences in class and regional loyalties — especially 
the split between Quito and Guayaquil — remained important. 

In general, financially successful whites were employed as high- 
status professionals, government officials, prosperous merchants, 
and financiers. In the white ideal, manual labor was viewed as 
degrading and evidence of an inability to maintain a proper lifestyle. 
Accordingly, business interests were geared toward maintaining 
the family's social status rather than the pursuit of economic suc- 
cess for its own sake. 

Below the white elite, but merging with it, were mestizos or cholos. 
Mestizos shared, to a large extent, a common set of values and 
a general cultural orientation with whites. Indeed, the boundary 
between the two groups remained fluid. Geography also played 
a role. In the smaller towns of the Sierra, those of mixed ancestry 
would call themselves whites, but they would be considered as 
mestizos by whites of larger cities or by those with more clearly 
superior social status. Income and lifestyle also constituted impor- 
tant factors; a wealthy mestizo might be called a white, whereas 
a poorer one would be classified as a mestizo. Those in rural areas 
sometimes distinguished between "whites" and "legitimate whites." 
The latter could demonstrate to the satisfaction of the local com- 
munity that their parents were considered white. Differing views 
of ethnicity partially reflected status differences between those 
involved in a given exchange. Hacienda foremen, for example, typi- 
cally thought of themselves as whites. Although Indians would agree 
with that classification, hacendados regarded foremen as mestizos. 

The terminology and categories themselves derived from colonial 
legal distinctions. Peninsulares (Spanish-born persons residing in the 
New World) ranked at the top of the social hierarchy. They en- 
joyed a range of legal privileges and status denied even wealthy 
criollos born of Spanish parents in the colonies. The pedigree of 
forebears defined status at every level. Individuals were ranked by 
the number of grandparents legally classified as white. 

Common usage, however, modified the categories through the 
centuries. In the nineteenth century, for example, the term mestizo 
described a person whose parents were an Indian and a white. In 
contrast, a cholo was one whose parents were an Indian and a 
mestizo. By the twentieth century, the terms mestizo and cholo were 
frequently used interchangeably. On occasion, however, some peo- 
ple used cholo in a derogatory sense to describe an Indian trying 
to rise above his or her proper station. Other people might use cholo 
to designate an intermediate category between Indian and mestizo. 



85 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

As with whites, facility in Spanish, urban orientation, livelihood, 
manners, and fineness of clothing defined mestizo identity. Tradi- 
tionally, mestizos filled the intermediate occupations, serving as 
clerks, small merchants, hacienda foremen, and low-ranking 
bureaucrats. Although mestizos were assumed to be of mixed 
Indian-white ancestry, an Indian might gradually become mestizo 
by abandoning his or her previous lifestyle. 

Usually, individuals desiring to switch ethnic affiliation had to 
leave their villages, learn Spanish well enough to mask their ori- 
gin, and acquire a mestizo occupation. They also had to acquire 
sufficient finesse and confidence in dealing with whites and mestizos 
not to be marked as Indians. It was virtually impossible for an In- 
dian to change ethnic identity in his or her home community. No 
improvement in expertise, level of education, or facility in Span- 
ish would cause locals to treat one born an Indian as a mestizo. 

In special circumstances, individuals could move from one group 
to the other without leaving their communities. For example, the 
Saraguro Indians of southern Ecuador were generally more prosper- 
ous than local whites. Indeed, the latter either depended on the 
Saraguros for their livelihood or lived in communities where typi- 
cally most of the populace was Indian. As a result, a distinctive 
pattern of ethnic change prevailed. Some whites opted to become 
Indians, usually improving their economic options in the process. 
A few Indians decided to improve their ethnic status and became 
white. The switch was made, however, without resort to subter- 
fuge. Indians did not hide their origins or leave their home com- 
munities. 

Blacks 

Approximately one-half million blacks lived on the north coast 
and its riparian hinterlands. They were the descendants of Afri- 
can slaves who worked on coastal sugar plantations in the sixteenth 
century. Blacks held a slightly higher position in the ethnic hierar- 
chy than Indians, manifesting little of the subservience that charac- 
terized Indians in dealing with whites and mestizos. Few readily 
identifiable elements of African heritage remained, although ob- 
servers noted aspects of dance, music, and magical belief that 
represented purported vestiges of African influence. Some linguists 
saw evidence of an "Africanized" Spanish in the dialects spoken 
by those blacks living in the more remote areas. 

Most blacks earned their livelihood in subsistence agriculture 
supplemented by wage labor, fishing, and work on cargo boats. 
Women on the coast earned income through shellfish gathering. 
Before the onslaught of Sierra to Costa migration in the 1960s and 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



1970s, some black males earned their living running small stores 
and cantinas, and others served as intermediaries between black 
laborers and white and mestizo employers. White and mestizo 
migrants, however, took over virtually all small-scale commerce 
and marketing efforts and increasingly served as employment 
brokers. The switch made skin color more important as an ethnic 
marker, with light-skinned blacks enjoying greater opportunities 
for mobility than those with darker skin. 

Sierra Indians 

Sierra Indians had an estimated population of 1.5 to 2 million 
in the early 1980s and lived in the intermontane valleys of the 
Andes. Prolonged contact with Hispanic culture, which dated back 
to the conquest, had a homogenizing effect, reducing the varia- 
tion among the indigenous Sierra tribes. 

The Indians of the Sierra were separated from whites and mes- 
tizos by a castelike gulf. They were marked as a disadvantaged 
group; to be an Indian, or indigena, in Ecuador was to be stigma- 
tized. Indians were usually poor and frequently illiterate, they en- 
joyed limited participation in national institutions, and they 
commanded access to few of the social and economic opportuni- 
ties available to more privileged groups. 

Visible markers of ethnic affiliation, especially hairstyle, dress, 
and language, separated Indians from the rest of the populace. In- 
dians wore more manufactured items by the late 1970s than previ- 
ously; their clothing, nonetheless, was distinct from that of other 
rural inhabitants. Indians in communities relying extensively on 
wage labor sometimes assumed Western-style dress while still main- 
taining their Indian identity. Indians spoke Quichua — a Quechua 
dialect — although most were bilingual, speaking Spanish as a sec- 
ond language with varying degrees of facility. By the late 1980s, 
some younger Indians no longer learned Quichua. 

Most whites and mestizos viewed Indians as inherently inferior. 
Some regarded indigenas as little better than a subspecies. A more 
benign perspective condescendingly considered the Indian as an 
intellectual inferior, an emotional child in need of direction. Such 
views underlay the elaborate public etiquette required in Indian- 
white/mestizo interactions. Common practice allowed whites and 
mestizos to use first names and familiar verb and pronoun forms 
in addressing Indians. 

Although public deference to other ethnic groups supported 
stereotypes of Indians as intellectually inferior, Indians viewed def- 
erence as a survival strategy. Deference established that an indi- 
vidual Indian was properly humble and deserving of the white's 



87 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

or mestizo's aid and intercession. Given the relative powerlessness 
of Indians, such an approach softened the rules governing inter- 
ethnic exchanges. 

The tenor of such exchanges differed in cases of limited haci- 
enda dominance. The Otavalos of northern Ecuador, the Saraguros, 
and the Salaacas in the central Sierra resisted hacienda intrusion 
and domination by whites and mestizos. These Indians were thus 
less inclined to be subservient and adopted instead an attitude of 
aloofness or distance in dealing with whites and mestizos. 

Most Indians, however, could improve their situation only by 
changing their ethnic affiliation. Such a switch in allegiances was 
fraught with risk, since individuals thereby lost the security offered 
by their small community of family and neighbors. Many rejected 
such an extreme move and instead made a series of accommoda- 
tions such as changing their dress and hairstyle while working for 
brief periods away from home and gradually increasing the length 
of their absences. 

By the early 1980s, changes in Indian ethnic consciousness could 
be identified in some communities. An increasing number of edu- 
cated Indians returned to work in their native communities instead 
of assuming a mestizo identity and moving away. They remained 
Indian in their loyalty and their ethnic allegiance. The numbers 
of Indian primary school teachers of Quichua increased, and liter- 
acy programs expanded; both trends reinforced Indian identity. 

Although these developments were most prominent among 
prosperous groups such as the Otavalos and the Saraguros, the num- 
ber of Indians in general moving into "mestizo jobs" increased 
during the oil expansion. New opportunities gave Indians the op- 
tion of improving their economic status without sacrificing their 
ethnic identity. Observers also noted a general growth in ethnic 
pride coupled with negative reactions toward those Indians who 
chose to abandon their roots and become mestizos. 

Oriente Indians 

Although the Indians of the Oriente first came into contact with 
whites in the sixteenth century, the encounters were more sporad- 
ic than those of most of the country's indigenous population. Until 
the nineteenth century, most non-Indians entering the region were 
either traders or missionaries. Beginning in the 1950s, however, 
the government built roads and encouraged settlers from the Sierra 
to colonize the Amazon River Basin. Virtually all remaining In- 
dians were brought into increasing contact with national society. 
The interaction between Indians and outsiders had a profound im- 
pact on the indigenous way of life. 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



In the late 1970s, roughly 30,000 Quichua speakers and 15,000 
Jivaros lived in Oriente Indian communities. Quichua speakers 
(sometimes referred to as the Yumbos) grew out of the detribali- 
zation of members of many different groups after the Spanish con- 
quest. Subject to the influence of Quichua-speaking missionaries 
and traders, various elements of the Yumbos adopted the tongue 
as a lingua franca and gradually lost their previous languages and 
tribal origins. Yumbos were scattered throughout the Oriente, 
whereas the Jivaros — subdivided into the Shuar and the Achuar — 
were concentrated in southeastern Ecuador. Some also lived in 
northeastern Peru. Traditionally, both groups relied on migration 
to resolve intracommunity conflict and to limit the ecological 
damage to the tropical forest caused by slash-and-burn agriculture. 

Both the Yumbos and the Jivaros depended on agriculture as 
their primary means of subsistence. Manioc, the main staple, was 
grown in conjunction with a wide variety of other fruits and vege- 
tables. Yumbo men also resorted to wage labor to obtain cash for 
the few purchases deemed necessary. By the mid-1970s, increas- 
ing numbers of Quichua speakers settled around some of the towns 
and missions of the Oriente. Indians themselves had begun to make 
a distinction between Christian and jungle Indians. The former 
engaged in trade with townspeople. The Jivaros, in contrast to the 
Christian Quichua speakers, lived in more remote areas. Their 
mode of horticulture was similar to that of the non-Christian 
Yumbos, although they supplemented crop production with hunt- 
ing and some livestock raising. 

Shamans (curanderos) played a pivotal role in social relations in 
both groups. As the main leaders and the focus of local conflicts, 
shamans were believed to both cure and kill through magical means. 
In the 1980s, group conflicts between rival shamans still erupted 
into full-scale feuds with loss of life. 

The Oriente Indian population dropped precipitously during the 
initial period of intensive contact with outsiders. The destruction 
of their crops by mestizos laying claim to indigenous lands, the 
rapid exposure to diseases to which Indians lacked immunity, and 
the extreme social disorganization all contributed to increased mor- 
tality and decreased birth rates. One study of the Shuar in the 1950s 
found that the group between ten and nineteen years of age was 
smaller than expected. This was the group that had been youngest 
and most vulnerable during the initial contact with national soci- 
ety. Normal population growth rates began to reestablish them- 
selves after approximately the first decade of such contact. 

Increased colonization and oil exploration also displaced the in- 
digenous population, hurt the nutritional status of Indians, and 



89 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

damaged tribal social relations. The Indians' first strategy was to 
retreat to more remote areas — an option that became less avail- 
able with increased settlement of the tropical forest. Land pres- 
sures also produced a decline in the game available and, hence, 
in Indian protein levels. Even livestock raising did little to improve 
Indian diets, since this was done primarily for sale rather than con- 
sumption. In addition, the decline in migration opportunities in- 
creased tribal hostility and competition between rival shamans. 

Critics contended that the government took little effective ac- 
tion to protect Indians. Although the government had designated 
some land as "indigenous communes" and missionaries had or- 
ganized some Indians into cooperatives, Indians remained dis- 
advantaged in conflicts with settlers, who had greater familiarity 
with the national bureaucracy. 

Family and Kin 

Family and kin constituted the most enduring and esteemed in- 
stitutions in the country's social fabric. Both Indian and Hispanic 
traditions emphasized the family; indeed, few alternative institu- 
tions competed for an individual's loyalty. The family buffered In- 
dians from the vagaries of a hostile world. For the landed gentry, 
a distinguished family name played a major role in the assignment 
of status. 

As circumstances dictated, a household commonly consisted of 
a nuclear family — husband and wife with their unmarried chil- 
dren — and one or more members of the wider circle of kin. Cou- 
ples often resided with the parents of one of the spouses for a period 
after marriage. Parents typically spent their declining years with 
the youngest son and his spouse, who remained at home to care 
for them. Although individuals owed their primary allegiance and 
responsibility to their families, ties extended outward from this 
group. The wider circle of kin offered the individual a potential 
source of assistance and support. Trust and responsibility flowed 
along the lines of kinship at each level of the social scale. 

The Hispanic man served as the unquestioned head of the house- 
hold and the model of manhood to his sons. Although he might 
also be a kindly and affectionate parent, he was unlikely to take 
an active role in the day-to-day functioning of the family. Social 
tradition granted men the right of independence in their leisure 
time; many took full advantage of their freedom, spending much 
time in clubs, coffeehouses, and bars or simply on the street, de- 
pending upon the social stratum to which they belonged. 

A woman's range of activity, by tradition, rested within the home 
and that remained true into the 1980s. She managed the household 
and the day-to-day upbringing of children. Provided she ran the 



90 



Young boy carrying water 
to his home in Guayaquil 
Courtesy World Bank 



family in a way her husband deemed appropriate, a woman could 
normally expect considerable autonomy. Even in the more cos- 
mopolitan sectors of the larger cities, the traditional role of the wife 
and mother remained largely unchanged. Even young women who 
had high levels of education and a professional career were subor- 
dinate to their husbands in a wide variety of matters. 

Less stress on the contrasting roles of men and women existed 
among Sierra Indians. Women's economic role in the household 
economy demanded that they take the initiative in many matters. 
Women bore primary responsibility for the health and welfare of 
the family's members. In addition, the double standard for mari- 
tal fidelity — tacitly accepted or even lauded in Hispanic culture — 
was replaced among Indians by a moral code demanding faithful- 
ness on the part of both members. 

Family and kin served as a bulwark against the indi'gena's fre- 
quently precarious circumstances. The married couple was the 
center of a social system extending outward in concentric circles. 
The couple's parents and their siblings (and the siblings' spouses) 
formed the primary extended kin group and were bound by strong 
ties of trust and cooperation. Most marriages took place within the 
small village or community; generations of intermarriage created 
a web of reticulate kin ties within the community. The bonds of 
kinship reinforced cohesion and a sense of shared identity among 
kin and community members alike. 



91 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

For all ethnic groups, the range of recognized kin beyond the 
nuclear family and close relatives varied depending on their eco- 
nomic and social circumstances. Large landowning families of the 
Sierra derived part of their status and power from their far-reaching 
kinship ties. Families of lower status typically chose which of their 
kin to recognize and cultivate. Beyond a fairly narrow circle, an 
individual had an element of choice and activated the relationship 
through mutual gift giving, shared meals, and reciprocal partici- 
pation at family and community fiestas. 

The strength of kin ties at every level of society often allowed 
unrelated persons to establish bonds of fictive kinship through the 
institution of compadrazgo. In Hispanic and Indian traditions alike, 
compadres (people related through compadrazgo) should manifest the 
highest regard and loyalty toward one another. Although individuals 
might criticize and argue with relatives, such actions with compadres 
would be unthinkable. 

The occasions for selecting godparents varied from group to 
group; Christian Indians and Hispanics commonly chose them at 
baptism, confirmation, and marriage. In each instance, the god- 
parents assumed ritual and financial obligations to the child (or 
couple) and the parents involved. In the case of baptism, the tie 
between the child's godparents and parents persisted even if the 
child died. Marriage compadres were part of a four- way relation- 
ship linking the couple, the compadres, and each spouse's parents. 
Beyond their immediate responsibilities in the marriage ceremo- 
nies, compadres had a duty to take an ongoing interest in the mar- 
riage. Great care went into the choice of godparents for every 
occasion. 

Compadrazgo ties cut across class and ethnic boundaries. Indians 
and mestizos often asked wealthy and influential whites to serve 
as godparents. In so doing, they established a patron-client rela- 
tionship with the higher status person. The lower status person ex- 
pected to receive various forms of assistance; in return, the higher 
status person gained a loyal follower. For Indians the link with white 
or mestizo compadres represented one of the few relationships of trust 
with members of the dominant ethnic group. 

People also chose compadres of equal status, selecting distant kin, 
close friends, business associates, or neighbors to serve as godpar- 
ents. The advantage in asking neighbors and kin was that the par- 
ents knew their reputation and standing in the community more 
thoroughly than they knew this about the others. Among compadres 
of equal status, people tried to match the economic resources of 
the couples involved, so that the reciprocal obligations and gifts 
between the two families balanced evenly. 



92 



The Society and Its Environment 



Religion 

The Roman Catholic Church assumed a pivotal role in Ecua- 
dor virtually at the onset of the Spanish conquest. Catholicism was 
a central part of Hispanic culture, defining the ethos and world- 
view of the time. Through the Office of the Inquisition, the church 
examined the "purity" of possible officeholders. The church was 
virtually the only colonial institution dealing with education or the 
care of the needy. It amassed great wealth through donations, 
dowries, and outright purchases. Virtually every segment of the 
organization — the hierarchy, individual clerics, and religious or- 
ders — owned some form of assets. 

The liberals' ascendancy in 1905 brought a series of drastic limi- 
tations to the Roman Catholic Church's privileges (see The Rule 
of the Liberals, 1895-1925, ch. 1). The state admitted representa- 
tives of other religions into the country, established a system of 
public education, and seized most of the church's rural proper- 
ties. In addition, legislation formally abolished tithes (although 
many hacienda owners continued to collect them). The 1945 con- 
stitution (and the Constitution of 1979) firmly established freedom 
of religion and the separation of church and state. 

Beginning in the 1960s, the country's Catholic bishops became 
increasingly active in supporting social change. Church leaders or- 
ganized literacy campaigns among the Indians, distributed the in- 
stitution's remaining lands, assisted peasants in acquiring land titles, 
and helped communities form cooperatives. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
the bishops espoused a centrist position on social and political is- 
sues. The episcopate contended that the unjust organization of Ec- 
uadorian society caused many to live in misery. The bishops also 
claimed that the economic development of the 1970s and early 1980s 
had merely widened the gap between rich and poor. At the same 
time, however, Catholics were warned against employing Marxian 
analyses of society or endorsing violence or class conflict. 

Church support for social reform occasionally brought it into con- 
flict with government authorities. In 1976, for example, police 
arrested Riobamba bishop Leonidas Proafio Villalba — the espis- 
copate's most outspoken critic of Ecuadorian society and politics — 
and sixteen other Latin American bishops who were attending a 
church conference in Chimborazo Province. After accusing the 
prelates of interfering in Ecuador's internal politics and discuss- 
ing subversive subjects, the minister of interior released Proafio 
anct expelled the foreign bishops from the country. Some Cath- 
olics formed groups to support conservative causes. The Commit- 
tee of Young Christians for Christian Civilization, for example, 



93 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



advocated scuttling the "confiscatory and anti-Christian" agrar- 
ian reform laws. 

In 1986 the Roman Catholic Church was organized into three 
archdioceses, ten dioceses, one territorial prelature, seven apostolic 
vicariates, and one apostolic prefecture (see table 6, Appendix). 
The church had only 1 ,505 priests to minister to a Catholic popu- 
lation of slightly more than 8 million, a ratio of 1 priest for every 
5,320 Catholics. 

Although approximately 94 percent of Ecuadorians were Roman 
Catholic, most either did not practice their religion or pursued a 
syncretistic version. Most Sierra Indians, for example, followed 
a type of folk Catholicism in which doctrinal orthodoxy played only 
a small part. Indigenous beliefs combined with elements of Catholic 
worship. Much of community life focused on elaborate fiestas that 
marked both public and family events. Although the precise con- 
figuration of fiestas varied from community to community, in gen- 
eral public fiestas involved an individual in a series of increasingly 
demanding and expensive sponsorships {cargos) of specific religious 
celebrations. By the time individuals had completed all the expected 
cargos, they were recognized community leaders. 

The Roman Catholic Church's relatively weak presence in the 
countryside and in squatter settlements, coupled with the nomi- 
nal, syncretistic practice of most Catholics, created a fertile ground 
for Protestant evangelical and Pentecostal missionary activity. 
Although multidenominational groups such as the Gospel Mission- 
ary Union (GMU) had been active in Ecuador since the begin- 
ning of the twentieth century, significant levels of conversion did 
not occur until the late 1960s. By the late 1970s, the GMU reported 
that it had converted 20,000 Sierra Indians in Chimborazo Province 
alone. The Christian and Missionary Alliance indicated that con- 
versions among Indians in Otavolo climbed from 28 in 1969 to 
900 in 1979. By the mid-1980s, an estimated 50,000 Ecuadorians 
had converted to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
(the Mormon Church). Other significant forces in the Protestant 
camp included World Vision, an evangelical development group 
based in California, and the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL). 
The Texas-based SIL dispatched linguists to remote areas of Ec- 
uador to study and codify tribal languages. The eventual goal of 
such efforts was to translate the Bible. 

The phenomenal pace of conversion — some observers estimated 
that evangelicals and Pentecostals totaled 40 percent of the popu- 
lation in Chimborazo Province in the late 1980s — had an impact 
on social relations in rural areas. Change in religious affiliation 
was a major rupture with an individual's past traditions and social 



94 




All Saints Cathedral, Cuenca 
Courtesy Martie B. Lisowski Collection, 
Library of Congress 



95 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

ties, effectively removing him or her from participation in fiestas — a 
major focus of much of community life. Families and extended fam- 
ilies found the break with the rest of the community easier in the 
company of fellow converts. Protestantism replaced the patterns 
of mutual reciprocity characteristic of peasant social relations with 
a network of sharing and support among fellow believers. This sup- 
port system extended to migrants; converts who left for the city 
or the coast sought out their coreligionists for assistance in finding 
lodging and employment even as Catholics looked to their compadres. 

Social Welfare 
Education 

In the late 1980s, formal education was divided into four cycles: 
a preprimary two-year cycle; six years of primary school; second- 
ary school, which was divided into two three-year cycles; and higher 
education. Children could begin attending preprimary school at 
four; primary school began at age six. Attendance theoretically was 
compulsory for children from six to fourteen years of age. The first 
three-year cycle of secondary school was a general curriculum that 
elaborated on that of primary school. In the second cycle, students 
could specialize in one of several different curriculums. An aca- 
demic, liberal arts course led to university admission; other spe- 
cialized courses prepared students for technical schools or teachers' 
training. 

Roughly 20 percent of primary and secondary schools were pri- 
vately run. The role of private schools increased with grade level; 
slightly less than 20 percent of primary students and more than 
40 percent of secondary students attended private schools. Private 
education was a predominantly urban phenomena. Approximately 
one-third of city primary and secondary schools were private. 

The country had twelve state universities, equally divided be- 
tween the Costa and the Sierra, and an additional five private 
universities — three in the Sierra and two in the Costa. A number 
of polytechnic schools and teachers' colleges offered specialized post- 
secondary studies. The number of university students per 100,000 
population grew fivefold from 1960 to 1980; the number of profes- 
sors grew ten times. About two- thirds of those enrolled in higher 
education attended public institutions, especially the Central Uni- 
versity in Quito. 

The 1960s and 1970s saw a major expansion in educational 
opportunities at every level. Spending increased until by 1980 edu- 
cation represented one- third of total government outlays. Enroll- 
ments, which had begun to climb in the 1950s, continued their 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



increase (see table 7, Appendix). Retention rates at the primary 
and secondary level also improved. 

Expansion created its own set of problems, however. Construc- 
tion failed to keep up with the increase in students. A significant 
proportion of teachers lacked full accreditation, especially at the 
levels of secondary and higher education. These deficiencies were 
most evident in the countryside, where the percentage of uncerti- 
fied primary teachers was estimated to be double that of the cities. 
Finally, despite enrollment increases, by the 1980s the percentage 
of school-aged children attending school lagged (see fig. 10). Rates 
were particularly low for rural primary- school- aged children. Rela- 
tively few children continued beyond the first cycle of secondary 
school. 

Illiteracy rates, especially those in the countryside, also remained 
elevated (see table 8, Appendix). The Ministry of Education and 
Culture, municipal governments, and the military all offered literacy 
classes (see Recruitment and Conditions of Service, ch. 5). Over- 
all, the programs had limited impact, however; most of the decline 
in illiteracy came through increased school enrollments. In the 
1980s, there were efforts to target literacy programs to the needs 
of the rural populace and non-Spanish speakers. 

Health and Social Security 

Both the public and the private sectors provided health services. 
Most public health care came under the aegis of the Ministry of 
Public Health, although the armed forces, the Ecuadorian Social 
Security Institute (Instituto Ecuatoriano de Seguridad Social — 
IESS), and a number of other autonomous agencies also contribut- 
ed. The Ministry of Health covered about 80 percent of the popu- 
lation and IESS another 10 percent. 

The Ministry of Public Health organized a four-tiered system 
of health care. Auxiliary health-care personnel staffed posts that 
served small rural settlements of fewer than 1,500 inhabitants. 
Health centers staffed with health-care professionals serviced com- 
munities of 1,500 to 5,000 inhabitants. Urban centers took care 
of the larger provincial capitals. Provincial and national hospitals 
were located in the largest cities. In the early 1980s, there were 
approximately 2,100 health establishments nationwide; the Ministry 
of Public Health ran more than half. Both the limited numbers 
of health-care professionals and their lack of training hampered pub- 
lic health care. These deficiencies were most apparent in regard 
to medical specialists, technicians, and nurses. 

Infant mortality-rate estimates in the early 1980s ranged from 
70 to 76 per 1,000 live births, with government projections of 63 



97 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



100 




6-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 

AGE-GROUP 



■ Rural 2 Urban | 


> 


'j Total 





Source: Based on information from Ecuador, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos, 
IV Censo Nacional de Poblaciony III de Vivienda, 1982 — Resumen Nacional: Breve Andli- 
sis de los Resultados Definitivos, Quito, 1985, 49. 

Figure 10. Percentage of School-Aged Population Enrolled in School, Divided 
by Urban-Rural Residence, 1982 

per 1,000 live births for the period 1985 to 1990. Although these 
rates were a significant improvement from the death figure of 140 
recorded in 1950, they remained a serious concern. Infant mor- 
tality varied significandy by region and socioeconomic status. Sur- 
veys in urban areas showed a range of 5 to 108 infant deaths per 
1,000 live births, whereas those in rural areas varied from 90 to 
200. Intestinal ailments and respiratory diseases (including bron- 
chitis, emphysema, asthma, and pneumonia) caused roughly three- 
fourths of all infant deaths. 

Childhood mortality (deaths among one- to four-year-olds) 
dropped to 9 per 1,000 in the mid-1980s following immunization 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 



campaigns and some attempts to control diarrheal diseases. Acute 
respiratory infections represented one-third of all deaths in this age 
group. Further improvement in the childhood mortality rate 
demanded extending the immunization program, increasing the 
availability of oral rehydration therapy, improving nutrition, and 
controlling respiratory ailments. 

Precise, detailed evidence about children's nutritional status re- 
mained limited and contradictory. The government conducted a 
national survey in 1959 and followed this with more limited studies 
in the late 1960s and 1970s. In the late 1960s, 40 percent of preschool 
children showed some degree of malnutrition. Among children 
under twelve years of age, 30 percent were malnourished and 15 
percent anemic. 

The main causes of death among adults in the mid-1980s were 
motor vehicle accidents, coronary heart disease, cerebrovascular 
disease, cancer, and tuberculosis. Maternal mortality remained 
high— 1.8 per 100,000 live births in the mid-1980s. As with the 
case of infant mortality, maternal mortality national averages 
masked considerable regional variation, with the rate nearly three 
times higher in some areas. These higher percentages reflected the 
limited access many rural women had to health care. In the early 
1980s, more than 40 percent of all pregnancies were not monitored; 
the majority of births were unattended by modern medical per- 
sonnel. 

A number of tropical diseases concerned health officials. On- 
chocerciasis (river blindness) was found in a number of small areas; 
its range was expanding in the mid-1980s. Although Chagas' dis- 
ease (a parasitic infection) was not prevalent, environmental fac- 
tors favored its spread. Leishmaniasis (also a parasitic infection) 
was expanding in the deforested areas of the coast and coastal trop- 
ical forest. Malaria was found in 60 percent of the country and 
became a major focus of public health efforts in the late 1980s. A 
drop in mosquito control programs coupled with severe flooding 
in 1981 and 1982 led to an increase in the prevalence of malaria 
in the mid-1980s. Between 1980 and 1984, the number of reported 
cases increased ten times. As of 1988, Ecuador also reported forty- 
five cases of, and twenty-six deaths from, acquired immune defi- 
ciency syndrome (AIDS). 

The Ecuadorian Social Security Institute, an autonomous agency 
operating under the Ministry of Social Welfare, offered its mem- 
bers old-age, survivor, and invalidism benefits, sickness and mater- 
nity coverage, and work injury and unemployment benefits. In 
1982, however, the system covered only approximately 23 percent 
of the economically active population (21 percent of men and 33 



99 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

percent of women). Coverage varied widely according to urban 
or rural residence as well as sex. Urban women had the highest 
rates of coverage (42 percent), whereas rural men had the lowest 
(9 percent) (see table 9, Appendix). Employees in banking, indus- 
try, commerce, and government, and self-employed professionals 
had coverage for most benefits. Agricultural workers were covered 
for work injury and unemployment benefits and were gradually 
being included in pension funds and survivors' and death benefits. 

Osvaldo Hurtado's Political Power in Ecuador describes the dy- 
namics of Ecuadorian society from the colonial to the modern era. 
Norman E. Whitten, Jr.'s numerous studies offer a wealth of data 
concerning Costa blacks and Oriente Indians. Simon Commander 
and Peter Peek's "Oil, Exports, Agrarian Change, and the Rural 
Labor Process: The Ecuador Sierra in the 1970s" is an insightful 
analysis of social change in the Sierra. Frank Salomon, Peter C. 
Meier, Joseph B. Casagrande, and Wendy A. Weiss all describe 
the dynamics of ethnic relations. De Wight R. Middleton and 
Marilyn Silverman examine coastal society, especially the changes 
resulting from migration. Axel Kroeger and Francoise Varobora- 
Freedman, Mario Hiraoka, Shozo Yamamoto, and Michael J. 
Harner examine the indigenous peoples of the Oriente or the im- 
pact of colonization on that region. (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



100 



Chapter 3. The Economy 




Terra-cotta hunter (Jama-Coaque culture) 



AS THE 1980S DREW TO A CLOSE, Ecuador remained a lower 
middle-income nation with a gross domestic product (GDP — see 
Glossary) of US$9.4 billion, or US$940 per capita. In South Ameri- 
ca, only Peru, Bolivia, and Guyana had a lower per capita GDP. 
Agriculture (primarily bananas, coffee, and cocoa) and fishing were 
still important sectors of the economy, together providing 40 per- 
cent of export earnings in 1989. Petroleum, the other major ex- 
port commodity, produced 50 percent of export earnings in the 
same year. Nevertheless, services, especially trade and financial 
services, constituted the fastest-growing economic sector and by 
the end of the 1980s employed almost half of the work force. 
Manufacturing also played a small but growing role in the economy. 

Historically, Ecuador's economy has been characterized by the 
dichotomy, and sometimes bitter rivalry, between the large-scale, 
export-oriented agricultural enterprises of the Costa (coastal re- 
gion) and the smaller farms and businesses of the Sierra (Andean 
highlands) . Unlike many developing countries that have highly cen- 
tralized infrastructures, Ecuador had two banking, communi- 
cations, transportation, and trade centers — one in Guayaquil to 
handle the country's export trade and the other in Quito to serve 
the populace in the Sierra. Manufacturing was divided also, with 
Guayaquil leading Quito in output. 

The discovery of substantial new petroleum deposits in 1967 
spurred economic growth and a shift away from traditional agricul- 
ture to manufacturing and services. The government invested much 
of its petroleum revenue in domestic development programs. The 
rapid growth years in the 1970s were followed by hardship in the 
1980s, however, as petroleum prices fell and the entire economy 
slumped. 

Two administrations in the 1980s tried different approaches to 
restoring the economy. President Leon Febres Cordero Ribadeneyra 
(1984-88) applied free-market principles and deregulation, policies 
that initially promoted growth. Wage increases and high inflation, 
however, ultimately erased most gains. President Rodrigo Borja 
Cevallos (1988- ) replaced the free-market approach with state in- 
tervention and imposed an austerity program. His policies resulted 
in new economic growth, but inflation and unemployment remained 
at record high levels. 

Ecuador's chronically large foreign debt continued to stifle eco- 
nomic growth. Having borrowed heavily during the boom years 



103 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

of the 1970s, the government found itself unable to meet its for- 
eign debt obligations at the end of the 1980s. An earthquake in 
1987, which damaged the country's crude petroleum pipeline, fur- 
ther curtailed import earnings. Although by 1989 Ecuador had re- 
sumed its foreign debt payments and was again exporting oil, the 
nation's economic future remained uncertain. 

Growth and Structure of the Economy 

Colonial Ecuador was governed first by the Viceroy alty of Peru 
and then by the Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada (see Spanish Colo- 
nial Era, ch. 1). Ecuador differed significantly from the viceroyalty 
centers (Lima and Bogota), however, in that mining never became 
a vital part of the economy. Instead, crop cultivation and livestock 
raising dominated the economy, especially in the Sierra. The Si- 
erra's temperate climate was ideal for producing barley, wheat, 
and corn. The Costa became one of the world's leading producers 
of cocoa. Sugarcane, bananas, coconuts, tobacco, and cotton also 
were grown in the Costa for export purposes. Foreign commerce 
expanded gradually during the eighteenth century, but agricultural 
exports remained paramount. Manufacturing never became a sig- 
nificant economic activity in colonial Ecuador, but busy sweatshops, 
called obrajes, in Riobamba and Latacunga made Ecuador an ex- 
porter of woolen and cotton fabrics; a shipyard in Guayaquil was 
one of the largest and best in Spanish America; and sugar mills 
manufactured sugar, molasses, and rum made from molasses. 

When Ecuador gained complete independence in 1830, it had 
a largely rural population of about one-half million. The rural econ- 
omy came to rely on a system of peonage, in which Sierra and Costa 
Indians were allowed to settle on the lands belonging to the hacen- 
dado, to whom they paid rent in the form of labor and a share of 
their crop. The economy of the new republic, based on the culti- 
vation of cash crops and inexpensive raw materials for the world 
market and dependent on peonage labor, changed little during the 
remainder of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. 
Vulnerable to changing international market demands and price 
fluctuations, Ecuador's economy was often characterized by insta- 
bility and malaise. 

During the second half of the nineteenth century, cocoa produc- 
tion nearly tripled, and total exports increased tenfold (see The 
Era of Conservatism, 1860-95, ch. 1). As a result, the Costa be- 
came the country's center of economic activity. Guayaquil domi- 
nated banking, commercial, and export-import affairs. During the 
first two decades of the twentieth century, cocoa exports continued 
to be the mainstay of the economy and the principal source of 



104 



The Economy 



foreign exchange, but other agricultural products like coffee and 
sugar and fish products were also important exports. The decline 
of the cocoa industry in the 1930s and 1940s, brought about by 
chronic pestilence and the loss of foreign markets to competitors, 
had debilitating repercussions for the entire economy. During the 
1950s, government-sponsored replanting efforts contributed to a 
partial revival of the cocoa industry, so that by 1958 Ecuador was 
the world's sixth leading exporter of cocoa. Nonetheless, by the 
early 1950s bananas had replaced cocoa as the country's primary 
export crop. 

The Ecuadorian economy made great strides after 1950, when 
annual exports, 90 percent of which were agricultural, were valued 
at less than US$30 million, and foreign-exchange reserves stood 
at about US$15 million. Between 1950 and 1970, a slow, steady 
expansion of nonagricultural activities took place, especially in the 
construction, utilities, and services sectors. Construction, for ex- 
ample, made up only 3 percent of the GDP in 1950, but it con- 
tributed 7.6 percent to the GDP in 1971 . Agriculture's annual share 
of the GDP was 38.8 percent in 1950 compared with a 24.7 per- 
cent share in 1971 (see table 10, Appendix). 

The 1960s saw an acceleration and diversification of the manufac- 
turing sector to meet domestic demand, with an emphasis on in- 
termediate inputs and consumer durable goods. By 1971 these 
accounted for about 50 percent of industrial output. Still, manufac- 
tured products — mainly processed agricultural goods — made up 
only about 10 percent of Ecuador's exports in 1971. Industry was 
still at an early stage of development, and about 50 percent of the 
labor force worked in agriculture, forestry, and fishing. Traditional 
industries, such as food processing, beverages, and textiles, were 
largely dependent on agriculture. The small size of the domestic 
market, the high production cost in relation to available external 
markets, and an undeveloped human, physical, and financial in- 
frastructure all combined to limit the expansion of consumer durable 
goods in the Ecuadorian economy. 

The discovery of new petroleum fields in the Oriente (eastern 
region) after 1967 transformed the country into a world producer 
of oil and brought large increases in government revenue be- 
ginning in 1972 (see Petroleum and Natural Gas, this ch.). That 
year saw the completion of the Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline, a 
503 -kilometer-long oil pipeline leading from the Oriente to the port 
city of Esmeraldas (see fig. 11). A refinery also was constructed 
just south of Esmeraldas. In addition, in 1970 large quantities of 
natural gas deposits were discovered in the Gulf of Guayaquil. 



105 



Ecuador: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from Orlando Martino, Mineral Industries of Latin America, 
Washington, 1988, 58. 

Figure 11. Petroleum and Mineral Resources, 1988 

Largely because of petroleum exports, Ecuador's net foreign- 
exchange earnings climbed from US$43 million in 1971 to over 
US$350 million in 1974. 

The production and export of oil that began in the early 1970s, 
coupled with dramatic international price increases for petroleum, 
contributed significantiy to unprecedented economic growth. Real 
GDP increased by an average of more than 9 percent per year dur- 
ing 1970 to 1977, as compared with only 5.9 percent from 1960 
to 1970. The manufacturing sector alone experienced a 12.9 per- 
cent average annual GDP real growth rate during 1975-77. Ecua- 
dor became a lower middle-income country, although it remained 



106 



The Economy 



one of the poorer countries of South America. Economic growth 
had negative side effects, however. Real imports increased by an 
annual average of 7 percent between 1974 and 1979; this spawned 
an inflationary pattern that eroded income. During the same pe- 
riod, the country's external debt grew from US$324 million to about 
US$4.5 billion. 

Recent Economic Performance 

In the early 1980s, the economy faltered as the international price 
of petroleum began a gradual decline and the country lost some 
foreign markets for its traditional agricultural products. Dramatic 
climatic changes caused by El Nino during 1982-83 produced 
coastal floods, torrential rains, and severe drought, which were high- 
ly damaging to crops and to the transportation and marketing in- 
frastructures (see Return to Democratic Rule, 1979-84, ch. 1; 
Climate, ch. 2). The economy also began to feel the pinch of the 
country's growing external debt, which amounted to US$8.4 bil- 
lion in 1984. Debt servicing in that year absorbed approximately 
60 percent of the country's export earnings. Foreign sources of credit 
began to dry up as early as 1982, leaving the national government 
and hundreds of state-owned companies short of capital. Inflationary 
pressures mounted during the early 1980s; consumer prices, which 
rose 14 percent in 1980, increased by 25 percent in 1982 and by 
53 percent in 1983 (see fig. 12). 

In March 1983, the government, with an eye toward reschedul- 
ing the external debt, introduced several austerity measures, in- 
cluding a second devaluation of the sucre (S/; for value of the 
sucre — see Glossary) in two years, this time a 21 -percent devalua- 
tion of the sucre, a 16-percent rise in the commercial interest rate, 
and a deceleration of government spending. The government's 
stabilization program, which included new exchange controls and 
the reduction of fuel and export subsidies, was unpopular domes- 
tically, but it enabled Ecuador to successfully negotiate a new debt 
repayment schedule with the International Monetary Fund (IMF — 
see Glossary), which also proved willing to grant Ecuador an ad- 
ditional US$107 million in financial assistance. The government, 
after several months of negotiation, also concluded multiyear 
rescheduling agreements with foreign private banks in December 
1984 and with the Paris Club (a financial consortium of Western 
banks and governments) in April 1985. By successfully refinanc- 
ing nearly all of the public- sector debt, the government narrowly 
avoided defaulting on payments, and, for the period 1985-89, the 
external debt- service ratio was reduced from 60 percent of export 



107 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



PERCENT 




80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 
YEAR 



Figure 12. Rise in Consumer Prices, 1980-89 

earnings to a manageable 30 percent. From 1985 until the beginning 
of 1987, Ecuador paid only the interest on its external debt (see 
External Debt, this ch.). 

The Ecuadorian economy recovered during 1984, partly as a 
result of temporary stability in the international price of crude oil 
and partly because of a rebound in the agricultural sector. By late 
1984, the balance-of-payments current account, which had reflected 
a US$58 million deficit in 1983, had a US$19 million credit, and 
the trade surplus reached US$1 billion. The real GDP growth rate 
was 4 percent, nearly a 7 -percent increase over 1983. These im- 
provements in the economy, combined with wage restraints and 
a tight national government budget, made it possible to reduce the 
inflation rate in 1984 to 25 percent; for the next two years, the in- 
flation rate was contained at about 24 percent. 

In 1985 Ecuador withdrew for one year from the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in order to free itself 



108 



The Economy 



PERCENT 

8 



CD 

I 6 



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80 81 82 83 



84 85 86 
YEAR 



87 88 89 



Figure 13. Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth Rate, 1980-89 



from that organization's export quotas and thus increase oil export 
revenue. In 1984 petroleum had accounted for about 70 percent 
of all commodity exports and about 50 percent of the central govern- 
ment's revenues. In 1985 Ecuador earned over US$1.8 billion in 
revenue from petroleum exports, two-thirds of Ecuador's export 
revenue that year. But a sharp decline in international oil prices 
in 1986 resulted in a US$1 . 1 -billion drop in petroleum export 
revenue. The balance-of-payments current account, which regis- 
tered a surplus of US$149 million in 1985, showed a US$613-million 
deficit for 1986. Foreign-exchange reserves declined to US$145 mil- 
lion by mid- 1986, and real GDP growth for 1986 came to only 1.7 
percent, compared with 3.8 percent in 1985 (see fig. 13). To meet 
the economic crisis, in January 1987 the government suspended 
debt repayments to all private lending institutions and imposed a 
2 5 -percent surcharge on many imported items. 



109 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

Febres Cordero had entered office promising prosperity and neo- 
liberal economic reforms featuring governmental efficiency, a free- 
enterprise approach in managing the economy, and a free-market 
exchange system that would promote economic deregulation. To 
fulfill these promises, Febres Cordero removed government price 
controls, devalued the currency, and eliminated most import quotas. 
In addition, he reduced import tariffs on industrial raw materials 
by one-half and invited new foreign investment into the country. 
Although GDP growth had bounced back from a negative 2.8 per- 
cent in 1983 to a healthy 4.0 percent in 1984 and 3.8 percent in 
1985, the sharp drop in petroleum export revenue in 1986 and the 
resulting increase in the fiscal deficit, 81 percent of which was 
financed through foreign borrowing, brought the nation to the brink 
of an economic crisis. In 1986 GDP growth fell to 1 .7 percent, un- 
employment went up, and per capita income fell to its lowest level 
since 1978. 

In March 1987, an earthquake destroyed about forty kilometers 
of the Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline and its pumping stations, caus- 
ing a nearly six-month suspension in crude petroleum pro- 
duction and the loss of an additional US$700 million in export 
revenue. Meanwhile, revenue from other exports — cocoa, coffee, 
and shrimp — did not increase and failed to compensate for the 
decline in oil income. The Ecuadorian government acquired a 
World Bank (see Glossary) loan of US$80 million to help finance 
the reconstruction of the damaged pipeline, but repairs cost the 
government a total of US$150 million. GDP fell to -5.2 percent 
in 1987, inflation inched up to 32.5 percent, and the trade deficit 
stood at US$33 million. The government responded to its finan- 
cial emergency by raising domestic gasoline prices by 80 percent 
and bus and taxi fares by 14 percent. To help make up for the oil 
revenue shortfall, a consortium of international banks loaned 
Ecuador an additional US$220 million, bringing public-sector ex- 
ternal debt at the end of 1987 to about US$9.6 billion, one of the 
world's highest on a per-capita basis. (Ecuador's GDP for 1987 
was US$10.6 billion.) 

During Febres Cordero 's last two years in office, his economic 
team concentrated on implementing monetary reforms, renegotiat- 
ing the external debt, and encouraging foreign investment. Its ef- 
forts were only partially successful. The government failed to hold 
wages down, and, despite efforts to curtail government spending, 
public-sector expenditures increased dramatically in 1987 and in 
the first half of 1988. Ecuador's halting experiment with neoliberal 
economic measures unofficially came to a close on March 3, 
1988, when Febres Cordero announced the end of the free-market 



110 



The Economy 



foreign-exchange system (see Monetary and Exchange Rate Poli- 
cies, this ch.). Two months later, on May 8, 1988, Febres Cor- 
dero's longtime rival, Rodrigo Borja of the Social Democratic party, 
the center-left Democratic Left (Izquierda Democratica — ID), was 
elected president with 46 percent of the vote (see Political Parties, 
ch. 4). 

In contrast to Febres Cordero, Borja advocated an expanded state 
role in the national economy. During the campaign, he promised 
to promote industrialization and nontraditional exports and stressed 
the importance of agrarian reform. Borja, however, inherited a 
rapidly worsening economy as he assumed office on August 10, 
1988; within a month he announced a national economic austerity 
program that included a sharp devaluation of the sucre, tax in- 
creases, new import restrictions, a reduction in public-sector spend- 
ing, a 100-percent increase in fuel prices, and a 40-percent boost 
in electricity rates for private households. Borja also opened new 
negotiations with foreign creditors to whom Ecuador was in ar- 
rears for almost US$1 billion. The president, however, refused to 
lift the suspension of foreign debt payments, imposed by Febres 
Cordero in 1988, until April 1989 (see External Sector, this ch.). 

Borja' s austerity policies and the resulting climb in the unem- 
ployment rate to 13 percent by the end of 1988, the highest in ten 
years, spawned strikes by labor unions, public employees, and stu- 
dents. The government, however, continued its anti-inflationary 
program. Despite government cost-cutting efforts, inflation reached 
86 percent in 1988, the highest in the country's history. On the 
positive side of the economic ledger, GDP expanded by 8 percent 
in 1988, as petroleum exports returned to pre-earthquake levels. 

In an attempt to blunt criticism of his policies, Borja introduced 
a new package of economic liberalization measures in 1989, in- 
cluding a relaxation of import restrictions, a further devaluation 
of the official exchange rate to prod exports, and a loosening of 
banking controls to stimulate the manufacturing sector. About 62 
percent of the import items that had been barred since mid- 1988 
were to be allowed into the country beginning in 1990. 

Role of Government 

The Constitution reserves to the state the sole right to exploit 
natural resources and to create and maintain the basic national eco- 
nomic infrastructure. The central government traditionally han- 
dled this responsibility through a decentralized approach to 
economic development. Over the decades, the government formed 
numerous autonomous or independent agencies in an ad hoc fashion 
to perform public services or develop natural resources. Some of 



111 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

these independent enterprises became large and powerful and func- 
tioned largely beyond government control or monitoring. 

Mismanagement and inefficiencies characterized many indepen- 
dent agencies. Petroecuador, for example, the largest and perhaps 
most important state-owned enterprise, which was responsible for 
much of Ecuador's petroleum production and refining, was not 
required to pay dividends or to meet established performance stan- 
dards. Because it had no control over oil-generated income, 
Petroecuador lacked the incentive to keep production costs down 
or to improve efficiency. The Ecuadorian Institute of Electrifica- 
tion (Instituto Ecuatoriano de Electrificacion — Inecel), which was 
founded in 1961 under the auspices of the Ministry of Energy and 
Mines, was unable to coordinate its major departments, or to set 
the rates charged to electricity consumers. As a result, Inecel re- 
lied on the government to meet operating costs. The Ecuadorian 
Institute of Telecommunications (Instituto Ecuatoriano de 
Telecomunicaciones — Ietel), established in 1972 and attached to 
the Ministry of Public Works and Communications, suffered from 
poor internal organization and weak financial management (see 
Natural Resources and Energy, this ch.). 

The government's highly bureaucratic and decentralized ap- 
proach to economic development thus served as a disincentive to 
entrepreneurs, who were forced to battle an array of regulations 
controlling business and commerce. Cumbersome administrative 
procedures often resulted in protracted and costly delays in such 
fundamental activities as procurement, business registration, and 
trade transactions. 

Fiscal Policies 

The Ecuadorian public sector, comprising the central govern- 
ment, state enterprises, and autonomous agencies operating on a 
national scale, expanded rapidly during 1972-77. Public-sector ex- 
penditures, adjusted for an average annual inflation rate of 14 per- 
cent, swelled about 65 percent during this period. Such increases 
were made possible because of the boost in revenue derived from 
a rise in international oil prices and the expansion of oil exports, 
especially during the 1972-74 period, when petroleum revenues 
rose as a proportion of GDP from 2 percent to 8.4 percent. Mean- 
while, revenues from nonpetroleum commodity exports declined 
from 18.7 percent of GDP in 1972 to 13.8 percent in 1975. In ef- 
fect, the government substituted the taxation of oil for the taxa- 
tion of other traditional products. 

This policy caused no harm until 1975, when the volume of 
petroleum exports began to moderate and oil revenues declined 



112 



The Economy 



relative to GDP. As the gap between public revenues and expen- 
ditures widened, budget deficits became the norm, and the govern- 
ment resorted increasingly to foreign borrowing as a substitute for 
declining tax revenues from nonoil products. Between 1976 and 
1979, the foreign debt more than quadrupled; after 1979 the rate 
of borrowing decelerated, but still the foreign debt had doubled 
by the end of 1986 (see fig. 14). In 1983, as foreign banks reduced 
the amount of credit available to the government, unpopular auster- 
ity measures were adopted to help reduce the public-sector deficit. 

The oil bonanza encouraged the government to undertake two 
deficit-producing policies. First, the government used about 50 per- 
cent of total public revenues from oil exports to subsidize domes- 
tic consumption of such items as food products, electricity, and 
gasoline and other oil derivatives. Government subsidies to con- 
sumers reached a peak of 10 percent of GDP in 1981 . Second, the 
government increased substantially its public-sector employment 
and public capital expenditures. Although the labor force increased 
at an average annual rate of only 2.8 percent between 1970 and 
1984, public- service employment rose at an average annual rate 
of 7 percent during the same period. A moderate expansion in public 
capital expenditures during the 1974-82 period contributed to im- 
provements in the transportation and utility infrastructure and also 
in water and sewerage systems. During this period, public capital 
spending increased from 7.3 percent of GDP to 10.1 percent of 
GDP. Overall government revenue, however, had declined by 1 
percent of GDP between 1973 and 1982. The public-sector deficit 
in 1982 represented 7.5 percent of GDP, most of which was financed 
by foreign borrowing. 

The sharp drop in the international price of petroleum in 1986. 
followed a year later by a US$700-million loss of oil revenue in 
the aftermath of the March 1987 earthquake, generated increased 
foreign borrowing by the government, reduced debt-service pay- 
ments, and induced the government to print money to make up 
for revenue shortfalls. To help keep inflation down to 32.5 per- 
cent in 1987 (about a 5-percent increase over 1986), liquidity was 
restricted in the private sector by raising bank reserve requirements. 
This policy made it difficult to acquire a commercial loan during 
the second half of 1987. 

Although oil production reached near-record levels of 310,000 
barrels per day following the repair of the Trans-Ecuadorian Pipe- 
line in August 1987, international crude oil prices remained low, 
averaging about US$17.70 for that year. The government's failure 
to raise domestic energy prices or reduce spending in other areas 
contributed to a fiscal deficit approaching 12 percent of GDP. 



113 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



BILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS 
12-, , , , , , — 




75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 



YEAR 



Figure 14. Foreign Debt, 1975-89 

Real GDP improved 8 percent in 1988, mainly as the result of 
increases in crude petroleum exports. The government's deficit 
reached about 12 percent of GDP. The government controlled the 
fiscal deficit by doubling domestic fuel prices, eliminating wheat 
import subsidies, and increasing electricity rates by 40 percent for 
household users and 60 percent for industrial users. 

In 1989 the fiscal budget totalled US$1.4 billion, of which 49 
percent was financed by oil export revenues and most of the re- 
mainder through taxes. About 38 percent of expenditures went to 
meet foreign debt payments after April, 10 percent for internal 
investment, and the balance to meet internal debt payments and 



114 



The Economy 



current government expenditures. During 1989 the Borja adminis- 
tration accelerated efforts to curtail public spending, but the deficit, 
10 percent of GDP, was still too high to be fiscally sound. The 
government continued its tight money policies, sustaining high in- 
terest rates and strict credit requirements, especially for noncor- 
porate consumers. 

Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies 

The Monetary Board, created in 1948, formulated the govern- 
ment's monetary, credit, and public debt policies, including main- 
tenance of a stable currency, management of the foreign-exchange 
reserves, control of import and export permits, and regulation of 
international transactions. The Central Bank of Ecuador was the 
official government bank, responsible for carrying out the policies 
of the Monetary Board and for supervising the activities of pri- 
vate banks (see Financial System, this ch.). The Central Bank also 
issued the sucre (S/), the Ecuadorian unit of currency. Notes were 
issued in denominations of 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 500, and 1,000 sucres; 
copper-zinc coins in denominations of 5, 10, 20, and 50 centavos; 
and a pure nickel 1 -sucre coin. 

The official exchange rate was used for foreign debt repayment 
and import transactions. During the 1970s, the currency's exchange 
rate had remained fixed at S/25 = US$1 . At the end of December 
1983, after a series of currency adjustments, the rate stood at 
S/54 = US$1. The Feb res Cordero administration quickened the 
pace of currency rate adjustments. In September 1984, Febres 
Cordero changed currency transactions from the official to the Cen- 
tral Bank intervention exchange rate. The official exchange rate 
was set at S/67 = US$1, or a 24-percent devaluation in compari- 
son with the rate prevailing in December 1983. During 1985 the 
sucre depreciated a total of 19 percent. The shock of a US$15 per 
barrel drop in the value of Ecuadorian crude oil between Decem- 
ber 1985 and April 1986 forced the government to devalue the 
currency another 14 percent in January; a rate of S/109 = US$1 
held until July. This last devaluation was part of a reform package 
that included a 15-percent increase in prices paid to farmers and 
further reductions in import tariffs to discourage smuggling and 
thereby increase tariff revenues. 

To help set the government's fiscal house in order and to help 
persuade foreign creditors to provide essential foreign exchange, 
in mid- 1986 Febres Cordero ordered an across-the-board 5 per- 
cent spending cut. Febres Cordero, however, faced with a serious 
political setback to his party in midterm elections, lacked the will 
and support to fully implement planned austerity measures. 



115 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



In August 1986, Febres Cordero decreed that all private- sector 
transactions would take place at the private free-market exchange 
rate used by the private sector for overseas trade. This action and 
the devaluation of the official sucre exchange rate produced a 
35-percent decline in the value of the national currency. Mone- 
tary board officials took these measures to protect the country's 
diminishing dollar reserves and to boost nonoil exports by making 
them more competitive in price. 

The lifting of foreign-exchange controls for private- sector im- 
ports in 1986 and the government's tightened monetary and credit 
policies resulted in a strong demand for dollars to finance imports. 
This pressure on the sucre led to an oscillating free-market exchange 
rate during 1987. By September 1987, the free-market rate had 
reached S/206 = US$1. Inflationary pressures also began to have 
a significant impact on the exchange rate. In 1987 the consumer 
price index showed a 32.5 percent inflation rate for that year, 
depreciating the value of the sucre by the end of the year to 
S/280 = US$1 . Capital flight and inflationary pressures contributed 
significantly to the devaluation of the sucre by an additional 56 
percent during the first half of 1988, from S/280 to S/550 = US$1 . 

In a last-ditch effort to improve his popularity and project a 
populist image, Febres Cordero increased government spending 
and allowed the Central Bank to loosen controls on public- sector 
financing during the final seven months of his administration. The 
monthly inflation rate averaged 7.16 percent in 1988, reflecting 
relaxed government credit policies as well as increased food prices 
brought on by a drought and by faulty agricultural policies during 
1987. These policies included insufficient credit to farmers and price 
controls that dampened their incentive to plant. 

As he prepared to assume the presidency in mid- 1988, Borja un- 
veiled an economic stabilization package of restrictive measures 
aimed at stimulating GDP growth, devaluing the sucre to control 
imports and save foreign-exchange earnings, and reducing the 
central government's fiscal deficit, which had reached 12 percent 
of GDP. Although the new president permitted price increases for 
some food items, he sought to keep monetary growth below the 
rate of inflation as a restraint on overall price increases. Interest 
rates were allowed to rise. In August the Central Bank initiated 
a gradual adjustment of the exchange rate, devaluing the currency 
by S/2.5 per week. In 1989 Borja' s anti-inflationary policies had 
begun to pay off, even though the consumer price index increased 
from 58 percent in 1988 to 76 percent in 1989. 

During 1988 the free-market value of the sucre fluctuated some- 
what, ending the year at about S/500 = US$1. By year end 1989, 



116 



The Economy 



however, the sucre traded at S/648 = US$1. Throughout 1989 the 
government maintained its contractive monetary policy to help con- 
trol inflation and sought to narrow the gap between the official and 
free-market exchange rates. By December 1989, these policies had 
produced mixed results. The inflation rate dropped to an annual 
rate of 54 percent in December 1989, but real wages and salaries 
declined markedly, and the country's fiscal deficit climbed to 17 per- 
cent of GDP. Overall GDP growth in 1989 did not exceed 1 percent. 

Government Budget Process 

Ecuador had a complex and splintered budget process. Only 
about 65 percent of tax revenues were dedicated to financing the 
national budget. The remainder were earmarked for direct and 
automatic allocation to autonomous agencies, state enterprises, and 
local governments on a predetermined basis. Despite tax reform 
efforts in the 1980s, several funds continued outside the regular 
budget process. About 5 percent of income, for example, was desig- 
nated for revenue sharing with 100 municipalities and 20 provin- 
cial governments. This system, which did not require recipients 
to justify their need for the automatically appropriated sums, 
reduced the amount of economic planning and fiscal control that 
could be exercised by policy makers. Not only did recipient agen- 
cies and local governments lack the incentive to be frugal, but the 
central government was left with inadequate funds to begin new 
programs or establish new agencies as needed. 

With the national budget, preparations for current and for cap- 
ital expenditures were each handled differently. The Ministry of 
Finance and Credit established current expenditures based on ac- 
tual budgets from the previous year, allowing for increases need- 
ed to offset inflation. The National Development Council (Consejo 
Nacional de Desarrollo — Conade) formulated a budget proposal 
for all capital expenditures relying on project requests from public 
agencies, which was sent to the Ministry of Finance and Credit; 
a national budget plan was then drafted at the ministry and for- 
warded to the National Congress (Congreso Nacional — hereafter, 
Congress). 

Authorization for both current and capital expenditures was com- 
plete when Congress passed the budget plan, but disbursements 
against authorizations were at the discretion of the Treasury. The 
Constitution requires each budget to be balanced, but throughout 
the 1980s deficits were the norm. 

In 1987, of total government revenues, 65 percent was derived 
from taxes on income and capital gains, 13.7 percent from domestic 
taxes on goods and services, 17.3 percent from taxes on interna- 
tional trade and transactions, 2 percent from other taxes, and 2 



117 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

percent from nontax revenues. Total revenues for that year repre- 
sented about 18.5 percent of Ecuador's gross national product 
(GNP— see Glossary). 

During the same year, of total government expenditures, 11.8 
percent was earmarked for the military, 24.5 percent for educa- 
tion, 7.3 percent for health, 0.9 percent for housing and social secu- 
rity, 19.8 percent for economic services, and 35.7 percent for other 
purposes. Total expenditures represented 16.3 percent of GNP; 
the overall budget deficit represented 2.1 percent of GNP. 

Human Resources and Income 

Composition of Labor Force 

In 1987 about 3.3 million people, or 33 percent of Ecuador's 
total population, were estimated to be economically active. The 
economically active population was almost evenly divided between 
the self-employed and wage earners. Agriculture remained the larg- 
est employer in 1987, but the previous fifteen years had seen the 
total percentage of the work force employed in this sector drop from 
almost half (46 percent) to just slightly over a third (35 percent) 
(see table 11, Appendix). The service sector experienced the larg- 
est growth, with the percentage of the work force employed in 
government and other services rising from 17 to 24 percent from 
1974 to 1987. Manufacturing and commerce each employed about 

10 percent of the economically active populace in 1987. 
Although the percentage of the economically active population 

employed in manufacturing declined from 12 percent in 1974 to 

1 1 percent in 1987, the percentage engaged in commerce rose from 
10 percent to 12 percent over the same period. Artisan manufac- 
turing, defined as firms employing up to thirteen workers, declined 
compared with larger- scale factory manufacturing. Employment 
in manufacturing also shifted to larger urban areas; in the late 1980s, 
over half of the labor force engaged in manufacturing was in the 
provinces that included Quito and Guayaquil. 

In the late 1980s, analysts estimated the median age for the total 
labor force to be slightly under thirty. When broken down by sex, 
however, data showed that women in the work force tended to be 
younger. The median age for men alone was over thirty. Other 
employment statistics broken down by gender revealed a higher 
ratio of women employed in urban areas, whereas men had higher 
percentages of employment in rural districts. 

Employment Indicators and Benefits 

Figures for unemployment and underemployment varied and 
were considered unreliable, but analysts agreed that both problems 



118 



The Economy 

I 

increased during the 1980s. Unemployment in urban areas was 
officially estimated at 10.2 percent in 1987, up from about 6 per- 
cent in 1975. According to government statistics, underemploy- 
ment climbed from 25 percent in 1975 to 40 to 50 percent in 1987. 
Underemployment in rural areas was particularly high and had 
proven an intractable problem. 

The government set minimum wages and increased them fre- 
quendy to keep abreast of inflation and devaluations of the currency. 
Minimum wages alone, however, did not accurately represent eco- 
nomic conditions of the average worker because Ecuadorian labor 
enjoyed an extensive system of mandatory fringe benefits. For ex- 
ample, the average wage earner was entitled to a yearly bonus equal 
to three months of his or her basic monthly wage and to a monthly 
cost-of-living and transportation allowance. Paid vacations, over- 
time pay, and severance pay were all obligatory. These and other 
supplements could raise a wage earner's average monthly income 
by as much as 70 percent over his or her basic wage. Workers also 
benefited from legislation making it difficult to fire employees. 

Organized Labor 

Because of the government's strong regulation of the economy 
and direct control over wages and prices, organized labor directed 
its challenges against the government rather than against the pri- 
vate sector. Even disputes between labor and government, however, 
lacked the acrimony or frequency found elsewhere in Latin Amer- 
ica, largely because a succession of populist governments curried 
favor with low-income groups by conceding economic benefits and 
expanded worker rights. With little struggle, workers gained the 
right to organize, to strike and bargain collectively, to withhold 
union dues from paychecks, to work a forty-hour week, and to 
receive minimum wage and social security benefits. Thus, while 
the legal framework favored union development, government en- 
dorsement of benefits undercut the power of union leadership. High 
underemployment and rising unemployment in the 1980s also 
moderated aggressive bargaining (see Political Forces and Interest 
Groups, ch. 4). 

Labor- government relations became more strained during the 
Febres Cordero presidency, however, because of that administra- 
tion's free-market philosophy. Labor called two national strikes in 
1987, a one-day stoppage on March 25 to protest rises in gasoline 
and transportation prices and a second strike on October 28 to de- 
mand the ouster of the minister of government and justice. The 
first stoppage was highly successful and showed an unprecedented 
degree of unity among Ecuador's divergent labor groups. The 



119 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

second, more political in nature instead of being focused on mone- 
tary issues, had much less impact on national activity. 

In contrast to growing tension between organized labor and 
government, the number of conflicts and strikes centered on col- 
lective bargaining issues with the private sector declined during 
the 1980s. Analysts attributed the decline to the increasing reluc- 
tance of the average worker to risk his or her job in the face of 
rising unemployment and a deteriorating economy. The most seri- 
ous strikes during this period involved work stoppages by public- 
sector employees, usually teachers or university personnel. Short 
strikes by petroleum workers and employees of the state electric 
utility also occurred. 

Agriculture 

Agriculture and fishing were the country's largest employers in 
the late 1980s, providing nearly half of all export earnings. Including 
livestock raising, forestry, and fishing, agriculture generated almost 
16 percent of the GDP in 1986 and nearly 18 percent in 1987. The 
three principal export crops — bananas, coffee, and cocoa — alone 
accounted for 2.4 percent of the total GDP in 1986, while livestock 
raising contributed 5.3 percent of the GDP, and forestry and fish- 
ing contributed 1.1 and 1.9 percent, respectively. 

Land Use and Tenure 

Data on land use varied widely and were often considered by 
analysts as unreliable or at best an approximation of actual num- 
bers. In the mid-1980s, for example, estimates of cropland ranged 
from 1.6 to 2.5 million hectares out of the total land area of 27.1 
million hectares. Different sources put the amount of pastureland 
at 4.4 or 4.8 million hectares. Estimates for the total land area 
suitable for agriculture showed an even wider variation, from less 
than 50 percent to as high as 90 percent. 

Over half of the cultivated land was in the Costa (coastal region), 
about a third in the Sierra, and the remainder dispersed through- 
out the Oriente region. The Costa, with the exception of the area 
near the Santa Elena Peninsula, had generally fertile land with a 
climate conducive to agriculture. Altitude, rainfall, and soil com- 
position determined land use in the Sierra. The intermontane basins 
near Quito and farther south near Cuenca and Loja offered the 
most productive Sierra lands, whereas the basins surrounding 
Latacunga and Riobamba had dry and porous soil and the least 
fertile lands. Higher areas of the Sierra contained grasslands suitable 
only for grazing or cold-tolerant crops, such as potatoes. 



120 



A peasant family in the Sierra 
Courtesy Inter-American Foundation (Miguel Say ago) 



Modern land tenure patterns developed from Spanish colonial 
land systems. The Spanish encountered large native populations 
in the Sierra and established the encomienda system whereby the 
crown granted individual colonists rights to land and the Indians 
who lived there. This system gradually produced haciendas worked 
by a "captive" labor force composed of huasipungueros (see Spanish 
Colonial Era, ch. 1; Peasants, ch. 2). These huasipungueros worked 
without salary in return for the farming rights to minifundios (small 
plots) on the haciendas. In many cases, the huasipungueros were 
bought or sold with the hacienda. Large-scale agriculture developed 
later in the Costa, where farming for export used sharecroppers 
or paid labor to harvest crops. The monetary labor system that 
developed in the Costa began to compete with the feudal system 
of the Sierra for cheap labor. 

Pressure to reform feudal agricultural practices came from 
abroad, from humanitarian and liberal elements within the coun- 
try, and from large landowners in the Costa, who needed addi- 
tional cheap labor. A land reform law enacted in 1964, the Land 
Reform, Idle Lands, and Settlement Act, outlawed the huasipungo 
system and also set up the Ecuadorian Institute of Agrarian Re- 
form and Settlement (Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria 



121 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

y Colonizacion — IERAC) to administer the law and to expropri- 
ate idle arable land for redistribution to farmers. The law outlawed 
absentee ownership and limited the size of holdings to 800 hect- 
ares of arable land in the Sierra, 2,500 hectares of arable land in 
the Costa, and 1 ,000 hectares of pastureland in either region. The 
law also set the minimum amount of land to be granted in the redis- 
tribution at 4.8 hectares. Revisions of the law in the early 1970s 
required that all land with absentee landlords be sold to the tenants 
and that squatters be permitted to acquire title to land they had 
worked for three years. 

Although IERAC made some progress initially, political oppo- 
sition slowed implementation of the land reform act. IERAC 
received little government funding and was not permitted to ac- 
tively encourage expropriation. Later amendments to the land re- 
form act exempted all farms that were efficiently run. In addition, 
redistributed land was frequently poor or on mountainsides because 
the large landowners kept fertile valley lands for themselves. Ex- 
cept for a few showcase examples, farmers on minifundios received 
no government assistance or services to make the plots productive. 
In spite of these difficulties, however, by 1984 over 700,000 hect- 
ares had been distributed to 79,000 peasants. 

Distribution of the land remained highly unequal. In 1982, 80 
percent of the farms consisted of less than ten hectares; yet these 
small farms accounted for only 15 percent of the farmland. Five 
percent of the farms had more than fifty hectares, but these large 
farms represented over 55 percent of the land under cultivation. 
In addition, minifundios were more likely to be found in the Sierra 
in areas of poor soil or with poorer growing conditions than in other 
areas. 

Agricultural censuses revealed that over three-quarters of the 
farms were worked by their owners. About 12 percent of the farms 
were occupied by families that did not hold title to the land but 
rented it, sometimes hiring additional laborers. Sharecroppers or 
communal farmers cultivated the remaining 7 percent. 

Although intensely cultivated, minifundios in the Sierra could not 
sustain the region's occupants. Because of the higher wages for 
nonagricultural jobs, many farmers held unskilled jobs in the cities 
while family members stayed on the land to grow crops for home 
use or for sale (see Migration and Urbanization, ch. 2). A study 
in the late 1970s indicated that over half of small farm earnings 
came from off the farm. 

Patterns of cultivation ranged from primitive to modern, with 
the more modern methods generally used in the Costa, where much 
of the production was geared for export. In 1982 Ecuador had fewer 



122 



The Economy 



than 7,000 tractors in use. Ox-drawn plows were used on some 
farms, and digging sticks were used for cultivation on slopes. High 
prices limited the use of chemicals; manure was the common form 
of fertilizer in the Sierra, but farmers had increased the use of pesti- 
cides and fungicides. 

Sizeable areas of land, estimated at over 320,000 hectares, were 
under irrigation using ditches dug by individual farmers, and about 
40,000 hectares were irrigated under government- supported irri- 
gation projects. State support for irrigation schemes began in 1944 
with the creation of the Ecuadorian Institute of Hydraulic Resources 
(Instituto Ecuatoriano de Recursos Hidraulicos — Inerhi). Inerhi's 
largest project, inaugurated in 1970, brought water to 10,000 hect- 
ares of land in Pichincha Province. 

Crops 

A variety of temperature and rainfall patterns resulted in a diver- 
sity of tropical and temperate crops (see table 12, Appendix). 
Moderate or cool temperatures in highland areas allowed the cul- 
tivation of products usually associated with more northern latitudes. 
In the Costa, a warm climate, fertile soils, and proximity to ports 
led to large-scale production of such export crops as coffee, bananas, 
sugar, cocoa, palm oil, and rice. Smaller plots in the Sierra produced 
potatoes, corn, beans, wheat, barley, and tea. Larger farms prac- 
ticed dairy farming as well as increasing production of nontradi- 
tional crops such as cut flowers, asparagus, and snow peas. Farmers 
planted some coffee and tea in transition areas between the Sierra 
and the Oriente, but in general the Oriente's poor soil made it badly 
suited to agriculture. 

Ecuador began marketing bananas abroad after World War II. 
By 1947 bananas had become the country's leading export crop. 
Capitalizing on problems with hurricanes, disease, and labor un- 
rest in the traditional banana- growing regions of Central Amer- 
ica, Ecuador emerged as the world's largest exporter of bananas 
by the mid-1980s. The main banana-producing areas were the 
eastern parts of Los Rios, Guayas, and especially El Oro provinces. 
Banana production involved few very large or very small planta- 
tions; most ranged from 80 to 120 hectares. 

In 1969 the Ecuadorian National Board of Planning and Eco- 
nomic Coordination recommended that land devoted to banana 
cultivation be more than halved and that the higher yielding, 
disease-resistant Cavendish- type bananas replace the traditional 
Gros Michel variety. This latter change prompted modifications 
in production patterns. Cavendish bananas bruise easily and 
require more careful handling. In addition, they cannot tolerate 



123 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



transport in open trucks, so boxing must take place at the planta- 
tion. Centralized, specialized packing meant the end of small-farm 
production. Since the new variety had triple the yield of the Gros 
Michel banana, the government realized that the hectares planted 
in bananas needed to be reduced to avoid a sharp drop in world 
prices. Statistics showed the change: land devoted to bananas 
dropped from 200,000 hectares in 1972 to about 110,000 in 1980, 
yet production remained fairly constant. In 1987, 2.4 million tons 
of bananas were produced on 120,000 hectares of land; 1.4 mil- 
lion tons were exported. 

Coffee, introduced into the country early in the nineteenth cen- 
tury, was the second most valuable crop throughout the 1980s. 
Ecuador produced both arabica and robusta varieties, with over 
half of the plantings in the hilly areas of Manabf Province; most 
of the remaining plantings were found in the western foothills of 
the Andes south of Guayaquil. In 1987 over 380,000 hectares were 
devoted to coffee, and 373,000 tons were produced. Most of this 
coffee was exported. Coffee was generally grown on small land- 
holdings with about half the land planted in coffee trees alone and 
the rest planted with coffee trees mixed with cacao, citrus fruits, 
bananas, or mangoes. 

The small size of typical coffee farms usually resulted in poor 
production techniques, yields, and quality. Much of the coffee pro- 
duced retained the pulp after processing and therefore brought a 
lower price on world markets. Other than establishing minimum 
prices for coffee, the government provided little technical assistance 
to coffee farmers. 

Cocoa was the mainstay of the economy in colonial times. The 
Spanish found the Indians cultivating cocoa when they arrived in 
the sixteenth century, and it first became an export crop in 1740. 
Produced on large Costa plantations, the crop was nearly wiped 
out by a fungal disease in the 1920s. Low world prices during the 
Great Depression further discouraged production, and the plan- 
tations were broken up and diversified into rice, sugar, corn, and 
bananas. After World War II, increased prices and new disease- 
resistant strains revitalized the industry. 

Most cocoa production took place on small farms, frequentiy only 
to provide supplemental income to the farmer. Most small producers 
preferred traditional cultivation techniques and did not harvest the 
beans in years when the price was low. In contrast, the few large 
plantation owners systematically replaced older trees with newer 
disease-resistant varieties and used fertilizer to increase yields. Most 
cocoa farmers grew an aromatic variety used for flavoring. In 1987, 
311,000 hectares produced 57,000 tons of cocoa beans. 



124 




Field worker in 
a banana orchard 
Courtesy World Bank 




125 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

Sugarcane was grown widely, both in the Sierra and in the Costa. 
Over 44,000 hectares were planted in 1987, producing 3 million 
tons of sugarcane. The sugar extraction rate from the cane was 
about 10 kilograms of sugar from 100 kilograms of cane. Sugar 
was an important export crop in the 1960s and 1970s, but produc- 
tion levels dropped in the 1980s, and the supply could not satisfy 
the domestic market, so that Ecuador had to import refined sugar. 

Almost all of the sugarcane grown in the Costa was used to make 
centrifugal sugar, so called because of the means of extracting the 
sugar. Centrifugal sugar was the type most used in foreign trade. 
Sugarcane in the Costa was grown on large plantations and pro- 
cessed in one of the five mills located east of Guayaquil. Sierra 
peasants grew sugarcane on small landholdings and used much of 
the cane for noncentrifugal sugar, mainly in a form known aspanela 
(a raw brown-sugar cake). Growers also marketed molasses, a sugar- 
cane by-product, exporting some of it and using the rest for the 
domestic manufacture of alcohol or for livestock feed. 

Farmers cultivated rice, a staple of the Ecuadorian diet, mainly 
on the flood plains of the Guayas River Basin in Guayas and Los 
Rfos provinces. Rice production fluctuated depending upon the 
weather, but during the 1980s the harvest increased by an annual 
average of 7 percent. In 1987, 780,000 tons were produced on 
276,000 hectares of land. In years of good harvest, growers 
produced enough rice to meet domestic demand and to export a 
surplus. Because of low international market prices for rice, 
however, the government policy stabilized rice production at the 
level required to meet domestic needs. 

Corn, another basic foodstuff, had been grown since precolo- 
nial times. Corn was widely grown throughout the country and 
could be planted from sea level to an altitude of 2,200 meters. Farm- 
ers used about half the crop for animal feed, particularly for poultry. 
In 1987 over 422,000 tons were produced on 460,000 hectares. 

Barley, a crop introduced by the Spaniards, proved highly adapt- 
able to the rigorous climate of the Sierra. Its tolerance for cold and 
severe weather allowed it to be grown at higher altitudes than corn. 
Widely planted on small landholdings in the central highlands areas, 
it was grown both for food and for malt for the beer industry. 
Figures for 1987 showed 43,000 tons produced on 61 ,000 hectares. 

Wheat, almost all of which was used to make bread, was for- 
merly widely grown in the Sierra. Ironically, however, as bread 
increased in popularity and replaced potatoes and corn as a dietary 
staple, domestic wheat production decreased. Perhaps the most 
significant reason was that the government introduced subsidies 
on wheat imports in order to ease the effects of the inflation that 



126 




Irrigated fields in 
Imbabura Province 
Courtesy Patricia Mothes 





began in the oil-boom years of the 1970s. As a result, consump- 
tion of the more expensive domestic wheat declined from 46 per- 
cent in 1946 to 7* percent in 1980. The breakup of the large 
wheat-producing haciendas in the Sierra also contributed to lower 
levels of wheat production. 

Cotton and hemp were the principal fiber crops. The govern- 
ment carried out a program in the 1980s to increase both the qual- 
ity and quantity of cotton produced. Output increased, and by 1986 
Ecuador was nearly self-sufficient in cotton. Hemp was turned into 
Manila hemp fiber used to produce tea bags. Lesser fiber crops 
included aloe, which was used to make cloth for sacks, and ramie, 
which was woven into a cloth resembling linen. 

Tea was produced near Puyo on the eastern slopes of the Andes 
at elevations of about 1,000 meters. An even distribution of rain- 
fall allowed for year-round harvests, a condition not usually found 
in tea-producing nations. 

African palms were widely planted and were the main source 
of vegetable oil. The government promoted and financed large 
plantings to cut imports of expensive cooking oils. Although not 
as high in oil content as the nuts of the royal palm, previously the 
principal domestic source of vegetable oil, African palms bore more 
nuts and matured more quickly. 

Cottonseed, sesame seed, peanuts, coconuts, and soybeans were 
other sources of vegetable oils. Cottonseed production fluctuated, 



127 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

depending upon weather conditions. Sesame could be planted from 
two to three times a year on the warm coastal plains where it took 
only three months to mature. About 9,000 hectares of peanuts were 
planted, but most of the production was used for direct consump- 
tion as peanuts rather than for crushing into oil. Production of coco- 
nut oil varied because most coconuts were consumed directly and 
not processed. Soybean plantings had increased, and soybeans could 
be grown both in the Costa and lower reaches of the Sierra. 

Ecuador was one of the world's major castor bean producers. 
Although the bean was inedible, its oil was used for medicinal pur- 
poses and as a lubricant in precision tools. The plant could be grown 
on dry lands where it was uneconomical to raise other crops, or 
planted along with corn, peanuts, or cotton. 

Black tobacco, Ecuador's traditional type, made up the bulk of 
the 3,600 tons grown in 1987. Blond tobacco for cigarettes was in- 
troduced in the late 1960s and was produced mainly in Loja 
Province. The growth of a domestic cigarette industry was slowed, 
however, by the high volume of cigarettes smuggled into the coun- 
try. 

Farmers also grew numerous minor crops for domestic food con- 
sumption or for export in small quantities. Growers raised pears, 
peaches, apples, berries, grapes, and plums in the Sierra and citrus 
fruit, avocados, mangoes, and a wide variety of tropical fruits in 
the Costa. Important vegetable crops included garlic, onions, cab- 
bage, lettuce, cucumbers, tomatoes, and various types of melons 
and peppers. Spices included annatto seed, anise, and cardamon. 
Rubber and mocora and toquilla grass, used to make Panama hats, 
were minor nonfood crops. 

Livestock and Poultry 

Livestock raising represented an important part of agricultural 
output and grew significantly throughout the 1980s. Livestock was 
produced primarily for domestic consumption and was one of the 
few agricultural products found throughout the country. Although 
animal husbandry was widespread, it was generally practiced on 
small plots of land. 

The Costa and Oriente produced mainly beef cattle with dairy 
cattle found mostly in the Sierra. Cattle were grazed on Costa land 
otherwise unsuited for agriculture, such as the hilly terrain in Man- 
abf Province, seasonally flooded river plains, or semiarid parts of 
the far south. Dairy production in the Sierra typically was carried 
on in fertile valleys, particularly between Riobamba and the Colom- 
bian border. Beef cattle were fairly new to the Oriente, although 
large parcels of land were suitable for grazing. The beef industry 



128 



The Economy 



in the Oriente suffered a serious setback in 1987, however, when 
the earthquake damaged roads used to transport the beef to mar- 
kets. Ecuador had about 3.7 million head of beef cattle in 1986. 

The 1980s saw an improvement in stock with the introduction 
of European and Asian breeds. The native criollo breed represented 
about half of all cattle, with the rest a cross between criollo and 
Holstein, Brown Swiss, or Jersey for dairy, and criollo and Santa 
Gertrudis or Charolais for beef. The absence of veterinarians and 
medicines remained a problem, however, and diseases and para- 
sites plagued many herds. 

Besides cattle, livestock included pigs, sheep, and a small num- 
ber of goats. The number of pigs increased dramatically in the 1980s 
to about 5 million in 1986; they were raised nationwide, but the 
greatest concentration was in coastal areas. Sheep numbered 2 mil- 
lion in 1986 and were generally found in pastureland higher than 
3,000 meters in altitude. Analysts estimated that Ecuador had fewer 
than 300,000 goats in 1986. 

Poultry raising was another rapid-growth area in the 1980s, 
although floods in 1983 from El Nino caused a sharp drop in produc- 
tion. Chickens were raised both for eggs and for meat, and in 1986 
there were more than 45 million birds. Historically, peasant families 
raised chickens, but the 1980s saw the establishment of large-scale 
poultry enterprises near larger cities. 

Fishing 

The Pacific waters along the coast and as far west as the Gala- 
pagos Islands had abundant and varied fish resources. The impor- 
tance of marine resources to the economy increased steadily, and 
fisheries were one of the faster- growing industries in the 1980s, as 
both export sales and domestic consumption increased. 

Tuna represented the most important of the many varieties of 
saltwater fish. Most of the tuna caught was skipjack or albacore, 
although the yellowfin was the variety most often exported. Ecua- 
dor modernized its tuna fleet in the late 1980s with the addition 
of refrigerated vessels and the leasing of several large seiners (nets) 
from the United States. 

Shrimp production was the strongest growth area in the fishing 
industry. Although ocean shrimping declined, Ecuador's warm cli- 
mate and shallow coastal waters, especially in the Gulf of Guaya- 
quil, provided ideal conditions for shrimp farming. In 1986 Ecuador 
overtook Mexico as the world's largest shrimp exporter. 

Other important fish included sardines, anchovies, and mack- 
erel. Most of the anchovies and sardines were canned for the ex- 
port market, with the remainder ground into fishmeal for poultry 



129 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

feed. Except for a few trout hatcheries in the Sierra, the country 
gave little attention to freshwater fish. 

Forestry 

An estimated 50 percent of Ecuador (about 14 million hectares) 
was forested, about half of this in government-owned lands. 
Although officially contributing only 4 percent to Ecuador's GDP, 
the forest resources were important because of wood's wide use 
for fuel and rural construction. Erosion and deforestation from 
widespread cutting of timber for fuel had emerged as significant 
national problems in the 1980s. 

The original forests in the Sierra had long ago been cleared to 
provide space for pastures and wood for fuel and construction. 
Eucalyptus trees introduced from Australia in the 1800s supplied 
the Sierra with fuel and construction material and helped prevent 
soil erosion. In the 1980s, the northern province of Esmeraldas con- 
tained most of the forests in the Costa and supplied the majority 
of the country's wood. The jungles of the Oriente contained several 
thousand known species of trees, the most valuable of which was 
the balsa. Isolation from population centers and lack of roads ham- 
pered exploitation of the Oriente' s resources, however. Other forest 
products included cinchona bark for quinine, ivory palm nuts for 
buttons, and kapok from the ceiba tree for mattress stuffing. 

Natural Resources and Energy 

The natural resource sector of the Ecuadorian economy contrib- 
uted almost 15 percent to the GDP in 1986, with the petroleum 
industry providing virtually all of that total. Although analysts be- 
lieved that Ecuador had numerous mineral deposits, few metals 
had been exploited. Hydroelectric power from several large dams 
provided the primary source of energy. 

Petroleum and Natural Gas 

Petroleum was the single most important element in the Ecua- 
dorian economy, accounting for over 14 percent of the GDP in 
1986, two-thirds of all export revenues in that year, and much of 
the foreign investment. In 1987 petroleum and mining together 
accounted for only about 8 percent of GDP because of a signifi- 
cant drop in petroleum production, but estimates for 1988 indi- 
cated that petroleum production had risen, exceeding its 1986 level. 
Although Ecuador's level of production in the late 1980s ranked 
near the bottom of the thirteen members of OPEC, it exceeded 
all countries in Latin America except Mexico and Venezuela. 



130 




A fishing village in Esmeraldas Province 
Courtesy Inter-American Foundation (Miguel Say ago) 



Petroleum was first discovered in the early 1900s both on and 
offshore from Salinas on the Santa Elena Peninsula west of Guaya- 
quil. More than 100 million barrels of crude petroleum were re- 
moved in six decades of exploitation; by the mid-1980s, however, 
Costa production had fallen to less than 1,000 barrels per day (bd). 
Old, expensive-to-maintain equipment produced high operating 
costs, making continued exploitation uncertain. 

The Oriente, however, had long since eclipsed the Costa as the 
center of Ecuador's petroleum activity. In the late 1980s, the vast 
majority of Ecuador's 1.6 million barrels of proven reserves lay 
in the northern part of the Oriente, between the Napo River and 
the Colombian border (see fig. 11). This area formed part of a rich 
oil-bearing region extending from southern Colombia through 
Ecuador and northeastern Peru. Indeed, analysts believed that this 
region represented one of the richest oil-bearing areas of the Western 
Hemisphere. 

Although exploration in the Oriente began in the 1920s, petro- 
leum was not actually found until a consortium formed by the 
Texaco Petroleum and Gulf Oil companies discovered several rich 
fields near Lago Agrio (now Nueva Loja) in 1967. The success of 
the Texaco-Gulf exploration attracted other companies, and over 



131 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

the next two decades more than fifty new wells began producing 
commercial quantities of crude petroleum. Production in 1989 had 
risen to over 1.1 billion barrels, over 99 percent from the Oriente 
fields (see table 13, Appendix). 

Ecuador built the 503-kilometer Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline to 
carry crude petroleum from the Oriente fields across the Andes 
to a new refinery just south of Esmeraldas. Although the pipeline 
was designed to carry as much as 400,000 bd, volume averaged 
just over 300,000 bd in the late 1980s. A landslide caused by a se- 
vere earthquake in March 1987 destroyed forty kilometers of an 
above-ground section east of Quito. To keep exports from stop- 
ping completely, Ecuador quickly constructed a thirty-eight- 
kilometer spur from the Oriente fields to Colombia's pipeline. Oil 
was then either exported directly as crude from Colombian ports 
or taken by tanker from Colombia to Ecuador's largest refinery 
at Esmeraldas. Although this stopgap measure allowed for some 
petroleum to be exported, production at the Oriente fields had to 
be trimmed by more than half for the five months it took to repair 
the Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline. 

Unlike many of the larger OPEC countries, Ecuador refined less 
than half of the petroleum it produced. Most of the country's 
123,000 bd refining capacity was located at two refinery complexes, 
one at Esmeraldas and a complex of three refineries at the Santa 
Elena oil fields. The Esmeraldas refinery had a 90,000 bd capac- 
ity, whereas the three older Santa Elena refineries had a combined 
output of 32,000 bd. Ecuador's newest refinery, completed in 1987 
near Nueva Loja in the Oriente fields, had a capacity of 1 ,000 bd. 

Control and ownership of petroleum production and refining was 
held by foreign oil companies, the government-owned Petroecua- 
dor which replaced the former Ecuadorian State Petroleum Cor- 
poration (Corporacion Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana — CEPE), or 
consortia composed of both. Petroecuador assumed complete con- 
trol of the Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline in 1989 and announced it 
would take over most other foreign interests in the petroleum in- 
dustry in the early 1990s. 

In addition to abundant supplies of petroleum, observers esti- 
mated that the country had natural gas reserves in the Oriente and 
offshore in the Gulf of Guayaquil totalling 400 billion cubic meters. 
Reserves in the Oriente were collocated with petroleum deposits. 
Producers flared most of the gas associated with petroleum drill- 
ing, using only small amounts as fuel. Distance from markets made 
exploitation of the gas uneconomical, although a small plant to 
harness the gas as a fuel was completed near Nueva Loja in the 
mid-1980s. Reserves in the Gulf of Guayaquil, thought to be among 



132 



The Economy 



the largest in Latin America, remained unexploited because of an 
uncertain domestic market for natural gas and a legal dispute be- 
tween the government and foreign companies over ownership. 

Mining and Minerals 

Mining played a small role in the economy in the 1980s, con- 
tributing only 0.7 percent to the GDP in 1986 and employing about 
7,000 persons. Inaccessibility of the regions where minerals were 
located and the incomplete exploration of resources hampered min- 
ing activities. Although observers believed that Ecuador had reserves 
of gold, silver, copper, zinc, uranium, lead, sulfur, and kaolin, 
as well as limestone, the latter dominated the industry. Miners gen- 
erally produced limestone in many small operations countrywide 
and used it in local cement plants. 

Gold, largely forgotten since its early exploitation in the sixteenth 
century, grew in importance in the 1980s; by 1987 Ecuador was 
exporting 2.4 tons per year. The southern Sierra region held the 
country's largest deposits; the newest veins were discovered in the 
southeastern province of Zamora-Chinchipe. 

In 1985 Congress passed a new law to encourage foreign explo- 
ration and investment in the mining industry. Designed to simplify 
regulation of the industry, this legislation also offered higher fi- 
nancial incentives" for the investor and lower overall taxation and 
established the Ecuadorian Institute of Minerals (Instituto Ecuatori- 
ano de Minerfa — Inemin) under the Ministry of Energy and Mines. 

Electric Power 

The period from 1976 to 1985 saw a rapid rise in the demand 
for electricity and in the construction of generating facilities. Dur- 
ing the same period, the country switched from primarily oil-fired 
thermal plants to hydroelectric-power generation. In 1986 total 
generating capacity reached 1,802 megawatts, and the country 
produced 5,202 gigawatt-hours of electricity. Although Ecuador 
had a larger generating capacity from thermal plants than from 
hydroelectric facilities, 70 percent of the electricity produced in 1986 
came from hydroelectric sources because many of the thermal plants 
sat idle or underutilized. Completion of three new hydroelectric 
complexes under construction in the late 1980s was expected to 
allow complete dependence on hydroelectric sources by 1992. 

The Amaluza complex on the Paute River near Cuenca offered 
Ecuador's largest single source of power. Current from this com- 
plex was carried to Guayaquil and to Quito via a 230-kilovolt 
transmission line. Disruptions of these lines caused occasional black- 
outs, and to provide for alternate routing, a second 230-kilovolt 



133 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



line was completed in 1988. Expansion of the grid continued 
throughout the early 1980s, until by 1984 more than half the house- 
holds nationwide had access to electricity. Access for urban house- 
holds considerably exceeded that for rural dwellings, however. 

A government agency, the Ecuadorian Institute of Electrifica- 
tion (Instituto Ecuatoriano de Electrification — Inecel), functioned 
as the nation's generation and transmission company. Inecel in 
turn sold electricity to local distribution companies over which it 
exercised some control through majority ownership of their stock. 

Manufacturing 

Industrialization occurred later in Ecuador than in most other 
Latin American countries. As late as 1960, the small industrial sec- 
tor consisted almost entirely of textile production, food process- 
ing, and artisan activity. Manufacturing began to develop in the 
mid-1960s, and during the 1970s, spurred by petroleum revenues 
and exports to other nations in the Andean Common Market 
(Ancom; also known as the Andean Pact), manufacturing became 
the most dynamic sector of the economy. Manufacturing stagnated 
in the 1980s, however, with an average annual growth of only 0.8 
percent for the period 1981-87. In 1987 it accounted for over 17 
percent of the GDP. 

Food processing and textile manufacturing accounted for almost 
60 percent of the total value of manufacturing in 1986. Nonmetal- 
lic minerals and metals comprised 12 percent of the total value; 
all other industries accounted for the balance (see table 14, Ap- 
pendix). 

Most industrial establishments were small and barely more than 
handicraft operations. A government industrial census in the early 
1980s listed more than 35,000 firms, but only 28 of these had more 
than 500 employees; more than 31,000 had from 1 to 4 workers. 
Individual proprietors owned and managed most firms. Shoemaking 
shops, woodworkers, or furniture makers represented nearly half 
of the establishments listed in the census. 

Guayaquil was the most important industrial center, followed 
by Quito. Together the two cities accounted for about two-thirds 
of total factory employment. Agricultural and beverage process- 
ing plants, sawmills, shipyards, iron foundries, and cement and 
chemical plants were Guayaquil's main industries. Textile produc- 
tion and food processing topped the list of industrial activities in 
Quito. The government had made an attempt in the early 1970s 
to disperse industrial activity by promoting industrial parks in other 
cities, with some success. 



134 




Workers in a cooperative in Chimborazo Province 
Courtesy Inter -American Foundation (Miguel Say ago) 
Sewing children } s clothes in a small shop in Guayaquil 
Courtesy Inter -American Foundation (Miguel Sayago) 



135 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

Sugar refining, rice milling, and flour milling were among the 
largest sectors in the food-processing industry. Two sugar mills 
dominated the industry and processed most of the sugar used domes- 
tically. Rice milling was concentrated in the Costa and consisted 
of numerous publicly owned mills, as well as many smaller pri- 
vate ones. Most flour mills were located near larger cities in the 
Sierra and used locally grown wheat; the three large flour mills 
near Guayaquil used mainly imported wheat. Ecuador also had 
a large baking industry, and nearly all cities had commercial bak- 
eries producing bread and cakes. 

The textile industry, which ranked next to food processing in 
value of production, was concentrated in the Sierra, where it origi- 
nated as an outgrowth of home weaving. Most textile plants re- 
mained small, although one Quito firm was among the largest 
employers in the country. 

The construction industry showed a steady decline during the 
1980s and accounted for only about 4 percent of the GDP in 1987. 
Because over 95 percent of the construction in Ecuador resulted 
from government-financed projects, the industry remained highly 
vulnerable to periods of austerity in government spending. Indeed, 
the sector's only growth year in the decade of the 1980s occurred 
in 1987, reflecting large-scale highway rebuilding after the earth- 
quake. High interest rates and a shortage of cement also hampered 
construction projects. 

Artisan activity constituted a large part of the manufacturing 
labor force. Although many of the artisans had considerable skills 
in such occupations as weaving, their wages were among the lowest 
in the labor force, and as machine-weaving became more wide- 
spread their skills were increasingly obsolete. In the 1980s, the gov- 
ernment offered special credits and loans to encourage a transition 
from artisan workshops to small factories. 

The largest number of artisans produced clothing and furniture. 
This group included dressmakers, tailors, shoemakers, cabinetmak- 
ers, and carpenters. Several thousand additional artisans were gold- 
smiths or silversmiths. 

Services 

The service sector constituted the largest component of the Ecua- 
dorian economy, accounting for almost 50 percent of the GDP in 
1987. The largest parts of the service sector were wholesale and retail 
trade at 29 percent, financial services at 23 percent, and transpor- 
tation and communications at 15 percent of services. Although con- 
tributing half the nation's wealth, financial services were inadequate, 



136 



The Economy 



and the communication and transportation networks remained 
underdeveloped . 

Financial System 

The country's modern finance and banking system began in 1948 
with the establishment of the Central Bank. The Law of the Mone- 
tary System of 1961 defined the functions of the Central Bank, 
which included issuing and stabilizing the national currency, provid- 
ing credit to the private sector, managing foreign-exchange reserves, 
controlling import-export permits, carrying out the Monetary 
Board's policies, supervising private banks, and regulating inter- 
national financial transactions. The bank also maintained a check 
clearinghouse, rediscounted and made advances to commercial 
banks, and published economic data. 

In 1989 the structure of the banking system resembled a three- 
tiered pyramid with the Monetary Board at the apex. The Bank 
Superintendency and the Central Bank occupied the next tier and 
lent funds to four state-owned financial institutions. At the bot- 
tom came the commercial banks, savings and loan associations, 
and finance companies, which operated at the local level. 

The Monetary Board regulated the entire banking and credit 
system, including the Central Bank. In the 1980s, the board's eleven 
members included the chairman, appointed by the president of Ec- 
uador, and the ministers of finance and credit; agriculture and 
livestock; energy and mines; and industry, commerce, integration, 
and fishing. Also included were the president of the National Plan- 
ning Board, two representatives of national chamber of commerce 
organizations, a representative of the commercial banks, the general 
manager of the Central Bank, and the head of the Bank Superin- 
tendency. The Monetary Board's functions included formulating 
the country's economic policy; determining interest rates; and set- 
ting Central Bank credit levels, minimum reserve requirements, 
and exchange rates. 

The Bank Superintendency supervised and controlled banks, 
finance companies, and insurance companies. The Congress ap- 
pointed the head or superintendent from three candidates proposed 
by the president. Funded by compulsory contributions from the 
financial institutions under its control, the Bank Superintendency 
also collected and published banking statistics. 

The national government and the private banks jointly owned 
the Central Bank and tasked it with carrying out the policies of 
the Monetary Board and for supervising the activities of private 
banks. All private banks in Ecuador were required to invest at least 



137 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

5 percent of their capital and reserves in the Central Bank, and 
together they owned the majority of shares in the Central Bank. 
Headquartered in Quito, the Central Bank had sixteen branches 
in other cities and towns in the late 1980s. 

The four major government-owned financial institutions were 
the National Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Fomento — 
BNF); the Securities Commission-National Financial Corporation 
(Comision de Valores-Corporacion Financiera Nacional — CV- 
CFN), more commonly known as the National Financial Corpo- 
ration (Corporation Financiera Nacional — CFN); the Ecuadorian 
Housing Bank (Banco Ecuatoriano de la Vivienda — BEV); and 
the Development Bank of Ecuador (Banco de Desarrollo de Ecua- 
dor — Bede), formerly known as the Cooperatives Bank of Ecua- 
dor. Each institution had a specialized role: the BNF provided loans 
for agriculture and industry, the CFN lent capital to industries 
utilizing local raw materials or making handicrafts, the BEV 
promoted low-income housing, and the Bede lent funds to local 
credit cooperatives, especially those in rural areas. 

The thirty-one commercial banks were the most important finan- 
cial institutions in the country, attracting the major portion of 
deposits and making the largest percentage of total loans in the 
banking system. Only four of the commercial banks were foreign: 
the United Holland Bank from the Netherlands, Citibank and the 
Bank of America from the United States, and Lloyd's Bank from 
Britain, formerly known as the Bank of London and South America. 
In 1986 the Bank of Pichincha, Pacific Bank, Philanthropic Bank, 
People's Bank, and Continental were the five largest locally owned 
commercial banks. 

Several other types of private financial institutions existed in 1988. 
Eleven savings and loan associations, 26 finance companies, 123 
cooperative savings institutions, and 4 credit card companies pro- 
vided various forms of financing or credit. The Ecuadorian De- 
velopment Finance Company (Compania Financiera Ecuatoriana 
de Desarrollo — Cofiec) was founded in 1966 by local and foreign 
commercial banks, local businessmen, several international finance 
firms, and the CFN. Cofiec was an important source of funds to 
private industry, both in the form of loans and in equity investment. 

Two stock exchanges operated, one each in Quito and Guaya- 
quil. Although the Quito exchange handled almost twice as many 
transactions as the Guayaquil exchange in 1986, neither was large. 
The great majority of trading occurred in government issues and 
mortgage bonds, with only a small amount of trading in common 
stocks or other securities. Most Ecuadorian businesses were owned 



138 



The Economy 



by small numbers of individuals, and few resorted to public financ- 
ing to raise capital. 

Tourism 

In contrast to many other Latin American countries, Ecuador 
had a small tourist industry, and it played only a minor role in 
the economy in the 1980s. In 1985 approximately 250,000 tourists 
visited Ecuador and contributed over US$200 million to the econ- 
omy. Colombia was the source of 36 percent of the visitors, fol- 
lowed by the United States with 2 1 percent and Western Europe 
with 18 percent. Ecuador did not include brief cross-border visits 
in official tourist statistics, so these figures do not include the many 
Colombian visitors who were only on short shopping trips, taking 
advantage of the generally lower prices in Ecuador. 

The government provided limited support of tourism, and many 
colonial towns, ancient ruins, and areas of natural beauty were un- 
developed because of lack of promotion or inadequate infrastruc- 
ture for visitors. The most popular tourist destination in the 1980s 
was the Galapagos Islands, but concerns over the delicate and 
unique environment limited large-scale tourism there. The National 
Directorate of Tourism was attempting to broaden the tourist des- 
tinations available. . 

Communications 

Although the system underwent expansion and modernization 
in the 1970s and 1980s, telecommunications remained underdevel- 
oped with most facilities located in Quito or Guayaquil. The media 
and broadcast facilities likewise remained concentrated in the coun- 
try 's two main urban areas and often displayed regional rivalries 
or biases in their coverage. Foreign television, motion pictures, 
and books dominated the entertainment and publishing arena. 

Despite improvements beginning in 1970, the telephone system 
still failed to provide adequate service to most customers, and fa- 
cilities remained concentrated in Quito and Guayaquil. In 1987 
the country counted 343,000 telephone lines, 70 percent residen- 
tial and 30 percent business, an average of only 3.5 lines per 100 
inhabitants. This compared poorly with averages for other 
countries — 5.8 lines per 100 inhabitants in Venezuela, 9.5 in 
Colombia, and 78.7 in the United States. Over three-quarters of 
the country's telephones were in the capital and in Guayaquil, with 
most of the remainder scattered throughout provincial capitals. In 
rural areas, with about 40 percent of the population, many towns 
had only one public telephone or were totally without telephone 



139 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

service. Customers in Quito and Guayaquil took advantage of a 
small telex network with more than 3,000 subscribers. 

The quality of telephone service remained poor, with frequent 
breakdowns of the entire system and difficulties in completing calls. 
In the late 1980s, much of the equipment in the telephone switch- 
ing centers was obsolete and overworked, and an average of only 
one- third of the telephone calls dialed could be completed. This 
completion rate dropped to nearly zero on calls between cities during 
business hours. Nearly all telephones were connected to automatic 
exchanges, and domestic long-distance calls could be dialed by cus- 
tomers without the assistance of an operator. International calls, 
however, had to be placed through an operator, with call comple- 
tion waits ranging from several minutes to several hours. 

Most long-distance calls within the country travelled on a 960- 
channel microwave trunk that linked Quito with Guayaquil. A 
lower-capacity microwave route extended out to smaller cities and 
also ran north from Quito into Colombia and south from Guaya- 
quil into Peru. Most international calls were routed to the ground 
satellite station east of Quito. With a 30-meter antenna permanently 
pointed to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organi- 
zation's Atlantic Ocean satellite, this ground station could handle 
more than 300 simultaneous telephone calls from Ecuador to loca- 
tions in North America, South America, and Europe. 

The Ecuadorian Institute of Telecommunications (Instituto Ecu- 
atoriano de Telecomunicaciones — Ietel), a government-owned cor- 
poration, provided all international and domestic long-distance 
telephone services, the telex services, and 95 percent of local tele- 
phone service. The Public Municipal Enterprise for Telephones, 
Potable Water, and Sewers (Empresa Publica Municipal de Tele- 
fonos, Agua Potable y Alcantarillado — Etapa) provided local service 
for the remaining 5 percent of the population with telephones in 
the city of Cuenca. The Ministry of Public Works and Communi- 
cations controlled both Ietel and Etapa. 

Radio broadcast facilities were numerous, and all areas of the 
country could receive at least one domestic station. As with other 
communication services, however, Quito and Guayaquil dominated 
mediumwave amplitude-modulation (AM) stations; of the more 
than 260 stations nationwide, more than 40 were in Guayaquil and 
three dozen in the capital. Most broadcasting was in Spanish, but 
a few rural stations had programming in Quichua and Shuar. Six- 
teen stations of the National Radio (Radio Nacional) were pub- 
licly owned; the remainder were in private hands and loosely 
organized into five networks. The country had an estimated 3 mil- 
lion radio receivers. 



140 



The Economy 



In addition to mediumwave broadcasts, in 1989 Ecuador boasted 
thirty-nine domestic shortwave stations, one international short- 
wave transmitter, and several frequency-modulation (FM) stations. 
Shortwave frequencies were used to transmit to isolated areas in 
the Oriente or to reach a broader audience nationwide. The coun- 
try's sole shortwave station intended for an international audience, 
the Quito-based HCJB, the "Voice of the Andes," was missionary- 
run with primarily religious programming. FM service was found 
primarily in Quito and Guayaquil. 

Ecuador had only ten television stations — four in Quito, three 
in Guayaquil, and one each in Esmeraldas, Portoviejo, and Cuenca. 
Channel 10 in Quito, however, maintained a network of small relay 
stations so that most of the country could receive its signal. Each 
station was required to broadcast a minimum of five minutes of 
literacy programming every day. Ecuador had the same television 
system as the United States, thus permitting the use of United 
States-made television sets or the taping and viewing of United 
States programs on video recorders without modification or con- 
version. A 1989 estimate showed 600,000 television receivers in- 
cluding 250,000 color sets. 

The National Postal Enterprise provided postal service and main- 
tained more than 500 offices throughout the country. Service was 
slow and unreliable, however, with frequent reports of thefts or 
loss of mail. 

The press was concentrated in Guayaquil and Quito, each city 
having four daily newspapers. El Universo, an independent paper 
published in Guayaquil, had the largest circulation in 1989, with 
225,000 subscribers, followed by El Comercio, a conservative, bus- 
iness paper from Quito with a circulation of 130,000 (see The 
Media, ch. 4). 

Ecuador had no national news agency. Foreign wire services with 
offices in Quito and Guayaquil included Associated Press and 
United Press International from the United States, Reuters from 
Britain, the West German Deutsche Press-Agentur, Agencia EFE 
from Spain, the Cuban Prensa Latina, TASS from the Soviet 
Union, and the New China (Xinhua) News Agency. 

Motion pictures remained a popular source of entertainment and 
communication. Because Ecuador produced no films domestically, 
all movies were imported and either dubbed or subtitled in Span- 
ish. Movie attendance was high, with an average of 5.5 visits to 
a theater annually. Increased sales of video cassette recorders made 
home viewing of movies as well as sports events and foreign tele- 
vision programs increasingly popular. 



141 



Ecuador: A Country Study 
Transportation 

Until the twentieth century, the transport pattern reflected and 
reinforced the historical division of the country into two antagonistic 
regions — the Costa and the Sierra (see Natural Regions, ch. 2). 
Transport routes on the Costa were laid out to move export crops 
from the production areas to the ports, and routes in the Sierra 
ran north-south through the inter- Andean valleys. Interregional 
movement was confined to a few crude pack trails that permitted 
only limited exchange of goods or people between the two regions. 

Completion of the Guayaquil-Quito railroad in 1908 provided 
the first effective interregional link and cut the travel time between 
the two cities from twelve days to twelve hours. In 1989 the rail 
system totaled 965 kilometers, all owned and operated by the State 
Railways Company (Empresa Nacional de los Ferrocarriles del 
Estado — ENFE) (see fig. 15). The principal line in the late 1980s 
remained the 447-kilometer link between Quito and Guayaquil. 
Floods in 1982 and 1983 disrupted service on this line, with ser- 
vice only partially restored by early 1989. 

In the 1950s, the rail system added two extensions: a spur south 
to Cuenca and, with French help, an oudet to the Pacific from Quito 
to the port of San Lorenzo. The Quito-San Lorenzo line suffered 
frequent suspensions of service, and in 1989 trains ran only on the 
portion from a point well north of Quito to the port. Several short 
lines, built in the late 1800s or early 1900s to transport agricul- 
tural products to ports, had all been abandoned by the 1980s. 

Until the 1950s, the railroads were the prime mover of passengers 
and freight and had played an important role in integrating the 
economy. After World War II, the government began to stress in- 
vestment in the highway system, and highways gradually became 
the principal means of transportation. A comparison of statistics 
from 1969 to 1989 illustrates the decline in the overall importance 
of the rail system: the amount of freight carried dropped from 
260,000 to 37,000 tons, and passenger traffic declined from 4.6 
million trips to slightly over 1.6 million. 

Construction of highways began on a small scale in the 1920s 
and continued sporadically until after World War II, when a gready 
expanded effort created the outlines of a network covering many 
parts of the country and opening up vast tracts of land to new set- 
tlement. By 1989 Ecuador had about 28,000 kilometers of roads, 
of which about 3,600 were paved, 17,400 were gravel and improved 
earth, and 7,000 kilometers were dirt roads. 

The 1,148-kilometer Pan American Highway remained the old- 
est and most heavily traveled route in the road network, following 



142 



The Economy 



the route of the Inca imperial highway through the Sierra and con- 
necting all the towns along the inter- Andean corridor between the 
Colombian border and the southern border with Peru. Except for 
a twelve-kilometer segment, this highway was paved from the 
Colombian border south through the capital to Cuenca. From 
Cuenca south to the Peruvian border, however, most of the sur- 
face was gravel and in fair condition. 

A paved north-south route through the Costa from Esmeraldas 
in the north through Quayaquil to the Peruvian border just south 
of Machala roughly parallelled the Pan American Highway. From 
Quevedo to Quayaquil, this route split into two branches with the 
eastern branch passing through Babahoyo and the western branch 
along the Daule River. This highway carried an important por- 
tion of the traffic in tropical produce of the Costa. 

Four paved highways connected the Pan American Highway and 
the north-south Costa route. In addition, asphalt roads linked 
Guayaquil with the small port of Manta and the oil-producing area 
of Salinas on the Pacific. These east-west arteries served to inte- 
grate the regions, as evidenced by the growing volume of goods 
trucked between the Costa and the Sierra. 

In the late 1980s, the Oriente continued to suffer from an almost 
total lack of all-weather highways. A few gravel or dirt roads 
extended east from the Pan American Highway, mostly to oil- 
producing areas in the northern part of this region. Although usually 
built by the petroleum companies for easier access to their fields, 
the roads served to increase colonization of the Oriente, and small 
population centers sprang up along their paths. 

A large number of bus lines and trucking companies provided 
intercity motor transport. The majority of the trucking enterprises 
were small with no schedules and were operated by the owner- 
driver. Most bus owners and drivers, and a few of the truck drivers, 
belonged to cooperatives, which set uniform rates. Intercity bus 
service among towns was frequent and inexpensive but often 
crowded and plagued by frequent vehicle breakdowns. In 1986 there 
were an estimated 250,000 passenger cars, 14,000 buses, and 22,000 
trucks. 

Air transport was fairly well developed with 179 airports, of which 
43 had permanent surface runways. Since the 1920s when com- 
mercial air service was first established, airlines held a secure, if 
limited, segment of the transport market. Because of the short dis- 
tances between most population centers, particularly in the Sierra, 
and the steadily expanding road network, few air routes were heavily 
traveled. The largest volume of passenger and cargo traffic moved 



143 



Ecuador: A Country Study 




Figure 15. Transportation System, 1989 

between Quito and Guayaquil. Throughout most of the Oriente, 
air travel provided the only means of communication with the rest 
of the country. 

Ecuador had four main airlines, one with both domestic and 
international routes and three smaller companies with mostly 
domestic service. Private interests originally established the largest 
company — the Ecuadorian Aviation Company (Compama Ecua- 
toriana de Aviacion — CEA, known as Ecuatoriana) — but sold it 
to the government in 1974. Designated the national airline of Ec- 
uador, Ecuatoriana maintained service from both Quito and Guaya- 
quil to more than a half dozen cities in Latin America and four 
in the United States. 



144 



The Economy 



Water transport was more important for foreign trade than for 
domestic commerce, although the country had well-developed 
coastal shipping and businesses extensively used some rivers, par- 
ticularly the waterways of the Guayas Basin. Although ships with 
moderate draught could navigate the rivers of the Oriente, only 
small canoes and vessels were used there. Competition from high- 
ways had diminished waterborne traffic, but riverboats continued 
to ply traditional routes calling at towns and farming areas not 
reached by roads. Boats sailed frequently between coastal cities and 
between the mainland and the Galapagos Islands. 

Ecuador's ports carried about 95 percent of all imports and ex- 
ports. Guayaquil handled about 60 percent of all seaborne trade, 
including most of the agricultural exports. The Old Port (Puerto 
Viejo) was located on the banks of the Guayas River; in 1962 the 
New Port (Puerto Nuevo) was built ten kilometers south of Guaya- 
quil on an estuary and connected to the Old Port by a canal. The 
New Port, Ecuador's largest, could berth up to five ships. 

Three other small ports had limited trade. Puerto Bolfvar, near 
Machala, handled most of the agricultural exports, especially 
bananas, from the southern part of the country. Coffee, castor 
beans, and frozen fish from the central provinces passed through 
Manta. Balao, sixteen kilometers south of Esmeraldas, was greatly 
expanded in the 1970s to accommodate petroleum exports. 

As of 1983, the national merchant marine consisted of 130 ves- 
sels with 530,000 gross registered tons (GRT). Ecuador's national 
oil tanker fleet, the Ecuadorian Petroleum Fleet, accounted for 
164,000 GRT. The principal maritime carrier, the Grancolom- 
bian Merchant Fleet, was jointly owned by Ecuador and Colom- 
bia, and its thirty-five ships accounted for a total of 250,000 GRT. 
The Banana Fleet was a subsidiary of the state general cargo line, 
the Ecuadorian Ship Transport. 

External Sector 
External Debt 

Ecuador's growing external debt problem was linked to the coun- 
try's heavy dependence on volatile petroleum export revenues. Dur- 
ing the 1970s, the government made optimistic forecasts concerning 
potential future revenues accruing as a result of oil exports, and 
it borrowed heavily from foreign sources to help meet development 
goals and to finance large public-sector deficits. In real terms, 
government spending grew by 9.6 percent each year during 
1973-82. Interest payments on the debt quintupled between 1978 
and 1982. During 1983-85, while the government implemented 



145 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

austerity measures as it sought to meet international debt obliga- 
tions, Ecuador successfully negotiated with about 300 foreign cred- 
itor banks a multiyear refinancing package on a US$5.2-billion 
portion of its external debt. Although the rescheduling agreement 
allowed Ecuador twelve years to repay 95 percent of its debt obli- 
gations, it eased the country's burden of debt repayments only tem- 
porarily. A US$13 per barrel drop in international oil prices in 

1986 created a serious revenue shortfall, forcing the government 
to announce in January 1987 that it would impose a three-month 
moratorium on payment of its foreign debt obligations. 

Ecuador was exporting about 220,000 barrels of petroleum per 
day in the first few months of 1987. The earthquake that hit the 
country in March destroyed forty kilometers of the vital Trans-Ec- 
uadorian Pipeline that connected productive oil fields in the Oriente 
region with port facilities just south of Esmeraldas. Repairs to the 
pipeline were completed in mid- August 1987, and by September 
Ecuador once again was exporting about 220,000 to 230,000 bar- 
rels of oil per day. But the loss to the government of US$700 mil- 
lion in oil export revenue during this period was devastating and 
undercut the country's ability to meet its external debt obligations. 
Debt payments to foreign private lending institutions were not re- 
sumed until early 1988, and then only for two months. 

During 1987 the country's external debt increased by about US$1 
billion to US$9.6 billion. At the beginning of 1988, Ecuador faced 
a debt-servicing burden of US$1.45 billion, and foreign-exchange 
reserves were nearly exhausted. The international price of Oriente 
crude had improved slightly during 1987 but dropped to US$12.50 
per barrel in 1988. Government officials, mindful that the coun- 
try would not earn enough export revenue in 1988 to cover the 
expected balance-of-payments deficit or to meet the country's ex- 
ternal debt- service obligations, suspended interest payments to pri- 
vate banks in April 1988. 

When Borja assumed the presidency in 1988, Ecuador's interest 
arrearages to private commercial banks amounted to almost US$1 
billion. In November 1988, Ecuadorian officials began a new round 
of negotiations to refinance US$6.5 billion of the country's grow- 
ing external debt, which by then was approaching US$1 1 billion. 
At the end of these unsuccessful negotiations, Ecuador's Mone- 
tary Board chairman, citing low oil prices and damage from the 

1987 earthquake, announced that service payments would be re- 
sumed only after the country's economic situation had improved. 
Foreign debt payments to commercial banks finally were resumed 
in April 1989, but creditor banks were doubtful that Ecuador could 
make payments sufficient to cover the accumulated arrears. 



146 




147 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

Meanwhile, Ecuador had not stopped making payments to multi- 
lateral lending organizations, and it secured new loans from the 
World Bank and the IMF. During the first half of 1989, more than 
US$600 million in loans, all of which was earmarked for develop- 
ment purposes, was received from the World Bank. The IMF pro- 
vided Ecuador with US$254 million in credit during 1987-88, and 
an additional US$137 million standby credit agreement was reached 
in September 1989. 

Trade and Balance of Payments 

The health of the Ecuadorian economy was dependent on for- 
eign trade. But this dependence left the country vulnerable to the 
vagaries of international commerce, especially the unpredictabil- 
ity of prices for Ecuadorian export goods. 

The improved performance of the economy during the 1970s 
was the result mainly of the rapid acceleration of Ecuador's oil ex- 
ports beginning in 1972 and a sharp increase in international 
petroleum prices starting in 1974. In 1971 crude petroleum exports 
made up less than 1 percent of total exports and were valued at 
US$1.2 million. The volume of petroleum exports expanded dra- 
matically in 1972 and 1973; by 1974 petroleum made up almost 
65 percent of the country's commodity exports and was valued at 
US$792 million. Although domestic consumption of petroleum 
derivatives rose steadily and the volume of Ecuadorian oil exports 
moderated during the remainder of the 1970s, the spectacular rise 
in the early 1980s of the crude oil price, which reached a peak of 
US$34.50 in 1981, resulted in sharp increases in petroleum ex- 
port revenue. The rapid decline in international oil prices that began 
in 1986 and the 1987 suspension of crude petroleum production 
in the aftermath of a destructive earthquake produced a 50-percent 
drop in the value of Ecuadorian crude petroleum exports in 1986-87 
(see table 15, Appendix). 

Ecuador's substantial income from crude oil exports had posi- 
tive and negative effects on the economy. During the 1960s, foreign- 
exchange reserves averaged about US$25 million. Because of the 
oil boom, the balance-of-payments situation improved during the 
mid- to late 1970s. Net foreign-exchange earnings, for example, 
had reached US$230 million by the end of 1973 and more than 
US$350 million in 1974. This improvement in foreign exchange 
had a positive impact on the economy, but that gain was partially 
wiped out by the relaxation of import restrictions, which allowed 
the import volume to go up almost 50 percent in 1974. Growing 
oil export revenue also encouraged the government to subsidize 
commodities such as gasoline and food items, expand public-sector 



148 



The Economy 



employment, increase government-sponsored social benefits, and 
finance the growing budget deficit through foreign borrowing. 
Austerity measures were implemented in the mid-1980s to reduce 
the cost of subsidized goods, but by the end of the decade the govern- 
ment had failed to adequately tackle its growing budget deficits 
or its foreign debt payment problems. 

In 1970 fish, timber, and other agricultural products, mainly 
bananas, coffee, cocoa, and sugar, had accounted for almost 90 
percent of foreign-exchange earnings. But the dramatic increase 
in petroleum production that began in 1972 profoundly altered the 
country's long-term export structure. First, petroleum displaced 
agricultural products as the country's major export commodity, 
and, second, the overall value of exports grew tenfold between 1970 
and 1980, from US$235 million in 1970 to US$2.52 billion in 1980. 
Between 1974 and 1981 , gains in export earnings were mainly the 
result of favorable international prices for Ecuadorian commodi- 
ties, including farm products. The value of commodity exports 
leveled off during the first half of the 1980s and then declined moder- 
ately to US$2. 19 billion in 1986, reflecting the fall of international 
crude petroleum prices. The value of commodity exports remained 
stable during 1987, 1988, and 1989— US$2.0 billion, US$2.2 bil- 
lion, and US$2.3 billion, respectively. In 1989 petroleum accounted 
for about 50 percent of export revenues. In the same year, the value 
of shrimp exports amounted to US$348 million; banana exports, 
US$316 million; coffee, US$191 million; and cocoa, US$73 million. 

Also during the 1970s, imports rose by an average of 1 1 percent 
per annum, and the value of imports grew steadily between 1970, 
when it stood at US$249.6 million, and 1981, when it stood at 
US$2.36 billion. The value of imports declined after 1981, falling 
to US$1 .6 billion in 1986. Although the value of imports had mul- 
tiplied sixfold since 1970, the structure of imports changed only 
in minor details. Capital goods for industry, for example, repre- 
sented 15.4 percent of total imports in 1970; by 1975 capital goods 
were averaging about 22 percent of total imports, and they would 
remain at that level until 1987. The growth in imports of capital 
goods was consistent with increases in manufacturing output. Im- 
ports of durable consumer goods averaged about 1 5 percent of total 
imports during the early 1980s, compared with an average of slightiy 
less than 5 percent during the 1970s, when the process of import 
substitution (see Glossary) for consumer goods was moderately more 
successful than in the 1980s. In 1986, however, as the government's 
import restrictions and devaluations of the sucre took effect, only 
7 . 7 percent of imports would come under the category of durable 
consumer goods (see table 16, Appendix). 



149 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

In 1987, 61 percent of exports went to the United States, and 
30 percent of imports came from the United States, making that 
country Ecuador's main trading partner. Wheat, assorted ma- 
chinery, transport equipment, and chemicals were the principal 
United States exports to Ecuador in 1987. Shrimp, petroleum, 
bananas, coffee, and cocoa were the principal United States im- 
ports from Ecuador in the same year. Other major trading part- 
ners included the European Community, other Latin American 
and Caribbean countries, and Japan (see table 17, Appendix). 

Ecuador's current-account balance varied, registering an aver- 
age yearly deficit of US$100 million during the 1970s. Financing 
the current-account deficits was not difficult as long as Ecuador 
enjoyed continuing improvements in its terms of trade (see Glos- 
sary). By 1977 it was clear that the balance of payments was being 
supported by high oil receipts and external borrowing. The gradual 
decline of international crude petroleum prices beginning in 1982, 
coupled with a poor export performance during 1982-83, made 
it more difficult for the government to secure external financing 
from foreign commercial banks. Export earnings fell by about 8 
percent in 1982, and despite a moderate reduction in the volume 
of imports, the current-account deficit passed the US$1 billion mark, 
which in 1982 represented 9 percent of GDP. 

To deal with the balance-of-payments crisis, in 1982 the govern- 
ment, in cooperation with an IMF fiscal austerity program, 
devalued the sucre for the first time since 1971. Another sharp 
devaluation occurred in 1983, when the government also introduced 
new exchange controls, prohibited or limited the importation of 
some items, and reduced fuel and export subsidies. During late 
1982 and early 1983, crop production and exports dropped sharply 
because of the devastating effects of El Nino, but they returned 
to 1980 levels by mid- 1984. Meanwhile, the government began 
negotiations to reschedule the external debt. The austerity plan, 
although painful, helped Ecuador to virtually eliminate its current- 
account deficit by the end of 1983. Ecuador's current- account deficit 
was offset by a virtually identical surplus in 1985. 

In 1986 the international price of crude petroleum dropped 
sharply to an average of US$15.35 from the previous year's aver- 
age of US$27. 16. The result was a decline in foreign-exchange earn- 
ings and a return to chronic current-account deficits during the 
1986-89 period. In 1987, the year of the US$700 million oil revenue 
loss, the current- account deficit reached -US$1.13 billion. The 
current- account deficit improved in 1988 when it stood at -US$597 
million; in 1989 the deficit decreased slightly to about -US$500 
million (see table 18, Appendix). Nevertheless, despite these 



150 



The Economy 



improvements, the prospects for Ecuador's balance of payments, 
as for its economy as a whole, were uncertain. 

* * * 

Relatively few book-length studies exist on the Ecuadorian econ- 
omy. The most comprehensive introduction to the subject can 
be found in David W. Schodt's Ecuador: An Andean Enigma. Luis 
Mendoza's Geo-Economia del Ecuador offers an excellent, although 
dated, examination of national economic issues. Specific economic 
data may be drawn from the Economist Intelligence Unit's quart- 
erly Country Profile: Ecuador and the annual reports of Ecuador's 
Central Bank. (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography.) 



151 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 



Priest playing a large panpipe (Jama-Coaque culture) 



ONE OF THE LEAST POLITICALLY stable of the South 
American republics for most of its history, Ecuador had 86 govern- 
ments and 17 constitutions in its first 159 years of independence. 
Only twenty of those governments resulted from popular elections, 
and many of the elections were fraudulent. Jose Maria Velasco 
Ibarra, who completed only one of his five terms as president, often 
stated, " Ecuador is a very difficult country to govern." 

Ecuador had four successive democratic elections from 1948 to 
1960, but the country did not experience relative political stability 
under democratic rule again until the 1980s. Seven years of mili- 
tary dictatorship ended with the presidential inauguration of Jaime 
Roldos Aguilera on August 10, 1979. After Roldos died in an air- 
plane crash on May 24, 1981, Vice President Osvaldo Hurtado 
Larrea assumed the presidency. The completion of the Hurtado/ 
Roldos administration and the constitutional and orderly transfer 
of power — the first such transfer in twenty-four years — to conser- 
vative Leon Febres Cordero Ribadeneyra (1984-88) in August 1984 
seemed to affirm the restoration of democracy in Ecuador. 
Nevertheless, as Roldos himself had cautioned shortly before tak- 
ing office, the nation had only a formalistic and ritualistic democratic 
tradition. 

Indeed, Ecuador has been shaken periodically since 1984 by bitter 
conflicts between the executive branch on the one side and the 
unicameral legislature and the judiciary on the other. These clashes 
were particularly pronounced during Febres Cordero' s polemical 
administration. His authoritarian rule also provoked military mu- 
tinies and even his brief abduction by rebellious troops. Although 
battered, Ecuador's democratic system survived, and Febres Cor- 
dero transferred power to his long-time rival, Rodrigo Borja Ce- 
vallos, in August 1988. Whereas Febres Cordero, a millionaire 
businessman from Guayaquil, had advocated a free-market econ- 
omy, strong executive control, and close alignment with the United 
States, Borja, a social democrat from Quito, espoused a mixed econ- 
omy, a pluralist government, and a nonaligned foreign policy. In 
his first two years, Borja succeeded in softening the impact of his 
predecessor's legacy of political, economic, and social crises. 

Despite a decade of civilian democratic rule marked by three 
peaceful transitions of government, analysts generally agreed that 
the political system remained vulnerable. Political scientist John D. 
Martz noted, for instance, that the transition to a third democratic 



155 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

government in 1988 provided ''little reason to believe that the fragile 
democratic system in Ecuador had been strengthened, nor that the 
historic pattern of instability had been fundamentally reversed or 
modified." 

The destabilizing conflicts among the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches of government resulted primarily from idiosyn- 
crasies of Ecuador's institutional structure. For example, the judi- 
ciary, despite being independent, lacked the authority needed to 
serve as an effective check on the abuse of presidential powers. 
Although the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justi- 
cia — CSJ) carried out many judicial duties normally expected of 
a nation's highest court, it did not rule on constitutional issues. 
A nonjudicial appendage of the National Congress (Congreso 
Nacional — hereafter, Congress), the Tribunal of Constitutional 
Guarantees (Tribunal de Garantfas Constitucionales — TGC), ex- 
ercised that function, thereby giving the legislative body the power 
to, in effect, control interpretation of the Constitution. 

The traditional, deep-seated division between the liberal, trade- 
oriented, tropical Costa (coastal region) and the conservative, 
agrarian-oriented Sierra (Andean highlands) also helped explain 
Ecuador's bitter infighting over political and economic affairs. This 
fundamental division pitted the Pacific port city of Guayaquil, the 
country's principal economic center, against the highland capital 
of Quito. The enmity between natives of Guayaquil and of Quito 
was reflected in the alignment of the country's sixteen registered 
political parties in the 1988 elections, as well as in the refusal of 
outgoing President Febres Cordero, a native of Guayaquil, to speak 
to his successor, Rodrigo Borja, a native of Quito, or even to per- 
sonally pass the presidential sash to him on August 10, 1988. Ac- 
cording to political scientist and former president Hurtado, rivalry 
among provinces and regions for central government attention in 
the form of development projects, principally road construction, 
also was a major source of political conflict. 

Although Ecuador's political parties and its free and partisan 
press participated in a lively and contentious democratic political 
process, parties suffered from factionalism, weak organization, lack 
of mass participation, and blurred ideologies, as well as from the 
competing influences of populism and militarism. Analysts gener- 
ally agreed that the proliferation of small parties and the need to 
negotiate alliances contributed significantly to political instability 
in the 1980s. 

Constitutional Background 

The tension between civilian and clerical authority dominated 
Ecuador's constitutional history for much of the nineteenth and 



156 



Government and Politics 



early twentieth centuries. This issue provided one of the bases for 
the lasting dispute between Conservatives, who represented primar- 
ily the interests of the Sierra and the church, and the Liberals, who 
represented those of the Costa and anticlericalism. 

Ecuador's first constitution of 1830, when the country seceded 
from the Confederation of Gran Colombia, followed the precedents 
of other independence documents: the Quito State Charter (1812) 
and the Gran Colombia constitutions of Cucuta (1821) and Bogota 
(1830). The Quito State Charter, framed before independence, 
called for a unicameral legislature and a popular and representa- 
tive state established through indirect elections by its citizens. The 
term "popular," however, meant in practice participation by only 
wealthy and influential persons. Succeeding constitutions clearly 
defined the stringent property, professional, and literacy require- 
ments for citizenship and distinguished between citizens and Ec- 
uadorians. Only a small, white, male minority (initially those over 
twenty-one years of age) met these requirements and therefore 
enjoyed the impressive rights guaranteed under these and other 
nineteenth-century constitutions (see The Struggle for Indepen- 
dence, ch. 1). 

Ecuador's first constitution as a republic, that of 1830, also be- 
came known as the Floreana constitution, after the new nation's 
first president, General Juan Jose Flores (1830-45). It established 
a unitary and centralized presidential system of government and 
separation of powers, with the executive power predominating in 
practice. The 1830 constitution also established a unicameral con- 
gress, elected by indirect suffrage and made up of an equal num- 
ber (ten) of deputies from each of the three districts — Quito, Azuay, 
and Guayaquil — and a Council of State to assist the executive in 
administering the government and to substitute for Congress dur- 
ing the recess. 

The five constitutions framed between 1830 and 1852 had much 
in common. Voting was made indirect, through electors, in both 
congressional and presidential elections. The presidential term was 
four years, with the exception of the 1843 constitution (the so-called 
"Slavery Charter"), which provided for an eight-year term. The 
1843 constitution also recognized Roman Catholicism as the state 
religion. Only the constitutions of 1830 and 1851, however, pro- 
vided for a unicameral legislature; the others established a bicameral 
Congress, composed of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The 
1843 constitution also made an exception to indirect congressional 
elections by extending popular suffrage to the election of senators. 
The 1845 constitution declared that sovereignty resides in the 
people, although it extended suffrage only to all male citizens. 



157 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

The constitution of 1861, promulgated by President Gabriel 
Garcia Moreno (1859-75), eliminated the financial requirements 
for citizenship and the franchise; introduced direct and secret 
suffrage for electing all members of a bicameral Congress, the presi- 
dent and vice president of the republic, and the provincial authori- 
ties; and established proportional representation for Ecuador's 
provinces in the Chamber of Deputies (each province elected two 
senators). These innovations made the 1861 constitution the most 
representative in Ecuador's constitutional evolution in the nine- 
teenth century. It also reintroduced the strong presidency, whose 
chief executive was elected by " universal suffrage" for a four- 
year term. Although it retained Roman Catholicism as the only 
legal religion, the 1861 constitution guaranteed free expression of 
thought. 

Nearly all of the constitutions prohibited the immediate reelec- 
tion of the president, but this provision was often violated in spirit. 
Despite a strong sentiment against long-term monopoly of the 
presidency, generals Flores, Garcia, and Eloy Alfaro (1895-1912) 
managed to rule behind the scenes between their terms of office. 
In 1869 Garcia, a conservative, intensely devout Catholic, promul- 
gated a more authoritarian constitution, referred to as the Gar- 
ciana constitution or Carta Negra (the Black Charter), which 
extended the presidential term to six years (see The Era of Con- 
servatism, 1860-95, ch. 1). It introduced the religious factor into 
politics by making membership in the Roman Catholic Church a 
requisite for citizenship, and it also required being at least twenty- 
one years of age, married, and able to read and write. The 1884 
Elections Law, however, eliminated the requirement of being Cath- 
olic in order to be a citizen. 

The Liberal period from 1895 to 1925 had two constitutions, 
those of 1897 and 1906. The first, promulgated by General Jose 
Eloy Alfaro Delgado, prohibited religious orders, abolished priv- 
ileges of the Catholic Church, and reduced the male voting age 
to eighteen (or marital status). The second, the country's twelfth 
and most durable charter, provided unprecedented protection of 
civil and political rights and guarantees, including abolition of the 
death penalty, introduced new individual freedoms, and prohib- 
ited arbitrary imprisonment for debts. It also established the sepa- 
ration of the church and state and strengthened the Council of State 
(see The Role of the Liberals, 1895-1925, ch. 1). The 1906 Elec- 
tions Law gave women the right for the first time to participate 
in political and administrative life. 

The 1929 constitution combined quasicorporate features drawn 
from many different models. Described as a semiparliamentary 



158 



Government and Politics 



charter, it reorganized the Senate into a body consisting of fifteen 
senators elected to represent specific interest groups. Ecuadorian 
judicial scholar Hernan Salgado Pesantes notes that the 1929 con- 
stitution was the only one that weakened presidential powers by, 
for example, disallowing successive presidential reelection and in- 
troducing a Council of Ministers and a vote of no confidence. Con- 
gress was even able to impeach an incumbent president in 1933. 
The 1929 document also introduced various social, economic, and 
political rights, including the right of literate women of at least 
twenty-one years of age to have citizenship and to vote, and the 
right of minorities to elect deputies and provincial councillors (con- 
sejeros provinciates). The traditional social and ethnic stratification 
continued, however, as did the constitutional distinction between 
citizens and Ecuadorians. Consequently, the 1929 charter, coin- 
ciding as it did with the worldwide economic crisis, failed to im- 
prove political stability significantly. 

A Constituent Assembly, dominated by the leftist Ecuadorian 
Democratic Alliance, deliberated almost six months before adopt- 
ing the country's fourteenth constitution, promulgated by Presi- 
dent Velasco on May 3, 1945. Although Velasco had opposed the 
assembly's efforts to strengthen the legislature, the new constitu- 
tion imposed a number of important checks on the president, es- 
pecially regarding the executive's use of emergency and veto powers. 
The 1945 constitution also provided for a unicameral legislature, 
rendered the cabinet partially responsible to Congress, replaced 
the Council of State with the TGC, and established the Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Superior Electoral — TSE). In addi- 
tion, the 1945 constitution smoothed over the religious issue by 
stating that the nation did not recognize any official religion and 
that citizens could practice any faith. 

Although Velasco signed the 1945 constitution, his immediate 
rejection of it prompted the adoption of another, promulgated in 
1946, that restored the bicameral legislature (consisting of a forty- 
five-member Senate and a sixty-four-member Chamber of Deputies) 
and the Council of State (replacing the TGC) and greatly increased 
the executive's authority. Velasco 's constitution also reintroduced 
the office of vice president, for which no provision had been made 
in the constitutions of 1869, 1906, 1929, and 1945. The constitu- 
tion made autonomous the institutions responsible for supervising 
the electoral process: the TSE and the Provincial Electoral Tribunals 
(Tribunales Provinciales Electorales — TPEs) (see The Electoral 
Process, this ch.). 

The most extensive of Ecuador's constitutions, the 1967 doc- 
ument, drafted by a popularly elected constituent assembly, 



159 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

legitimized political parties recognized by the TSE; made voting 
obligatory for women as well as for men; and made Congress bi- 
cameral, meeting twice a year in ordinary sessions (from March 6 
to May 4 and from August 10 to October 9). In addition, the TGC 
again replaced the Council of State. 

The 1967 constitution, however, contained provisions that dis- 
pleased Velasco, who as of June 2, 1968, was in his fifth term as 
president. For example, it restricted powers to call a state of siege. 
On June 22, 1970, Velasco, in an autogolpe (self- seizure of power), 
assumed extraconstitutional powers and began ruling by decree. 
He suspended the 1967 constitution, which he charged had de- 
stroyed executive control, amputated the Senate's power, divested 
the police of all authority, and dismembered the administrative or- 
ganization. 

After General Guillermo Rodriguez Lara deposed Velasco in 
a military coup in February 1972, the armed forces issued a decree 
reinstating the 1945 document. Rodriguez suspended it in 1974, 
however, and cancelled plans for holding an election. In January 
1976, a military junta ousted Rodriguez and again reinstated the 
1945 constitution. In a measure unprecedented in Ecuador's con- 
stitutional history, the junta held a popular referendum on Janu- 
ary 15, 1978, to decide between a reformed version of the 1945 
document and a new charter; 44 percent of the voters cast their 
ballots for the latter, and 31 percent for the former. Nullified votes 
totaled 23 percent. 

By allowing for a considerable amount of state intervention and 
providing for a large number of economic and social rights, the 
new Constitution (promulgated on August 10, 1979) is much more 
progressive than the reformed document, which had favored the 
status quo. Framed along the lines of the 1945 and 1967 charters, 
the 1979 Constitution, the country's seventeenth, contains several 
innovations, including granting citizenship and suffrage to all Ec- 
uadorians over eighteen years of age, including illiterates; and re- 
quiring candidates in popular elections to affiliate with a legally 
recognized party. It also creates a unicameral Congress (for the 
fourth time in Ecuador's constitutional history) and four legisla- 
tive commissions, which form the Plenary of Legislative Commis- 
sions (Plenario de las Comisiones Legislativas — PCL). In addition, 
it requires the selection of the president and vice president in the 
same election, prohibits either from seeking a successive term, 
authorizes Congress to elect a new vice president if the incumbent 
resigns, and allows the president to declare a state of national emer- 
gency and to finance the public debt without prior legislative 
authorization. Although the Constitution initially extended the 



160 



Government and Politics 



presidential term to five years, an amendment later reduced it to 
four. The Constitution also creates the National Development Coun- 
cil (Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo — Conade), headed by the vice 
president, to plan state policies. 

To help compensate for numerous deficiencies in the 1979 Con- 
stitution, amendments were approved in 1983. These reforms, 
which went into effect in August 1984, give more power to the TGC; 
reduce from five to four years the term of the principal officials 
of the state, including the president (with the exceptions of TGC 
and TSE members, who serve two years); shorten the terms of the 
judges of the CSJ, Fiscal Tribunal, and Contentious Administra- 
tive Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo — TCA) from 
six years to four; and make the president and vice president of the 
republic subject to trial only for treason, bribery, or other infrac- 
tions that seriously compromise the national honor. 

The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, 
religion, language, or social status. Nevertheless, in the late 1980s 
Indians and blacks constituted a disproportionate share of those 
living in poverty, although there was no legally sanctioned discrimi- 
nation against them. Moreover, there were still few highly placed 
women in the political structure. Fewer than 15 percent of the can- 
didates in the 1984 elections were women, and only three of the 
seventy-one congressional deputies elected that year were female. 
Women still suffered some discrimination under civil law and usu- 
ally received lower wages than men employed in similar positions. 
In 1987, however, changes in laws concerning divorce, property 
distribution, and inheritance gave women equal rights with their 
husbands in these areas as required by the Constitution. 

According to the United States Department of State, the following 
individual rights were respected in the late 1980s: the freedom of 
peaceful assembly and association; the freedom of religion (although 
the country was overwhelmingly Roman Catholic); the freedom 
of movement within the country, of foreign travel, and of emigra- 
tion and repatriation (persons from other Latin American coun- 
tries readily found asylum in Ecuador); and the freedom to exercise 
political rights. Worker rights that were generally respected included 
the right of association, the right to strike, and the right to organize 
and bargain collectively. Although forced or compulsory labor and 
employment of children under the age of eighteen were prohib- 
ited, Indians often worked for near- starvation wages, and many 
children in rural areas were active in the work force. 

Governmental Structure 

Under the 1979 Constitution, Ecuador is a democratic and unitary 
state with a republican, presidential, elective, and representative 



161 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

government. Although the presidency is mainly a political office, 
it and the rest of the executive branch are responsible for the govern- 
mental process. Congress is responsible for the legislative process. 
The Supreme Court of Justice, which supervises the Superior 
Courts, is, along with other judicial organs, responsible for serv- 
ing justice. Relations between the executive and legislative branches 
are based on the principle of the separation of powers, although 
there are several points of contact. In the 1980s, there also have 
been numerous points of friction between the executive and legis- 
lative branches, particularly during the Febres Cordero adminis- 
tration. As political scientist David Corkill observed in 1985, 
"Politics became locked in a familiar cycle of executive-legislative 
conflict, protracted political deadlock, and military intervention 
to break the impasse." 

The Executive 

The executive branch of government consists of the president, 
the vice president, the ministers of state and their subordinate offi- 
cials, and Conade (see fig. 16). The office of the president is lo- 
cated in the National Palace (Palacio Nacional) in Quito, and the 
offices of the vice president and ministers at various other loca- 
tions in the capital. The president serves a four-year term and may 
not run for reelection. 

To be president, one must be Ecuadorian by birth, in full pos- 
session of the rights of citizenship, and at least thirty-five years of 
age at the time of the election. Election requires an absolute major- 
ity of the votes cast by direct, universal, and secret ballot. A can- 
didate may not be a current or former president, a spouse or relative 
of an incumbent president, vice president in the term immediately 
prior to the election, a minister of state at the time of the election, 
a member of the Public Forces (composed of the armed forces and 
National Police) within six months prior to the election, a minister 
of any religious denomination, a government contractor, or a legal 
representative of a foreign company. 

The president's duties and powers include the following: to com- 
ply with and enforce the Constitution, laws, decrees, and interna- 
tional conventions; to approve, promulgate, carry out, or challenge 
the laws enacted by Congress or the PCL; to maintain domestic 
order and national security; to freely appoint and remove ministers, 
chiefs of diplomatic missions, governors, and other public officials, 
as provided by law (the president sends a list of three candidates 
for high-level state positions to Congress, which selects one); to 
determine foreign policy and direct international relations; to enter 
into treaties and other international agreements, and to ratify 



162 



Government and Politics 



treaties and agreements after their approval by Congress; to con- 
tract loans; to serve as commander in chief of the Public Forces; 
to appoint, confer promotions on, or remove officials of the Public 
Forces; to mobilize or demobilize the Public Forces and assume 
command of them in wartime, and to approve their organization; 
to declare a state of national emergency and to assume emergency 
powers as needed in times of crisis; to submit an annual report 
to Congress on the general state of the government and the repub- 
lic; and to call a popular referendum on important questions. 

The president may declare a state of emergency in general situ- 
ations involving imminent foreign aggression, international war, 
or serious internal strife or catastrophe. A state of emergency em- 
powers the president to decree the anticipated collection of taxes; 
to invest fiscal funds designated for other areas (with the excep- 
tion of health and social services) in the defense of the state or the 
solution of a catastrophe, but not in the case of an internal con- 
flict; to move the seat of the government; to close or open ports; 
to censor the media; to suspend observance of constitutional guaran- 
tees, with the exception of such basic human rights as the right 
to life, personal integrity, and freedom from expatriation or con- 
finement (except under certain conditions); and to declare a secu- 
rity zone in the national territory. In order to prevent arbitrary 
presidential declarations, Congress or the TGC may revoke the 
state of emergency at any time if the circumstances justify such 
action. 

The president has important legislative powers as well. The prin- 
ciple of ''legislative coparticipation" allows the chief executive to 
participate in the formation as well as the execution and applica- 
tion of laws. The president may present before Congress or the 
PCL any proposed law, including constitutional amendments. Con- 
gress or the PCL must invite the head of state or a representative 
to participate, without voting rights, in the discussions of the pro- 
posed law. Within fifteen days, Congress or the PCL must approve, 
amend, or reject urgent presidential proposals on the economy. 
In the absence of any congressional action, the president may 
promulgate any such proposal as a decree-law, which the Congress 
may overrule or amend. Any bill approved by Congress or the PCL 
must be submitted to the president, who has ten days to approve 
or to object partially or totally to it. The legislature may override 
a presidential veto by a two-thirds majority. The chief executive, 
once signing a bill into law, must promulgate it by publishing it 
in the Registro Oficial del Estado (Official Register of the State) and 
issue regulations within ninety days. 



163 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



Executive Branch 



National 




Vice 




Development 




President 




Council 




of the 




(Conade) 1 




Republic 





President 

of the 
Republic 

I 



Public Works 
and 

Communications 



Social 
Welfare 



Secretary 
General of 
Administration 



Secretary 
General for 

Public 
Information 



\utonomou 
Agencies 



eh 




Chamber 
of 

Deputies 




Supreme 
Court 

of 
Justice 


1 Fiscal 
| Tribunal 

|] 


i Contentious 
1 Administrative 
Tribunal 
(TCA) 2 


~l 




I 




Tribunal 
of 

Constitutional 
Guarantees 
(TGC) 3 




Superior 
Courts 




1 J 




Lower 
Courts: 






criminal, 
provincial, 
cantonal 









Special 
Courts 



Governors 





Provincial 




Provincial 




Prefects 




Councils 



tons 



Political 
Chiefs 




Mayors 





Municipal | 
Councils | 



Political 
Lieutenants 



Parish 
Councils 



Supreme 
Electoral 
Tribunal 
(TSE) 4 



Provincial 
Electoral 
Tribunals 
(TPEs) 5 



Vote 
Receiving 
Committee 
(JRVs) 6 



1 Conade-Consejo National de Desarrollo 

2 TCA-Tribunal Contencloso Admlnistratfvo 

3 TGC-Trlbunal de Guarantlas Constltuclortales 

4 TSE-Tribunal Superior Electoral 

5 TPE$~Tribunate$ Provinciates Electorates 

6 JRVs-Juntas Beceproras del Voto 



Figure 16. Organization of the Ecuadorian Government, 1989 



164 



Government and Politics 



The president may call Congress into extraordinary session to 
consider exclusively matters put before it by the head of state. In 
practice, however, these sessions have not always worked to the 
president's advantage. For example, although President Febres Cor- 
dero convoked extraordinary sessions of Congress in March and 
April 1985, the legislature suspended the first one after rejecting 
a presidential bill to increase the monthly minimum wage by 30 
percent, and the president of Congress unilaterally, and some 
claimed illegally, suspended the second session without complet- 
ing its agenda. Although the Constitution does not specifically give 
Congress the power to suspend an extraordinary session called by 
the president, the legislative body may interpret the charter and 
the laws as it sees fit. 

The presidency may be declared vacant following the incum- 
bent's death, resignation, physical or mental incapacitation, or 
removal from office by the legislature for having been absent from 
Quito for thirty consecutive days or for having left the country 
without congressional authorization. Under these circumstances, 
the Constitution provides for subrogation or substitution of the 
president. The order of presidential subrogation is the vice presi- 
dent, the president of Congress, and the president of the CSJ. The 
presidential order of subrogation also serves for the temporary 
replacement of the vice president. In the definitive absence of the 
vice president, Congress may designate a successor by an abso- 
lute majority. 

The 1979 Constitution establishes that the vice president be 
elected simultaneously with the president on the same party slate 
by an absolute majority and meet the same requirements and re- 
strictions. The vice president also serves as president of Conade, 
which plans the various policies of the state. 

The ministers of state, who comprise the cabinet, discharge the 
affairs of state and represent the president in matters relating to 
their respective ministries. To be a minister, one must be Ecua- 
dorian by birth, in full possession of the rights of citizenship, and 
at least thirty years of age. In 1989 the Borja cabinet had twelve 
ministers and also included two secretaries of state — the secretary 
general of administration and the secretary general for public 
information — with ministerial rank. All ministries also had deputy 
ministers, who were, with the usual exception of the deputy minister 
of defense, civilians. In addition, the president supervised more 
than 700 autonomous agencies, including the national planning 
board, Conade. 

Conade determines the general economic and social policies of 



165 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

the state and prepares development plans for presidential approval. 
The eleven-member Conade consists of the vice president, four 
ministers of state appointed by the president, the president of the 
Monetary Board, and one representative each of Congress, the 
mayors {alcaldes), and provincial prefects (prefectos provinciates) , or- 
ganized labor, the Commercial Associations (Camaras de Produc- 
cion), and the polytechnical universities and schools. In the event 
of a tie, the matter is resolved by the vote of whoever is presiding 
over the meeting. Once approved by the president, the policies 
adopted by Conade must be implemented by the appropriate min- 
isters and by government agencies. 

Under a restructuring directive issued by Vice President Luis 
Parodi in January 1990, Conade created the offices of undersecre- 
taries of Economic Planning and Decentralized Planning and Social 
Development. In addition, seven general directorates were estab- 
lished: Short-Range Planning, Medium- and Long-Range Plan- 
ning, Decentralized Planning, the Costa Social Development, 
Technical and Financial Cooperation, and Administration. The 
changes resulted from a desire to emphasize the role of planning 
as a tool of the government, thus necessitating modernization and 
institutional consolidation of the council. 

The Legislature 

Although a bicameral organization of Congress had been pre- 
dominant in Ecuador's republican history, the 1979 Constitution 
establishes a unicameral legislative body, the Congress. Two classes 
of deputies — the nationals and the provincials — are elected. The 
twelve national deputies are elected through a national vote, are 
at least thirty years of age at the time of election, and serve four 
years; they may be reelected after sitting out a legislative period. 
Provincial deputies serve two years and may be reelected after wait- 
ing out one legislative term. They are elected in the twenty-one 
provinces under a system of proportional representation. The pro- 
vincial deputies must be at least twenty-five years of age at the time 
of their election and be either natives of the province they are to 
represent or residents of that province for at least three years prior 
to the election. National and provincial deputies must be Ecua- 
dorian by birth, in full possession of the rights of citizenship, and 
affiliated with one of the political parties legally recognized by the 
TSE. 

Those prohibited from serving as members of Congress or even 
from participating in the electoral process include virtually all mem- 
bers of the executive and judicial branches, public employees, 



166 




Presidential Palace, Quito 
Courtesy Martie B. Lisowski Collection, 
Library of Congress 

officials of banks and other credit institutions, holders of active state 
contracts, military personnel on active duty, ministers of any 
denomination and members of religious communities, and represen- 
tatives of foreign companies. In addition, no candidate may be eco- 
nomically dependent on the state or have had any connection with 
it at least six months prior to the election. Ninety days prior to 
an election, a legally recognized political party must register its 
candidates for Congress with the TSE. 

Once elected, a deputy may not hold any other public post, with 
the sole exception of a university teaching position. Likewise, depu- 
ties are prohibited from exercising their profession while Congress 
and its commissions are in session. While performing their legis- 
lative duties or even carrying out acts outside of these functions, 
deputies are protected by parliamentary immunity from prosecu- 
tion for common law penal infractions. They may be prosecuted 
only if Congress votes to lift their immunity. 

Congress usually meets once a year for a period of seventy work- 
ing days beginning on August 10 and ending on October 8. When 
Congress convenes in an ordinary period of sessions, it elects from 
among its members a president and vice president to serve one- 
year terms. In addition, two secretaries are elected who are not 

167 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

members of the legislature. The holders of these one-year appoint- 
ments may be reelected. 

Congress also must name, from among its national deputies, 
seven legislators and seven substitutes (suplentes) to each of the four 
legislative commissions. These commissions cover civil and penal 
issues; labor and social issues; tax, fiscal, banking, and budgetary 
issues; and economic, agrarian, industrial, and commercial issues. 
Congress may also designate or form other commissions to deal 
with specific issues, such as constitutional reform. When Congress 
recesses, the four established commissions continue operating with 
certain powers, and in some matters certain state organs may sub- 
stitute for Congress. To discuss and approve laws or other legisla- 
tion, the four commissions meet under the direction of the president 
of Congress and form the PCL (see table 19, Appendix). The PCL 
may approve or reject proposals of law; codify the laws; prosecute 
the judges of the CSJ, the Fiscal Tribunal, and the TCA for in- 
fractions of the law; reject treaties or international agreements; and, 
when Congress is in recess, make the final decision on the legality 
of laws, decrees, regulations, orders, or resolutions suspended by 
the TGC for reasons of unconstitutionality. 

The Constitution gives Congress important powers in legisla- 
tion and in political and judicial control. Only Congress, or in its 
recess the PCL, may enact legislation or interpret the Constitu- 
tion. The executive may only work out regulations for the appli- 
cation of the laws, without interpreting or altering them. Specific 
congressional powers include reforming the Constitution and in- 
terpreting ambiguous provisions; expediting, modifying, reform- 
ing, repealing, and interpreting the laws; establishing or replacing 
taxes, rates, or other public revenues; and approving or rejecting 
public treaties and other international conventions entered into by 
the executive. High officials of the state — including the president, 
the presidents of the CSJ, TSE, TGC, and Fiscal Tribunal, as well 
as the comptroller general and the attorney general — must also 
present their annual reports to Congress. 

The legislature may also prosecute the president and vice presi- 
dent; the ministers of state; the ministers of the CSJ, TCA, and 
Fiscal Court; the members of the TGC and TSE; the comptroller 
general; the attorney general; the fiscal general minister; and the 
superintendents of banks and companies for infractions commit- 
ted during the exercise of their duties or up to one year after leav- 
ing office. The president may be prosecuted only for serious charges, 
such as betrayal of the nation, bribery, or other infractions severely 
affecting the national honor. 



168 



Government and Politics 



Utilizing the interpellation procedure, one or more legislators 
draw up a list of questions to an official or judge who is to be 
prosecuted by Congress. The secretary of Congress must deliver 
the list to the person at least five days prior to the date of interpela- 
cion (interpellation procedure), when the individual must appear 
before Congress to answer the questions. If during the proceeding 
the person is determined to be guilty by an absolute majority, Con- 
gress may censor the subject and dismiss him or her from the post; 
the case then passes on to the appropriate judges. 

Congress also appoints a number of high-level government offi- 
cials, including the comptroller general, the attorney general, the 
fiscal minister, and superintendents of banks and companies. These 
appointments are made from lists submitted by the president, each 
containing three proposed names. Only Congress may remove these 
individuals from their four-year posts. Congress also appoints the 
ministers or judges of the CSJ, the Fiscal Tribunal, and the TCA. 
Should any of these posts become vacant when Congress is in recess, 
it remains unoccupied until the next session. 

The political nature of judicial appointments became a matter 
of considerable controversy in the 1980s. For example, in October 
1984 a dispute broke out between the legislative and executive 
branches following Congress's appointment of sixteen CSJ judges 
opposed by Febres Cordero. He used military and security forces 
to prevent the newly elected judges from entering the Supreme 
Court of Justice building. The controversy was resolved that De- 
cember, however, when Congress agreed to waive its prerogative 
to select all of the judges and allow Febres Cordero to appoint eight 
of them. 

Congress also designates the seven members who make up the 
TSE, as well as their substitutes. It elects three TSE members on 
its own accord and elects the remaining four from two sets of names: 
two members from one set provided by the president and two mem- 
bers from another list sent by the CSJ. In addition, Congress selects 
three of the eleven members of the TGC and their substitutes and 
nominates the remaining members and their alternates from lists 
of candidates submitted by the president, the CSJ, the Electoral 
College, the Electoral College of Provincial Prefects, the National 
Federation of Workers, and the Commercial Associations. 

Congress also has a role in budgetary matters. One of its legis- 
lative commissions reviews the budget submitted by the executive 
branch through the Ministry of Finance and Credit. Only in the 
case of budgetary discrepancies does Congress intervene. Once Con- 
gress resolves any discrepancies, its approval is final, and the ex- 
ecutive may not object. If Congress wishes to repeal or modify 



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Ecuador: A Country Study 

laws that increase public expenditures, it must seek other sources 
of financing, create new substitute revenues, or increase the exist- 
ing ones. 

Other congressional powers include installing the president and 
vice president once the TSE proclaims them to be elected, and elect- 
ing the vice president, if that post becomes vacant. Congress also 
handles resignations of the president, the vice president, and cer- 
tain other officials. Congress grants or denies permission to the 
president and vice president to be absent from the country, grants 
them general amnesty for political crimes, and imposes fines on 
them for common crimes. 

Congress may dismiss cabinet ministers by majority vote. Dur- 
ing the Febres Cordero presidency, the opposition majority in Con- 
gress dismissed the finance and credit minister in late 1986 for 
alleged abuse of tariff, exchange, and public spending laws; forced 
the resignation of the energy and mines minister in August 1987 
for allegedly violating Ecuador's sovereignty in negotiating an oil 
trade agreement; and impeached the government and justice 
minister that October for alleged complicity in arbitrary arrests, 
torture, and disappearances. 

To deal with important matters that cannot wait until the next 
ordinary session, the legislature may convene in extraordinary ses- 
sion. This session may be called by two- thirds of the legislators, 
the president of Congress, or the president. It may consider only 
the specific matters for which it was called. If another important 
issue arises or is introduced by the president, it cannot be consid- 
ered until the assembly ends and another is called. 

The Judiciary 

The Court System 

The judicial branch consists of three organs of equal status and 
importance: the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ); the Fiscal 
Tribunal, which recognizes and resolves controversies arising be- 
tween the revenue-collecting administration and the taxpayers and 
determines tax obligations; and the Contentious Administrative 
Tribunal (TCA), which is primarily responsible for recognizing 
and resolving controversies arising in public administration. Lo- 
cated in Quito, these judicial bodies have jurisdiction over all of 
the national territory. Their judges or ministers of justice must be 
Ecuadorian citizens by birth, be at least forty years of age, hold 
a doctorate in jurisprudence, and have at least fifteen years of profes- 
sional experience as a lawyer, judge, or university professor in 
jurisprudence. The appointment of the CSJ's sixteen justices is the 
constitutional prerogative of Congress. 



170 



Government and Politics 



In practice, Congress and the executive branch have frequently 
manipulated the supposedly independent judiciary for political pur- 
poses. Congress appoints the judges of the three judicial organs 
to serve four-year terms. If vacancies later arise, these are filled 
by the organs themselves until Congress nominates official replace- 
ments. Occasionally, the president may intervene (on his or her 
own accord and without any specific constitutional authorization 
to do so) in the process of nominating CSJ justices by presenting 
a list of candidates, and the Council of State (a body whose bu- 
reaucratic organization and powers are unclear) may intervene by 
endorsing the candidates suggested by the president. 

At the apex of the court system is the CSJ, consisting of five 
chambers of three judges each, as well as the court's president. 
When they meet, the members of the five chambers constitute the 
plenary tribunal. The tribunal selects the court's president, who 
represents the entire judicial branch for a two-year period and may 
not be reelected until after five periods have elapsed. 

The three judicial organs have certain powers with respect to 
reforming the Constitution and initiating legislation. The CSJ may 
initiate reforms of the Constitution, and all three judicial organs 
may initiate proposals of law. In an arrangement similar to the 
"legislative coparticipation" enjoyed by the president, the justices 
of the three judicial bodies may meet with Congress or its legisla- 
tive commissions to intervene, without voting rights, in the dis- 
cussion of bills. The CSJ has a very secondary role in controlling 
matters of constitutionality. Although any of its chambers, as well 
as the Fiscal Tribunal and the TCA, may declare a law or regula- 
tion unconstitutional, the plenary session of the CSJ must affirm 
such a declaration, in which case the matter is reported to the TGC. 

The CSJ supervises the superior, lower, and special courts and 
prepares regulations to ensure that judicial employees function 
properly. The CSJ examines the statistics of the cases submitted 
annually by the superior courts, hears or resolves questions raised 
by these courts, and suspends or removes lawyers who violate legal 
statutes. It also removes criminal, provincial, and cantonal judges 
and attorneys for misconduct while in office or for incapacitation. 
Finally, it publishes the semiannual Gaceta Legal (Legal Gazette), 
as well as the court's diary. 

Each province has a Superior Court, whose judges are named 
by the CSJ. Within its jurisdiction, each Superior Court nominates 
penal, civil, labor, traffic, and tenancy judges, as well as fiscal agents, 
public defenders, notaries, registers of property and merchandise, 
and other judicial officials. Superior courts have first-instance juris- 
diction in criminal cases involving provincial governors, mayors, 



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Ecuador: A Country Study 

members of electoral tribunals, customs officials, provincial judges, 
and police officials. They hear appeals from lower courts in both 
criminal and civil cases. They also resolve questions raised by lower- 
court judges and supervise their activities, as well as those of at- 
torneys and notaries public. In addition, they appoint provincial 
and cantonal judges and attorneys. 

Lower courts included thirty-five criminal and forty-two provin- 
cial courts in the late 1980s. They have first-instance jurisdiction 
in civil cases where the amount involved exceeds 8,000 sucres (for 
the value of the sucre — see Glossary). They must consult the higher 
courts on the interpretation of the law. When ordered by higher 
courts, lower courts must have representatives visit the jails in the 
provinces to hear the complaints of inmates, correct any abuses 
caused by prison personnel, and secure the release of any person 
arrested or detained in an illegal manner. To be a provincial judge, 
a person must be a citizen and a lawyer with three years of service. 

The eighty-seven cantonal courts have jurisdiction in civil cases 
where the amount involved is between 200 and 8,000 sucres. Can- 
tonal judges also may fine political lieutenants (tenientes politicos), 
who are responsible for the administration of justice in each parish 
(parroquia), for negligence of duty. Finally, special courts try cases 
involving juveniles, and labor disputes. 

The Fiscal Tribunal, consisting of three chambers and nine judges 
named by Congress, resolves tax controversies. The TCA, which 
consists of two chambers of three judges each who are named by 
Congress, resolves controversies originating in the public adminis- 
tration and monitors the application and fulfillment of the law by 
entities of the state and their officials. 

The justices of the three judicial organs — CSJ, Fiscal Tribunal, 
and TCA — are subject to prosecution by Congress or, in its recess, 
the PCL. The Constitution prohibits the judges and fiscal officials 
from carrying out leadership functions in the political parties, or 
intervening in elections. They are also prohibited from serving as 
lawyers or holding other public or private positions, with the ex- 
ception of university professorships. 

The Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees 

The TGC, rather than the CSJ, interprets and monitors com- 
pliance with the Constitution. Located in Quito, the TGC con- 
sists of eleven members and their substitutes, who serve for a 
two-year period, without the possibility of reelection. Congress ap- 
points three TGC members who are nonlegislators and selects eight 
others from lists submitted by the president, the CSJ, the mayors 
and provincial prefects, the legal labor unions, and the Commercial 



172 



Government and Politics 



Associations. TGC members selected to represent the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches must not already be government 
officials; they must be citizens by birth, in possession of their rights 
of citizenship, over forty years of age, and doctors of jurisprudence; 
and they must have fifteen years of professional experience as law- 
yers, judges, or university professors in jurisprudence. TGC mem- 
bers representing the workers, the Commercial Associations, and 
the citizenry (such as the mayors and provincial prefects) are re- 
quired only to be citizens by birth and in possession of their citizen- 
ship rights. The ministers of state, the comptroller general, and 
the leaders of recognized political parties may participate in TGC 
deliberations without voting rights. 

The TGC's role has been secondary and temporary, and its 
decision-making power weak. Salgado points out that the control 
of constitutionality has been, in effect, entrusted to a largely polit- 
ical organ, Congress, which lacks the requisite impartiality for 
debating the unconstitutionality of laws, decrees, or resolutions 
enacted by Congress itself. Although the 1979 Constitution failed 
to give the TGC enforcement authority, the 1983 constitutional 
reforms partly rectified this deficiency. Under the 1983 reforms, 
the TGC may demand the dismissal of officeholders who violate 
TGC decisions, and the violators' superiors are obligated to com- 
ply; request judges to initiate penal action; or report its decision 
to Congress, which may act on it. The TGC may also suspend 
those laws, decrees, accords, regulations, ordinances, or resolu- 
tions that violate the Constitution. Nevertheless, it must submit 
its decision to Congress or, in its recess, to the PCL, for final reso- 
lution of the case of unconstitutionality. The PCL, for its part, has 
had relatively broad powers to control constitutionality. 

The TGC has several other powers as well. During the recess 
of Congress, the TGC is empowered to authorize any foreign travel 
by the president and to revoke a state of national emergency. The 
Law of Municipal Regime allows the TGC to rule on cases involving 
the disqualification of municipal councillors (concejales municipales) , 
vacancies, or unconstitutional ordinances that the Provincial Coun- 
cils were unable to resolve. The Law of Political Parties of 1978 
and the Law of Elections of 1987 also grant the TGC some elec- 
toral powers. 

Public Administration 

The Public Ministry is one of the autonomous agencies and is 
headed by the attorney general. The ministry consists of the state's 
only judicial representative, the attorney general (who may delegate 
this representation), and the ministers, fiscal agents, and other 



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Ecuador: A Country Study 



officials who determine the law and establish the ministry's powers, 
rights, reasons for dismissal, and replacement procedures. The 
attorney general, who serves four years, must meet the same re- 
quirements as the members of the CSJ. The office of the attorney 
general of the state is an autonomous organ headed by the attor- 
ney general. 

The autonomous office of the comptroller general of the state 
manages the public funds and the property of public- sector enti- 
ties. Its oversight extends to the private- sector entities that receive 
state subsidies. The comptroller general and the superintendents 
of banks and companies all serve for four years. 

Local Government 

The republic is divided administratively into provinces, cantons 
(municipalities), and parishes. Provinces are governed by a gover- 
nor, cantons by a political chief (jefe politico), and parishes by a po- 
litical lieutenant. These officials all answer to, and are appointed 
by, the president or the executive branch. The Ministry of Na- 
tional Defense administers the Galapagos Islands. 

Each of the twenty-one provinces has an autonomous provin- 
cial council, headed by a prefect who has only a deciding vote in 
case of ties in the council. The council, which has jurisdiction 
throughout the province and a seat in its capital, maintains public 
services, carries out public works, coordinates municipal activities, 
and informs the central government of budget expenditures. A 
municipal council, presided over by a mayor empowered to cast 
a deciding vote in case of ties, is responsible for the government 
of each canton, of which there were 103 in the late 1980s. 

All provincial and municipal officials are elected for a four-year 
period by direct and secret popular vote. In elections for mayor, 
president of the municipal council, and provincial prefect, the can- 
didates who obtain the greatest number of votes are elected. Coun- 
cils at both levels have functional, financial, and administrative 
autonomy. Their legislative decisions are issued in the form of or- 
dinances. 

The 746 parishes that existed in the late 1980s were predominant- 
ly rural areas governed by a political lieutenant and a parish council 
within its area of responsibility; over 100 were classified as urban 
parishes. Although the urban parishes were mainly voting districts, 
the rural ones also had municipal functions. The parish council 
is responsible for improving public services, executing public works, 
investing revenues, and carrying out any other duties required by 
law. Its members are elected by direct popular vote to serve a four- 
year term. 



174 



Municipal building, Guayaquil 
Courtesy Embassy of Ecuador, 
Washington 




The Electoral Process 

Under the 1987 Law of Elections, all citizens have the right to 
vote or be elected, except active-duty members of the Public Forces 
and anyone whose citizenship rights have been suspended. Elec- 
toral registrars (padrones electorales) determine citizens' qualifications 
to vote. The franchise is obligatory for those entitled to vote, with 
the exception of illiterates, persons over seventy-five years of age, 
those certified as sick or physically disabled, individuals who suffered 
a domestic calamity on election day or from one to eight days be- 
fore, and citizens who are absent from the country or who arrived 
on the day of the election. 

The 1979 Constitution establishes several innovations in the sys- 
tem for designating the president and vice president. Whereas previ- 
ously they were elected by a plurality, the Constitution requires 
that they be elected by an absolute majority of votes. This stipula- 
tion usually requires a second electoral round between the two lead- 
ing candidates. The three organs responsible for overseeing the 
electoral process, with the aid of the Public Forces, are the TSE 
(Supreme Electoral Tribunal), TPEs (Provincial Electoral Tribu- 
nals), and the Vote Receiving Committees (Juntas Receptoras del 
Voto— JRVs). 

As the highest of these bodies, the TSE is responsible for ap- 
pointing and supervising TPE members, overseeing the electoral 
registrars, convoking elections and the entities that form the electoral 



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Ecuador: A Country Study 

colleges, counting electoral votes, resolving appeals of rulings made 
by the TPEs, and issuing regulations governing the political par- 
ties. The TSE must convoke elections at least 120 days in advance 
of the casting of ballots. If this deadline is missed by more than 
forty-eight hours, the TGC may convoke the elections or a popu- 
lar referendum and replace the TSE members with their substi- 
tutes, although in 1989 the constitutionality of this arrangement 
remained an issue. The TSE must resolve within ten days appeals 
raised about TPE decisions not to register candidates, to nullify 
votes, to invalidate or annul the vote counting, or to impose penal- 
ties for electoral infractions. The TSE also resolves electoral com- 
plaints made against civil authorities. 

The TPEs are formed by the TSE in each province. The seven 
TPE members, who serve two years, represent the various politi- 
cal parties. TPE members direct and oversee the electoral process 
in their own jurisdiction and see that the orders of the TSE are 
carried out. The TPEs also appoint the members of the JRVs, con- 
duct vote counting in their jurisdiction in a popular referendum 
or in elections for mayor, and resolve complaints by citizens and 
political parties over electoral irregularities. 

The JRVs receive ballots at a public polling place on the elec- 
tion days. For each election, the TPEs designate a number of JRVs 
in accordance with the electoral registrars. The JRVs each have 
three principal members, three substitutes, and a secretary, all of 
whom are selected by their respective electoral registrar. The var- 
ious political parties must be represented in the JRVs. Parties sub- 
mit suggested candidates to the TPE at least sixty days before 
elections. The principal powers and duties of the JRVs are to pro- 
vide each citizen with ballots and later a certificate of having voted; 
to conduct partial vote counting immediately after the polls have 
closed; to determine the number of valid, blank, or null votes; and 
to remit the ballots to the TPEs. 

Only legally recognized political parties may declare candidates 
and register them. Registration must be completed ninety days be- 
fore the date of the elections. A citizen may not be a candidate 
in a national and provincial election simultaneously. The presi- 
dent and vice president of the republic, mayors, presidents of 
municipal councils, provincial prefects, and most of the council- 
lors, council members, and national and provincial deputies are 
elected in the first electoral round every four years. The second 
electoral round is held two years after the first round. Provincial 
deputies, whose term lasts two years, and some replacements for 
councillors and council members are elected at that time. 



176 



Government and Politics 



The Constitution provides for a popular consultation (consulta popu- 
lar), which the Law of Elections refers to more specifically as a ple- 
biscite (generally held as a vote of confidence on an action of a 
government) or a referendum (generally held to approve the text 
of a law). Either the executive or the legislative branch of govern- 
ment may call on the electorate to resolve a divisive issue, although 
the former has greater prerogatives to hold a popular consultation. 

The decision adopted by a popular consultation is final. Febres 
Cordero became embroiled in a constitutional row in early 1986 
when he formally called for an election-day plebiscite on whether 
independent candidates should be allowed to run for elective office. 
The opposition, believing that the proposed reform was designed 
to concentrate political and economic power in the presidency, 
contended that Febres Cordero's action violated Article 78, which 
allows the president to call plebiscites on ''issues of national tran- 
scendence," but not on constitutional amendments. The opposi- 
tion also claimed that Febres Cordero violated a provision giving 
the president recourse to a plebiscite only if Congress votes against 
a constitutional reform proposed by the executive. Although Febres 
Cordero had his way and the plebiscite on the constitutional amend- 
ment was held in June 1986, he lost the vote by a margin of 58 
to 26 percent. 

Political Dynamics 
Political Parties 

The 1967 constitution was the first to introduce provisions for 
political parties. The 1979 Constitution attempts to strengthen the 
party-based system by giving parties state protection and finan- 
cial assistance. For a party to receive state financial aid, it must 
have obtained at least 5 percent of the votes in elections for na- 
tional and provincial deputies, councillors, and council members. 
In these elections, the parties are prohibited from forming al- 
liances; each party is obliged to run its own candidates. Alliances 
are allowed, however, in elections for president and vice president, 
mayors, and prefects. 

The Constitution apportions state financial aid to legally recog- 
nized parties as follows: 60 percent in equal parts to each party 
and the remaining 40 percent according to the votes obtained in 
the last national elections. Although the parties also receive con- 
tributions from their affiliates, they may not receive, directly or 
indirectly, financial donations from individuals or groups that have 
contracts with the state or from companies, institutions, or foreign 
states. 



177 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

Article 37, which was widely debated prior to the holding of a 
popular referendum in June 1986, gives legally recognized parties 
a type of monopoly because only they can run candidates in an 
election. Whereas the Constitution gives any citizen the right to 
be elected, Article 37 prohibits a citizen from running as an in- 
dependent candidate and requires candidates to be affiliated with 
a political party. Salgado observed that the party affiliation require- 
ment probably strengthens the party system, but it does so by com- 
promising the political right of any citizen to run for office. 

Although Ecuadorians over eighteen years of age may join a po- 
litical party, under the Law of Political Parties this right does not 
apply to active-duty members of the armed forces and National 
Police, ministers of any religious denomination, or anyone sen- 
tenced to jail for defrauding the state (at least until after a period 
double that of the prison sentence). The law also prohibits more 
than one party affiliation. The penalty of violating this law is loss 
of citizenship rights for one year. 

The Constitution sets out the organizational requirements for 
a political party. It must have a party doctrine and a program of 
political action that are in accord with the national interest. A party 
must keep count of the number of its members and be organized 
on a national level; that is, its organization must extend to no fewer 
than ten provinces, including two of the three most populated 
provinces (which in the late 1980s were Guayas, Pichincha, and 
Manabf). The Law of Political Parties also establishes that the mem- 
bership of a party must constitute no fewer than 1 . 5 percent of the 
registered voters in the last electoral turnout. 

A grouping or political movement must seek TSE recognition 
as a party according to a procedure laid out in the Law of Political 
Parties. To participate in elections, a party must have been legally 
recognized six months before the holding of these elections. In the 
late 1980s, Ecuador had sixteen legal parties. 

Any changes in the higher leadership of a party or in its statutes 
must be reported to the TSE within eight days. The principal leader 
of a party and the members of its higher leadership body serve two- 
year terms. The principal leader may be reelected only once, after 
a two-year period, for another term. When a party splits and two 
directorates are formed, the TSE must determine which faction 
is legitimate. To that end, each faction has a thirty-day period in 
which to present its case. The TSE then has fifteen days in which 
to decide on the case, and its decision is final. Other party problems 
generally are resolved internally and in accordance with the party's 
statutes and regulations. The party's national leadership or the 



178 



Government and Politics 



elements in conflict may, however, submit their problem to the 
decision of the TSE. 

According to the Law of Political Parties, the TSE may abolish 
a party that decides to dissolve itself, incorporates or joins with 
another party, does not participate in general elections in at least 
ten provinces, forms paramilitary organizations, or does not respect 
the required nonpolitical character of the active-duty armed forces 
and National Police. As originally formulated, the Law of Politi- 
cal Parties also provided that if a party failed to obtain at least 5 
percent of the votes in each of two successive elections, the TSE 
could dissolve it by withdrawing its legal recognition. That provi- 
sion was not in effect in 1988, however, having been declared un- 
constitutional because of a technicality; whereas the Law of Political 
Parties spoke of a required "electoral percentage," the Constitu- 
tion refers only to an "electoral quotient." 

Unless it is dissolving itself, a party being abolished by the TSE 
has sixty days in which to present documentation in its own defense. 
Notice of the abolishment of a party and the cancellation of its regis- 
tration are published in the Registro Oficial del Estado and sent to 
the news media. 

The Law of Political Parties guarantees parties the right to or- 
ganize meetings, marches, and public demonstrations. A party must 
submit a written request to hold a public march or demonstration 
at least forty-eight hours in advance. The authority may reject a 
request only if another demonstration will be held at the same place, 
day, and hour, but will approve another date and hour and must 
act on the request within twenty-four hours. A rejection may be 
appealed to the TPE. Any march or public demonstration must 
also be authorized by the police authority in the provincial capi- 
tals, by the national commissioner (comisario national) in the can- 
tons, and by the political lieutenant in the parishes. Parties do not 
require authorization to hold nonpublic meetings, but are obligated 
to inform the aforementioned authorities in advance. Counter- 
demonstrations are prohibited. 

The Law of Political Parties also guarantees the right of parties 
to propagandize their programs. If, however, political propaganda 
or statements disseminated by news media impugn the honor or 
good name of someone, that individual may demand that the 
offender publish a retraction. If necessary, the individual may ap- 
peal to the TPE to have this demand carried out. Under the law, 
all means of social communication not owned by a party must pro- 
vide access to all parties and may not enter into exclusive political 
propaganda contracts. Lastly, political proselytism in schools and 
colleges is prohibited, as is coercing someone to join a party, to 



179 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

vote for a candidate, to participate in marches or demonstrations, 
or to make financial contributions. 

Traditional Parties 

Middle- and upper-middle class professionals and businessmen 
have led Ecuador's two traditional parties, the Conservative Party 
(Partido Conservador — PC) and the Radical Liberal Party (Par- 
tido Liberal Radical — PLR), also commonly referred to as the 
Liberal Party (Partido Liberal) (see The First Century of the Repub- 
lic, ch. 1). Garcia Moreno established the PC in 1869 as a loosely 
structured party and gave it a rightist ideological base. The Con- 
servative Party promoted close cooperation between church and 
state, a strong, centralized government, and private property. Its 
regional stronghold was the Sierra, particularly Quito and Cuenca 
(capital of Azuay Province). The PC monopolized political power 
from 1860 until 1895, when the PLR seized power as the outcome 
of a civil war. The PC steadily lost ground thereafter. Although 
neither party held the presidency between 1944 and 1989, the PC 
supported the successful presidential candidacy of Camilo Ponce 
Enriquez in 1956. The PC also consistently made a strong show- 
ing in municipal and congressional elections in the 1960s. 

Like the Conservatives, the Liberals were slow to develop a for- 
mal party structure. According to Osvaldo Hurtado, although the 
Liberal political movement had strengthened organizationally and 
ideologically by the 1880s, especially in Guayaquil, it still lacked 
a formal political party and remained factionalized into two main 
groups. The original "civilist" faction consisted of doctrinaire in- 
tellectuals who opposed the Conservative governments through the 
press and legislature. In 1884 the six-year-old radical faction of the 
Liberals led by Eloy Alfaro and his revolutionary montoneros (guer- 
rillas) proclaimed itself the true Liberal Party and took up arms 
on the Costa against the Conservative government. After the tem- 
porary defeat of the radicals in 1887, the civilist faction again as- 
sumed the leadership of the Liberals. The Liberal Party was 
formally organized as a political entity with the holding of its first 
assembly in Quito in July 1890. Nevertheless, party factionalism 
continued. In 1892 a "fusionist" faction broke away and joined 
the Conservatives. Liberal opposition to Conservative rule became 
so bitter, however, that Alfaro was able to consolidate the various 
factions into the Radical Liberal Party (PLR) by 1895, when it 
took power. 

The PLR was the principal ruling party between 1895 and 1944, 
although the coup of July 9, 1925, marked the beginning of a grad- 
ual decline in the two-party structure and in Liberal hegemony. 



180 



Modern Quito 

Courtesy Embassy of Ecuador, Washington 



Since its founding, the PLR had been strongest in the Costa, but 
in the 1960s it also won a significant following in Quito. Since the 
1920s, the PLR's platform has included anticlericalism and agrarian 
reform. The Radical Liberals traditionally aligned themselves with 
the armed forces and commercial interests. The armed forces, dis- 
credited by their association with the party, distanced themselves 
after 1942, but trade and banking interests continued to finance 
the PLR. Like the PC, the PLR garnered nearly a third of the 
vote in congressional elections in the decades prior to 1972. 

The traditional parties depended to a considerable extent on the 
largess of wealthy individuals or economic interest groups. It was 
customary, moreover, for most donors to expect large returns on 
their investment, and most of them assumed the role of patron (pa- 
tron) toward the dependent party leaders, who were expected to 
assume a properly subservient attitude. Corruption was widely as- 
sumed to be an institutionalized attribute of partisan activities, and 
party platforms enjoyed little credibility. 

Other Parties 

The two-party structure began to decline in the early twentieth 
century as leftist parties emerged and the country experienced a 



181 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

quarter-century of political instability. Ecuador had at least four 
communist and socialist parties. The oldest was the Ecuadorian 
Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Ecuatoriano — PSE), founded in 
1925 as a section of the Communist International. Consisting of 
a small group of intellectuals, the PSE was influential only through 
coalitions either with groups on the left, including the Communists, 
or more often, with the PLR. The PSE was one of the few parties 
that was neither regionally based nor personalist in character. 
Although it depended on wealthy groups and individuals for sup- 
port, the PSE played a major role in formulating social welfare 
legislation. 

The PSE gave birth to both the Moscow-oriented Ecuadorian 
Communist Party (Partido Comunista Ecuatoriano — PCE), which 
broke away in 1928, and the pro-Cuban Revolutionary Socialist 
Party of Ecuador (Partido Socialista Revolucionario del Ecua- 
dor — PSRE), which broke away in 1962. The PCE, a legal party, 
generally has concentrated on enhancing its position within or- 
ganized labor, student organizations, and the educational bureau- 
cracy; it had little voter appeal. By the 1970s, the PSRE had become 
the strongest advocate of revolution in the country. The PSRE and 
PCE, along with Christian leftists and Maoists, joined in 1977 to 
form a Moscow-line leftist front called the Broad Left Front (Frente 
Amplio de la Izquierda — FADI). Another PCE splinter group, the 
pro-Chinese Communist Party of Ecuador — Marxist-Leninist (Par- 
tido Comunista del Ecuador — Marxista-Leninista — PCE-ML) was 
formed in 1972. 

Several noncommunist and Christian Democratic parties also 
emerged in the twentieth century. The Ecuadorian Nationalist 
Revolutionary Action (Accion Revolucionaria Nacionalista 
Ecuatoriana — ARNE), founded in 1942, was a highly nationalis- 
tic, anticommunist, quasi-fascist group with its strongest appeal 
among youths in the Sierra. The center-right Social Christian Party 
(Partido Social Cristiano — PSC) was established in 1951 and be- 
came the ruling party when Febres Cordero assumed the presidency 
in 1984. The Christian Democratic Party (Partido Democrata 
Cristiano — PDC), founded in 1964, affiliated with the International 
Christian Democratic Association. Its center-left platform attracted 
a small but growing following among workers, students, and young 
professionals. 

In 1970 Rodrigo Borja broke away from the PLR and formed, 
in 1977, a Quito-based Social Democratic party, the center-left 
Democratic Left (Izquierda Democratica — ID). The ID became 
Ecuador's largest party and the voice of a new generation of reform- 
ist, professionally trained political leaders. The Alfarist Radical 



182 



Government and Politics 



Front (Frente Radical Alfarista — FRA), a populist and centrist 
party, was established in 1972. Popular Democracy (Democracia 
Popular — DP), an affiliate of the Christian Democratic Inter- 
national, was founded in 1978 as a coalition of the PDC and the 
Progressive Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Progresista — 
PCP) and a breakaway faction of the PC. Because of its Christian 
Democratic membership, DP often was referred to as Democracia 
Popular — Democracia Cristiana. 

Personalist Movements 

According to Hurtado, political parties were always relatively 
insignificant in the Ecuadorian political process, whereas individuals 
transformed into caudillos played the dominant role. None of the 
personalist movements, however, had more than a temporary im- 
pact on politics, usually only as long as their leader enjoyed popular- 
ity. Major personalist movements have included the National 
Velasquista Party (Partido Nacional Velasquista — PNV), organized 
in 1952 by Velasco; the Social Christian Movement (Movimiento 
Social Cristiano — MSC), founded in 1951 by former president 
Camilo Ponce Enriquez; the Democratic Institutionalist Coalition 
(Coalicion Institucionalista Democratica — CID), founded in 1965 
by former provisional president Otto Arosemena Gomez; and the 
Concentration of Popular Forces (Concentration de Fuerzas Popu- 
lares — CFP), a Guayaquil-based, populist, and center-right party 
organized in the late 1940s as a splinter of the velasquista movement 
by Carlos Guevara Moreno, a former interior minister. In 1980 
a roldosista faction broke away from the CFP and formed People, 
Change, and Democracy (Pueblo, Cambio y Democracia — PCD), 
which dissolved after the death of its leader Jaime Roldos Aguilera 
in 1981. The populist Ecuadorian Roldosist Party (Partido Rol- 
dosista Ecuatoriano — PRE), led by Abdala Bucaram Ortiz (nephew 
of Asaad Bucaram Elmhalim, a staunchly anti-Marxist former 
mayor of Guayaquil and former leader of the CFP), was founded 
in Guayaquil in late 1982. 

In order to participate more effectively in elections, personalist 
movements often joined ad hoc coalitions of parties. Every presi- 
dent elected to office since 1944, with the exception of Velasco, 
owed his victory to a coalition rather than to a single party. Although 
most of these coalitions were unstable and short-lived, a few had 
a semipermanent character, emerging from dormancy at each elec- 
tion and representing roughly the same groups and interests each 
time. One of the most important was the National Democratic Front 
(Frente Democratico Nacional — FDN), which usually formed 
around the nucleus of the PLR, frequently along with the PSE. 



183 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

Often more successful than the moderate FDN was the conserva- 
tive Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular — AP), usually composed 
of Conservatives, arnistas (members of ARNE), and MSC mem- 
bers. The AP was responsible for Ponce Enriquez's victory in 1956 
and congressional victories in 1958 and 1962. 

Party Politics in the 1980s 

Ecuadorian politics in the 1980s constituted an increasingly bit- 
ter struggle among conservative, center-left, and far-left parties and 
their leaders. Political scientist Catherine M. Conaghan, comment- 
ing on the declining standards of Ecuadorian political discourse 
in the late 1980s, noted that "in the absence of strong institutions 
and new ideas, Ecuadorian politics has devolved into a highly per- 
sonalized and often trivialized arena of intra-elite struggle." 

Party competition in the 1980s was mainly between the PSC 
(Social Christian Party) and the ID (Democratic Left). Many 
blamed the heightened interparty friction on Febres Cordero, the 
PSC leader who won the presidency by polling 52.2 percent in the 
second round of voting in May 1984. Febres Cordero narrowly 
defeated Borja, who polled 47.8 percent as the ID candidate. Febres 
Cordero' s conservative National Reconstruction Front (Frente de 
Reconstrucion Nacional — FRN) coalition consisted of seven par- 
ties, including the traditional PC and PLR. The FRN held only 
twenty-nine of the seventy-one seats in Congress, however, and 
the opposition effectively controlled the remaining forty-two. The 
resulting political infighting threatened the stability of the coun- 
try's fragile democracy on several occasions. 

Febres Cordero promised an honest public administration and 
a revival of market principles in managing the economy. Neverthe- 
less, his government suffered from a succession of political and eco- 
nomic crises. Ruling more in the style of a caudillo than an elected 
politician, Febres Cordero used his executive powers boldly, creat- 
ing a number of constitutional conflicts with the other two branches 
of government. For example, in late 1985 he promulgated a con- 
troversial bill changing the electoral law and postponing the legis- 
lative elections scheduled for early 1986. The proposed reform, 
which was defeated in the plebiscite held on June 1, 1986, would 
not only have given the executive extraordinary economic powers, 
but would also have limited the right of habeas corpus, set a four- 
year term for all members of Congress, and allowed independents 
to be elected. Febres Cordero's authoritarian rule and strongly 
pro-United States policies were blamed for his government's major 
political defeat in the mid-term congressional elections by allied 



184 



Government and Politics 



center-left and Marxist parties, which captured forty-three of the 
legislature's seventy-one seats. 

Certain high-ranking military officials posed a challenge to Febres 
Cordero in 1986. He dismissed the armed forces chief of staff, Air 
Force Lieutenant General Frank Vargas Pazzos, for accusing the 
minister of national defense and an army commander of corrup- 
tion. Vargas subsequently staged a week-long double revolt — first 
at the Eloy Alfaro Air Base in Manta on the Pacific Coast and then 
at Quito's Marshal Sucre International Airport — and demanded 
the resignations of the two military leaders. A bloody battle in 
March ended the second revolt and resulted in Vargas's arrest. 
Although Congress granted Vargas amnesty that October, a deci- 
sion upheld by the TGC, Febres Cordero refused to honor the de- 
cision, sparking a constitutional controversy. 

During a presidential visit to the Taura Air Base outside Guaya- 
quil in January 1987, paratroop commandos loyal to Vargas ab- 
ducted Febres Cordero and his defense minister. They were released 
eleven hours later after Febres Cordero personally granted amnesty 
to Vargas and signed a written guarantee that no reprisals would 
be taken against either the rebellious former general or his com- 
mandos. A few days later, however, the army arrested the ninety- 
four paratroopers, who were then expelled from the air force. A 
military tribunal sentenced fifty-eight of them to prison sentences 
ranging from six months to sixteen years. 

Rather than rallying around the president following the near over- 
throw of the democratic system, the leftist-dominated Congress 
called a special session to consider impeaching Febres Cordero for 
allowing himself to be kidnapped and then negotiating his release 
by freeing Vargas. Although the opposition was unable to obtain 
the two-thirds majority needed to impeach the president, it approved 
a nonbinding demand that Febres Cordero resign for "disgrac- 
ing" the national honor. 

Running as both a Socialist and a populist, Vargas participated 
in the first round of the 1988 presidential elections as the rep- 
resentative of the People's Patriotic Union (Union del Pueblo 
Patriotico — UPP). To the surprise of many, Vargas placed fourth 
by garnering over 12 percent of the vote. In that election, Var- 
gas's UPP also allied itself with the PSE (Ecuadorian Socialist 
Party), the Ecuadorian Revolutionary Popular Alliance (Alianza 
Popular Revolucionaria Ecuatoriana — APRE), and FADI (Broad 
Left Front). 

Also running as a center-left candidate was Jamil Mahuad Witt, 
a DP protege of former president Osvaldo Hurtado. Mahuad won 
11.5 percent of the vote. On the far left, Jaime Hurtado ran as 



185 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

the candidate of the Maoist-oriented Democratic Popular Move- 
ment (Movimiento Popular Democratico — MPD), with the back- 
ing of the FADI, but collected only 5 percent of the vote, behind 
the CFP's Angel Duarte, with nearly 8 percent. 

Another contender was PRE leader Abdala Bucaram Ortiz, who 
returned from Panama, where he had fled in 1985 after criticizing 
the armed forces, to participate in the first round of the presiden- 
tial elections. Febres Cordero allowed the flamboyant, mercurial 
Bucaram to return in the belief that his candidacy would help 
weaken the center-left and unite the right. The 18.4 percent of the 
vote Bucaram garnered shocked all the candidates and their par- 
ties, especially those on the disunited right, whose prime contender, 
the PSC's Sixto Duran Ballen, placed third with not quite 15 per- 
cent of the vote. A high voter turnout (nearly 78 percent) throughout 
the country and particularly in Guayaquil contributed to Bucaram 's 
impressive showing. He suddenly became a major challenger by 
edging out Duran and placing second to Rodrigo Borja who, as 
expected, was in first place, with 24.5 percent. 

Accordingly, the second round of the presidential elections in 
May 1988 was a contest between Borja and Bucaram. Despite their 
lack of substantive policy differences — both favored economic na- 
tionalism and import substitution — their campaigns were charac- 
terized by hard-hitting personal attacks that, Conaghan notes, 
"brought the level of political discourse to a new low. " Borja won, 
as expected, with 1.7 million ballots, or 47.4 percent of the vote. 
Bucaram, with the aid of the Lebanese community in Guayaquil, 
polled 40.3 percent, totaling about 1.45 million votes. (Of the ap- 
proximately 3.8 million ballots cast, 425,000 were null and 45,000 
blank.) This was a much better showing than expected, especially 
considering the failure of his PRE to win the support of any of the 
other major registered parties. Bucaram subsequently fled the coun- 
try again to avoid an arrest order issued by the president of Guaya- 
quil' s Superior Court for alleged malfeasance when he was mayor 
of Guayaquil in 1985. Nevertheless, according to Conaghan, the 
electoral results legitimized Bucaram as a national leader and as- 
sured him a future role as a presidential contender. 

Although Borja lost in the five coastal provinces, he carried the 
fourteen provinces of the Sierra and Oriente (eastern region), as 
well as the Galapagos Islands. (Sucumbios, the twenty-first province, 
was not created until 1989.) He also made an important showing 
in Guayas Province and adjacent Los Rios Province, winning about 
33 percent of the vote. Borja' s ID became the majority party by 
winning twenty-nine of the seventy-one seats in Congress and en- 
tering into a coalition with the Popular Democratic Union (Union 



186 




Democratica Popular — UDP) and DP (Popular Democracy), with 
seven seats, and FADI, with two seats. FADI was joined by the 
Movement for the Unity of the Left (Movimiento para la Unidad 
de la Izquierda — MUI) and the Revolutionary Movement of the 
Christian Left (Movimiento Revolucionario de la Izquierda Cris- 
tiana — MRIC). Borja also had the support of the FRA (Alfarist 
Radical Front), the Maoist MPD, and CFP (Concentration of Pop- 
ular Forces). 

Borja took office in August 1988 promising to reverse completely 
the policy course of Febres Cordero. He called for a "pluralist 
cabinet" and a "government of consensus," meaning a national 
understanding (concertacion) among workers, employers, and the 
government. His cabinet included seven ID members, four indepen- 
dents, and one DP member, as well as the two secretaries general, 
who belonged to the ID. Borja, a former professor of constitutional 
law at the Central University, made respect for legal guarantees 
a central theme in the selection of his ministers. His government 
energetically investigated alleged civil abuses perpetrated by Febres 
Cordero' s government and secured several convictions. 

The Borja government also took a new direction by making 
moves to appease opposition elements within military and guer- 
rilla ranks. In November 1988, with the approval of the CSJ and 
several other institutions, including the military, Borja pardoned 
the air force paratroopers who had kidnaped Febres Cordero and 



187 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

had become, in jail, heroes among left-wing and populist parties. 
In early 1989, the Borja government negotiated an agreement with 
the Eloy Alfaro Popular Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Populares 
Eloy Alfaro — FAP-EA), popularly known as the Alfaro Lives, 
Damnit! (j Alfaro Vive, Carajo! — AVC), a guerrilla/terrorist group 
founded in 1982 (see Internal Security, ch. 5). Borja also pardoned 
a number of imprisoned former air force members (see Political 
Forces and Interest Groups, this ch.). In mid- 1989, his legislative 
coalition with Hurtado's Christian Democratic party ended by 
mutual accord: Hurtado had opposed it from the start, and Borja 
no longer needed the agreement with the Christian Democrats, hav- 
ing won the support of other small parties. 

Political Forces and Interest Groups 

Interest groups able to influence regime changes traditionally 
have included the church, the military, the agrarian elite, the largely 
Guayaquil-based commercial community, foreign commercial in- 
terests, the urban working class, the politically active peasantry and 
rural workers, and the middle class (including students). Some of 
these groups have formed alliances with or have manipulated less 
influential groups. Motivated primarily by parochial concerns, 
many of these interest groups, like the political parties themselves, 
have provided little impetus to national development. Other smaller 
interest groups have included the myriad of governmental autono- 
mous agencies, which generally controlled their own funds and fol- 
lowed their own policies. Illegal political extremist organizations, 
such as the AVC and a nascent narcotics- trafficking mafia, may, 
in a sense, constitute additional, unconventional interest groups. 

The Roman Catholic Church 

The role of the Roman Catholic Church in society was the most 
divisive political issue in Ecuador for more than a century after 
independence. Despite the confiscation of its land by the Alfaro 
government at the beginning of the twentieth century, the church 
in the Sierra retained its preeminent position in social and eco- 
nomic life. In the more remote villages and small towns of the 
Sierra, the parish priest was often seen as the ultimate temporal, 
as well as spiritual, authority. The church gave religious and moral 
legitimacy to the actions of its defender, the PC. By contrast, the 
Costa was the base of the PLR, whose major platform traditionally 
had been anticlericalism. PLR policies caused the clergy and many 
devout laymen to rise to the defense of the church and its preroga- 
tives. Nonetheless, by 1945 the church-state conflict had ceased 
to be a significant political issue on the national level. 



188 



Government and Politics 



In the 1960s, the church hierarchy, influenced by reform-oriented 
papal encyclicals, endorsed land reform, a more just system of taxa- 
tion, and workers' rights. The church underwent a process of sig- 
nificant internal transformation and ideological renovation and 
found itself cast in the role of an advocate of far-reaching change 
and innovation (see Religion, ch. 2). Nevertheless, Thomas G. 
Sanders noted that the Catholic Church in Ecuador had become 
firmly committed to nonpartisanship by the late 1970s. According 
to Sanders, the Ecuadorian church's more neutral role contributed 
to political stability and strengthened pluralism by emphasizing na- 
tional unity and the need to promote social justice. 

The Military 

Historically, the military establishment alternated between direct 
or indirect control over the executive functions in general and a 
more limited role of exercising a veto over policies considered to 
fall within the area of its corporate interests (see Involvement in 
Politics and Government, ch. 5). In contrast with the pattern found 
in the majority of Latin American countries, the Ecuadorian mili- 
tary, which traditionally was allied with the PLR, early on became 
more closely identified with the merchant class than with the land- 
holding elite. After the decline of the traditional parties in the early 
twentieth century and the rise of ad hoc political coalitions, however, 
the military acquired greater autonomy as an institutional politi- 
cal force. 

Constitutions between 1945 and 1979 have legitimized the role 
of the military in policy making by allotting to the officer corps 
an official seat in the Senate. Interventions between 1945 and 1963 
arose most often over issues considered basic by the military leader- 
ship. For example, in 1962 the military pressured President Carlos 
Julio Arosemena Monroy to sever relations with Cuba and other 
socialist countries. When they ousted him in 1963, it was only after 
more than a year of encouragement by various political factions 
and economic interest groups, all of which were concerned over 
the chaotic drift in national affairs and over Arosemena' s personal 
conduct (see Instability and Military Dominance, 1960-72, ch. 1). 
After assuming power, however, the military became increasingly 
confident of its ability to rule better than civilians. The changing 
attitude of the officer corps, coupled with its declining trust in 
civilian leaders, was attributed in part to a new emphasis in mili- 
tary training on technical and managerial skills and to extensive 
foreign training in general. 

Factionalism within the armed forces has helped to account for 
the propensity of military plotting against civilian governments, 



189 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



as well as the difficulties encountered by the military establishment 
in its attempts to govern on its own. Civilian contenders for politi- 
cal power often sought the support of dissident elements of the mili- 
tary in order to topple an administration or to forestall an electoral 
outcome unfavorable to them. At the same time, factions within 
the military aligned themselves with civilian groups in order to 
strengthen their own positions vis-a-vis other military factions. For 
example, when widespread civilian discontent boded ill for the con- 
tinuation of government by junta in 1966, important elements of 
the armed forces joined the civilian opposition and contributed to 
the fall of the junta. 

On numerous occasions, the military applied its influence to ward 
off political developments that it opposed or to intervene indirectly. 
For example, when the leftist opposition in Congress undertook 
to impeach Febres Cordero in January 1987, armed forces represen- 
tatives warned the president of Congress that the military would 
shut down the legislature if impeachment proceedings were not 
halted. Febres Cordero's interference in internal military matters, 
however, created resentments, as demonstrated dramatically by 
the military rebellions in March 1986. In June 1987, a group of 
about a dozen army and naval officers met with the defense minister 
and suggested that Febres Cordero resign. The military also report- 
edly threatened to intervene if Bucaram won the 1988 presidential 
election. 

The Economic Elite 

In popular usage, the term oligarchy referred to the old Quito 
upper class, whose fortunes were amassed originally through owner- 
ship of land, and to prominent commercial groups in Guayaquil. 
Although members of the wealthiest families historically seldom 
participated personally in politics — except for serving in diplomatic 
posts in Europe or the United States or as foreign ministers — the 
economic elite often appeared to manage political affairs to its own 
advantage. 

Since the mid-twentieth century, associational interest groups 
representing the upper class have proliferated. Commercial, in- 
dustrial, and agricultural associations became increasingly impor- 
tant, even in provincial capitals where informal connections were 
previously considered sufficient. After the constitution of 1967 al- 
lowed agricultural, commercial, and industrial associations to elect 
one senator each from the Sierra and one each from the Costa, 
the Senate became dominated by representatives of employer groups 
(see Elite, ch. 2). 



190 



A view of the Northern Sierra 
Courtesy Patricia Mothes 



Although lacking the claims to aristocracy of the Quito upper 
class, Guayaquil's commercial and financial elite was the wealthi- 
est in the country. Its members espoused liberal principles, such 
as the expansion of political participation, but generally seemed 
even less disposed toward economic reforms than did its counter- 
parts in Quito. The coastal elite participated in the political process 
by financing the campaigns of various parties and factions. It was 
well organized, principally through the Guayaquil Chamber of 
Commerce, and was capable of raising the banner of regional au- 
tonomy whenever its interests were threatened. 

The provincial landowners formed the most conservative of all 
significant political groups. Their strength was much greater in the 
Sierra than on the Costa, and they were especially powerful in 
provincial and municipal affairs in the south. Until the dissolu- 
tion of Congress in 1970, hacendado associations were strongly 
represented in that body, both through the regional senators and 
deputies representing the southern highland provinces and through 
the senators elected by the associations themselves. There was broad 
sympathy and support for the hacendado viewpoint among those 
who monopolized most instruments of power. 



191 



Ecuador: A Country Study 
Labor 

Disunited and poorly organized for most of its history, the labor 
movement developed only slowly and had only a marginal politi- 
cal impact. Precise figures on unionization in the late 1980s were 
practically nonexistent, even within the unions themselves. The 
organized labor movement was divided into four confederations 
and a number of independent federations. At the local level, labor 
organizations also took the form of artisan guilds, cooperatives, 
and neighborhood associations. In addition to representing only 
a minority of the workers in all sectors of employment (approxi- 
mately one-fifth), the labor movement traditionally was weakened 
by rivalry and government repression. Nevertheless, it had influence 
disproportionate to its numbers as a result of the concentration of 
labor unions in urban areas, mainly Quito and Guayaquil, its or- 
ganizational power, and the political impact of strikes and demon- 
strations on governments that did not enjoy strong support. 

Professional or employee associations (cdmaras), composed of 
middle-class, white-collar workers, constituted about 25 percent 
of all labor unions. Representing the dominant economic groups 
in the country, these associations exercised a predominant influence 
on economic policy; their representatives frequently held cabinet 
posts and other top government positions dealing with economics. 
The support of the associations proved crucial to most governments. 

Although union organizations began forming in Ecuador early 
in the twentieth century, organized workers did not begin to ac- 
quire any influence until the late 1930s. Key events in Ecuador's 
labor history took place in 1938 with the promulgation of the Labor 
Code and the founding of the first labor confederation, the Ecua- 
dorian Federation of Classist Organizations (Central Ecuatoriana 
de Organizaciones Clasistas — CEDOC). Between 1938 and 1949, 
some 550 labor organizations were formed. These included the 
country's second confederation, the Confederation of Ecuadorian 
Workers (Confederacion de Trabajadores Ecuatorianos — CTE), 
which began operating in 1944. A total of 3,093 unions were es- 
tablished between 1950 and 1973. 

CEDOC was never an effective articulator of worker interests, 
being more concerned with religious causes, combating efforts to 
eliminate exclusion of ecclesiastical control and influence in labor 
organizations, and curtailing communist infiltration in the labor sec- 
tor. Although of Catholic origin, CEDOC rejected its Christian 
Democratic leadership in 1976 and adopted a socialist orientation. 
The old leaders retained the support of a few grassroots organiza- 
tions and formed a parallel organization. Approximately 80 percent 



192 



Government and Politics 



of CEDOC 'S membership came from the Ecuadorian Federation 
of Peasant Organizations (Federacion Ecuatoriana de Organiza- 
ciones Campesinas— FEDOC). In the mid-1980s, CEDOC had 
unions in fifteen of the twenty provinces; its estimated member- 
ship of 130,000 was largely composed of artisans, with almost no 
industrial worker membership. After twelve years of political di- 
vision, the two CEDOC branches united in 1988 and formed the 
Ecuadorian Confederation of Classist Organizations for Workers' 
Unity (Confederacion Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Clasistas para 
la Unidad de los Trabajadores— CEDOCUT). 

Through militant activities, such as petitions, collective conflicts, 
and general strikes, the CTE — composed predominantly of indus- 
trial workers and led by members of the communist and socialist 
parties — emerged as the principal labor organization in Ecuador 
in the late 1970s. Although the CTE had become the largest of 
the three national confederations by the 1970s, its hegemony 
declined in the 1980s as a result of the growth of rival confedera- 
tions, internal conflicts and splits, and governmental repression. 
In 1987 only a shadow remained of its peasant federation, the Ec- 
uadorian Indian Federation (Federacion Ecuatoriana de Indios— 
FEI). The CTE still included a number of industrial unions and 
various public-sector unions, and was organizing autonomous work- 
ers. It encompassed an estimated 55,000 members in 200 affili- 
ated unions. 

The Communist Party of Ecuador — Marxist- Leninist established 
a small federation, the General Union of Ecuadorian Workers 
(Union General de Trabajadores Ecuatorianos — UGTE), in an at- 
tempt to rival the CTE. Apart from the powerful National Union 
of Teachers (Union Nacional de Educadores — UNE), which had 
about 100,000 members, the UGTE had little success in affiliat- 
ing unions. Together with student unions and a few other groups, 
the UGTE formed the Popular Front (Frente Popular— FP), which 
in the 1980s was attempting to rival the United Workers Front 
(Frente Unitario de Trabajadores — FUT) in organizing protest 
action. 

The Inter- American Regional Organization of Workers (Or- 
ganization Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores — ORIT) 
tried to unify the non-Marxist unions by founding the Ecuadorian 
Confederation of Free Trade Union Organizations (Confederacion 
Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres — CEOSL) in 
1962. The CEOSL became the third-largest confederation, with 
membership consisting almost exclusively of urban white- and blue- 
collar workers. It included fourteen provincial and thirteen national 
federations made up of a large proportion of industrial workers, a 



193 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

number of members from the service sector, and a small number 
of agricultural workers, peasants, and craftsmen. 

FUT emerged in 1971 and eventually united the three main 
confederations — CEDOC, CEOSL, and CTE — plus a number of 
independent unions, including the Catholic Federation of Workers 
(Central Catolica de Obreros — CCO), making FUT the country's 
largest workers' confederation. By the 1980s, FUT totaled an esti- 
mated 300,000 members and emerged as the leader of a massive 
movement that arose spontaneously to protest the economic cri- 
sis, and that greatly outnumbered the ranks of unionized workers. 
FUT nearly toppled President Hurtado in 1982 when he introduced 
austerity measures in the face of the debt crisis. In June 1988, FUT, 
together with the National Coordinator of Workers (Coordinadora 
Nacional de Trabajadores — CNT), the Confederation of Indige- 
nous Nationalities of Ecuador (Confederation de Nacionalidades 
Indigenas del Ecuador — Conaie), and FP, staged a one-day na- 
tional strike aimed at obtaining a large increase in the minimum 
wage and a freeze on the prices of basic goods. It was the seventh 
general labor action against the Febres Cordero government and 
coincided with an ongoing strike by the UNE for a rise in monthly 
wages. The impact of FUT remained limited, however, because 
the federation tended to maintain its working-class orientation, 
bas~d on wage claims, and in practice gave relatively little impor- 
tance to the claims of other sectors that looked to it for leadership. 

Students 

Beginning in the first decade of the twentieth century, students 
took to the streets on a number of occasions in defense of public 
freedoms, university autonomy and reform, separation of church 
and state, and opposition to dictatorship. Following the establish- 
ment in 1944 of the Federation of University Students of Ecuador 
(Federacion de Estudiantes Universitarios del Ecuador — FEUE), 
the student movement, spurred by campus representatives of the 
political parties, became increasingly politicized and one of the most 
influential pressure groups in the country, playing a role in every 
nonconstitutional change of government. Both the FEUE and the 
Federation of High School Students of Ecuador (Federacion de 
Estudiantes Secundarios del Ecuador — FESE) contributed signif- 
icantly to the downfall in 1966 of the military junta, which had 
abolished university autonomy and student-faculty government. 
Student federations were organized at Catholic universities in 1966 
and at the polytechnic schools in 1969. In the early 1970, the FEUE 
represented some 40,000 student at five public and two Catholic 



194 



Broadcasting in Quichua 
over Radio Latacunga in Cotopaxi Province 
Courtesy Inter-American Foundation (Miguel Say ago) 

universities, one non-Catholic private university, and the polytech- 
nic schools (see Education, ch. 2). 

During the late 1960s, the student movement, heavily influenced 
by the Cuban Revolution, had assumed a militantly anti-oligarchy, 
anti-military, and anti-imperialist orientation. Student radicalism 
prompted the military government to intervene brutally in the Cen- 
tral University in 1966 and to close it in 1970. In the late 1970s, 
the student movement, seriously weakened as a result of endemic 
factionalism and the increasing isolation of the FEUE leadership, 
faced invincible shortcomings. With few exceptions, the political 
action of the university federations in the 1970s had gone no far- 
ther than press statements, graffiti, revolutionary pamphlets, street 
demonstrations, meetings, strikes, and work stoppages. Conse- 
quently, the groups had lost their traditional political prestige and 
the support of important segments of the student population. 

The Media 

Although the 1979 Constitution accords Ecuadorians the right 
to freedom of opinion and expression of thought, media owner- 
ship has remained concentrated in the hands of a few large interests. 
In the late 1980s, all media were privately controlled, except the 



195 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

National Radio (Radio Nacional), which was operated by the 
government's ministerial-level National Communications Secre- 
tariat (Secretaria Nacional de Comunicaciones — Senac), previously 
called the National Secretariat for Public Information (Secretaria 
Nacional de Information Publica — Sendip) under the Febres Cor- 
dero administration. The government, however, controlled the al- 
location of radio and television frequencies. Historically, most media 
owners endorsed the political status quo and gave tacit support to 
right-wing governments and even to dictatorships. In the 1980s, 
however, conservative interests were less dominant in radio than 
in television and the written press. 

The Febres Cordero government used the media systematically 
in an effort to gain media support for its free-market economic poli- 
cies, and in the process it infringed on press freedom. For exam- 
ple, in late 1984 the government temporarily closed five radio 
stations — four in Guayaquil and one in Quito — after they broad- 
cast Guayaquil mayor Abdala Bucaram's censure of Febres Cor- 
dero. The government also used economic means of pressure, such 
as suspending its substantial public- sector advertising in the center- 
left daily Hoy and the monthly magazine Nueva, as well as pressur- 
ing private banks and companies not to advertise in these publica- 
tions. As a result, the independent media initially omitted or toned 
down criticism of the government. However, two prestigious inter- 
American media associations criticized the Febres Cordero govern- 
ment for alleged violations of press freedom. In a report released 
in March 1985, the Inter- American Press Association accused the 
government of intolerance toward the independent press and a lack 
of objectivity in government press releases. In addition, many op- 
position journalists complained that the government was using legal 
or pseudo-legal devices and pretexts to reduce further the already 
limited space available to the minority press. In 1987 opposition 
radio and television stations continued to experience government 
attempts to stifle the media. The ability of the government to pres- 
sure state and private companies to discriminate against the in- 
dependent media diminished following the erosion of Febres 
Cordero 's standing and influence. 

On taking office in August 1988, Borja vowed to uphold free- 
dom of the press and appointed various journalists to high-level 
governmental posts. Senac, composed of new members appointed 
by Borja, undertook efforts to make the government accessible 
to the media and to promote freedom of the press. Senac also 
abolished the progovernment simulcasts initiated by the Febres 
Cordero administration and allowed Channel 5 in Quito to resume 
broadcasting in August 1988, after being closed for four years. 



196 



Government and Politics 



Ecuador had ten principal television stations in the late 1980s. 
The country's commercial radio stations numbered over 260, in- 
cluding 10 cultural and 10 religious stations. The "Voice of the 
Andes" station had operated for more than fifty years as an evan- 
gelical Christian shortwave radio service supported largely by con- 
tributions from the United States. 

Ecuador had only thirty daily newspapers in the late 1980s. The 
newspapers with the largest circulations, El Comercio and El Universo, 
were published in Quito and Guayaquil, respectively. Founded in 
the 1920s, they were closely connected with each city's small but 
powerful business community in the 1980s. Quito and Guayaquil 
each had four dailies. Quito's largest newspaper, El Comercio, was 
conservative and had a circulation of 130,000. El Comercio also 
owned an evening newspaper, Ultimas Noticias. The Quito-based 
Hoy, founded in the early 1980s, had a circulation in 1987 of be- 
tween 35,000 and 40,000. Guayaquil's El Universo was indepen- 
dent and had a circulation of between 120,000 and 190,000 on 
weekdays and 225,000 on Sundays. Guayaquil's second newspaper, 
Expreso, published evening newspapers in both cities: Extra in 
Guayaquil and La Hora in Quito. Some ten international news agen- 
cies had bureaus in Quito. 

The principal weekly periodicals that covered political and eco- 
nomic affairs were Quito's La Calle, with a circulation of 20,000, 
and Guayaquil's Andlisis Semanal and Vistazo. Nueva, with a circu- 
lation of between 12,000 and 14,000, was founded in the early 1970s 
as an alternative magazine oriented to those sectors of the popula- 
tion that were under-represented by the traditional press, such as 
trade union workers, intellectuals, and Indians. 

Among Ecuador's ten principal publishers, only Editorial Clari- 
dad and Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Ecuador, published 
books on politics. According to the United States Department of 
State in the late 1980s, there was no political censorship of domes- 
tic or foreign books, films, or works of art, and no government 
interference with academic inquiry. 

Foreign Relations 

According to the United States Department of State, Ecuador's 
principal foreign-policy objectives have included defense of the na- 
tional territory from external aggression and internal subversion; 
support for the objectives of the United Nations (UN) and the Or- 
ganization of American States (OAS); defense of its claim to 320 
kilometers of territorial and fisheries jurisdictions off its coast; and 
revision of the 1942 Protocol of Peace, Friendship, and Bound- 
aries (Rio Protocol), which ended, at least officially, open warfare 



197 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

between Peru and Ecuador over a territorial dispute. Although Ec- 
uador's foreign relations traditionally have centered on the United 
States, Ecuador's membership in the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the 1970s and 1980s allowed some 
Ecuadorian leaders to exercise somewhat greater foreign policy 
autonomy. Ecuador's international foreign policy goals under the 
Borja government in the late 1980s were more diversified than those 
of the Febres Cordero administration, which closely identified with 
the United States. For example, Ecuador was more active in its 
relations with the Third World, multilateral organizations, Western 
Europe, and socialist countries. 

The United States 

The United States maintained good relations with Ecuador's 
democratically elected governments in the 1980s. These close ties 
were based on trade, investment and finance, cooperation in Ec- 
uador's economic development, and participation in inter- American 
organizations and treaties, including the Western Hemisphere's 
regional mutual security treaty, the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) of 1947. The United States 
provided US$48 million in assistance to Ecuador in 1988 and was 
its main commercial partner. The United States provided economic 
assistance through its Agency for International Development pro- 
gram in Ecuador and multilateral organizations, such as the Inter- 
American Development Bank and World Bank (see Glossary). In 
addition, the United States Peace Corps operated a sizable pro- 
gram in Ecuador. 

Three irritants in particular affected bilateral relations in the 
1970s and 1980s. One was the United States Foreign Trade Act 
of 1974, which denied (until the 1980s) favorable tariff treatment 
to all OPEC members, even though neither Ecuador nor Venezuela 
participated in the 1973 oil boycott of the United States. Ecuador 
also reacted indignantly in early 1977 when the United States 
prohibited Israel from selling a dozen Kfir fighter-bombers to Ec- 
uador because the aircraft contained licensed General Electric en- 
gines. In 1981, however, the United States lifted the prohibition 
(see Equipment Sources, ch. 5). An additional aggravation was 
a dispute over the extent of the territorial sea claimed by Ecuador 
since 1953 and its rights over highly migratory fish traveling through 
these waters. In the early 1970s, Ecuador seized about 100 tuna 
boats flying the United States flag and collected fines and fees total- 
ing more than US$6 million. No additional seizures occurred until 
November 1980, when ten tuna boats were detained while fishing 
and fined. That action provoked a United States embargo on the 



198 



Government and Politics 



importing of tuna from Ecuador. Although still unresolved, the 
territorial sea and fishing issues did not adversely affect bilateral 
relations for most of the 1980s. 

Febres Cordero's foreign policy was characterized by a marked 
preference for bilateralism and closer ties to the United States. His 
foreign and economic policies mirrored those advocated by the ad- 
ministration of President Ronald Reagan, particularly on matters 
related to Central America and Latin America's international debt. 
During Febres Cordero's week-long state visit to Washington in 
January 1986, United States and Ecuadorian officials repeatedly 
underlined their two presidents' total agreement on economic and 
political matters. 

Ecuador was almost alone in its enthusiastic reception of the 1986 
Baker Plan (named after then United States secretary of the trea- 
sury James A. Baker III) for alleviating Third World debt, which 
called for fresh infusions of capital into the debt-ridden countries, 
contingent on structural reforms. Febres Cordero advocated bi- 
lateral negotiation rather than the use of a regional "cartel" to 
renegotiate the debt and strongly favored an "understanding" be- 
tween debtor and creditor nations. (Nevertheless, Ecuador stopped 
paying interest on its debt in 1987.) The Febres Cordero govern- 
ment also ignored petroleum production quotas set by OPEC and 
threatened to withdraw from the cartel as well. 

Febres Cordero approved "Operation Blazing Trails," a United 
States-sponsored civic-action project to repair bridges and roads 
in the earthquake-devastated province of Napo. The project in- 
volved rotating contingents of 600 United States troops through 
the country at fifteen-day intervals beginning in May 1986, until 
an Ecuadorian congressional resolution in July called for their im- 
mediate withdrawal. Marxist and centrist leaders alike had de- 
nounced Febres Cordero's approval of the project as a violation 
of national sovereignty. 

United States secretary of state George P. Shultz attended Borja's 
swearing-in ceremony on August 10, 1988. During his first year 
in office, Borja remained on good terms with the United States. 
In his meeting with United States vice president Daniel Quayle 
in Caracas in February 1989, Borja stressed the need for good re- 
lations within the framework of mutual respect and noninterven- 
tion in Ecuador's domestic affairs. The Borja government expressed 
satisfaction with the proposal presented in March 1989 by United 
States treasury secretary Nicolas Brady regarding the Latin Ameri- 
can debt problem. The Brady Plan called for the creditor banks 
to write off a portion of a poor country's indebtedness in return 
for guaranteed repayment of the remaining debt. Nevertheless, 



199 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

Borja favored a Bolivian-style policy of holding back payments be- 
cause of poverty. 

Other Nations and International Organizations 

Ecuador and the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations 
in 1969, but it was not until 1972, when Ecuador joined OPEC, 
that the Soviets showed much interest in Ecuador. By the mid- 
1970s, the Soviet Union maintained an embassy in Quito rivaling 
in importance that of the United States. 

Ecuador traditionally favored multilateral approaches to inter- 
national problems. It belonged to the UN, the Nonaligned Move- 
ment (NAM), the OAS, and other regional integration groupings, 
such as the Latin American Economic System (Sistema Economico 
Latinoamericano — SELA), the Latin American Energy Organi- 
zation, the Latin American Integration Association, and the Andean 
Pact. Ecuador — along with Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, and Peru — 
signed the Andean Pact and the Cartagena Agreement in 1969, 
creating an Andean Common Market. In 1978 Ecuador and seven 
other South American countries signed the Amazon Pact treaty 
for the joint development of the Amazon River Basin. 

Febres Cordero, however, took exception to Ecuador's traditional 
multilateralism. Impatient with regional and multilateral arrange- 
ments, he opposed the clause in the Andean Pact that restricted 
foreign investment, and sought to have it liberalized. To that end, 
Ecuador threatened several times to withdraw from the Andean 
Pact. It did not send a representative to the 1986 meeting of the 
group's foreign ministers in Uruguay. The Febres Cordero govern- 
ment also kept a low profile in the OAS, SELA, and the Cartagena 
Group. 

Praised as "realistic and pragmatic" by some, Febres Cordero 's 
foreign policy was criticized as "erratic and incongruous" by others. 
Evidence supporting both these views could be found in his govern- 
ment 's relations with Cuba and Nicaragua and his positions on 
Latin American issues. On April 16, 1985, Febres Cordero became 
the first conservative Latin American president to visit Cuba since 
Fidel Castro Ruz took power twenty-six years earlier. The Ecua- 
dorian president reportedly talked at length with Castro about ways 
to ease the region's foreign debt burden and bring peace to Cen- 
tral America. 

The Febres Cordero government kept its distance, however, from 
most of the region's initiatives to promote Latin American solidar- 
ity. In October 1985, Ecuador joined the so-called Lima Group 
of four South American nations — Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and 
Uruguay — supporting the search for peace in Central America 



200 



Government and Politics 



initiated by the Contadora Group (consisting of Mexico, Venezuela, 
Colombia, and Panama, whose ministers first met in 1983 on Con- 
tadora Island in the Gulf of Panama). Nonetheless, Ecuador not 
only withdrew from the Lima Group later that month, but also 
became the first Latin American nation to break diplomatic rela- 
tions with Nicaragua. The break in relations, which came suddenly 
after Febres Cordero and Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega 
Saavedra traded public insults, had the unintended effect of isolating 
Ecuador from other Latin American countries. Some observers also 
viewed it as Febres Cordero 's response to the United States' re- 
quest for a blockade of international aid to Nicaragua. 

In his inaugural address, Borja vowed to pursue an indepen- 
dent, nonaligned foreign policy based on the principles of self- 
determination and nonintervention. He believed that Latin Ameri- 
can unity should take priority over ideological differences. Accord- 
ingly, he invited both Ortega and Castro to his inauguration 
ceremony on August 10. Castro attended the event, but Febres 
Cordero refused to allow Ortega into the country, except as a 
tourist. Consequently, Ortega delayed his arrival in Quito until 
August 1 1 , by which time Borja, in one of his first official acts as 
head of state, had restored diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. 
Borja also expanded the relationship that Febres Cordero had in- 
itiated with Cuba, allowing some Cuban and Nicaraguan advisers 
to assist in Ecuador's National Literacy Program. In addition, he 
criticized the policy of isolating Cuba from international forums, 
such as the UN and OAS. 

Borja also endorsed the establishment of an OPEC common front 
to defend oil prices, to fulfill the obligations that Ecuador assumed 
in the modifying protocol of the Cartagena Agreement, and to rein- 
corporate Ecuador into the group of Latin American countries sup- 
porting the Central American peace process. The Borja government 
anticipated good relations with Venezuela, another OPEC mem- 
ber whose president, Carlos Andres Perez, was Borja' s closest as- 
sociate in the region. In early 1989, however, the Group of Eight 
(the eight democratic Latin American countries which belonged 
to the former Contadora or Lima Groups) rejected Ecuador's bid 
for membership. Nevertheless, in June 1989 Colombian president 
Virgilio Barco Vargas invited Ecuador to replace Panama in the 
Group of Eight. In September 1989, Borja stated publicly his be- 
lief that General Manuel Antonio Noriega, Panama's de facto leader 
as commander of the Panama Defense Forces, should step down, 
but added that he opposed United States military intervention to 
depose him. 



201 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

A protracted border dispute continued to strain relations between 
Ecuador and Peru. The approximately 200,000-square-kilometer 
area of the Amazon (the Maranon district), which Ecuador had 
claimed since the nineteenth century, contained the city of Iquitos 
on the west bank of the Amazon River and also Peru's main jun- 
gle petroleum-producing region. Since 1960, when Ecuador's presi- 
dent Velasco declared invalid the Rio Protocol, under which the 
area was recognized as Peru's, Ecuador had continued to assert 
its right to the disputed region and to emphasize its need for an 
outlet to the Atlantic via the Amazon River (see Reform, Chaos, 
and Debacle, 1925-44). A small border war with Peru broke out 
on January 28, 1981, in the Condor mountain range, which runs 
along the border between the Amazon Basin and Ecuador. After 
Peruvian forces drove Ecuadorian troops back from the border 
posts, a cease-fire came into effect on February 1. A commission 
composed of the military attaches of the United States, Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile, who helped negotiate the cease-fire, was charged 
with supervising the border area. Most Ecuadorians, however, sup- 
ported their government's efforts to obtain a revision of the 1942 
protocol. 

As a vice president of the Socialist International, Borja enjoyed 
good relations with several West European countries. He was par- 
ticularly close to Portuguese president Mario Lopes Soares, who 
attended his inauguration. The French-speaking Ecuadorian presi- 
dent was also a long-time admirer of France's president Francois 
Mitterrand, whose wife Danielle attended the installation ceremony 
on behalf of France. The deputy prime minister of Spain also at- 
tended, as did representatives from the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many (West Germany), the German Democratic Republic (East 
Germany), and Sweden. The Soviet Union and China were also 
represented at the inauguration. The Borja government reaffirmed 
Ecuador's support for the rights of the Palestinian people and for 
a peaceful, just, and lasting solution to the Middle East conflict 
within the framework of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
338 and an international conference under UN auspices. Borja at- 
tended the NAM summit in Yugoslavia in September 1989. 

* * * 

The scholarly literature in English on Ecuador's political sys- 
tem is limited. A pioneering study of Ecuador's political system 
is George I. Blanksten's Ecuador: Constitutions and Caudillos. John 
D. Martz's Ecuador: Conflicting Political Culture and the Quest for Progress 
is a somewhat dated but still useful historical study of the political 



202 



Government and Politics 



system. Former president Osvaldo Hurtado's Political Power in Ec- 
uador is a very informative and insightful academic study of Ecua- 
dorian politics. Although some of the data in the revised version 
remains outdated or inconsistent, Hurtado's book is nevertheless 
widely considered to be one of the best and most original studies 
of the country's political, economic, and intellectual history. An 
authoritative study of Ecuador's constitutional history and politi- 
cal system in the 1980s by one of the country's leading judicial schol- 
ars is Hernan Salgado Pesants's Instituciones Politicas y Constitucion 
del Ecuador. Other up-to-date, scholarly books include David W. 
Schodt's Ecuador: An Andean Enigma, Ecuador: Fragile Democracy by 
David Corkill and David Cubitt, and Catherine M. Conaghan's 
Restructuring Domination: Industrialists and the State in Ecuador. 

Insightful political analyses in academic journals include Martz's 
"Instability in Ecuador" and Conaghan's "Ecuador Swings To- 
ward Social Democracy" in Current History. A detailed and well- 
informed analysis (in French) of voting patterns in Ecuador's 1984 
and 1988 presidential elections is "Equateur de Leon Febres 
Cordero a Rodrigo Borja (1984-1988)," by Yves Saint-Geours. 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



203 



Chapter 5. National Security 




Military chief clutching a club (Bahia culture) 



ALTHOUGH MODEST IN SIZE AND operational capacity, 
the Ecuadorian armed forces (Fuerzas Armadas — FF.AA.), have 
been sufficient to deal with the nation's limited external and domes- 
tic security concerns. The only outside hostilities Ecuador has ex- 
perienced have been with Peru in 1941 and 1981, when the two 
nations engaged in brief encounters over disputed claims in the 
Amazon River Basin. On both occasions, the Ecuadorian army 
proved little match for the larger and better equipped Peruvian 
forces. As of 1989, the distant prospect of some renewed confron- 
tation with Peru remained the primary justification for the pur- 
chase of modern military armaments. In the late 1980s, organized 
domestic terrorism was not the challenge in Ecuador that it was 
in neighboring Peru and Colombia. The security of the northern 
frontier area against drug traffickers and insurgent groups originat- 
ing in Colombia was, however, a continuing problem. 

The president of the republic functioned as commander in chief 
of the armed forces. The National Security Council (NSC) and 
the Joint Command, the chief of which was the senior military 
officer, advised the president on defense issues. A ranking mili- 
tary officer, either active or retired, customarily held the position 
of minister of national defense. The army, the dominant branch 
of the military with about 40,000 troops, included five infantry 
brigades, two jungle brigades, an armored brigade, and a special 
forces brigade. The navy, with two submarines and a number of 
missile-armed surface vessels, was capable of protecting territorial 
waters and communications with the Galapagos Islands. Analysts 
regarded the air force's three squadrons of modern fighter planes 
as effective in both air defense and ground support roles. 

The military employed a conscription system requiring young 
men to serve for one year at the age of nineteen. Those able to 
meet stringent requirements could remain as career personnel. 
Officers entered by way of one of the three military academies. 
Advancement was based on merit, coupled with successful perfor- 
mance in service schools at various levels. 

In the early years of Ecuadorian independence, individual mili- 
tary leaders frequentiy dominated the political system. The political 
involvement of the military institution, however, was a phenome- 
non of the twentieth century. Although the armed forces assumed 
power only three times — in 1925, 1963, and 1972 — those were ex- 
tended periods and the military's influence and interests loomed 



207 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

continuously over the political scene. In 1979, following seven years 
of reformist military rule that was only partially successful in bring- 
ing about economic modernization, the armed forces oversaw the 
enactment of a new constitution and voluntarily returned to the 
barracks. During the 1970s, however, the armed forces had nearly 
doubled in size, and defense spending rose accordingly. Acquir- 
ing its own business enterprises and profiting from the oil bonanza, 
the military assembled a considerable inventory of modern weapons, 
including armored vehicles, combat aircraft, and naval units. The 
country's mounting economic crisis and the sharp drop in oil rev- 
enues in the 1980s, on the other hand, brought an abrupt halt to 
the equipment modernization efforts. 

Although not in sympathy with most of the civilian governments 
of the 1980s, the armed forces refrained from intervention. Indeed, 
the other service chiefs considered the revolt by the air force com- 
mander in 1986 as damaging to internal discipline and order and 
did not support him. In spite of the blow to the prestige and unity 
of the armed forces caused by this episode and the subsequent brief 
kidnapping of the president by air force commandos, cooperative 
civil-military relations remained an important ingredient in Ec- 
uadorian political life. 

Military Heritage 

Ecuador's military history dates from the first attempt to secure 
freedom from Spain in 181 1 . The rebel forces of the newly declared 
independent state of Quito attempted to extend their control to other 
parts of Ecuadorian territory but proved little match for the army 
dispatched by the viceroy of Peru. In the Battle of Ibarra in De- 
cember 1812, Spanish forces easily reasserted control of the coun- 
try. When the independence movement began again in 1820, 
Ecuadorian forces assembled in Guayaquil, combining with con- 
tingents of revolutionary soldiers from Colombia commanded by 
Antonio Jose de Sucre Alcala, a close collaborator of the Venezuelan 
liberator, Simon Bolivar Palacios. After a successful invasion of 
the Sierra (Andean highlands), the rebels scored a decisive victory 
over the royalist army in 1822 at the Battle of Pichincha (see The 
Struggle for Independence, ch. 1). 

In 1828, as a member along with Colombia and Venezuela of 
the Confederation of Gran Colombia, Ecuador fought against Peru 
to block the latter' s attempt at annexation. Confederation forces, 
fewer than half of which were Ecuadorians, defeated the much larger 
Peruvian invasion force at a second Battle of Pichincha in Febru- 
ary 1829. 



208 



National Security 



At the dissolution of Gran Colombia in 1830, most of Ecuador's 
senior army officers and many of its troops were Venezuelans, as 
was the country's first president, Juan Jose Flores. The army of 
2,000 men consisted of three infantry battalions and one cavalry 
regiment. Even as late as 1845, when Flores was forced from his 
second term of office, only four of fifteen general officers were Ec- 
uadorian. Non-Ecuadorians comprised most of the officers and non- 
commissioned officers (NCOs) of the elite cavalry units as well. 
Upon taking office as president in 1851 , General Jose Maria Urbina 
freed the black slaves and recruited many of them into the military. 

Beginning in the 1860s, successive governments attempted to 
professionalize the armed forces. Gabriel Garcia Moreno, who 
dominated the political scene from 1860 until 1875, reduced the 
army in size and depoliticized it. Further improvements in the army 
occurred during the relatively prosperous period of the 1880s and 
1890s under the military dictator Ignacio de Veintemilla and suc- 
cessor civilian governments. French officers arrived to provide train- 
ing on a newly acquired arsenal of weapons. By 1900 the army 
was able to repel an attack from Colombia by Ecuadorian political 
opponents of the government in power. 

In 1905 the government established military education and train- 
ing institutions and divided the country into four defense zones. 
Immediately preceding World War I, the army had nine infantry 
battalions, three cavalry regiments, three artillery regiments, and 
three engineering battalions. By the mid- 1920s, it had expanded 
to fifteen infantry battalions. Later, under the influence of an Italian 
military mission, the infantry was reduced to ten battalions, al- 
though each battalion now consisted of four rather than the previ- 
ous two or three rifle companies. In 1930 the army had a total 
strength of about 5,500 men of all ranks. 

Despite the military's continual growth, in July 1941, when con- 
flict broke out over the Amazonian region disputed with Peru, the 
Ecuadorians were ill-prepared to resist invasion. The much larger 
Peruvian army of 13,000, supported by a battalion of Czech- 
manufactured tanks, together with artillery and air power, moved 
quickly into the southern coastal province of El Oro, threatening 
Guayaquil (see fig 1). The fewer than 1,800 Ecuadorian troops in 
the area lacked air cover and could offer only limited resistance. 
Peruvian forces also moved into the disputed Amazonian territo- 
ry without significant opposition. After a campaign lasting only 
three weeks, an armistice was arranged. The subsequent Protocol 
of Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries (Rio Protocol) in early 1942 
imposed on Ecuador acceptance of Peru's claims in the Amazonian 



209 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

region in return for Peruvian withdrawal from Ecuador's coastal 
provinces. 

Ecuador declared war on the Axis powers and began to receive 
military aid from the United States in 1942. This aid consisted at 
first of light weapons, mortars, light tanks, and armored scout cars. 
Under a military assistance agreement with the United States in 
1952, the Ecuadorian armed forces, which now totaled approxi- 
mately 15,000 troops, received additional equipment, including 
howitzers, tanks, and armored personnel carriers. Revenue com- 
ing from the oil discovered in the late 1960s financed the purchase 
of considerable additional ground forces weaponry as well as fighters 
for the small air force (see Armed Forces, this ch.). 

Occasional clashes with Peru occurred in the border area lost 
by Ecuador in the 1942 settlement. These clashes flared into an 
outbreak of serious fighting in January 1981. Ecuadorian troops 
had apparently established an outpost on Peruvian soil but were 
driven back in an engagement lasting five days at a reported cost 
to Ecuador of 200 deaths. The Peruvians made effective use of 
helicopters, air strikes, and commando teams specially trained for 
jungle operations. In 1983 and again in 1984, shooting incidents 
occurred when patrols of both countries met in the territory still 
claimed by Ecuador. 

Strategic Perspective 

The predominant military concern remained, as of late 1989, 
Ecuador's refusal to accept the boundary settlement of 1942 as final 
(see Other Relations and International Organizations, ch. 4). The 
southern deployment of many Ecuadorian army and air force com- 
bat units reflected the nation's preoccupation with the possibility 
of future tensions in the disputed area, although the units were not 
in forward positions. Peru's armed forces were far stronger than 
those of Ecuador, but analysts regarded the likelihood of an un- 
provoked Peruvian attack as remote. From a Peruvian perspec- 
tive, there was no unsettled border problem. Peru regarded the 
Rio Protocol as fixing the boundary permanently and subsequent 
confrontations and clashes in the area as simply Ecuadorian efforts 
to reopen the issue. 

As the 1941 conflict had demonstrated, Ecuador was in a vul- 
nerable position in the event of a serious conflict with Peru. Its 
coastal areas in the south were exposed to penetration, and the port 
of Guayaquil could be subjected to both land attack and blockade 
from the sea. In addition, observers noted that Ecuador had been 
unwilling to risk the commitment of its modern fighter aircraft dur- 
ing the 1981 hostilities, presumably out of fear that Ecuador's air 



210 



I 



An artillery unit in Quito in 1944 
Courtesy Prints and 
Photographs Division, 
Library of Congress 




force would suffer a crippling blow at the hands of the stronger 
Peruvian air power. 

Ecuador did not believe it necessary to take special military precau- 
tions against Colombia, its neighbor to the north, except to limit 
the infiltration of terrorists and narcotics traffickers. Like the north- 
eastern border with Peru, the border area with Colombia consisted 
of heavily canopied jungle that gready limited surveillance by ground 
patrols or air reconnaissance. The jungle was inhabited only sparsely 
by Indian tribes. Ecuador and Colombia had cordial official rela- 
tions and no outstanding disputes. The Colombian armed forces, 
although somewhat larger than those of Ecuador, were not geared 
for offensive operations. Moreover, Colombia was preoccupied with 
serious internal security problems, notably narcotics trafficking and 
guerrilla insurgencies. Although one of these guerrilla organi- 
zations — the 19th of April Movement (Movimiento 19 de Abril — 
M-19) — had helped train an Ecuadorian underground group, ter- 
rorism imported from Colombia remained primarily a police rather 
than a military problem (see Internal Security, this ch.). 

As a nation facing the Pacific Ocean, Ecuador had important 
maritime resources to protect, as well as protecting the security 
of the Galapagos Islands, 1,000 kilometers distant from the main- 
land (see Geography, ch. 2). The navy therefore patrolled the 
320-kilometer zone claimed as territorial waters, both off the coast 
of the mainland and around the Galapagos Islands. 



211 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

Involvement in Politics and Government 

With the exception of Garcia Moreno, the most powerful Ecua- 
dorian political figures of the nineteenth century arose from the 
military. Chronically threatened by revolts and insurrection, leaders 
employed force to defend their authority. The distinction between 
civilian and military spheres of action was blurred, and the institu- 
tional identity of the military had not become wholly established. 

Reformist Liberal governments of the early part of the twen- 
tieth century codified military law, regularized promotions, and 
banned soldiers from joining political parties or clubs. The estab- 
lishment of a military academy in Quito in 1901 helped profes- 
sionalize the armed forces. In addition, the military recruited an 
increasing proportion of its officer corps from the middle rather 
than the upper class. By 1916 officers had begun to regard them- 
selves increasingly in institutional terms. 

In 1925 the army as an institution intervened in national poli- 
tics. A group of young officers, objecting to the political domina- 
tion of the Guayaquil business oligarchy, revolted against civilian 
rule (see The Rule of the Liberals, 1895-1925, ch. 1). Ambivalent 
over imposing direct military rule, the officers appointed a civilian- 
dominated junta, followed, in 1926, by a civilian as provisional 
president. The army continued to intervene in political affairs until 
1948, removing numerous presidents. Yet the military refrained 
from governing directly. 

In 1963 the army high command deposed President Carlos Julio 
Arosemena Monroy, perceiving him to be overly tolerant of the 
communist threat against Latin America and a national embar- 
rassment because of his reported public drunkenness (see Instability 
and Military Dominance, 1960-72, ch. 1). In contrast to previous 
patterns, however, the army assumed direct control, claiming the 
need to "end the chaos and rectify mistaken paths" and promis- 
ing to introduce a new socioeconomic structure. Over the next three 
years, the military junta adopted a moderate program of fiscal, 
agrarian, and industrial reforms aimed at eliminating structural 
obstacles to development. The military failed to mobilize support 
from the intended beneficiaries of its reforms, however, and stirred 
strong opposition from elite groups, especially Guayaquil business 
interests. Shaken by the lack of popular backing and an economic 
downturn and fearful of damage to military prestige, the armed 
forces relinquished power to a civilian interim president in 1966. 

The longest period of direct control by the armed forces occurred 
between 1972 and 1979. In 1970 President Jose Maria Velasco 
Ibarra, unable to win congressional approval for his budget, had 



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National Security 



assumed dictatorial power with agreement of the military. Con- 
cerned over Velasco's cumulative political misjudgments and his 
interference in military promotions and assignments, however, the 
armed forces seized power in 1972 (see Direct Military Rule, 
1972-79, ch. 1). General Guillermo Rodriguez Lara launched an 
era of military authoritarianism with a program of state-led de- 
velopment more ambitious than any during previous interventions 
by the armed forces. Ranking officers held many cabinet posts or 
became deputies in ministries and agencies headed by civilians. 
In spite of being divided into reformist and traditionalist elements, 
the military government brought banking, basic industries, agricul- 
ture, and fisheries under public-sector control. It also nationalized 
several large unprofitable enterprises. In addition, the government 
created new mixed-ownership firms and public enterprises, nota- 
bly the Ecuadorian State Petroleum Corporation (Corporacion 
Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana — CEPE). Some enterprises served 
the military's own equipment requirements and brought revenue 
to the armed forces. After powerful large landholders diluted an 
ambitious effort to recast agriculture by redistributing income to 
the peasantry, however, the military's reformist thrust gradually 
lost momentum. 

Although key capital garrisons successfully foiled a coup attempt 
against Rodriguez Lara by the chief of staff of the armed forces 
in 1975, discontent simmered among senior military and influen- 
tial civilian political elements. Early the following year, a Supreme 
Council of Government composed of the commanders of the army, 
navy, and air force replaced Rodriguez Lara. The triumvirate dis- 
agreed as to the advisability of an early restoration of civilian govern- 
ment, but the commitment to gradual military withdrawal espoused 
by its head, Admiral Afredo Poveda Burbano, prevailed, and con- 
stitutional rule was restored in 1979. The incoming civilian govern- 
ment inherited serious economic problems, however, because of 
the Supreme Council's unwillingness to make unpopular decisions 
on wages and consumption. 

The military attempted to limit its withdrawal by retaining a veto 
power over undesirable candidates, parties, and coalitions. Out- 
maneuvered by civilian politicians, however, the armed forces could 
not prevent the electoral victory of a left-leaning coalition that it 
found distasteful. Nonetheless, the seven years of military rule had 
strengthened the position of the armed forces. They controlled the 
membership of the boards of major state corporations; operated air 
and sea transportation lines; became major industrial shareholders 
through investments made by the Directorate of Army Industries 
(Direction de Industrias del Ejercito — Dine); and received a portion 



213 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



of petroleum revenues for military requirements. The armed forces 
reportedly controlled at least fourteen major business enterprises, 
ranging from an automotive assembly plant and a profitable shrimp- 
farming project owned by the army to a dredging company owned 
by the navy, and a domestic airline operated by the air force. In 
addition, several prominent retired officers had turned to politics 
or management positions in private or government-owned businesses. 

During the 1980s, the military as a whole remained loyal to the 
constitutional system. Nonetheless, civilian politicians could never 
safely ignore the reactions of the military to their proposed actions 
and accepted a degree of military autonomy in matters of national 
defense. Indeed, the outbreak of hostilities with Peru in 1981 was 
fundamentally a military affair; the elected civilian government had 
litde choice but to support the initiatives taken by the high command. 

During the conservative administration of President Leon Febres 
Cordero Ribadeneyra (1984-88), a series of episodes inflamed re- 
lations between the military and the executive branch. Matters 
reached a crisis point in March 1986 when Lieutenant General Frank 
Vargas Pazzos, the air force commander and chief of the Joint Com- 
mand of the armed forces, accused the minister of national defense 
and an army commander of corruption and demanded their dis- 
missal. When the president reneged on his commitment to remove 
the two officers and bring them to trial, Vargas and his supporters 
took control of the Quito air force base. The brief rebellion was put 
down at the cost of several lives, and Vargas was court-martialed 
and put under house arrest at an army base. In January 1987, air 
force paratroop commandos loyal to Vargas seized Febres Cordero 
at the Taura Air Base near Guayaquil. In return for his freedom, 
the president pledged that no reprisals would be taken against his 
kidnappers and agreed to Vargas's release. Vargas later presented 
himself as a candidate for president and came in fourth in the first- 
round election in January 1988, winning over 12 percent of the vote 
(see Political Dynamics, ch. 4). 

When the Congress initiated moves to impeach Febres Cordero, 
the military warned congressional leaders that it would shut down 
the legislature if a formal impeachment action were brought against 
the president. Military authorities also backed Febres Cordero in 
proceeding with the court-martialing of the rebellious paratroopers 
in spite of his promise of immunity. Nevertheless, the episode shook 
military unity and tarnished its prestige as an institution (see Po- 
litical Forces and Interest Groups, ch. 4). 

Armed Forces 

The Constitution of 1979 defines the armed forces as a nonde- 
liberative body and an instrument of civil authority — an inaccurate 



214 



National Security 



reflection of the true civil-military relationship in Ecuador. Accord- 
ing to the Constitution, the president is the commander in chief 
of the armed forces and the only one authorized to grant military 
ranks. The mission of the Public Forces (the armed forces and the 
National Police) is to preserve national sovereignty, to defend the 
integrity and independence of the republic, and to guarantee its 
legal order. The Constitution further enjoins the Public Forces, 
in a manner to be determined by law, to lend their cooperation 
in national economic and social development. 

National Security Act Number 275 of 1979 authorized the presi- 
dent to mobilize forces during threats of aggression and to declare 
a state of national emergency at times of imminent aggression, 
major disturbances, and domestic disasters. This law also estab- 
lished the NSC, chaired by the president, to make recommenda- 
tions on, and supervise execution of, national security policies. NSC 
members included the president of the National Congress (Con- 
greso Nacional, hereafter Congress); the president of the Supreme 
Court of Justice; the chairs of the National Development Council 
and the Monetary Board; the ministers of foreign relations, na- 
tional defense, government and justice, and finance and credit; and 
the chief of the Joint Command. 

The Secretariat General, the NSC's operational arm, coordi- 
nated and helped shape national security planning. Secretariat per- 
sonnel primarily consisted of active-duty or retired officers. Analysts 
considered it to be a subordinate arm of the Joint Command, whose 
chief nominated the head of the secretariat, ordinarily an army 
general. The secretariat direcdy supervised the National Directorate 
of Mobilization, the National Directorate of Civil Defense, the In- 
stitute of Higher National Studies, and the National Directorate 
of Intelligence. Although the latter body was designed to coordinate 
all intelligence activities, its head had a lower rank than the chief 
of army intelligence. 

The Joint Command, consisting of its chief and chief of staff 
of the Joint Command as well as the commanders of the three ser- 
vice branches, also directly advised the president. The Joint Com- 
mand had its own staff organized into functional departments. Each 
of the three services had staffs organized along similar lines (see 
fig. 17). The minister of national defense was normally a senior 
active-duty or retired officer. His influence on national defense pol- 
icy generally depended on his rank relative to the chief of the Joint 
Command and his personal relationship to the president. 

All retired career personnel and all conscripts had reserve sta- 
tus until the age of fifty. The armed forces maintained a skeleton 
reserve organization at the national level, directly under the Minis- 
try of National Defense, as well as cadre organizations staffed by 



215 



Ecuador: A Country Study 












| Operations 
Command 

j Air Zone] 


Fighter and 
-ighter Grounc 
ttack Squadro 




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E <DQ-.EO-JLU.E 

<Q 



w g o 



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fx 



216 



National Security 



retired officers and NCOs in various areas of the country. Train- 
ing exercises were not generally held, but former conscripts assigned 
to reserve units could expect to be called up for annual weekend 
musters. 

Army 

Organization and Equipment 

The army was the dominant service; its personnel strength of 
approximately 40,000 in 1989 was nearly four times the combined 
strength of the navy and air force, and its commander normally 
held the rank of four- star general. The army had four theaters of 
operation, commonly known as defense zones, with headquarters 
in Quito, Guayaquil, Cuenca, and Puyo, respectively (see fig. 18). 

The army's principal operational units consisted of twelve 
brigades, all odd-numbered, running in sequence from the first 
to the twenty-third. The first ("El Oro"), third ("Portete"), fifth 
("Guayas"), seventh ("Loja"), and thirteenth ("Pichincha") 
brigades were infantry units with headquarters at Machala, Cuenca, 
Guayaquil, Loja, and Quito, respectively. The army deployed two 
jungle brigades in the Oriente (eastern region): the seventeenth 
("Pastaza"), with headquarters at Mera, and the nineteenth 
("Napo"), based at Puerto Napo. The ninth Special Forces brigade 
("El Patria") — an outgrowth of a special paratroop detachment 
formed in 1960 to combat leftist guerrillas in the Oriente — had 
its headquarters at Latacunga. The eleventh armored brigade 
("Galapagos") deployed from Riobamba. Three other specialized 
brigades, the twenty-first (logistics), the twenty-third (corps of en- 
gineers), and the fifteenth (army aviation), operated out of Quito. 
Originally confined to transport, communications, training, and geo- 
graphic survey duties, the fifteenth brigade expanded into battle- 
field logistic support following the delivery in 1981 of French Puma, 
Super Puma, and Gazelle helicopters. 

Combat brigades generally consisted of three battalions. Although 
not all brigades were at full strength, key units such as the Loja 
brigade near the Peruvian border had full complements or even 
additional reinforcements. States of readiness varied because per- 
sonnel primarily consisted of one-year conscripts, some of whom 
received minimal training. Brigade commanding officers generally 
held brigadier general rank, although some were led by senior 
colonels. The commanders of the Pichincha, Guayas, Portete, and 
Pastaza brigades served concurrendy as commanders of their respec- 
tive theaters of operation. 

The army's standard infantry weapons consisted of the Belgian 
FN FAL 7.62mm rifle and the Israeli Uzi 9mm submachine gun, 



217 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



(Pacific 
Ocean 



Puerto Napo 




• • International boundary 

Theater of Operations Boundary 
National capital 
Populated place 

Army, Navy, and Air Force Headquarters 
Army Theater of Operations Headquarters 
Naval Zone Headquarters 
Air Zone Headquarters 
Army Brigade Headquarters 
viz Naval Base ^ Air Base 



IV 



/ 







GALAPAGOS ISLANDS 




SO 100 KSdmetefs 
50 100 Miles 




Q Pacific 




o Ocean 












N—-^ q Puerto" 
Baquerizo 
Moreno 





Figure 18. Major Military Installations and Deployments, 1989 



the latter employed for counterinsurgency operations. The FN 
MAG 7.62mm was the standard machine gun, although the army 
still had .30- and .50-caliber machine guns of United States origin 
and 81mm mortars in its inventory. Armored vehicles included 
French-origin light tanks and four-wheeled reconnaissance vehi- 
cles, as well as Cascavel armored cars from Brazil (see table 20, 
Appendix). Most of the army's approximately 100 armored per- 
sonnel carriers were French and Brazilian wheeled models, although 
it also had some tracked M-113s from the United States. A large 



218 



National Security 



order for obsolete medium tanks and armored personnel carriers 
from Argentina had to be cancelled in 1988 because of the deepening 
financial crisis. 

Training and Education 

Army conscripts received their training in the units to which they 
were assigned. The quality of basic training depended greatly on 
the importance attached to it by the brigade commander. In an 
effort to standardize unit training, the Department of Instruction 
was created in army headquarters in 1988. Special ranger, under- 
water demolition, parachute, and other similar courses were given 
at brigade level. Upon attaining the rank of corporal, conscripts 
accepted for enlistment for further service could apply to one of 
several NCO schools. Each school included a core curriculum ac- 
companied by training in a military occupational specialty at such 
facilities as the armor school at Riobamba or the engineers' school 
at Esmeraldas. The intense competition and the difficulty of the 
courses produced a high dropout rate among NCO candidates. 

Cadets preparing for commissioning as army second lieutenants 
studied at the Eloy Alfaro Advanced Military School (Escuela Su- 
perior Militar "Eloy Alfaro") in Parcayacu, approximately fifteen 
kilometers north of Quito. Candidates had to complete the ninth 
grade of school and pass a battery of written examinations, inter- 
views, and psychological screening. In 1987 approximately 130 
cadets graduated from the school's three-year course of study, which 
corresponded to the final three years of high school. The Eloy Al- 
faro school offered separate curricula for cadets opting for combat 
arms (infantry, armor, artillery, engineers, and signals), service 
branches (administration, supply, transportation), and service sup- 
port branches (health, military justice, cartography). Observers con- 
sidered the school's quarters, sports facilities, and training areas 
to be excellent. Additional construction was expected to allow en- 
rollment to climb from 500 in 1987 to 800 cadets by 1989. 

Prior to promotion, lieutenants and captains each attended 
separate nine-month courses at the Advanced Training Institute 
(Escuela de Perfeccionamiento). Courses covered tactical opera- 
tions, integration of the various service arms, and branch-oriented 
training. Total enrollment was about 165. 

The Army War Academy (Academia de Guerra del Ejercito), 
located in a southern suburb of Quito, prepared majors for com- 
mand and general staff posts or for assignments to service elements 
at brigade and higher echelons. The study material corresponded 
to that of the United States Army Command and General Staff 
College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The academy offered a 



219 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

two-year program for officers of combat arms and a one-year pro- 
gram for service and service support officers. Enrollment in 1987 
was forty-five in the combat arms track and seventy in the service 
tracks. 

The Army Polytechnic Institute (Escuela Politecnica del Ejercito — 
Espe), located in Quito, combined the functions of a technical train- 
ing school, a technical college, and a postgraduate scientific and 
engineering university. Espe included undergraduate departments 
of civil, mechanical, and electronic engineering as well as geo- 
graphy. A graduate -level program consisted of industrial and sys- 
tems engineering. Although administered along quasi-military lines, 
Espe had a largely civilian faculty and student body. Military at- 
tendees ranged from soldiers from the enlisted ranks through mid- 
level officers. Several Espe dependent institutes offered nondegree 
courses in basic sciences, languages, computer programming and 
systems analysis, and industrial administration. One Espe branch 
at Latacunga, the Advanced Technical Institute of the Armed 
Forces, offered practical training in automotive mechanics, elec- 
tronics, telecommunications, and automatic data processing. 

The Institute of Higher National Studies at Quito offered a one- 
year course for ranking military officers of all three services and 
for civilian officials. Comparable to the National Defense Univer- 
sity in Washington, the institute offered a curriculum focused on 
the planning and execution of policies at the highest levels of govern- 
ment. The NSC supervised the operation of the institute. 

Each of the services operated a number of schools for children 
in the first through the ninth grades. Although originally intended 
to help families of military personnel avoid difficulties arising from 
divergent school calendars in the Costa (coastal region) and the 
Sierra, the schools also accepted children of civilians on a tuition 
basis. Ecuadorians rated these schools highly; as a result, compe- 
tition for admission was keen. Graduates of the armed forces schools 
had an advantage in applying for admission to one of the service 
academies. 

Navy 

The origin of the Ecuadorian navy can be traced to the indepen- 
dence era when British officers in the service of Bolivar assembled 
a small squadron at Guayaquil. An 1832 congressional decree for- 
mally established the navy. 

Organization and Equipment 

As of 1988, the navy had a personnel complement of approxi- 
mately 5,000, including 1,000 marines. Its varied missions included 



220 



J) 




One of the Ecuadorian 
navy's German-made fast attack craft 
Courtesy United States Department of Defense 

preparing and maintaining the fleet during peacetime for naval 
operations in wartime; controlling ocean and river communica- 
tions; protecting territorial waters, the coastline, and rivers; par- 
ticipating in operations in conjunction with other branches of the 
armed forces; regulating the merchant marine; promoting the de- 
velopment of the naval construction industry; overseeing the in- 
stallation and maintenance of aids to navigation; and preparing 
hydrographic charts. 

The country was divided into three naval zones. The first, head- 
quartered at Guayaquil, had jurisdiction over the southern 
provinces and the territorial waters adjacent to the coastal prov- 
inces of Manabf, Guayas, and El Oro. The second had authority 
over the Galapagos archipelago and surrounding territorial seas 
and operated from Puerto Baquerizo Moreno on San Cristobal 
Island. The third, with headquarters at Quito, had jurisdiction over 
the northern provinces and the territorial seas adjacent to the coastal 
province of Esmeraldas. The navy also had bases at Guayaquil, 
San Lorenzo, Salinas, and Jaramijo. 

Operationally, the navy was organized into a destroyer division, 
a squadron of fast-missile craft, a squadron of corvettes, a submarine 
squadron, and auxiliary vessels and transports. A naval aviation 



221 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

unit, equipped mainly with light reconnaissance and liaison air- 
craft, supported the fleet by patrolling territorial seas and coast- 
lines, combating smuggling, and performing logistical tasks. A small 
coast guard, formed in 1980, controlled maritime traffic, interdicted 
drug and contraband traffic, and enforced Ecuadorian maritime 
law. Equipped with twenty coastal patrol craft, most of which were 
twelve to fifteen meters in length, the coast guard had a personnel 
strength of 200 as of 1988. 

The marines conducted amphibious operations, maintained secu- 
rity of naval bases and detachments, and protected the Trans- 
Ecuadorian Pipeline terminal and shipping point at Esmeraldas 
(see fig. 11). Directly subordinate to the naval operations staff, the 
marines had their headquarters at Guayaquil and were organized 
into three battalions, consisting of a commando group, a security 
force, and a support group, based at Guayaquil, in the Galapagos, 
and in the Oriente. In addition to small arms, the marines were 
armed with 81mm mortars and 106mm recoilless rifles. 

At the time of the navy's formal establishment, naval equipment 
consisted of one frigate and seven gunboats. During the turbulent 
years that followed, however, the fortunes of the navy often suffered, 
and equipment was reduced to a single vessel in 1880. Four years 
later, the armed forces took the first step in the creation of a modern 
navy with the launching of the Cotopaxi, a 300- ton gunboat. Well 
into the twentieth century, the navy's only seagoing units remained 
the Cotopaxi and the 750-ton torpedo gunboat, Libertador Bolivar. 

Ecuador acquired a number of armed yachts and miscellaneous 
craft from the United States in return for having granted the lat- 
ter base rights in the Galapagos Islands and at Salinas during World 
War II. In 1955 Ecuador purchased two older Hunt-class destroy- 
ers from Britain; these became the most formidable vessels in the 
Ecuadorian fleet. A significant expansion took place during the 
1970s with the purchase of missile attack craft and two small sub- 
marines from the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). 
In the early 1980s, Ecuador acquired corvettes equipped with Exocet 
missiles from Italy. The Hunt-class destroyers were retired and were 
replaced in 1980 by a United States-manufactured Gearing-class 
destroyer, renamed the Presidente Eloy Alfaro. This destroyer re- 
mained the principal surface vessel as of 1989 (see table 21, Ap- 
pendix). 

Training and Education 

Training of enlisted naval personnel took place primarily at the 
Center of Naval Instruction at the Salinas Naval Training Base. 
In addition to basic training, the center provided a variety of basic 



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National Security 



and advanced specialized courses, such as electronics, radio oper- 
ation, gunnery, and administration. 

Naval cadets attended the Advanced Naval Academy (Escuela 
Superior Naval) at Salinas in a four-year program that stressed 
the humanities, scientific subjects, naval science, and physical train- 
ing. Cadets also completed practice cruises on board a three-masted 
sailing vessel. 

Located in Guayaquil, the Naval War College was the service's 
senior instructional institution and prepared officers, generally at 
the level of commander, for higher ranks and general staff duty. 
The two-year course of study covered such topics as strategy and 
tactics, logistics, geopolitics, operational planning, intelligence, and 
international maritime law, together with sociology, economics, 
and other nonmilitary subjects. 

The marines operated their own instructional program, includ- 
ing a basic school for recruits and more advanced courses in am- 
phibious operations, communications, intelligence, and weaponry, 
plus special courses in frogman and paratroop skills. The navy also 
administered the Merchant Marine School, whose cadets received 
some military training and formed part of the naval reserve after 
graduation as merchant marine officers. 

Air Force 

The origins of the air force (Fuerza Aerea Ecuatoriana — FAE) 
date to the early 1920s when, under the guidance of an Italian mili- 
tary mission, Ecuador acquired several planes and established a 
flying school near Guayaquil. During the 1930s, the air force, still 
subordinate to the army, came under growing United States in- 
fluence as it purchased a number of Curtis Wright training planes 
and employed United States advisers. By the time of the brief war 
with Peru in 1941, the air force had forty-eight pilots but, lacking 
modern combat aircraft, did not present a serious threat to the 
Peruvians. 

During World War II, the United States transferred a number 
of training aircraft to Ecuador, provided advanced training to Ec- 
uadorian pilots, and operated the air base at Salinas. The first com- 
bat squadron was formed with seven obsolescent Seversky P-35 
fighters. After becoming independent from the army in 1944, the 
FAE received additional planes under the United States Military 
Assistance Program, including twenty F-47 Thunderbolts to replace 
the P-35s, Catalina maritime patrol aircraft, and a number of C-47 
transports. During the 1950s, the air force purchased its first jet 
fighters, Gloster Meteors, from Britain, along with Canberra B-6 
jet-engined bombers. The FAE deactivated the bomber squadron 



223 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

in 1981; although it retained the three surviving Canberras in 
reserve status, they were no longer livable by 1987. Sixteen F-80s 
supplied by the United States in 1958-60 permitted creation of a 
second jet fighter squadron. 

During the 1970s, new oil revenues enabled the FAE to modern- 
ize its combat fleet by purchasing British Jaguars to replace the 
Meteors and F-80s in the ground attack role, as well as Cessna 
A-37Bs suitable for training and counterinsurgency operations. After 
the United States licensed the export of General Electric engines, 
Ecuador purchased twelve Israeli Kfir fighters in the early 1980s. 
The FAE also placed an order for sixteen French-manufactured 
Mirage F-ls, plus two Mirage trainers, deliveries of which began 
in early 1979. All combat aircraft were equipped with French- or 
Israeli-origin air-to-air missiles. Total personnel strength was be- 
lieved to be somewhat less than 5,000 in 1988. 

As of 1989, Jaguars, Kfirs, and Mirages provided the FAE's three 
fighter squadrons with a small but modern and effective combat 
air arm. The FAE had also received a number of Lockheed At- 3 3 
Shooting Stars from United States stocks, refurbished for light at- 
tack and advanced training roles (see table 21, Appendix). The 
jet pilots were a highly select group, well- trained and competent. 
The quality of other FAE personnel varied, and the mixture of 
equipment sources presented a maintenance and training problem. 
The FAE as a whole had only a marginally satisfactory safety record. 

The FAE divided Ecuador into two air zones, the first covering 
the coastal areas from its headquarters at Taura near Guayaquil 
and the second covering the remainder of the country from Marshal 
Sucre International Airport at Quito. These two facilities also 
functioned as the FAE's principal air bases. The first-line combat 
squadrons operated from Taura, although they were regularly 
deployed to other air bases in various parts of the country. The 
Mera airfield — developed by the Texaco-Gulf oil consortium — 
was the only one in the Oriente long enough to accept jet aircraft. 
The air force paratroop squadron, a combat commando unit, was 
disbanded after its involvement in the kidnaping of the president 
in 1987. It was replaced by a special police unit, wearing a dis- 
tinctive uniform, with responsibility for air base security. 

The Military Air Transport Command incorporated the civil 
airline operated by the military, Ecuadorian Military Air Trans- 
port (Transportes Aereos Militares Ecuatorianos — TAME), as well 
as the international civil airline, Ecuatoriana. TAME had both mili- 
tary and civilian crews, including many retired FAE pilots. The 
passenger and cargo fleet with dual civil-military markings con- 
sisted mainly of Boeing 707s, 720s, and 727s. 



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National Security 



Israeli teams under contract carried out major overhaul for many 
aircraft, including commercial planes flown by TAME. FAE tech- 
nicians working under Israeli supervision maintained and carried 
out some overhaul of Kfirs, T-34s, and A-37s at Cotopaxi Air Base 
at Latacunga. In addition to serving as Ecuador's principal main- 
tenance and training center, Cotopaxi had the country's longest 
landing strip. 

The Air Force Academy, located at Salinas, provided a three- 
year course for aspiring FAE officers. Cadets received basic flying 
instruction mainly on T-34s. After commissioning, those officers 
selected for jet training attended the Military Aviation School and 
received instruction on the At-33, the A-37, and the Strikemaster. 
Future helicopter pilots trained at Manta. A specialists' school in 
Guayaquil offered nonflight instruction for technicians and en- 
gineers. The eighteen-month program consisted of six months of 
basic military instruction followed by training courses in main- 
tenance of jet and reciprocating engines, air frames, hydraulics, 
electronics, radar, and aerial photography. The Air War College 
at Quito offered a general staff course of two academic years' du- 
ration, qualifying field- grade officers for promotion to senior ranks 
and general staff assignments. 

Military Justice 

Military justice followed procedures prescribed in the armed 
forces' penal code. A trial for a nonserious offense was held in the 
military unit of the accused, with the case usually prosecuted by 
a member of the judge advocate corps and decided by the unit com- 
mander and two officers of captain rank. The accused had the right 
to representation, to speak in his or her own defense, and to be 
defended by a qualified individual. Trials for more serious offenses 
were held in the headquarters of the military zone or the navy or 
air force district in courts known as military discipline councils. 
A member of the military accused of serious crimes was subject 
to court-martial. All members of such a court were senior in rank 
to the accused. 

Military law could be implemented in cases of serious civil dis- 
order. Such law authorized trials of civilians in military courts. 
Civilians could also be tried for infractions of military regulations 
or acts against military installations. In practice, few civilian de- 
tainees were placed under military control, and these were gen- 
erally persons accused of terrorism or subversion. 

The procedures and penalties in military trials closely approxi- 
mated those of civil courts. The maximum penalty was sixteen years 
for most serious crimes, such as murder. A person convicted of 



225 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

the military offense of treason, however, could be punished by life 
imprisonment. An individual guilty of insubordination could receive 
from three months to two years of military confinement. In cases 
of absence without leave, sentences ranged from eight days to two 
years, depending in part on the reasons for the transgression. 

Ranks, Insignia, and Uniforms 

The rank structure of the armed forces generally conformed to 
that used in the United States, except that Ecuador did not em- 
ploy all of the ranks found in the United States military. The army 
and air force had nine officer ranks ranging from second lieutenant 
to general. The navy had eight officer ranks from ensign to vice 
admiral (see fig. 19). Army enlisted personnel had seven grades 
ranging in level from private to sergeant major, air force enlistees 
had seven grades ranging from airman to chief master sergeant, 
and naval enlistees had eight grades from the equivalent of sea- 
man to master chief petty officer (see fig. 20). 

Rank insignia for officers of the army and air force were a ser- 
ies of five-pointed stars on shoulder boards. Insignia for general, 
lieutenant general, and major general consisted of four, three, and 
two gold stars, respectively, with gold-braided borders and the na- 
tional crest. Field- grade officers wore gold stars, and company- grade 
officers wore silver stars on shoulder boards. Naval officers wore 
gold stripes indicating rank on the lower sleeve of the blouse. Army 
and air force enlisted personnel wore red and yellow stripes, respec- 
tively, and the navy red or yellow stripes, as appropriate, on shoul- 
der boards or upper sleeve of the uniform. 

The three services had dress, semi-dress, service, and field uni- 
forms for officers and dress, service, and field uniforms for enlisted 
personnel. The army winter service uniform consisted of a gray 
blouse and trousers, white shirt, and black tie. Air force winter 
service uniforms were light blue, whereas those for the navy were 
navy blue and white. The armed forces also had summer uniforms. 

Recruitment and Conditions of Service 

According to the Constitution, all Ecuadorians are subject to a 
military service obligation. In practice, conscription applied only 
to males, who were liable for call-up at age nineteen for one year 
of service. Only a small number of women had been recruited as 
specialists in the enlisted grades; some received commissions in a 
few categories, such as medicine and dentistry. As of 1988, there 
were approximately 1,834,000 males in the eighteen to forty-nine 
age bracket, about 80,000 of whom reached the age of eligibility 
each year. Analysts considered this figure ample for service needs 



226 



National Security 



even though approximately 50 percent could not meet minimum 
physical or educational standards. 

There was little active opposition to the conscription system. 
Those undergoing military service enjoyed a measure of respect. 
In a country with chronic underemployment, many poorer youths 
improved their educational, housing, health-care, and dietary sit- 
uations by joining the armed forces. Ambitious young men with 
few opportunities in the civilian labor market might be successful 
candidates for further service and training, thereby learning valu- 
able skills and finding an avenue for upward mobility. Selective 
service boards in provincial capitals chose conscripts and liberally 
granted exemptions for family reasons, such as being the only son 
or the breadwinner. Students in good academic standing received 
deferments. 

Since the 1960s, the army had assigned many conscripts with 
peasant backgrounds to the Army Agrarian Military Conscription 
(Conscripcion Agraria Militar del Ejercito — CAME). The CAME 
program sought to enable youths from rural areas — often with a 
minimum education — to meet their service obligation by working 
in army-operated dairy, livestock-raising, vegetable- or fruit-farming, 
and shrimp enterprises. The conscripts received a limited amount 
of military training and were exposed to modern farming practices 
that might benefit them when they returned to civilian life. The mili- 
tary used CAME products directly or sold them commercially. 

Virtually all officers graduated from one of the three military 
academies. In an analysis of the social origins of the officer corps 
based on cadets entering the military academies between 1960 and 
1966, political scientist John Samuel Fitch determined that more 
than 60 percent came from the middle segment of the middle classes 
(see Middle Class, ch. 2). Fitch assumed each cadet's class back- 
ground from his father's occupation; this group had fathers who 
were mainly civil servants, military officers, teachers, and mer- 
chants. Those of working-class or lower middle-class origins, whose 
fathers were artisans, military NCOs, or workers, constituted ap- 
proximately 20 percent. Approximately 17 percent had fathers who 
were members of the property-owning upper class or professionals 
from the upper middle class. Fitch's research confirmed a definite 
trend toward democratization of the officer corps. In 1928 and 1929, 
for example, more than 44 percent of entering cadets came from 
the upper and upper middle classes, whereas some 55 percent were 
from the middle class and none from the lower classes. The num- 
ber of sons of military officers remained constant at about 20 per- 
cent of the entering cadets, although a growing number of sons 
of NCOs had qualified for the service academies since 1956. 



227 




228 



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Ecuador: A Country Study 

Fitch's study found a striking pattern of recruitment to the officer 
corps from the interior highlands, which had persisted in spite of 
the shift of population toward the coastal provinces (see Migra- 
tion and Urbanization, ch. 2). In 1963, when the total population 
of the Sierra and Oriente barely exceeded that of the Costa, merely 
7 percent of the entering classes came from the Costa. Guayas 
Province, with over 20 percent of the nation's population, supplied 
less than 1 percent of the new cadets. 

Strict regulations determined promotion of officers, taking into 
account such factors as seniority; attendance and performance at 
service schools, both in Ecuador and abroad; assignments held; 
and demonstrated administrative effectiveness. At the highest levels, 
boards of admirals and generals of the three services screened officers 
for promotion, subject to the approval of the president, the minister 
of national defense, and the chief of the Joint Command. The presi- 
dent appointed the commanding officer of each service. During 
the 1980s, attempts by President Febres Cordero to circumvent 
the established procedure for promotion caused serious tensions 
in his relations with the military. 

Observers considered basic salaries for officers adequate by com- 
parison with civilian government employees. In 1988 a major gen- 
eral received a base salary of about US$600 a month. Benefits and 
allowances added at least 50 percent to this salary. In addition to 
the excellent medical care and post exchange and commissary 
privileges available to all military personnel, a general officer had 
the use of a car and driver, gasoline, a cook, and other allowances. 
Per diem allowances for travel abroad were extremely generous. A 
high-ranking officer attending frequent meetings or courses in other 
countries could supplement his salary with savings from this source. 

Corruption within the military reportedly was fairly widespread. 
In the case of senior officers, this often took the form of "commis- 
sions" on arms purchases. Lower-ranking officers had fewer op- 
portunities to benefit by improper means but might be guilty of 
such minor abuses as the unauthorized use of official equipment 
for personal purposes. 

Most officers were subject to retirement after twenty years of 
service unless they reached the rank of general. Time spent in at- 
tendance at a military academy was included in calculating retire- 
ment benefits. In addition to receiving a relatively high percentage 
of their base pay, retired career personnel also received severance 
pay that was often used to begin business careers. 

Defense Budget 

A series of unfavorable economic developments in the second 
half of the 1980s, beginning with the decline in oil revenues in 1986 



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and a devastating earthquake in March 1987, curtailed national 
government outlays, including spending on the armed forces. The 
precipitous drop in the value of Ecuadorian currency meant an es- 
calation of the cost of imported weapons, on which the armed forces 
almost entirely depended. In September 1988, the new administra- 
tion of Rodrigo Borja Cevallos (1988- ) cancelled a US$106-million 
contract with Argentina for the purchase of armored vehicles and 
other equipment. Even prior to this, other planned procurements, 
such as the purchase of planes for an additional fighter squadron, 
had to be postponed. 

In 1987, the most recent year for which such data were availa- 
ble in late 1989, the Ecuadorian government reported that defense 
expenditures totalled 32.0 billion sucres — equivalent to US$188 mil- 
lion at the prevailing rate of exchange (for the value of the sucre — see 
Glossary). The defense budget for 1987 did not reflect the cut that 
followed the earthquake. The corresponding figure for defense in 

1986 was 20.4 billion sucres, equivalent to US$166.2 million. 
Although defense expenditures apparently declined after the end 

of military rule in 1979, it was difficult to draw conclusions about 
trends in defense spending owing to a number of factors, includ- 
ing variations in the dollar-sucre exchange rate. Analysts believed 
that the true cost of defense exceeded the officially budgeted figures 
by a considerable amount because of unreported nonbudgetary 
spending. The armed forces covered these costs, which observers 
believed to have been as high as the official defense expenditures 
in some years, through profits from business enterprises owned by 
the military and receipts from the sale of petroleum abroad. A por- 
tion of revenues from petroleum production above a stipulated level 
was allocated to a special military account, but the amount involved 
and the formula by which it was calculated remained confidential. 
Low oil production levels and depressed prices in the late 1980s 
necessitated a sharp curtailment of imports of military equipment. 

The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA) estimated Ecuador's military expenditures at US$250 mil- 
lion in 1987. ACDA noted, however, that this estimate omitted 
most arms acquisitions. According to ACDA, annual defense spend- 
ing had risen over a ten-year period from US$150 million in 1978. 
If defense expenditures for 1978 were converted to 1987 dollars, 
however, they would come to US$245 million — nearly equal to the 

1987 expenditures in purchasing power. The lowest levels of defense 
spending during the decade were in 1983 and 1984, when military 
outlays fell below US$160 million, calculated in 1987 dollars. 

According to ACDA's analysis, based on 1987 data, Ecuador's 
annual defense expenditures of US$25 per capita were lower than 



231 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

the average for Latin America as a whole (US$36 per capita), 
although well above comparable figures for Brazil and Colombia. 
The defense budget of its larger neighbor and rival, Peru, was four 
times as great per capita. The number of persons in military ser- 
vice per 1,000 population (4.4 in 1987) almost mirrored the aver- 
age for Latin America as a whole, although it was higher than the 
figure for Brazil or Colombia and lower than that for Peru. Mili- 
tary expenditures constituted 15.3 percent of central government 
expenditures in 1987 and 2.6 percent of gross national product 
(GNP — see Glossary). These ratios compared to 10.4 percent of 
central government expenditures and 2.0 percent of GNP for Latin 
American countries as a whole, but were again well beneath the 
corresponding figures for Peru. 

Civil Defense 

Article 82 of National Security Act Number 275 of 1979 estab- 
lished a civil defense structure composed of the National Direc- 
torate of Civil Defense, provincial boards (juntas), and various local 
bodies. A military officer of colonel or higher rank held the posi- 
tion of civil defense national director. Chaired by governors, the 
provincial boards included representatives of the military, the Na- 
tional Police, the Roman Catholic Church, and provincial officers 
of various ministries. 

The National Directorate of Civil Defense was subordinate to 
the NSC. Essentially a planning organization, the directorate pre- 
pared guidelines and coordinated preparations for possible disasters 
and subsequent relief operations to be carried out by other national, 
provincial, municipal, and private agencies. 

Participants in actual disaster relief operations included the armed 
forces; the Ecuadorian Social Security Institute; the ministries of 
Public Health, Social Welfare, and Public Works and Communi- 
cations; the National Police; local fire departments; the Red Cross; 
and Catholic relief agencies. In the event of an emergency, the Na- 
tional Directorate of Civil Defense normally assigned a local agency 
to take the lead in resource mobilization. 

The massive floods in 1982 and 1983 and the earthquake of 1987 
severely tested the capabilities of the civil defense organizations. Dur- 
ing these crises, compliance with leadership from the national level 
tended to be haphazard, with political considerations often receiv- 
ing priority in the allocation of efforts. Relief projects were delayed 
because the national directorate lacked the power to resolve ques- 
tions of jurisdiction among other agencies. The armed forces repeat- 
edly demonstrated their effectiveness in responding to emergencies, 



232 



National Security 



but in many instances they did not coordinate their efforts with 
other civil defense authorities. 

During the 1982-83 flood disaster, the national directorate formed 
an emergency operations center in Guayaquil to supervise the logis- 
tics of relief assistance. It subsequently established a flood commis- 
sion to coordinate the efforts of nongovernment organizations, and 
a high-level committee to assess infrastructure damage and recon- 
struction needs. Following the 1987 earthquake, the government set 
up the National Emergency Relief Center in Quito to coordinate 
the dispensing of assistance from public and private sources, including 
foreign governments, international charities, and personal donations 
of money, goods, and services. The FAE, assisted by the air forces 
of Italy, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, established an ''air 
bridge" of supplies from Quito to the Oriente. 

Civic Action 

The armed forces actively engaged in various civic-action pro- 
grams. Army engineer battalions played a leading part in road con- 
struction between the remote areas of the Oriente and the more 
populated regions of the country (see Transportation, ch. 3). They 
repaired and restored roads and bridges damaged during natural 
calamities and built various public buildings such as schools. Army 
medical teams periodically conducted examinations and provided 
medicines, inoculations, and dental services in remote settlements 
lacking civilian medical facilities. The military also engaged in 
health, education, and construction projects in the slums and 
shantytowns of the cities. 

The army trained officers and selected enlisted men to provide 
literacy training to conscripts and to civilians living in areas where 
the military were assigned. In January 1989, the government re- 
ported that the armed forces and the National Police would pro- 
vide security, transportation, lodging, and food to teachers sent 
to conduct a new literacy campaign in remote areas (see Educa- 
tion, ch. 2). 

Foreign Influence 

Although French officers comprised the first foreign military mis- 
sion to Ecuador in the 1890s, the Ecuadorian armed forces relied 
primarily on Chilean and Italian assistance throughout the early 
years of the twentieth century. In 1903 the German-trained Chilean 
armed forces furnished a military mission and opened Chile's mili- 
tary academy to Ecuadorian cadets. The Chilean navy also provided 
sea training to Ecuadorian midshipmen, and Chilean officers staffed 
the Army War Academy until 1962. In 1922 an Italian military 



233 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

mission organized a system of army training schools in aviation, 
cavalry, infantry, and engineering. Beginning in 1935, United 
States specialists operating under private contracts gradually 
replaced Italian flight instructors. Italy withdrew its entire mili- 
tary mission in 1940 when it entered World War II. 

Military Relations with the United States 

Ecuador declared war on Japan immediately after the latter 's 
attack on United States forces at Pearl Harbor. Ecuador granted 
the United States base rights in the Galapagos Islands, primarily 
for the defense of the Panama Canal against possible Japanese at- 
tack; and United States influence on Ecuadorian military policy 
subsequently became significant. The United States constructed 
an air base on one of the Galapagos Islands, manned it until the 
end of World War II, and then turned it over to Ecuador. The 
FAE later took over the Salinas base, which the United States had 
also manned during the war. Agreements signed in 1940 and 1944 
also provided for the transfer of military equipment. In 1952 an 
agreement between the two governments resulted in the establish- 
ment of a United States Military Group that incorporated the al- 
ready existing army, navy, and air force missions and led to the 
delivery of significant amounts of United States military materiel. 
The United States withdrew the military group in 1971 as a con- 
sequence of a dispute over fishing rights but subsequently reestab- 
lished it. 

Between 1950 and 1988, almost 8,000 Ecuadorian officers and 
NCOs received training sponsored by the United States. Ecuadorian 
military personnel attended training programs in the former 
Panama Canal Zone and in the United States, including programs 
offered by the United States Naval Academy. 

Deliveries of United States military assistance to Ecuador be- 
tween 1950 and 1988, including credit sales, totaled almost US$123 
million. United States budgetary cutbacks limited military assistance 
financing to only US$4 million in grant form in fiscal year (FY — 
see Glossary) 1989. Proposed aid in FY 1990 was limited to US$3 
million in credit financing. The United States tailored much of the 
assistance in the late 1980s to the efforts to control the northern 
border and the eastern jungle areas frequently crossed by terrorist 
groups and narcotics traffickers. With the exception of the credit 
sale of At-33 trainer aircraft, assistance consisted largely of vehi- 
cles, medical equipment, communications items, small arms, and 
support for existing inventories. 

Between May and December 1987, almost 6,000 United States 
National Guardsmen, reservists, and active-duty personnel rotated 



234 



Relief operations following the 1987 earthquake 
Courtesy United States Agency for International Development, 
Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance (LeVonne Harrell) 



235 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

to Ecuador at two-week intervals to assist in earthquake reconstruc- 
tion. The United States initially regarded the project as a field- 
training exercise in road and bridge building. Although plans origi- 
nally called for restoration of roads in the Costa, the earthquake 
resulted in a United States-Ecuadorian decision to shift the project 
to the Oriente. United States forces encountered severe weather 
problems affecting the movement of heavy equipment over the 
Andes, carving a road through tropical jungle, and combating health 
hazards. In addition, the presence of United States troops became 
a source of political contention, as opposition forces in the Ecua- 
dorian Congress passed a resolution demanding the troops' immedi- 
ate departure. President Febres Cordero rejected the resolution but 
nevertheless terminated the project earlier than planned. 

Equipment Sources 

Historically, Ecuador depended on a wide variety of foreign sup- 
pliers for virtually all of its equipment needs. Only in the 1980s 
did it begin to develop a modest domestic arms industry as the 
Directorate of Army Industries manufactured rifle ammunition, 
uniforms, boots, and other consumable items. 

Prior to World War II, Italy supplied a substantial amount of 
military materiel to Ecuador. During and after World War II, the 
United States became the predominant supplier, although by the 
1950s Ecuador had also turned to World War II-vintage weapons 
from European countries, notably aircraft from Britain. During 
the 1960s and 1970s, France became a leading supplier of tanks 
and aircraft. Ecuador purchased submarine and patrol boats from 
West Germany and rifles and machine guns from Belgium. 

Ecuador became a substantial customer for Israeli arms in the 
1970s, purchasing Arava aircraft, Gabriel missiles for arming naval 
patrol craft, Uzi submachine guns, and other munitions. Under 
technical assistance contracts, Israel serviced Israeli planes in the 
air force inventory as well as Boeing civilian aircraft flown by 
TAME and Ecuatoriana Airlines. Ecuador reportedly also em- 
ployed Israeli security specialists as consultants in the fight against 
terrorism. 

In 1976 Ecuador became the first foreign country to order the 
Kfir, an advanced jet fighter equipped with the General Electric 
J-79 engine produced in Israel under license. The transaction, 
which required United States government approval because of the 
engine technology, was rejected by the administration of President 
Jimmy Carter in order to discourage the proliferation of sophisti- 
cated military equipment in the Third World. The action caused 



236 



National Security 



an uproar in Israel where the sale was regarded as an important 
breakthrough in Israel's efforts to develop international markets 
for the Kfir. In 1981, after the inauguration of President Ronald 
Reagan, Washington removed its objection to the sale. Although 
the contract called for the purchase of twelve Kfirs and an option 
to purchase an additional twelve, Ecuador acquired only the original 
group, at a price estimated at US$196 million. 

According to AC DA, Ecuador was a relatively heavy importer 
of arms in the late 1970s and early 1980s, averaging US$150 mil- 
lion annually and reaching a peak of US$280 million in 1982. These 
imports declined sharply to an average of only US$50 million an- 
nually between 1985 and 1987, presumably as a result of a dra- 
matic reduction in oil revenues and the precipitous drop in the value 
of the sucre, which made imported arms extremely expensive. Be- 
tween 1983 and 1987, Ecuador imported an estimated US$460 mil- 
lion of arms, primarily from Italy, France, the United States, and 
Britain. Ecuador did not receive military equipment from the Soviet 
Union or other communist countries. 

Internal Security 

In spite of the volatile nature of Ecuadorian politics during the 
1980s, the country did not encounter major disruptions of internal 
security and successfully contained localized episodes of public dis- 
order, such as riots and demonstrations. Since 1985, strikes and 
demonstrations to protest economic austerity measures and increases 
in living costs had been frequent. The Febres Cordero adminis- 
tration regularly declared such activities to be illegal and broke up 
street demonstrations with tear gas and arrests. Although police 
actions proved effective, critics often accused the police of excesses 
in dispersing public marches and rallies. In January 1986, several 
hundred Quito students clashed with police during a three-day pe- 
riod of demonstrations. This outbreak, in which 100 students were 
jailed, coincided with Febres Cordero's visit to the United States 
and was in part a protest against United States policies toward 
Ecuador. 

As of late 1989, no subversive or terrorist group posed a seri- 
ous threat to domestic order. A small leftist group, Alfaro Lives, 
Damnit! (jAlfaro Vive, Carajo! — AVC), periodically carried out 
acts of terrorism and insurgency. Even though the AVC had a low 
potential for subversive action and numbered only 200 to 300 ac- 
tivists, Ecuador was determined to avoid a situation like that in 
the neighboring nations of Peru and Colombia, where large, well- 
organized, and violent guerrilla organizations presented a grave 
challenge to the authority of the state. An intensive police campaign 



237 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

in the 1986-87 period resulted in the death or capture of most of 
the AVC leadership. 

The AVC had come to national attention in 1983 when it broke 
into a museum in Guayaquil and stole state swords used by the 
Ecuadorian national hero, Jose Eloy Alfaro Delgado. The AVC 
claimed to be non-Marxist and adopted a vague program to com- 
bat social injustice. Analysts believed that AVC members were 
primarily university-educated middle- or upper-class youths without 
close links to other domestic political movements. Some of its lead- 
ers, however, reportedly had ties with Cuba and Nicaragua. In 
addition, police found evidence of Libyan involvement in the train- 
ing of some AVC members. AVC activists also traveled to Colom- 
bia for training and participation in M-19 military operations. 

Between mid- 1986 and mid- 1987, the AVC kidnapped two jour- 
nalists, killed four policemen in a rescue operation to free one of 
its members being treated in a hospital, robbed five banks and a 
factory, and took over several radio stations, forcing them to broad- 
cast AVC manifestos. In August 1986, the AVC also kidnapped 
a prominent Guayaquil businessman; both the prisoner and his 
kidnappers died during a massive police assault. After this inci- 
dent, police infiltration, raids, and arrests dealt heavy blows to the 
AVC. By the beginning of 1987, sixty-one of its members were 
in prison and many others had been killed, including most of the 
leadership. 

Disorganized and essentially leaderless, the AVC had carried 
out few terrorist actions since mid- 1987. The remnants of the or- 
ganization entered into an agreement with the government in April 
1989 to lay down their arms, renounce violence, and integrate them- 
selves within the democratic system. 

A small splinter group of the AVC , Guerrillas for a Free Home- 
land (Montoneros Patria Libre — MPL), which made its appearance 
in 1986, did not take part in the negotiations with the government 
and vowed to continue its armed resistance. Estimated to have a 
membership of only 100, the MPL was suspected of a series of bank 
robberies to amass funds for its operations. 

The Ecuadorian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Ecua- 
toriano — PCE) grew out of the Socialist Party, which had been 
formed in 1926. The PCE gradually gained in importance; in 1944 
the PCE won fifteen out of eighty-five seats in the National As- 
sembly and had one of its members appointed minister of educa- 
tion. In 1946 the government outlawed the PCE and jailed many 
of its members. The PCE was legalized during the 1948-52 term 
of President Galo Plaza Lasso, but was banned again when the 
military junta held power in 1963-66. Thereafter, the PCE was 



238 



National Security 



a legally constituted political party, although it had only an esti- 
mated 500 members in 1988. The PCE participated in congres- 
sional and presidential elections as part of the coalition of the Broad 
Left Front (Frente Amplio de la Izquierda), which gained thirteen 
seats in Congress in 1986. The PCE also controlled the Confeder- 
ation of Ecuadorian Workers (Confederacion de Trabajadores 
Ecuatorianos — CTE), which comprised about 20 percent of or- 
ganized workers (see Political Forces and Interest Groups, ch. 4). 

A pro-Chinese faction, the Communist Party of Ecuador, 
Marxist-Leninist (Partido Comunista del Ecuador, Marxista- 
Leninista— PCE-ML), broke away from the PCE in 1963. With 
a membership estimated at only 100, the PCE-ML nevertheless 
published its own newspaper and contested elections as part of the 
Democratic Popular Movement (Movimiento Popular Democra- 
tico — MPD), a coalition that won four seats in the 1986 congres- 
sional election. Both the PCE and PCE-ML were legally recognized 
as of 1989 but had little political impact and were not regarded 
as constituting an internal security risk. 

Police 

Primary responsibility for the preservation of public order rested 
with the National Police functioning under the supervision of the 
minister of government and justice. According to Article 136 of 
the Constitution, the police are an auxiliary body of the armed forces 
and have the mission of guaranteeing internal order and individ- 
ual and collective security. 

The congress established by the constitution of 1830 decreed that 
the separate municipal councils would create their own police 
departments and would have appropriate regulations for law en- 
forcement. For the first thirty years after independence, the police 
systems were either under the control of the separate municipali- 
ties or dominated by the army. The police developed slowly under 
a system of provincial organizations until the formation of the first 
national police organization in 1937. In 1951 the name was changed 
from the National Civil Guard to the National Civil Police and 
in 1979 to the National Police. 

In 1988 the National Police had about 18,000 members grouped 
in a highly centralized structure organized along military lines. A 
clear line of demarcation existed between officers and troops with 
little or no opportunity for troops to advance to officer rank. The 
National Police was headed by a commanding general of the police 
who reported directly to the minister of government and justice. 
The organization consisted of a number of support directorates, 
as well as technical operations directorates (see fig. 21). The country 



239 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



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Ecuador: A Country Study 

was divided into four police districts, with headquarters in Quito, 
Riobamba, Cuenca, and Guayaquil, each with five commands cor- 
responding to provincial boundaries. The Galapagos Islands were 
included in the Guayaquil district. The National Police also had 
three instructional facilities: the Troop Training School, which 
offered basic instruction for enlisted ranks; the Officer Training 
School, a three-year academy for high school graduates; and the 
Police Officers' Higher Training School, which provided advanced 
courses. 

Several specialized and local police services supplemented the 
operations of the National Police. The National Directorate for Con- 
trol of Illegal Narcotics reported directly to the minister of govern- 
ment and justice. The Customs Police, with fewer than 2,000 
officers under the Ministry of Finance and Credit, countered smug- 
gling at ports and airports, supervised the storage of goods in cus- 
toms, and checked baggage of individuals entering and leaving the 
country. Both Quito and Guayaquil had metropolitan police forces 
of several hundred members with a number of low-level functions, 
such as enforcing local ordinances, controlling public vendors, as- 
suring the removal of trash, and maintaining order in public places. 
Most other cities also had some type of local police, generally poorly 
organized and led, whose contribution to law enforcement and 
prevention of crime was minimal. 

Standards of Police Conduct 

Although Ecuadorian police authorities had no tradition of mas- 
sive or systematic human rights violations, public attention focused 
on police conduct during the latter part of the 1980s. Evidence was 
presented of torture and abuse of prisoners in the hands of the police 
and, in some cases, the military. A number of official and private 
organizations — including the Tribunal of Constitutional Guaran- 
tees (Tribunal de Garantias Constitucionales — TGC), the Special 
Commission on Human Rights of the Ecuadorian National Con- 
gress, and the Ecumenical Commission of Human Rights (Comi- 
sion Ecumenica de Derechos Humanos — Cedhu) — recorded and 
investigated human rights complaints. 

According to Cedhu, the police frequently subjected detainees 
suspected of political infractions to violence in efforts to extract con- 
fessions and information. Common-crime suspects also suffered tor- 
ture or maltreatment, especially in rural areas. Cedhu reported 
sixty-nine cases of torture and eighty-nine cases of brutality in 1987 
and a further twenty cases of torture during the first half of 1988. 
Cedhu believed that police abuse was more widespread than these 
statistics indicated since many cases went unreported. In 1985 and 



242 



National Security 



1986, five persons arrested by the police or the military disappeared 
and were believed to have died in custody. No disappearances had 
been recorded since 1986. According to Cedhu, forty persons in 
1986 and thirty-four in 1987 died while in police custody. Many 
of these, including several of the ten AVC leaders killed by the 
police, were believed to have been victims of extrajudicial exe- 
cutions. 

The United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices for 1987 noted that, although mistreatment of de- 
tainees was not officially sanctioned, the government of Febres 
Cordero made no clear statement condemning the use of exces- 
sive force, nor were penal actions taken against police or military 
personnel believed to have taken part in deaths, disappearances, 
or torture. Upon taking office in August 1988, the Borja adminis- 
tration stated its unequivocal opposition to official use of abusive 
measures. The Department of State reported that, although some 
police abuse — including torture — occurred after Borja' s inaugu- 
ration, human rights groups hoped that over time the new presi- 
dent's promises of respect for human rights would have an impact 
on police behavior. 

The TGC, an autonomous body, is empowered under the 1979 
Constitution to investigate breaches of constitutional or human 
rights. Although the TGC had little real power to enforce its rul- 
ings, it focused public attention on human rights issues by hearing 
complaints of human rights activists and calling upon government 
officials to respond to questions (see The Judiciary, ch. 4). 

Charges against members of the police were reviewed by spe- 
cial police courts under a three-tiered system consisting of tribunals, 
district courts, and the National Court of Police Justice. Although 
the courts were ostensibly independent, some observers called into 
question their impartiality, especially inasmuch as most police 
judges were active or retired police officers. According to a survey 
by two human rights groups, Americas Watch and the Andean 
Commission of Jurists, the number of cases involving wrongful 
homicide and torture was inexplicably small in relation to the num- 
ber of complaints against the police in the 1984-86 period. Ap- 
parently none of the trials had resulted in convictions; all were either 
still pending or had been dismissed. 

Narcotics Control 

Cultivation of, and trafficking in, drugs was less of a problem 
in Ecuador than in neighboring countries. Coca cultivation, which 
began in 1984, had been essentially eliminated by late 1987 as a 
result of vigorous government action. With the assistance of the 



243 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

United States, which lent two helicopters, the Ecuadorian police 
detected and uprooted plantings of the crop, grown mostly along 
the border with Colombia. The police also interdicted shipments 
of cocaine and other coca products across Ecuador's territory to 
markets and processing centers elsewhere and suppressed cocaine 
refining laboratories within its borders. 

In early 1989, however, drug traffickers reportedly moved into 
the country from Colombia and Bolivia because of Ecuador's eas- 
ier access to the United States market. The United States Drug 
Enforcement Administration estimated that thirty to fifty tons a 
year of Colombian cocaine were being shipped through Ecuador 
destined for the United States, Europe, and Asia. Cocaine had been 
found in container shipments of Ecuadorian frozen orange con- 
centrate and chocolates and in air deliveries of fresh flowers. 
Analysts also believed that the Colombian Medellm Cartel had pur- 
chased Ecuadorian companies. Few big drug seizures had been 
made because of the limited resources of local authorities, although 
coca laboratories continued to be raided and destroyed. 

In October 1988, assailants assumed to have been drug dealers 
murdered a superior court judge in Quito who had been working 
on a number of drug trafficking cases. Other judges had received 
death threats. Despite the fact that Ecuador has bank secrecy laws, 
United States officials believed that the weakness of the sucre limited 
Ecuador's potential to become a major money-laundering center. 

In an effort to assist Ecuadorian drug-control efforts, the United 
States supplied a number of powerboats for patrolling rivers in the 
north and islands near the port of Guayaquil and supplied train- 
ing by the United States Navy. It also furnished sniffer dogs to 
detect drugs in export shipments and baggage. In FY 1990, Presi- 
dent George Bush requested from Congress US$1 .4 million in drug- 
control assistance for Ecuador. 

The Administration of Justice 

The court system consisted of the Supreme Court of Justice, 
which sat in the capital; superior courts in the capitals of 10 
provinces; 35 provincial criminal courts; 87 cantonal courts; and 
445 parish courts. Parish judges tried minor civil matters and mis- 
demeanors, their verdicts being subject to review by cantonal courts. 
Cantonal judges also could conduct preliminary hearings and make 
recommendations in criminal cases. Nonetheless, provincial courts 
were the courts of first instance in such cases, except those involv- 
ing government officials. Provincial criminal judges had the author- 
ity to try criminal cases for which, according to the penal code, 
the punishment did not exceed three years in prison. 



244 



National Security 



Criminal proceedings consisted of summary and plenary parts. 
The first of these usually took place before a local court and the 
second before a provincial criminal court. The summary assessed 
whether or not an offense had been committed and if a trial were 
warranted; the plenary determined the guilt or innocence of the 
accused. 

After an arrest, except for minor offenses, the police were re- 
quired to turn the suspect over to the judge of the local cantonal 
court, who would conduct an investigation to determine if there 
were sufficient grounds for trial. According to the law, the find- 
ings of the investigation had to be forwarded within fifteen days 
to the provincial criminal court holding jurisdiction over the case. 

When the summary proceedings had been completed, the record 
was delivered to the public prosecutor so that he could prepare the 
accusation. If, in the opinion of the presiding judge, the informa- 
tion contained in the summary did not warrant a continuation of 
the proceedings, the judge could release the suspect on bail. Dis- 
missal of the case would be final if the public prosecutor could not 
find merit in the accusation or if the judge felt the existence of an 
offense had not been absolutely established. If the case warranted 
a trial, it then went to the Tribunal of Crimes, a five-member body 
presided over by the judge of the provincial criminal court. Upon 
the completion of arguments, the tribunal retired in secret session 
and then announced its verdict. Except in special cases, such as 
those involving a breach of morality, trials were public. Ecuador 
did not use the jury system. 

Defendants could call witnesses on their own behalf, cross- 
examine witnesses, and refrain from testifying against themselves, 
and could appeal sentences to intermediate or higher courts. Ac- 
cused persons were entitled to legal counsel as soon as arrested. 
Although a public defender system is mandated by the 1979 Con- 
stitution, it had not been introduced as of 1988. Persons who could 
not afford counsel faced the longest period of pretrial detention. 
Detention without charge for more than forty-eight hours was pro- 
hibited by the criminal code, but the requirement was frequently 
violated in practice. Habeas corpus could be invoked by mayors 
or municipal council presidents who had the constitutional right 
to order the release of detainees. This power tended to be exer- 
cised liberally, regardless of the severity of the charges. 

According to the Department of State's human rights reports, 
the judicial system was inefficient and corruptible, in part because 
of inexperienced and poorly paid judges. A chronic backlog of cases 
meant that detainees might be forced to wait two years or longer 
for trial. According to the Special Commission on Human Rights, 



245 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

approximately 50 percent of all prisoners as of 1988 had not been 
charged or sentenced. Time spent awaiting trial counted toward 
completion of a sentence, but that did not help long-term detainees 
who were eventually acquitted. 

In the late 1980s, Ecuador recorded significant levels of urban 
crime. The increased crime rate, particularly notable in Guaya- 
quil and to a lesser extent in Quito, was linked to the steady rural 
to urban migration. Most migrants lacked the skills necessary to 
obtain employment in the cities. Many, in order to provide for 
themselves and their families, turned to crime. The country's eco- 
nomic setbacks during the latter half of the 1980s created an in- 
creasingly desperate situation for adults unable to find legitimate 
employment. Although muggings, assaults, pickpocketing, and bur- 
glaries were the most prevalent forms of crime, since 1985 there 
had been an upsurge of robberies of banks and private companies 
by well-armed gangs, as well as of kidnappings and sexual assaults. 
Some robberies were connected with the AVC or the Colombian 
M-19, but most appeared to be the work of professional criminals. 

Data reported to the International Criminal Police Organiza- 
tion (Interpol) indicated there were approximately 26,000 crimes 
committed in Ecuador in 1984. This number included 400 homi- 
cides, more than 500 rapes, almost 500 serious assaults, approxi- 
mately 2,400 robberies and violent thefts, more than 6,000 other 
robberies, almost 700 car thefts, approximately 600 cases of fraud, 
and almost 200 drug offenses. Ecuador had a crime ratio of 292 
per 100,000 population. Such a rate would be considered very low 
on an international scale, beneath that of many countries with a 
reputation for a low incidence of crime, such as Japan. Some ob- 
servers speculated that many offenses reported to the police were 
not classified as crimes, or that many crimes were not brought to 
the attention of the police. For example, the Indian population cus- 
tomarily dealt with crimes within its own communities without 
recourse to the Ecuadorian police. 

The Penal System 

The National Directorate of Social Rehabilitation, a component 
of the Ministry of Government and Justice, continued to operate 
the country's penal system in 1989. The Garcia Moreno Prison 
in Quito and the Coastal Prison in Guayaquil were Ecuador's larg- 
est criminal detention facilities. Quito and the capitals of all Costa 
and Sierra provinces also had municipal jails. 

Although the laws called for rehabilitation of prisoners, few facili- 
ties had space, staffing, and equipment for education or training 
programs. One exception, the women's prison in Quito, provided 



246 



National Security 



both academic and vocational courses. Some private factories held 
prison work contracts. All prisoners were expected to work and 
were paid a minimum wage. One-third of the wages went to the 
prisoner upon release; one- third to pay expenses while in prison; 
and one-third to the court to take care of expenses incidental to 
the trial. During the 1980s, two halfway houses were opened in 
Quito from which prisoners traveled to jobs and were allowed to 
visit their homes. 

Most prisons were greatly overcrowded, the result of budgetary 
restrictions and the low priority given prison construction and staff- 
ing. As of July 1986, Ecuador had 6,450 prisoners in a system whose 
total capacity was 2,600. The Garcia Moreno Prison, which was 
built in 1875 to house 300 and subsequently remodeled to hold 640, 
held 1,800 prisoners who were forced to share twenty toilets. As 
of 1988, a new prison was scheduled to open in Quito, which would 
help relieve existing pressures. 

According to the Department of State's Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices for 1988, "prison conditions are so squalid and brutal 
that in themselves they represent cruel treatment." Guards report- 
edly beat prisoners for disciplinary reasons. Notoriously underpaid, 
guards reportedly could easily be bribed by prisoners who wanted 
to avoid punishment, to receive improved living conditions, to se- 
cure visits, and to obtain drugs. 

According to a report by the Special Commission on Human 
Rights, unhygienic conditions in the prisons were conducive to skin, 
lung, gastrointestinal, and venereal infections. Prisons had few med- 
ical supplies and only sporadic visits by doctors. Again, the Quito 
women's prison was an exception to this general pattern. 

The Department of State reported that guards at the Coastal 
Prison often mistreated detainees charged with terrorism or sub- 
version. The Americas Watch and Andean Commission of Jurists 
group confirmed these observations, documenting various forms 
of guard brutality and the withholding of privileges, such as exer- 
cise, sunlight, visits, and recreation. This discrimination report- 
edly ended in 1987. 

* * * 

A number of studies trace the relationships between the armed 
forces and the civilian leadership. John D. Martz's The Military 
in Ecuador assesses both the 1972-79 military regime and the role 
of senior officers following the resumption of civilian rule. Osvaldo 
Hurtado's Political Power in Ecuador includes a concise analysis of 
the military's attitude toward civilian politics and its strengths and 



247 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

shortcomings while in power. The Military Coup d'etat as a Political 
Process: Ecuador, 1948-1 966 by John Samuel Fitch, although based 
on earlier research, contains still relevant data on the leanings and 
social background of the officer corps. David W. Schodt's Ecua- 
dor: An Andean Enigma treats the role of military figures and the 
military establishment in both the nineteenth and twentieth cen- 
turies. 

Human Rights in Ecuador, a study by Americas Watch and the 
Andean Commission of Jurists, contains much detail on abuses 
by the police, particularly in the treatment of political detainees, 
and on prison conditions. The Department of State's annual studies, 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, describe the operation of 
the legal system and practices of the police and prison authorities. 

Up-to-date reports on the organization and operational status 
of the Ecuadorian armed forces are scarce. Considerable informa- 
tion, particularly of a historical nature, may be found in the sec- 
tion on Ecuador in Adrian J. English's The Armed Forces of Latin 
America. The Military Balance, 1988-89, prepared by the London- 
based International Institute for Strategic Studies, has data con- 
cerning weapons systems in the armed forces inventory. (For fur- 
ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



248 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Annual Growth Rate by Region, Intercensal Periods, 1950-82 

3 Population and Annual Growth Rate of Guayaquil and Quito, 

1950-82 

4 Urban Growth Rate in the Costa and Sierra Regions and in 

Ecuador by Size of City, Intercensal Periods, 1950-82 

5 Landholding in the Sierra and Costa Regions by Size of Farm, 

1954 and 1974 

6 Organization of the Roman Catholic Church, 1986 

7 Enrollment by Level of Education, Selected Years, 1967-85 

8 Literacy Rate among Population over Ten Years of Age, Cen- 

sus Years, 1950-82 

9 Social Security Participation among Economically Active 

Population, 1982 

10 Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1950, 1971, and 1987 

11 Labor Force by Sector, 1974, 1982, and 1987 

12 Production of Selected Agricultural Commodities, 1983, 1984, 

and 1985 

13 Crude Petroleum Production in the Costa and Oriente Re- 

gions, 1980-89 

14 Value of Manufacturing Production by Sector, 1986 

15 Principal Exports, 1981-87 

16 Merchandise Imports, 1982-87 

17 Principal Trading Partners, 1985, 1986, and 1987 

18 Balance of Payments, 1983-88 

19 Law-Making Process, 1989 

20 Major Army Equipment, 1988 

21 Major Naval Equipment, 1988 

22 Major Air Force Equipment, 1988 



249 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) divide by 5 

and add 32 



Table 2. Annual Growth Rate by Region, Intercensal Periods, 1950-82 



Annual Growth Rate 

Region 1950-62 1962-74 1974-82 



Sierra 2.00 2.50 2.30 

Costa 4.11 3.40 2.66 

Oriente 3.98 7.28 4.95 

Galapagos 4.79 4.54 4.91 

ECUADOR 2.95 3.10 2.62 



Source: Based on information from Ecuador, Instituto Nacional de Estadfstica y Censos, 
IV Censo Nacional de Poblaciony III de Vivienda, 1982 — Resumen Nacional: Breve Andli- 
sis de los Resultados Definitivos, Quito, 1985, 32. 



Table 3. Population and Annual Growth Rate of 
Guayaquil and Quito, 1950-82 







Population 




Annual Growth Rate * 


City 


1950 


1962 1974 


1982 


1950-62 1962-74 1974-82 1950-82 


Guayaquil 
Quito . . . 


. 258,966 
. 209,932 


510,804 823,219 
354,746 599,828 


1,199,344 
866,472 


5.82 4.06 4.82 4.91 
4.47 4.47 4.70 4.53 



* Intercensal periods. 



Source: Based on information from Carlos Larrea, "Crecimiento Urbano y Dinamica de 
las Ciudades Intermedias en el Ecuador (1950-1982)," in Fernando Carrion 
(comp.), El Proceso de Urbanization en el Ecuador del siglo XVIII al siglo XX — Antologia, 
Quito, 1986, 104, 106. 



251 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



Table 4. Urban Growth Rate in the Costa and Sierra 
Regions and in Ecuador by Size of City, 
Inter censal Periods, 1950-82 

Region 

Size of City 1950-62 1962-74 1974-82 1950-82 



Costa 

Metropolitan 1 5.82 4.06 4.82 4.91 

Intermediate 2 7.71 6.24 6.13 6.76 

Small 3 5.61 3.72 5.51 4.87 

Sierra 

Metropolitan 4.47 4.47 4.70 4.53 

Intermediate 3.96 3.91 4.07 3.97 

Small 1.65 2.79 3.42 2.52 

Ecuador 

Metropolitan 5.24 4.23 4.77 4.74 

Intermediate 5.51 5.07 5.21 5.27 

Small 3.53 3.44 5.02 3.87 



1 More than 200,000. 

2 50,000 to 200,000. 

3 Less than 50,000. 

Source: Based on information from Carlos Larrea, "Crecimiento Urbano y Dinamica de 
las Ciudades Intermedias en el Ecuador (1950-1982)," in Fernando Carrion (ed.), 
El Proceso de Urbanization en el Ecuador del siglo XVIII al siglo XX — Antologia, Quito, 
1986, 113. 



Table 5. Landholding in the Sierra and Costa 
Regions by Size of Farm, 1954 and 1974 

1954 1974 

Region Percentage Percentage of Percentage Percentage of 

Size of Farm 1 of Farms Agricultural Land of Farms Agricultural Land 



Sierra 

to 10 90.4 

10 to 20 4.0 

20 to 100 4.4 

100 to 500 0.9 

More than 500 0.3 

Total Sierra 100.0 

Costa 

to 10 63.0 

10 to 20 12.8 

20 to 100 19.4 

100 to 500 4.0 

More than 500 0.7 

Total Costa 100.0 2 



16.5 87.1 18.3 

4.7 5.7 7.8 

14.5 6.1 25.7 

15.6 0.9 16.4 

48.7 0.2 31.8 
100.0 100.0 100.0 

7.0 67.4 8.9 

5.1 11.9 7.4 
23.5 17.7 32.2 
23.0 2.9 24.3 
41.4 0.4 27.2 

100.0 100.0 2 100.0 



1 In hectares. 

2 Figures do not add to total because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Howard Handelman, Ecuadorian Agrarian Reform: The 
Politics of Limited Change, Hanover, New Hampshire, 1980, 13. 



252 



Appendix 



Table 6. Organization of the Roman Catholic Church, 1986 

Catholic Number of 

Structure Area * Population Priests 

Archdiocese 

Cuenca 9,672 363,000 109 

Guayaquil 20,269 1,805,000 248 

Quito 17,090 1,251,540 430 

Diocese 

Ambato 3,844 336,200 64 

Azogues 4,514 181,200 32 

Guaranda 3,336 197,000 29 

Ibarra 5,669 244,500 75 

Latacunga 5,093 314,000 56 

Loja 11,000 377,000 80 

Machala 5,816 313,000 26 

Portoviejo 19,000 1,050,000 86 

Riobamba 6,161 507,000 62 

Tulcan 5,000 135,000 31 

Territorial prelature 

Los Rfos 6,521 368,000 18 

Apostolic vicariate 

Aguarico 28,000 39,600 20 

Esmeraldas 15,000 283,300 37 

Mendez 35,000 63,700 34 

Napo 25,000 52,135 27 

Puyo 24,000 27,000 11 

San Miguel de Sucumbfos 20,000 43,500 12 

Zamora 20,000 50,400 13 

Apostolic prefecture 

Galapagos 7,860 7,000 5 

TOTAL 297,845 8,009,075 1,505 

* In square kilometers. 

Source: Based on information from Annuario Pontificio per I'anno 1986, Vatican City, 1986. 



253 



Ecuador: A Country Study 













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254 



Appendix 



Table 8. Literacy Rate among Population over Ten 
Years of Age, Census Years, 1950-82 
(in percentages) 

1950 1962 1974 1982 



Urban 

Males 89 92 94 96 

Females 79 86 89 94 

Total urban 83 89 91 95 

Rural 

Males 51 63 70 80 

Females 38 53 60 71 

Total rural 45 58 65 76 

Ecuador 

Males 62 73 79 88 

Females 51 66 73 83 

Total Ecuador 56 70 76 85 



Source: Based on information from Ecuador, Instituto Nacional de Estadfstica y Censos, 
IV Censo Nacional de Poblaciony III de Vivienda, 1982 — Resumen Nacional: Breve Andlisis 
de los Resultados Definitivos, Quito, 1985, 45. 



Table 9. Social Security Participation among 
Economically Active Population, 1982 
(in percentages) 





Males 


Females 


Total 


Urban 


34 


42 


36 


Rural 


9 


12 


9 




21 


33 


23 



Source: Based on information from Ecuador, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos, 
IV Censo Nacional de Poblaciony III de Vivienda, 1982 — Resumen Nacional: Breve Andlisis 
de los Resultados Definitivos, Quito, 1985, 59. 



255 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



Table 10. Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 
1950, 1971, and 1987 " 
(in percentages) 



Sector 


1950 


1971 


1987 


Agriculture, livestock, fishing, 








1 C j. 




24.7 


17.8 




2.3 


-3.4 


7.6 




16.0 


17.0 


17.6 


Utilities 


0.5 


0.7 


1.6 


Construction 


.... 2.7 


7.6 


4.1 




. . . . 10.3 


17.5 


15.7 




4.8 


6.0 


8.3 




1.4 


2.4 


2.3 


Public administration 


5.8 


8.8 


9.3 




.... 9.3 


13.6 


13.0 




8.1 


5.1 


2.7 


TOTAL 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


Source: Based on information from Banco Central del Ecuador, Boleti'n Anuario, 10, Quito, 



1987. 



Table 11. Labor Force by Sector, 1974, 1982, and 1987 
(in percentages) * 



Sector 


1974 


1982 


1987 




. . . 46.2 


33.5 


34.8 


Government and community services . . . 


, , . 17.0 


23.7 


23.9 


Manufacturing 


, . 11.7 


12.2 


10.8 


Commerce 


9.7 


11.6 


10.8 


Construction 


4.4 


6.7 


7.3 


Utilities and transportation 


. ... 3.2 


4.9 


4.9 


Finance and insurance 


. ... 1.0 


1.9 


2.3 


Mining 


. . . . 0.3 


0.3 


0.1 


Other 


6.4 


5.1 


4.9 


TOTAL 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 



* Figures do not add to total because of rounding. 



Source: Based on information from Banco Central del Ecuador, Boleti'n Anuario, 10, Quito, 
1987. 



256 



Appendix 



Table 12. Production of Selected Agricultural 
Commodities, 1983, 1984, and 1985 
(in thousands of tons) 



Commodity 1983 1984 1985 



Export crops 

Bananas 1,642.1 1,677.6 1,969.6 

Cocoa 45.0 48.7 130.8 

Coffee 81.1 97.2 120.9 

Sugar (centrifugal) 2,625.5 3,041.9 2,693.6 

Sugar (noncentrifugal) 2,994.5 2,656.3 2,301.2 

Major food crops 

African palm oil 354.2 372.5 457.9 

Barley 29.6 25.0 26.7 

Cassava 194.8 239.2 228.8 

Corn 229.4 325.8 371.4 

Oranges 355.2 272.0 230.7 

Plantains 687.2 744.0 945.5 

Potatoes 314.0 389.6 423.2 

Rice (paddy) 273.5 437.2 397.4 

Wheat 26.9 25.2 18.5 

Other crops 

Castor beans 2.2 1.9 1.7 

Cotton 4.2 7.8 18.9 

Hemp 7.6 18.3 10.0 

Soybeans 14.1 47.4 62.9 

Tea 2.6 2.8 4.3 

Tobacco 1.8 4.4 3.1 



Source: Based on information from Vjekoslav Mardesic (ed.), Estadi'sticas del Ecuador, Quito, 
1988; and Ecuador, Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia, Estimation de la super- 
ficie cosechada y de la production agncola del Ecuador, 1983 a 1985, Quito, 1989. 

Table 13. Crude Petroleum Production in the Costa and 
Oriente Regions, 1980-89 
(in thousands of barrels) 



Year Costa Oriente Total 



1980 5,503 742,219 774,769 

1981 5,116 765,164 770,280 

1982 5,193 765,703 770,896 

1983 2,773 864,138 866,611 

1984 4,171 934,626 938,797 

1985 4,380 1,019,978 1,024,159 

1986 4,123 1,065,824 1,069,947 

1987 n.a. n.a. 669,000 

1988 n.a. n.a. 1,240,000 

1989 n.a. n.a. 1,246,000 



n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from Banco Central del Ecuador, Boletin Anuario, 10, Quito, 
1987, 170; and Economist Intelligence Unit, Ecuador: Country Report, No. 4, 1990, 
London, 1990, 23. 



257 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



Table 14. Value of Manufacturing Production by Sector, 1986 
(in percentages) 



Sector Value 



Food and tobacco processing 39.7 

Textiles 22.1 

Minerals and metals 12.2 

Paper and printing 6.9 

Chemicals and plastics 5.8 

Wood products and furniture 5.6 

Machinery and metal products 2.9 

Other 4.8 



TOTAL 100.0 



Source: Based on information from Banco Central del Ecuador, Boletin Anuario, 1987, Quito, 
1987, 154-55. 



Table 15. Principal Exports, 1981-87 
(in millions of United States dollars) * 



Commodity 


1981 


1982 


1983 


1984 


1985 


1986 


1987 




. 1,560 


1,388 


1,639 


1,679 


1,825 


912 


739 




150 


120 


94 


156 


102 


70 


78 




216 


213 


153 


136 


220 


263 


267 


Coffee 


106 


139 


149 


175 


191 


299 


192 




44 


61 


8 


96 


138 


71 


83 




106 


56 


26 


50 


78 


77 


57 


Shrimp and fish 


82 


128 


178 


167 


169 


315 


409 


Processed food 


138 


118 


56 


100 


123 


110 


87 


Industrial products and 
















chemicals 


. 113 


102 


44 


48 


52 


61 


105 



* Free on board. 



Table 16. Merchandise Imports, 1982-87 
(in millions of United States dollars) * 



Commodity 


1982 


1983 


1984 


1985 


1986 


1987 


Nondurable consumer goods . 


86 


52 


76 


85 


93 


116 




. . 371 


208 


230 


138 


126 


139 




. . 220 


256 


144 


158 


82 


354 


Raw materials (agriculture) . . 


45 


36 


54 


64 


54 


46 


Raw materials (industry) .... 


. . 667 


490 


654 


660 


624 


689 


Construction materials 


79 


32 


37 


39 


50 


53 


Capital goods (agriculture) . . . 


29 


9 


14 


29 


31 


24 


Capital goods (industry) 


. . 434 


237 


246 


309 


369 


447 


Transportation equipment . . . 


. . 250 


88 


112 


131 


203 


186 


TOTAL 


2,181 


1,408 


1,567 


1,613 


1,632 


2,054 



* Cost, insurance, and freight. 



258 



Appendix 



Table 17. Principal Trading Partners, 1985, 1986, and 1987 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Country 1985 1986 1987 



Imports 

Brazil 123 120 119 

Italy 50 100 65 

Japan 207 205 257 

Spain 50 52 58 

United States 575 509 575 

West Germany 167 165 170 

Other 566 625 675 

Total imports 1,738 1,776 1,919 

Exports 

Chile 44 47 31 

Colombia 47 30 23 

Japan 62 57 48 

Panama 120 59 43 

United States 1,636 1,322 1,243 

West Germany 59 78 80 

Other 1,088 578 561 

Total exports 3,056 2,171 2,029 



Source: Based on information from James W. Wilkie and Enrique Ochoa (eds.), Statistical 
Abstract of Latin America, 27, Los Angeles, 1989, 639-40. 



259 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



Table 18. Balance of Payments, 1983-88 
(in millions of United States dollars) 





1983 


1984 


1985 


1986 


1987 


1988 


Merchandise 

Exports 1 


2,348 
. -1,421 


2,622 
-1,567 


2,905 
-1,611 


2,186 
-1,631 


2,021 
-2,054 


2,203 
-1,614 


Trade balance 


927 


1,055 


1,294 


555 


-33 


589 


Services 
















340 


350 


418 


431 


444 


446 


Imports 


. -1,295 


-1,573 


-1,643 


-1,644 


-1,674 


-1,692 


Balance on goods and 
















-28 


-168 


69 


-658 


-1,263 


-657 


Government unrequited 
















24 


20 


80 


45 


132 


60 


Current account balance . . 


-4 


-148 


149 


-613 


-1,131 


-597 


Direct capital investment 














(net) 


50 


50 


62 


70 


75 


80 


Other long-term capital 














(net) 


-1,200 


-896 


-752 


-339 


83 


-891 


Short-term capital (net) . . . 


. -1,098 


-267 


-287 


-95 


72 


138 


Net errors and omissions . . 


. -182 


-74 


77 


-173 


-133 


192 


Total monetary movement 














(net) 


-2,434 


-1,335 


-751 


-1,150 


-1,034 


-1,078 


Valuation changes 


14 


22 


-27 


-29 


-62 


-23 


Exceptional financing 


2,473 


1,327 


881 


1,025 


936 


1,026 




74 


-72 


-107 


-47 


-1 


65 




127 


-58 


-4 


-201 


-161 


-10 



1 Free on board. 

2 Cost, insurance, and freight. 



Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statis- 
tics, 43, No. 6, Washington, 1990, 206. 



260 



Appendix 



Table 19. Law -Making Process, 1989 

Step Description 

Step 1 Bill is initiated by legislators or Plenary of Legislative Commissions 

(Plenario de las Comisiones Legislativas — PCL), the president of the 
republic, judicial organs, or popular initiatives. 

Step 2 Text is provided to each legislator fifteen days prior to debate in Congress. 

Step 3 Proposed bill is discussed in two debates on different days. After first de- 
bate, it may be returned to the originating commission, which must 
report on new observations to modify, alter, or change it. 

Step 4 At second debate, observations may be presented only if supported by 

two-thirds of the legislators present. 

Step 5 If the president has presented the proposed bill, he may intervene in a 

specially convened discussion without voting rights. 

Step 6 On being approved by Congress or the PCL, proposed bill must be sub- 



mitted to the president, who may approve or object to it. President 
may also approve it tacitly by allowing ten days to pass without veto- 
ing it. President may object either totally or partially. If the objection 
is partial, the part not objected to must be adopted immediately. In 
that case, Congress may accept the partial objection, correct the bill 
accordingly, and resubmit it to the president. Congress may also in- 
sist on the original version of the proposed bill by a vote of two-thirds 
of its members and proceed to promulgate it. 

Step 7 Final stage is promulgation, which requires publishing the law in Registro 

Oficial del Estado (Official Register of the State). 



261 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

Table 20. Major Army Equipment, 1988 



Country Number in 

Type of Origin Inventory * 



Tanks 

M-3 United States 45 

AMX-13 France 104 

Armored vehicles 

AML 60/90 reconnaissance -do- 35 

EE-9 Cascavel reconnaissance Brazil 10 

M-113 tracked personnel carriers United States 20 

AMX-VCI personnel carriers France 60 

EE- 11 Urutu wheeled personnel carriers Brazil 18 

Artillery 

Oto Melara M-56 105mm Italy n.a. 

M-101 105mm United States 50 

M-198 155mm -do- 10 

MK 73 155mm self-propelled France 10 

Mortars 

Soltam 160mm Israel 12 

Recoilless rifles 

M-67 90mm and M-40 106mm . United States 400 

Air defense guns 

M-1935 20mm -do- 28 

Oerlikon GDF-002 twin 30mm Sweden 30 

Bofors M-1A1 40mm -do- 30 

Surface-to-air missiles 

Blowpipe shoulder-fired Britain 150 

Aircraft 

Liaison, utility, and survey, various types United States 21 

Helicopters 

SA-330 Puma France 3 

SA-315 Lama -do- 3 

AS-332 Super Puma -do- 4 

SA-342 Gazelle -do- 4 



n.a. — not available 
* Estimated. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1988-1989, London, 1988, 195. 



262 



Appendix 



Table 21. Major Naval Equipment, 1988 

Country Number in Date 

Type of Origin Inventory Commissioned 

Destroyer 

Gearing-class, 3,500 tons, 1946; modernized 

four 5-inch guns United States 1 1980 

Frigate 

Lawrence-class, 2,130 tons, 

one 5-inch gun -do- 1 1943 

Submarines 

Shyri (T-209), 1,300 tons West Germany 2 1977-78 

Corvettes 

Esmeraldas, 550 tons, each 

with six Exocet missiles Italy 6 1982-84 

Fast attack craft 

Quito (Liirssen 45), 255 tons, 
each with four Exocet 

missiles West Germany 3 1976-77 

Manta (Liirssen 36), 120 tons, 
each with four Gabriel 

missiles -do- 3 1971 

Coastal patrol craft 

77-foot -do- 3 1954-55 

65-foot United States 3 Delivered 1976 

Amphibious 

Landing ship, tank, Recommissioned 
1,650 tons -do- 1 1977 

Landing ship, medium, 

750 tons -do- 1 1945 

Source: Based on information from Jane's Fighting Ships, 1988-89, London, 1988, 139-43. 



263 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



Table 22. Major Air Force Equipment, 1988 



Type 



Country 
of Origin 



Number in 
Inventory 



Fighters (ground attack) 

Jaguar S, B Britain 12 

Kfir C-2, TC-2 Israel 11 

Fighters 

Mirage F-1J France 16 

Light attack and jet conversion training 

Cessna A-37B United States 7 

Lockhead At-33 (reconditioned T-33) -do- 25 

Strikemaster Mk 89 Britain 6 

Transports 
TAME 

Boeing 727 United States 4 

Lockheed C-130H Hercules -do- 1 

C-160 France 1 

BAe 748 Britain 2 

DHC-6 Twin Otter Canada 3 

Ecuatoriana 

Boeing 720 United States 3 

Boeing 707 -do- 2 

Helicopters (liaison and sea-air rescue) 

AS-332 Super Puma France 2 

SA-330 Puma -do- 1 

Alouette III -do- 6 

Bell 212, 214 United States 3 

Bell UH-1H -do- 3 

Trainers 

Beech T-34C -do- 20 

Cessna T-41 -do- 2 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1988-1989, London, 1988, 195-96; 

and DMS Market Intelligence Report: South America/ Australasia, Greenwich, Connec- 
ticut, 1989. 



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[London].) 



282 



Glossary 



fiscal year (FY) — Calendar year. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — A measure of the total value of 
goods and services produced by the domestic economy during 
a given period, usually one year. Obtained by adding the value 
contributed by each sector of the economy in the form of profits, 
compensation to employees, and depreciation (consumption of 
capital). The income arising from investments and possessions 
owned abroad is not included, only domestic production. 
Hence, the use of the word domestic to distinguish GDP from 
GNP 

gross national product (GNP) — Total market value of all final goods 
and services produced by an economy during a year. Obtained 
by adding GDP (q. v.) and the income received from abroad 
by residents less payments remitted abroad to nonresidents. 

import substitution — An economic development strategy that em- 
phasizes the growth of domestic industries, often by import pro- 
tection using tariff and nontariff measures. Proponents favor 
the export of industrial goods over primary products. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations that takes responsibility for 
stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The 
main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its mem- 
bers when they experience balance-of-payments difficulties. 
These loans often carry conditions that require substantial in- 
ternal economic adjustments by the recipients. 

sucre (S/) — The national currency. From 1971 to 1981, the sucre 
was pegged to the United States dollar at S/25 = US$1 . Because 
this rate overvalued the sucre and dampened exports, the 
government allowed a steady devaluation of the currency 
throughout the first half of the 1980s. By 1985, the official ex- 
change rate averaged S/69 = US$1 . In August 1986, President 
Leon Febres Cordero Ribadeneyra (1984-88) transferred all 
private sector transactions to the higher free market rate and 
determined to close the gap between that rate and the official 
intervention rate through regular currency adjustments. The 
official rate averaged S/123 = US$1 in 1986 and S/170 = US$1 
in 1987. Responding to growing external indebtedness, capi- 
tal flight, and rising inflation, the free market rate climbed to 
S/400 = US$1 by March 1988. In response, Febres Cordero 



283 



Ecuador: A Country Study 

established a controlled rate for imports and exports and limited 
movement to within 10 percent of the prevailing official rate 
of S/250 = US$1. As was the case in the early 1980s, the se- 
verely overvalued official currency (the free market rate climbed 
to S/550 = US41 by July 1988) hindered export activity. Upon 
assuming the presidency in August 1988, Rodrigo Borja Cevallos 
(1988- ) devalued the controUed rate to S/390 = US$1 and 
adopted a program to further devalue the currency by 30 per- 
cent per year. In May 1989, Borja accelerated this program to 
nearly 40 percent per year. Consequently, the official rate aver- 
aged S/526 = US$1 and had closed to within 6 percent of the 
free market rate. 

terms of trade — Number of units that must be given up for one 
unit of goods received by each party (e.g., nation) to a trans- 
action. The terms of trade are said to move in favor of the party 
that gives up fewer units of goods than it did previously for 
one unit of goods received, and against the party that gives 
up more units of goods for one unit of goods received. In in- 
ternational economics, the concept of "terms of trade" plays 
an important role in evaluating relationships between nations. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of three 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the 
primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for 
productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but 
administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to 
furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much eas- 
ier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, 
founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD 
through loans and assistance specifically designed to encourage 
the growth of productive private enterprises in the less devel- 
oped countries. The president and certain senior officers of the 
IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institu- 
tions are owned by the governments of the countries that sub- 
scribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, 
member states must first belong to the International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF — q. v.). 



284 



Index 



ACDA. See United States Arms Control 

and Disarmament Agency 
Acosta Velasco, Jorge, 41 
acquired immune deficiency syndrome 

(AIDS), 99 
Administration, directorate of, 166 
Advanced Naval Academy, 223 
Advanced Technical Institute of the Armed 

Forces, 220 
Advanced Training Institute, 219 
Agencia EFE, 141 

Agency for International Development, 
198 

agrarian reform, 67, 111, 121-22, 181, 
212; under Borja, 111; effect of, on 
migration, 70; problems with, 54, 76- 
78 

Agrarian Reform Law, xxii, 37, 121 
agricultural exports, 23-24, 124 
agricultural products {see also under in- 
dividual crops), 123-28 
agriculture, 103, 120-30; effect of, on 
economy, 108; as employer, 118; irri- 
gation, 123; methods, 122-23; under 
Spanish colonial era, 14 
AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome 

air force (FAE) {see also paratroops): ad- 
vanced training, 223; air zones, 224; 
combat aircraft, 223-24; components 
of, 207; emergency relief efforts of, 233; 
influence of United States on, 223; jet 
training, 225; military materiel acquired 
for, 223; origins of, 223; paratroop 
squadron, 224; personnel strength, 224; 
revolt, 185; safety record, 224; training 
aircraft, 223 

Air Force Academy, 225 

airlines, 144 

airtransport, 143-44; inOriente, 144; be- 
tween Quito and Guayaquil, 144 
Air War College, 225 
Albemarle Island (Isabela Island), 58 
alfaristas, 26 

Alfarist Radical Front (FRA), 183, 187 
Alfaro Delgado, Jose Eloy, xxii, xxiv, 24, 
180, 238; affinity of, for United States, 
26; Catholic resistance to, 25-26; civil 



war in reaction to, 25-26; constitution 
under, 158; death of, 27; involvement 
of, in government, 158; political pro- 
gram of, 25; rivalry with Plaza, 27 

Alfaro Lives, Damnit! (AVC), 188; 
crimes committed by, 246; described, 
238; terrorist activities of, 237-38 

Almargo, Diego de, 7; execution of, 11; 
strained relations with Pizarro, 8 

Alvarado, Pedro de, 9, 10 

Amaluza electric complex, 133 

Amazon Pact, 200 

Amazon River, 58, 59, 202; etymology 
of, 10; Orellana's journey on, 10; Ama- 
zon River Basin, 12, 54; colonization 
of, 88; development of, 200; dispute 
over, with Peru, 202, 207, 209 

Ambato, 17 

Americas Watch, 243, 247 

Andlisis Semanal, 197 

Andean Commission of Jurists, 243, 247 

Andean Common Market, 46, 134 

Andean Pact, 200 

Andes Mountains, 5, 10, 54, 132; agricul- 
ture in, 14; migration to, 67-68; as 
natural boundary, 12 

Andrade, Arsenio, 26 

AP. See Popular Alliance 

APRE. See Ecuadorian Revolutionary 
Popular Alliance 

Archipielago de Colon. See Galapagos 
Islands 

Argentina, 202; emergency assistance of, 
233; as member of Lima group, 200; 
military aid of, to Guayaquil rebellion, 
17; and Rio Protocol, 26, 36 

argolla, la: decline of, 27-28; description 
of, 27; functions of, 29 

Arias de Avila, Pedro, 7 

armed forces. See military 

army: armored vehicles, 218-19; basic 
training, 219; combat brigades, 217; 
components of, 207; defense zones of, 
217; in 1830, 209; infantry weapons, 
217-18; intervention of, in politics, 
xxiv-xxv, 212; NCO schools, 41, 219; 
officer schools, 219-20; operational 
units of, 217; personnel strength of, 217 



285 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



Army Agrarian Military Conscription 

(CAME), 227 
Army Industries, Directorate of (Dine), 

213, 236 

Army Polytechnic Institute (Espe), 220 
Army War Academy, 219, 233 
ARNG. See Ecuadorian Nationalist Rev- 
olutionary Action 
Arosemena Gomez, Otto, 40, 42, 183 
Arosemena Monroy, Carlos Julio, 36, 37, 
189; background of, 36; deposed, 37, 
212; relations with Cuba maintained 
by, 37 

Arroyo del Rio, Carlos Alberto, 30-31, 
33; opposition to, 31; resignation of, 31 
artisan firms, 80, 134, 136 
artisans, xxi, 54; described, 80 
Asia, 244 

Associated Press, 141 
Association of Agriculturists of Ecuador, 
27 

Atahualpa, 6; defeat of Huascar by, 6; ex- 
ecution of, by Pizarro, 9; execution of 
Huascar by, 9; massacre of defenders 
of, 9; meeting of, with Pizarro, 8-9 

attorney general, 174 

audiencia, 11, 13, 14 

austerity measures, xxiv, 107, 113, 146; 
under Borja, 111; effect of, 150; failure 
of, 149; under Febres Cordero, 115; 
under Hurtado, 194; reaction to, 111, 
237 

autogestional sector, 44 
autogolpe, 41; defined, 40; by Velasco, 40 
AVC. See Alfaro Lives, Damnit! 
Avenue of the Volcanos, 57 
ayllu: defined, 6; described, 6 
Ayora, Isidro, 29; reforms under, 28 
Azuay Province, 157, 180; archaeologi- 
cal sites in, 4 



Babahoyo, 23, 143 

Babahoyo River, 58 

Baker, James A. Ill, 199 

Baker Plan (1986), 199 

balance of payments, 108, 150-51 

Balao, 145 

Balboa, Vasco Nunez de, 7 

banana boom, xxiii, 4, 34, 46, 123; 

benefit of, to Guayaquil, 69, 70, 71; 

end of, 35; politically stabilizing effect 

of, 34 



Banana Fleet, 145 

bananas, 104, 105, 120, 123; export of, 

145; production patterns for, 123-24; 

value of, 149 
banking system: structure of, 137 
Bank of America, 138 
Bank of London and South America. See 

Lloyd's Bank 
Bank of Pichincha, 138 
banks, commercial, 138 
Bank Superintendency: function of, 137 
Banos del Inca, 9 
Baquerizo Moreno, Alfredo, 27 
Barco Vargas, Virgilio, 201 
Belgium: military materiel bought from, 

236 

Benalcazar, Sebastian de, 8; conquest of 
Ruminahui by, 9; siege of Quito by, 10 

benefits, fringe, 119 

BEV. See Ecuadorian Housing Bank 

blacks, 84, 86-87; in the Costa, 53; dis- 
crimination against, 161; ethnic mobil- 
ity of, 87; occupations of, 86-87; origins 
of, 53, 86; as percentage of population, 
83 

Bogota, 18, 104; constitution (1830), 157 

Bolivar Palacios, Simon, 17, 208, 220; 
death of, 19; and formation of Con- 
federation of Gran Colombia, 18; war 
of liberation in Peru, 18 

Bolivia, 24, 64, 103; as signer of Carta- 
gena Agreement, 200; narcotics traf- 
fickers from, 244; as signer of Andean 
Pact, 200 

Bonaparte, Joseph, 16, 17 

Bonaparte, Napoleon: invasion of Spain 
by, 16 

Bonifaz Ascazubi, Neptali, 29 

Borja Cevallos, Rodrigo, 48, 111, 155, 
156, 184, 186-87, 202; budget deficit 
under, 115; cabinet of, 165; campaign 
promises of, 111; debt refinancing by, 
146; Democratic Left party formed by, 
182; economic stabilization program, 
116; economic strategies of, 103, 111, 
155, 200, 231; foreign policy of, 198, 
201; government of, 187-88; media 
under, 196; pardon of paratroopers by, 
187-88 

Borrero, Antonio, 24 

Bourbon kings: boundary changes under, 
15-16; reforms of, 15 

Brady, Nicolas, 199 



286 



Index 



Brady Plan, 199 

Brazil, 42; emergency assistance of, 233; 
as member of Lima group, 200; mili- 
tary materiel from, 218; and Rio Pro- 
tocol, 26, 36, 202 

Britain: military materiel purchased from, 
222, 223-24, 236, 237 

Broad Left Front (FADI), 182, 185, 186, 
187, 239 

Bucaram Elmhalim, Asaad, 41, 42, 44, 
183, 190; rivalry of, with Roldos, 46- 
47 

Bucaram Ortiz, Abdala, 183, 186, 196 

budget: expenditures, 114-15; for 1989, 
114-15; process, 117; process, prob- 
lems with, 117; 

Buenaventura, 12 

buses, 143 

Bush, George, 244 

bus lines, 143 

cabildo, 11 

Cabo San Lorenzo, 54 
Cajamarca, 8, 9 
Calderon Munoz, Abdon, 45 
Cali, 12 

CAME. See Army Agrarian Military Con- 
scription 

Canar Province: archaeological sites in, 4 
Canari Indians, 5; aid to conquistadors 
by, 9 

cantons: council, 174; elections, 174; gov- 
erned by, 174 

Cara Indians, 5 

Caracas, Venezuela, 199 

Carchi Province, 74; archaeological sites 
in, 4; blacks in, 84 

Caribbean: countries as trading partners, 
150 

cars, 143 

Cartagena Agreement, 201 

Cartagena Group, 200 

Carta Negra. See Constitution of 1861 

Carter, Jimmy, 45, 236 

Castilla, Ramon, 21 

Castro Ruz, Fidel, 36, 200, 201 

Catholic Church, Roman, 232; under Al- 
faro, 25, 26; under Garcia Moreno, 
22-23, 158; membership in, as requi- 
site for citizenship, 158; organization 
of, 94; role of, xxii, 93, 188; support 
of, for social change, 93, 189 



Catholic Federation of Workers (CCO), 
194 

Catholics, Roman, 192; bureaucracies of, 
12; social structure among, 94, 96 

Catholicism, Roman: as exclusive 
religion, 22; under Garcia Moreno, 
22-23; practice of, 94; as predominant 
religion, 161; as state religion, 157, 
158; as unifier of Ecuador, 22 

Cauca Province, 19 

Cayambe, Mount, 57 

Cayambe Province, 74 

Cayapa Indians, 84 

CCO. See Catholic Federation of Workers 

Cedhu. See Ecumenical Commission of 
Human Rights 

CEDOC. See Ecuadorian Federation of 
Classist Organizations 

CEDOCUT. See Ecuadorian Federation 
of Classist Organizations for Workers' 
Unity 

Center of Naval Instruction, 222 

Central Bank of Ecuador, 29, 116; deval- 
uation of sucre by, 116; functions of, 
115, 137-38; ownership of, 137-38; 
structure of, 137-38 

Central University, 40, 96, 187, 195 

CEOSL. See Ecuadorian Confederation of 
Free Trade Union Organizations 

CEPE. See Ecuadorian State Petroleum 
Corporation 

CFN. See National Financial Corporation 

CFP. See Concentration of Popular Forces 

Chamber of Deputies, 30, 157, 159; elec- 
tions to, 166; gun battle in, 36; repre- 
sentation in, 158 

Chambo River, 59 

Chargas' disease, 99 

Charles I: authorization by, of Pizarro's 
third voyage, 8 

Charles III, 15 

Charles IV, 16 

childhood mortality, 98-99; causes, 99; 
rate, 98 

Chile, 6, 24, 36, 202; military influence 
of, 233; as signer of Andean Pact, 200; 
as signer of Cartagena Agreement, 200 

Chimborazo, Mount, 9, 57 

Chimborazo Province, 74, 93; archaeo- 
logical sites in, 4; poverty in, 78 

China, 24, 202 

cholos: defined, 16, 53; family and kin, 
90-92; as percentage of population, 83 



287 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



Christian and Missionary Alliance, 94 
Christian Democratic Association, 182 
Christian Democratic International, 183 
Christian Democratic Party (PDC), 44, 
182, 187 

Christianity: conversion of Indians to, 13, 
94; Protestant (see also under individual 
denominations), 94-96 

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints (Mormon Church), 94 

CID. See Democratic Institutional Coa- 
lition 

Citibank, 138 

cities: growth rates of, 68 

citizenship: under Constitution of 1979, 
160; requirements for, 157, 158 

civic action, 233 

civilian authority: conflict of, with cleri- 
cal authority, 156-57 
civil defense, 232-33; structure, 232 
Civil Defense, National Directorate of, 
215 

civil war: of 1895, 25; of 1911, 27; of 

1932, 29 
class: basis of, 69 

clerical authority: conflict of, with civilian 
authority, 156-57 

CNT. See National Coordinator of Work- 
ers 

Coastal Prison, 246, 247 
coast guard, 222 
Coca River, 10, 59 

cocoa, 120, 123; production, 124; revenue 
from, 110; value of, 149 

cocoa boom (see also cocoa, cocoa indus- 
try), xxiii, 4, 23, 24, 46, 67, 76, 104; 
decline, 105; immigration initiated by, 
67 

cocoa industry: decline in, 28, 29 
coffee, 120, 123; export of, 145; produc- 
tion, 124; revenue from, 110; value of, 
149 

Colombia, 10, 12, 19, 54, 59, 131, 132, 
143, 201, 208; in Gran Colombia, 18; 
narcotics traffickers from, 207, 211, 244; 
relations with, 211; repulsion of attack 
by, 209; as signer of Andean Pact, 200; 
as signer of Cartagena Agreement, 200; 
telephone service, 139, 140; terrorism in, 
237 

colonization, 79, 88 
Colorado Indians, 84 
commerce: employment in, 118 



Commercial and Agricultural Bank of 

Guayaquil: influence of, 27 
Commercial Associations, 166, 169, 

172-73 

Committee of Young Christians for Chris- 
tian Civilization, 93-94 

Communist International, 182 

Communist Party of Ecuador — Marxist- 
Leninist (PCE-ML), 182, 193, 239 

compadres, 92 

compadrazgo: defined, 82, 92; as patron- 
client relationship, 92; selecting compadres 
for, 92 

comptroller general, 174 

Conade. See National Development Coun- 
cil 

Conaghan, Catherine M., 184, 186 

Conaie. See Confederation of Indigenous 
Nationalities of Ecuador 

Concentration of Popular Forces (CFP), 
34, 41, 46, 183, 187 

concierto peon, 74 

Condor mountain range, 202 

Confederation of Ecuadorian Workers 
(CTE), 192, 194, 239; activities of, 193; 
members of, 193 

Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities 
of Ecuador (Conaie), 194 

Conference of Foreign Ministers of the 
American Republics, Third, 31 

Confiec. See Ecuadorian Development Fi- 
nance Company 

Congress, National, 46, 156, 184, 215, 
236; appointments by, 169, 170, 172; 
budgetary role of, 117, 169-70; in Con- 
stitution of 1945, 159; in Constitution 
of 1979, 160, 166; dissolved by Velasco, 
30, 191; elections to, 166; extraordinary 
sessions of, 165, 170; judicial involve- 
ment with, 171; powers of, 163, 168-70; 
prosecution by, 169; responsibilities of, 
162, 167-68; restrictions on members of, 
166-67; sessions of, 167; threat to im- 
peach Febres Cordero, xxv, 214 

conscription system, 207, 226-30; attitude 
toward, 227 

Conservative Party (PC), 184, 188; back- 
ground of, 180; establishment of, 23, 
180 

Conservatives, 3, 35, 184; struggle of, 

against Liberals, 20, 156, 157 
Consolidation of National Workers, 29 
Constituent Assembly, 159 



288 



Index 



constitution of 1830, 18; described, 157 
constitution of 1843, 20 
constitution of 1861, 158 
constitution of 1897, 158 
constitution of 1906, 158 
constitution of 1929: provisions of, 29, 

158-59; social legislation under, 29 
constitution of 1945, 159; freedom of 

religion under, 93; reinstated, 160 
constitution of 1946, 159; components of, 

159 

constitution of 1967, 159-60; reforms 
under, 190; suspended, 160 

Constitution of 1979, xxv, 3, 44, 173, 195; 
amendments to, 161, 173, 175; Article 
37, 178; Congress in, 166; economy 
under, 111; freedom of religion under, 
93; innovations in, 160-61; military 
service under, 226; National Police 
under, 239; political parties under, 177, 
178; public defender under, 245; Pub- 
lic Forces under, 215; vice president 
under, 165 

construction boom, 82 

construction industry, 136 

Contadora Group, 201 

Contadora Island, 201 

Contentious Administrative Tribunal 
(TCA), 168, 169, 170, 171, 172 

Continental Bank, 138 

Cooperative Bank of Ecuador. See De- 
velopment Bank of Ecuador 

Cordero Crespo, Luis: as president, 24; 
resignation of, 24 

Cordillera Costanera, 57, 60 

Cordillera Occidental, 5; described, 57 

Cordillera Oriental, 5, 57, 58; crossing of, 
by Pizarro, 10; described, 57 

Cordova, Gonzalo S., 27; ties of, with la 
argolla, 28 

Corkill, David, 162 

Cortes, Hernan, 8 

Costa, 58, 180, 190; agriculture in, 78, 
104, 122-23, 124, 126, 128; climate of, 
59; cocoa boom in, 76; as economic 
center, 104; death of inhabitants of, by 
European diseases, 13-14; described, 
54-57; elite in, 53, 71; emergency relief 
in, 234; food processing in, 136; for- 
estry in, 130; highway transportation 
through, 143; land reform in, 72; land 
tenure in, 121, 122; land use in, 120; 
lifestyle of, 71; livestock raising in, 



128-29; migration to, from Sierra, 54, 
67, 68-70, 84; petroleum activity in, 
131; politics in, 156, 157, 181; popula- 
tion of, 67; rainfall in, 60; regionalism 
of, 3; and Sierra, economic distinction 
between, 71, 103; temperatures in, 560; 
universities in, 96 

Costa Externa, 57; rivers in, 58 

Costa Interna, 57; climate of, 60-61; 
Guayas River system in, 58, 58; tem- 
peratures in, 61 

Costa Social Development, Directorate of, 
166 

costenos, 67 

Cotopaxi Air Base, 225 
Cotopaxi, Mount, 57, 59 
cotton, 104, 127 

Council of the Indies: described, 11 

Council of Ministers, 159 

Council of State, 157, 158, 159, 160, 171 

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 
1987 (United States Department of 
State), 243, 245, 247 

coups d'etat: of 1834, 19-20; of 1851, 21; 
of 1875, 24; of 1906, xxiv, 27; of 1925, 
28, 180; of 1931, 29; of 1947, 33; of 
1961, 36; of 1963, 37, 212; of 1972, 41, 
160; of 1976, 43, 160, 213 

courts, lower, 172 

court system, 171, 172, 244; plenary pro- 
ceedings, 245; summary proceedings, 
245 

crafts: as income supplement, 78 

crime: causes of, 246; rate of, 246; statis- 
tics on, 246 

criollos, xxi; defined, 16; effect of indepen- 
dence on, 19 

CTE. See Confederation of Ecuadorian 
Workers 

Cuba, 238; political relations with, 37, 38, 

200; relations severed with, 189 
Cuban Revolution, 36, 195 
Cucuta constitution (1821), 157 
Cuenca, 5, 12, 120, 133; defense zone 
headquarters, 217; growth of, 70; high- 
way to, 143; National Police headquar- 
ters in, 242; politics in, 180; radio in, 
140; rail service to, 142; television sta- 
tions, 141 
curaca: defined, 6 
curanderos, 89 

current-account balance, 150 
Customs Police, 242 



289 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



Cuzco, Peru, 5, 6, 9; capture of, by Span- 
ish, 9 
Czechoslovakia, 37 

Daule River, 58, 143 
death, causes of, 99 
Decentralized Planning, Directorate of, 
166 

Decentralized Planning, Undersecretariat 
of, 166 

defense budget, 230-32; estimated, 231; 

expenditures per capita, 231-32; oil 

revenues for, 231; trends in, 231 
Democratic Alliance, 31-33 
Democratic Left (ID), 44, 111, 184, 186; 

formed by Borja, 182 
Democratic Institutionalist Coalition 

(CID), 183 
Democratic Popular Movement (MPD), 

186, 187, 239 
Depression, Great, xxiii, 28, 29, 124 
de Soto, Hernando, 9 
Deutsche-Press-Agentur, 141 
Development Bank of Ecuador (Bede), 

138; role of, 138 
Dine. See Army Industries, Directorate of 
discovery of Ecuador, 7-8 
DP. See Popular Democracy 
Duarte, Angel, 186 
Duran Ballen, Sixto, 44, 45, 186 



earthquake of 1987, 136, 199; economic 
impact of, 113, 129, 148; emergency as- 
sistance following, 232-33, 234-36; 
pipeline destroyed by, xxiv, 104, 11, 
130, 146, 148 

economic crisis, 47-48; efforts to correct, 
48 

economic growth, 46; contribution of 
petroleum to, 106; negative side effects 
of, 107 

economic history, 3-4 

Economic Planning, Undersecretariat of, 
166 

economy, colonial: basis of, 69; depres- 
sion of, in eighteenth century, 14-15; 
instability of, 104 

economy, modern: approaches to restor- 
ing, 103; decline, in, 107; effect of oil 
prices on, 148; effect of stabilization 
program on, 116-17; expansion of, 



105; government regulation of, 119; 
recovery in, 108; stabilization program, 
107, 116 

Ecuadorian Aviation Company. See Ecu- 
atoriana 

Ecuadorian Communist Party (PCE), 
182, 238 

Ecuadorian Confederation of Free Trade 
Union Organizations (CEOSL), 193- 
94; membership in, 193-94 

Ecuadorian Democratic Alliance, 159 

Ecuadorian Development Finance Com- 
pany (Confiec), 138 

Ecuadorian Federation of Classist Or- 
ganizations (CEDOC), 192, 194; ac- 
tivities of, 192; membership of, 193 

Ecuadorian Federation of Classist 
Organizations for Workers' Unity 
(CEDOCUT), 193 

Ecuadorian Federation of Peasant Or- 
ganizations (FEDOC), 193 

Ecuadorian Housing Bank (BEV), 138; 
role of, 138 

Ecuadorian Indian Federation (FEI), 193 

Ecuadorian Institute of Agrarian Reform 
and Settlement (IERAC), 79, 121-22 

Ecuadorian Institute of Electrification 
(Inecel), 112, 134 

Ecuadorian Institute of Hydraulic Re- 
sources (Inerhi), 123 

Ecuadorian Institute of Minerals (Ine- 
min), 133 

Ecuadorian Institute of Telecommunica- 
tions (Ietel), 112, 140 

Ecuadorian Military Air Transport 
(TAME), 224, 236 

Ecuadorian National Board of Planning 
and Economic Coordination, 123 

Ecuadorian Nationalist Revolutionary Ac- 
tion (ARNE), 35, 182, 184 

Ecuadorian Petroleum Fleet, 145 

Ecuadorian Revolutionary Popular Alli- 
ance (APRE), 185 

Ecuadorian Roldosist Party (PRE), 183, 
186 

Ecuadorian Ship Transport, 145 
Ecuadorian Socialist Party (PSE), 182 
Ecuadorian Social Security Institute, 97, 

232; coverage, 99-100; programs of, 99 
Ecuadorian State Petroleum Corporation 

(CEPE) (see also Petroecuador), 42, 43; 

control of, by military, 213 
Ecuatoriana, 144, 224, 236 



290 



Index 



Ecumenical Commission of Human 
Rights (Cedhu): human rights com- 
plaints investigated by, 242; statistics 
on police brutality, 243 

Editoral Claridad, 197 

education, 96-97; cycles of, 96; expansion 
in opportunities for, 96-97; under Gar- 
cia Moreno, 23; literacy classes, 97; 
polytechnic, 96; role of private schools 
in, 96; teachers', 96; university, 96 

Education and Culture, Ministry of, 97 

El Comer do, 141, 197 

Eldren Reyes, 27 

elections, 30, 33, 155, 176-77; presiden- 
tial, of 1948, 33; presidential, of 1952, 
34; presidential, of 1956, 35; presiden- 
tial, of 1960, 35; presidential, of 1968, 
40; presidential, of 1978, 44-45; 
presidential, of 1984, 48, 184; presiden- 
tial, of 1988, 185-87 

Elections Law (1884), 158 

Elections Law (1906), 158 

Elections Law (1987). See Law of Elections 

Electoral College, 169 

Electoral College of Provincial Prefects, 
169 

electoral system, 159, 175-77; election of 
deputies, 166-67; election of president, 
162; election of vice president, 165; par- 
ish elections, 174; provincial and mu- 
nicipal elections, 174 

electric power, 133-34; distribution of, 
133-34; generating capacity, 133; hy- 
droelectric generation, 133; thermal 
generation, 133; production, 133 

elite class, xxi, 54, 70-72, 190-91; effects 
of land reform on, 72; management by, 
of political affairs, 190 

El Nino, 47-48; described, 60; effects of, 
xxiv, 60, 107, 129, 150 

El Oro Province, 67, 123, 209 

Eloy Alfaro Advanced Military School, 
219 

Eloy Alfaro Air Base, 185 

Eloy Alfaro Popular Armed Forces (FAP- 
EA), 188 

El Universo, 141, 197 

emergency relief, 232-33 

encomiendas: abolished, 11; described, xxi, 
13, 121; pressure to reform, 121 

Energy and Mines, Ministry of, 112, 133 

Enlightenment: as precursor of indepen- 
dence, 16 



Ennquez Gallo, Alberto, 30 

Esmeralda Indians, 5 

Esmeralda scandal, 24 

Esmeraldas, 70, 78; highway transporta- 
tion through, 143; military training in, 
219; oil refinery in, 105, 132, 145; tele- 
vision stations, 141 

Esmeraldas Province, 12, 23, 57; archaeo- 
logical sites in, 4; blacks in, 84; fores- 
try in, 130; rainfall in, 60 

Esmeraldas River system, 58-59 

Espe. See Army Polytechnic Institute 

Espejo, Eugenio de Santa Cruz y: as pre- 
cursor of independence, 16 

Estrada, Emilio, 27 

Etapa. See Public Municipal Enterprise for 
Telephones, Potable Water, and Sewers 

ethnic groups (see also under individual 
groups), 83-90; changing membership 
in, 83-84, 86, 87; criteria for defining, 
83, 84; geography of, 84; ranking of, 84 

Europe, 190, 198, 202, 244 

European Economic Community: as trad- 
ing partner, 150 

evangelical missionary activity, 94 

executive branch, 162-66; components of, 
162; conflicts of, with legislature and 
judiciary, 155, 256 

exports, 104-5; of agricultural products, 
149; under Garcia Moreno, 23; of 
petroleum, 112, 149; to United States, 
150; value of, 149 

Expreso, 197 

external debt, 107, 145-48; cause of, 145; 
growth of, 107, 145, 146; interest pay- 
ments growth, 145; payments sus- 
pended, 109, 111; rescheduling of, 107, 
150; service ratio, 107-8 

Extra, 197 

Extremadura, 7 



FADI. See Broad Left Front 
FAE. See air force 

family, Hispanic: importance of, 90; kin- 
ship ties in (see also compadrazgo), 92; 
marital fidelity in, 91; role of, 90; role 
of men in, 90; role of women in, 90-91 

family, Indian: importance of, 90; kinship 
ties in, 92; marital fidelity in, 91; role 
of, 91 ; roles of men and women in, 91 

FAP-EA. See Eloy Alfaro Popular Armed 
Forces 



291 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



farms: size of, 76 

FDN. See National Democratic Front 

Febres Cordero Ribadeneyra, Leon, 4, 
48, 201, 236; abduction of, xxv, 185, 
214; attempt to change electoral law, 
184; austerity measures under, 115; 
authoritarian style of, xxv, 155, 165; 
campaign promises of, 110; censure of, 
196; crises in government of, 177, 184; 
devaluation of sucre under, 115, 116; 
dismissal of cabinet ministers under, 
170; economic strategies of, 103, 116, 
155; election of, 184; foreign policy of, 
198, 199, 200; free-enterprise approach 
under, 110; friction in government 
branches under, 155, 162; hatred of, for 
Borja, 156; interference of, in military 
matters, 190, 230; judicial appoint- 
ments by, 169; labor relations under, 
119, 194; media under, 196; opposition 
of, to Andean Pact, 200; suppression 
of anti-austerity demonstrations, 237; 
suspension of interest payments, 199; 
Vargas incident, 185, 214; visit of, to 
Washington, 199 

Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger- 
many), 202; military materiel pur- 
chased from, 222, 236 

Federation of High School Students of 
Ecuador (FESE), 194 

Federation of University Students of Ecua- 
dor (FEUE), 194, 195 

FEDOC. See Ecuadorian Federation of 
Peasant Organizations 

FEI. See Ecuadorian Indian Federation 

Ferdinand VII, 16-17 

FESE. See Federation of High School Stu- 
dents of Ecuador 

feudal system, Spanish, 12 

fiber crops, 127 

fiestas, 96; cargos for, 94; described, 94 
Finance and Credit, Ministry of, 117, 
169, 242 

financial institutions, private, 138 

financial services, 136-37 

financial system, 137-39 

fiscal deficit, 113, 116, 1 1 7 ; control of, 114 

fiscal reform, 212 

Fiscal Tribunal, 161, 168, 169, 171; com- 
ponents of, 172; function of, 170, 172 
fish: export of, 145 

fishing (see also "tuna war"), 103, 129-30; 
tuna, 129; shrimp, 129 



Fitch, John Samuel, 227 

flood disaster (1982-83): xxiv, 107, 129, 

150; emergency operations for, 232- 

33 

Flores, Juan Jose, 22, 24, 157, 209; as- 
sassination attempt on, 20; battle vic- 
tories of, 18; career of, 19; involvement 
of, in government, 158; opposition to, 
20; ouster of (1845), 20; as president, 
18, 19, 20 
Flores Jijon, Antonio, 24; as president, 24 
food processing, 134; baking, 136; as 
component of manufacturing, 134; 
flour milling, 136; rice milling, 136; 
sugar refining, 136 
foreign borrowing, 113 
foreign debt, xxiv, 103-4, 113; crisis in, 4 
foreign-exchange controls, 116 
foreign-exchange earnings, 106; sources 
of, 149 

foreign-exchange reserves, 109 
foreign policy: of Borja, 190, 201; of 
Febres Cordero, 198, 199, 200; objec- 
tives, 197-98 
forestry: area, 130; problems in, 130 
FP. See Popular Front 
FRA. See Alfarist Radical Front 
France: military influence of, 233; mili- 
tary materiel from, 218, 236, 237 
Franco, Guillermo, 21 
FRN. See National Reconstruction Front 
FUT. See United Workers Front 



Galapagos Islands, 5, 26, 54, 59, 129, 
186, 242; administration of, 174; cli- 
mate in, 59-60, 61-62; described, 58; 
location of, 54; military protection for, 
211; tourism to, 139; United States 
naval base on, 30, 222, 234; volcanos 
in, 58; water transport to, 145 

Garcia Moreno, Gabriel, xxii, 24, 25, 26, 
212; armed forces under, 209; attempt 
of, to assassinate Flores, 20; career of, 
22-24; childhood of, 22; Conservative 
Party established by, 23, 180; consti- 
tution under, 158; contributions of, 23; 
death of, 23; involvement of, in govern- 
ment, 158; Liberal resistance to, 23; 
opposition of, to Flores, 22; religious 
education of, 22; Roman Catholicism 
under, 22-23 

Garcia Moreno Prison, 246, 247 



292 



Index 



gas, natural: discovery of, 105; reserves, 
132 

Gaceta Legal, 171 

General Union of Ecuadorian Workers 

(UGTE), 193 
geography: area, 54; regions, 54-55 
German Democratic Republic, 202 
Gonzalez Alvear, Raul: economic policy 

under, 43 
Gonzalez Suarez, Federico, 26 
Gospel Missionary Union, 94 
government: disputes of, with labor, 119 
government agencies, 111-12; problems 

in, 112 

Government and Justice, Ministry of, 246 
government expenditures, 118 
government revenues: from taxes, 117-18 
government structure, 161-62 
government subsidies, 113 
grain, 126-27 

Gran Colombia, Confederation of, 157, 
208; dissolution of, 18, 19, 209; districts 
of, 18; Ecuador as district in, 18; Flores 
as governor of Ecuador under, 19; for- 
mation of, 18; war of, with Peru, 18 
Grancolombian Merchant Fleet, 145 
gross domestic product, 48, 103, 110; 
agriculture as percentage of, 120; con- 
struction as percentage of, 105, 136; fis- 
cal deficit as percentage of, 116; growth 
rate, 106, 108, 109, 110, 111, 114, 117; 
petroleum revenues as percentage of, 
112 

gross national product (GNP), 118 
Group of Eight, 201 
Guayallabamba River, 58 
Guayana, 103 

Guayaquil, 18, 21, 22, 41, 155, 157, 208, 
209, 220, 238, 244; airtransport, 144; 
climate in, 60; Costa regionalism in, 3; 
crime rate in, 246; declaration of in- 
dependence by, 1 7 ; defense zone head- 
quarters, 217; development of, 69; as 
economic center, 104; economic growth 
in, 46; elite in, 190, 191, 212; emer- 
gency operations center in, 233; Flores 
ousted by insurrection in, 20; founding 
of, 10, 65-66; industry and trade in, 14, 
103; Liberal politics in, 3, 24, 180; man- 
ufacturing in, 118, 134; marine head- 
quarters at, 222; metropolitan police in, 
242; migration to, xxii, 67, 69-70, 84; 
National Police headquarters in, 242; 



naval base, 221; Naval War College, 
223; naval zone, 221; newspapers in, 
141, 197; politics in, xxii, 156; popu- 
lation of, 69-70; prison in, 246; radio 
in, 140, 141; Rocafuerte as governor 
of, 20; slums in, 67; squatter settle- 
ments in, xxii, 67-68; stock exchange, 
138; struggle for independence by, 
17-18; telephone service in, 139, 140; 
television stations, 141; transferred to 
Peru, 16; uprising in, 31; vulnerabil- 
ity of, to attack, 210 
Guayaquil Chamber of Commerce, 40, 
43 

Guayaquil, Gulf of, 5, 57, 58, 60; natu- 
ral gas in, 105, 132-33; shrimp farm- 
ing in, 129 

guayaquileno, 40 

Guayaquil-Quito railroad, 26, 142 
Guay as Province, 57, 67, 123, 126, 178, 

186; archaeological sites in, 4 
Guay as River, 58, 69, 145 
Guayas River Basin, 58, 126, 145 
Guayas River system, 58 
Guerrillas for a Free Homeland, 238 
Guevara Moreno, Carlos, 34, 41, 183 
Gulf Oil, 131 



haciendas, xxi; Costa, 76; demise of, 
53-54; described, 71; operation of, 74; 
owners, 70-71; Sierra, 73-74 

Health, Ministry of, 97 

health, public: acquired immune defici- 
ency syndrome (AIDS), 99; causes of 
death, 99; childhood malnutrition, 99; 
childhood mortality, 98-99; deficiencies 
of system, 97; infant mortality, 97-98; 
maternal mortality, 99; system, 97; trop- 
ical diseases, 99 

Herring, Hubert, 9 

highway system, 142: construction of, 142 
history, pre-Hispanic, 4-6 
history, Spanish colonial, 11-16; labor 
under, 14, 15; working conditions, 14 
House of Trade: described, 11 
Hoy, 196 

Hoya del Quito, 58 
hoyas, 58, 67: defined, 57 
Huancavilca Indians, 5, 10 
Huascar, 6; execution of, 9 
huasipungo system: abolished, xxii, 37, 
121; defined, 37; described, 74, 121 



293 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



huasipungueros, xxi, 74, 79 

Huayna Capac, 5,6; death of, 6; move- 
ment of population under, 6; rule of, 6 

human rights: abuses by courts, 245; 
abuses by police, 243 

Hurtado, Jaime, 185-86 

Hurtado Larrea, Osvaldo, 44, 46, 155, 
156, 180, 183, 185; austerity measures 
under, 194; economic crisis under, 47; 
political ideology of, 4 



Ibarra, Battle of, 208 

ID. See Democratic Left 

IERAC. See Ecuadorian Institute of Agrar- 
ian Reform and Settlement 

Ietel. See Ecuadorian Institute of Telecom- 
munications 

Imbabura Province, 74; archaeological 
sites in, 4; blacks in, 84 

IMF. See International Monetary Fund 

imports: capital goods, 149; durable con- 
sumer goods, 149; from United States, 
150; value of, 149 

Inca (see also Tawantinsuyu): civil war in 
Ecuador under, 6; conquest of Ecuador 
by, xxi, 5; defeat of, by conquistadors, 
84; impact of, on Ecuador, 5-6 

Inca culture, 4 

income distribution: inequality of, 46 

independence: achievement of, xxi, 18; 
effect of, on criollos, xxi, 19; effect of, 
on peasants, 19; precursors of, 16; 
struggle for, in Quito audiencia, 16, 17 

Indians {see also under names of individual 
groups), xxi, 71, 124, 197; abolition of 
tribute demanded from, 21; benefits 
gained under Alfaro, 26; change in eth- 
nic affiliation of, 86; conversion of, to 
Christianity, 13; crime among, 246; 
destruction of, by European diseases, 
13-14; discrimination against, 161; 
family and kin, 90-92; as laborers, 80, 
82; in mita system, xxi, 13; as percen- 
tage of population, 83; resettlement of, 
13; as serfs, 84; subordination of, 71; 
tribute demanded from, 13; working 
conditions for, 14, 15 

Indians, Costa (see also under names of in- 
dividual tribes): description of, 5; in 
peonage system, xxi, 104; as under- 
class, 12 



Indians, Oriente (see also under names of 
individual tribes), 88-90; contacts of, with 
whites, 88; geographic distribution 
of, 89; impact of colonization on, 
89-90; Jivaros, 89; lack of protection 
for, 90; migration of, 89; population 
decline of, 89; subsistence, 89; Yum- 
bos, 89 

Indians, Sierra (see also under names of in- 
dividual tribes), 53, 87-88; description of, 
5; ethnic markers, 87; language of, 87; 
in peonage system, 104; political or- 
ganization of, 5; population, 87; pub- 
lic deference by, 87-88; religious 
practices of, 94; stigma of, 87 

indigena. See Indians 

individual rights, 161 

industrial reform, 212 

Inecel. See Ecuadorian Institute of Elec- 
trification 

Inemin. See Ecuadorian Institute of Min- 
erals 

Inerhi. See Ecuadorian Institute of Hy- 
draulic Resources 

infant mortality, 97-98; causes, 98; rate, 
63, 97 

inflation rate, 108; in 1972-77, 112; in 
1987, 110; in 1988, 111, 116; in 1989, 
117 

Inquisition, Office of the, 16; role of, 93 
Institute of Higher National Studies, 215, 
220 

Instruction, Department of, 219 
Inter-American Development Bank, 40, 
198 

Inter- American Press Association, 196 

Inter- American Regional Organization of 
Workers (ORIT), 193 

Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal As- 
sistance (Rio Treaty), 198 

internal security, 237-47 

International Criminal Police Organiza- 
tion (Interpol), 246 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 48, 
107, 148 

International Telecommunications Satel- 
lite Organization, 140 

interpellation procedure, 169 

Interpol. See International Criminal Police 
Organization 

Iquitos, 202 

irrigation: among Sierra Indians, 5 
Isabela Island (Albemarle Island), 58 



294 



Index 



Israel, 198: security consulting by, 236; 
service of aircraft by, 236; as supplier 
of military materiel, 236 

Italy: emergency assistance of, 233; mili- 
tary influence of, 233; military materiel 
purchased from, 222, 236, 237 

Japan, 24; attack by, on Pearl Harbor, 
234; declaration of war against, 234; as 
trading partner, 150 

Jarrin Ampudia, Gustavo, 42; oil policy 
of, 43 

Jesuits: expulsion of, 15, 20-21; improve- 
ments in education by, 23; settlement 
of, in Oriente, 12 

Ji'varos, 89: Achuar, 89; Shuar, 89 

Joint Command, 207, 215; function of, 
215; members of, 215 

JRVs. See Vote Receiving Committees 

judges: appointment of, 170; require- 
ments, 170, 172 

judicial appointments, 169 

judicial branch, 170-72; components of, 
170-72; conflicts of, with executive, 
155, 156; corruption and inefficiency 
in, 245-46; court system, 170-72, 245; 
manipulation of, 171; Tribunal of Con- 
stitutional Guarantees, 172-73; 

judicial organs; powers of, 171 

Kemmerer, Edwin W., 28 
Kfir, 236-37 
Korean War, 34 



labor: development of, 192; employee as- 
sociations, 192; history, 192; impact of, 
192; informal sector, 82; in Spanish 
colonial period, 14,15; working condi- 
tions, 14 

Labor Code of 1930, 30, 192 

labor force: demographics of, 118 

labor, organized, 192-94; disputes of, 
with government, 119 

La Calle, 197 

Lago Agrio, 131 

La Hora, 197 

land: division of, among siblings, 78-79; 

elite control of, 73-74 
land distribution, 79; inequality of, 122 
landholding: structure of, 76 



land reform (see also agrarian reform), 74; 

benefits of, 76; effects of, 72 
Land Reform, Idle Lands, and Setdement 

Act, 121-22; amendments to, 122; prob- 
lems with, 122 
land tenure: encomienda system, 121; hu- 

asipungo system, 121; minifundio system, 

121; sharecropping, 121 
land use: in the Costa, 120; for crops, 120; 

in the Oriente, 120; for pasture, 120; 

in the Sierra, 120 
Latacunga, 16; air base in, 225; land use 

in, 120; obrajes in, 104 
latifundio, 73 
latifundistas, 70 

Latin America, 161 ; countries as trading 
partners, 150; international debt of, 
199; solidarity within, 200, 201 
Latin American Economic System, 200 
Latin American Energy Organization, 
200 

Latin American Integration Association, 
200 

Law of Elections (1987), 173, 175, 177 
Law of the Monetary System, 137 
Law of Municipal Regime, 173 
Law of Political Parties (1978), 173, 178; 
party dissolution under, 179; and po- 
litical propaganda, 179-80; and pub- 
lic demonstrations, 179 
League of Young Officers: overthrow of 

Cordova by, 28; reforms under, 28 
Lebanese, 67, 186 

legislative branch, 166-70; conflicts of, 

with executive, 155, 156 
legislative commissions (PC L), 160, 162, 

163, 168, 172, 173; duties of, 168, 169; 

judicial involvement with, 171; rights 

of, 168 
leishmaniasis, 99 

Liberal Party (Radical Liberal Party — 
PLR), xxiv, 25, 26, 27, 182, 184, 212; 
anticlericalism of, 188; background of, 
180; as cause of political instability, 27; 
corruption in, 181; end of rule of, 28; 
led by Arroyo del Rio, 30; military sup- 
port for, 189; platform of, 181 

Liberals, 3; accomplishments of, under 
Alfaro, 26; agricultural exports and, 24; 
in Guayaquil, 24; problems under, 
26-27; resistance of, to Garcia Moreno, 
23; struggle of, against Conservatives, 
20, 156, 157 



295 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



Libya, 238 

Lima, Peru, 11, 104 

Lima Group, 200, 201 

literacy, 97; training provided by armed 

forces, 233 
livestock raising, 128-29; for beef, 128- 

29; for dairy, 128; improvements in, 

129; problems with, 129 
Lloyd's Bank, 138 
Loja, 120 

Loj a Province, 47, 67, 128; archaeologi- 
cal sites in, 4 
Lopes Soares, Mario, 202 
Los Rios Province, 123, 126, 186 
Luque, Fernando de, 7 

Machala, 70, 145 
Madrid, 11 

Mahuad Witt, Jamil, 185 
Mainas Province, 15 
malaria, 99 

Maldonado, Guillermo, 42; achievements 

of, 42 
malnutrition, 99 

Manabi Province, 54, 57, 178; archaeo- 
logical sites in, 4; coffee production in, 
124; livestock raising in, 128-29 

Manta, 185, 225 

Manta Indians, 5 

Manta region, 12; autonomy of, 12; con- 
quered, 12 

manufacturing, 103, 134-35; in colonial 
Ecuador, 104; employment in, 118; 
sizes of firms, 134; types of firms, 134 

manufacturing, artisan: defined, 118; em- 
ployment in, 118 

Mararion district, 202 

marcistas: described, 20 

marines, 222 

Marquesas Islands, 5 

Marshal Sucre International Airport, 185, 
224 

Martinez Mera, Juan de Dios, 29, 30 

Martz, John D., 45, 155-56 

maternal mortality, 99 

Medelh'n Cartel (Colombia), 244 

media (see also individual media): govern- 
ment attempts to stifle, 196; ownership, 
195 

Medium- and Long-Range Planning, 

Directorate of, 166 
Mera airfield, 224 



mercantilism, 14 
merchant marine, 145 
Merchant Marine School, 223 
mestizos, 16, 26, 84-86, 87, 88; as arti- 
sans, xxi, 80; defined, 53; family and 
kin, 90-92; identity, 86; occupations, 
86; as part of middle class, 73; 
as percentage of population, 83 
Mexico, xxi, 8, 129, 130, 201 
middle class, 54, 72-73; described, 72-73; 
ethnic components of, 73 ; immigrants 
in, 73; orientation of, 73; rise of, xxiv, 
53-54, 72 
Middle East, 202 

migrants: crime committed by, 246; to 
Oriente, typical, 79; Oriente Indians 
as, 89; peasant, to Oriente, 53, 54, 67, 
68 

migration: causes of, 67; to the cities, 67, 
68-69; commitment to, 83; to the Costa, 
xxii, 67, 68-69, 86; effects of, 67, 69-70; 
volume of, 82 

military (see also under individual branches), 
162, 189-90; autonomy, 214; civic- 
action programs of, 233; conscription, 
226; control of executive by, xxiv, 189, 
212-13; corruption in, 230; emergency 
relief, 232-33; factionalism within, 
189-90, 213; Febres Cordero's in- 
terference in, 190; history of, 208- 
10; influence of, 190; legitimization 
of political role of, 189; literacy train- 
ing provided by, 233; political involve- 
ment of, xxiv-xxv, 28, 41-45, 207- 
8, 212-14; position of, strengthened 
by rule, 213- 14; primary schools, 220; 
professionalization of, 209, 212; ranks, 
insignia, and uniforms, 226; reserves, 
214-17; training, United States-spon- 
sored, 234; vulnerability of, 210-11 

Military Air Transport Command, 224 

Military Aviation School, 225 

military education, 209; air force, 225; 
army, 219-20; academy established in 
Quito, 212; navy, 222-23 

military justice, 225-26; military law, 
225; procedures and penalties, 225-26; 
trials, 225 

military materiel: domestic sources for, 
236; foreign sources for, 236; imports 
of, 237 

minifundios, 73, 76, 79, 122, 122; defined, 
xxi, 121; earnings from, 122 



296 



Index 



minimum wage, 119 
mining: of gold, 133; of limestone, 133 
ministers of state: requirements of, 165; 
restrictions on, 165; missionary activi- 
ties, 94 

mita system: described, 13; end of, 16 
mitayos, 13, 14 
Mitterrand, Danielle, 202 
Mitterrand, Francois, 202 
Mobilization, National Directorate of, 
215 

Monetary Board, 146, 166, 215; function 

of, 115, 137; members of, 137 
Montalvo, Juan, 23 
montuvio. See mestizo 
motion pictures, 141 
Movement for the Unity of the Left 

(MUI), 187 
MPD. See Democratic Popular Movement 
MRIC. See Revolutionary Movement of 

the Christian Left 
MSC. See Social Christian Movement 
MUI. See Movement for the Unity of the 

Left 



Napo Province, 199 

Napo River, 59, 131 

narcotics control, 243-44; coca cultiva- 
tion, 243; United States assistance in, 
244 

narcotics traffickers, 188, 234; from 
Bolivia, 244; from Colombia, 207, 211, 
244 

National Assembly, 238 

National Civil Guard, 239 

National Civil Police, 239 

National Communications Secretariat 
(Senac), 196; press freedom under, 196 

National Congress. See Congress, Na- 
tional 

National Coordinator of Workers (CNT), 
194 

National Court of Police Justice, 243 
National Defense, Ministry of, 174, 215 
National Defense University (Washing- 
ton, D.C.), 220 
National Democratic Front (FDN), 183 
National Development Bank (BNF), 138; 

role of, 138 
National Development Council (Conade), 
117, 161, 162, 215; described, 165-66; 
restructuring of, 166 



National Directorate of Civil Defense, 

232; function of, 232 
National Directorate for Control of Ille- 
gal Narcotics, 242 
National Directorate of Intelligence, 215 
National Directorate of Social Rehabili- 
tation, 246 
National Directorate of Tourism, 139 
National Emergency Relief Center, 233 
National Federation of Workers, 169 
National Financial Corporation (CFN), 

138; role of, 138 
National Literacy Program, 201 
National Palace, 162 
National Planning Board, 165 
National Police, 162, 233, 232; abuse and 
torture by, 242-43; conduct of, 242; de- 
velopment of, 239; instructional facili- 
ties, 242; members of, 239; mission of, 
239; structure of, 239-42; supplemen- 
tary services, 242 
National Postal Enterprise, 141 
National Radio, 140, 196 
National Reconstruction Front (FRN), 
184 

National Secretariat for Public Informa- 
tion (Sendip), 196 

National Security Act Number 275 
(1979), 215, 232 

National Security Council (NSC), 207, 
220; established, 215; members of, 215 

National Union of Teachers (UNE), 193 

National Velasquista Federation, 40 

National Velasquista Party (PNV), 183 

Naval War College, 223 

navy: bases, 221; basic training, 222-23; 
coast guard, 222; components of, 207; 
equipment of, 222; marines, 222; ma- 
rine training, 223; missions of, 220-21; 
naval zones, 221; officer training, 223; 
organization of, 221-22; origin of, 220; 
patrols by, 211; personnel complement, 
220 

Negro River, 10 

New China (Xinhua) News Agency, 141 
New Laws (1542), 11 
newspapers, 197 
Nicaragua, 200, 201, 238 
19th of April Movement (M-19), 211, 
246 

Noboa, Diego, 20 

Nonaligned Movement (NAM), 200, 202 
Noriega, Manuel Antonio, 201 



297 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



NSC. See National Security Council 
Nudo del Azuay, 57 
nudos, 57; defined, 57 
Nueva, 196, 197 

Nueva Granada, Viceroy alty of, 104; Ec- 
uador as part of, 11; Quito audiencia 
under, 15 

Nueva Loja, 131, 132 

OAS. See Organization of American 
States 

obrajes, 14, 104; closing of, 15 

Officer Training School, 242 

officers: democratization of, 227; demo- 
graphics of, 227-30; promotion of, 230; 
retirement, 230; salaries for, 230 

Official Register of the State (Registro Ofi- 
cial del Estado), 163 

oil boom, xxiii-xxiv, 4, 46; benefit of, to 
Quito, xxiii, 71; economic strategies 
during, 113; effects of, 4, 69, 148-49; 
military's profit from, 208 

oil companies: exploration in Sierra by, 
53 

oil exports, 104, 112-13; effect of, on 

economy, 148-49 
oil, vegetable, 123; agriculture for, 1 27— 

28; export of, 145 
Olmedo, Jose Joaquin, 17 
onchocerciasis, 99 

OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries 

"Operation Blazing Trails," 199 

Orellana, Francisco de: exploration of 
Amazon by, 10, 12 

Organization of American States (OAS), 
197, 200, 201 

Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), 130, 132, 198, 200, 
201; Ecuador's entry into, 42; member- 
ship in, 198; problems in, 43; produc- 
tion quotas, 199; withdrawal from, 
108-9 

Oriente, 4, 12, 15, 54, 58, 132, 186; air 
transport, 144; Andean piedmont in, 
58; climate in, 59, 61; colonization in, 
79; described, 58; Eastern lowlands in, 
58; emergency relief in, 234; forestry 
in, 130; lack of highways in, 143; land 
use in, 120; livestock raising in, 
128-29; migration to, from Sierra, 54, 
67, 68, 84; natural gas in, 132; oil in, 



105, 146; oil companies in, 53; peasants 
in, 53; petroleum activity in, 131; pop- 
ulation increase in, 68; rainfall in, 61; 
reflection of pre-Columbian Ecuador 
in, 3; rivers in, 59; settlements in, 79- 
80; temperatures in, 61; Texaco-Gulf 
concession in, 42; water transport in, 
145 

ORIT. See Inter- American Regional Or- 
ganization of Workers 
Ortega Saavedra, Daniel, 201 
Otavalo Indians, 88 



Pachacuti Inca Upanqui: conquest of 

Ecuador by, 5 
Pacific Bank, 138 
Paez, Federico, 30 

Paine, Thomas: influence of works of, on 

Ecuador, 16 
Paita, Peru, 11 
Palestinian people, 202 
Palta Indians, 5 
Panama, 201 
Panama Canal, 26, 234 
Panama Canal Zone, 234 
Panama Defense Forces, 201 
Panama, Isthmus of, 7 
Pan American Highway, 142-43 
Panzaleo Indians, 5 
paratroopers: abduction of Febres Cor- 

dero, xxv; 185; 214; court martial of, 

214; pardon of, 187-88 
Parcayacu, 219 
Paris Club, 107 

parishes: council, 174; elections, 174; gov- 
erned by, 174 
Parodi, Luis, 166 
Pastaza River, 59 
Pasto Indians, 5 
Patate River, 59 
Paute River, 133 
PC. See Conservative Party 
PCD. See People, Change, and Democracy 
PCE. See Ecuadorian Communist Party 
PCE-ML. See Communist Party of Ec- 
uador — Marxist Leninist 
PCL. See legislative commissions 
PCP. See Progressive Conservative Party 
PDC. See Christian Democratic Party 
Peace Corps, United States, 198 
peasants, 54, 73-80; effects of conver- 
sion to Protestantism on, 96; effect of 



298 



Index 



independence on, 19; effects of land re- 
form on, 72; family structure of, 73; 
migration of, to Oriente, 53, 67-68; re- 
bellion by, in 1923, 28; sources of in- 
come for, 78; subordination of, 71 
penal system, 246-47; facilities, 246; over- 
crowding, 247; rehabilitation, 246-47; 
women's prison in Quito, 246, 247 
peninsulares, xxi, 12, 16, 85 
Pentecostal missionary activity, 94 
peonage system: described, 104; Indians 
in, 104 

People, Change, and Democracy (PCD), 
183 

People's Bank, 138 

People's Patriotic Union (UPP), 185 

Perez, Carlos Andres, 201 

periodicals, 197 

personalism, 3 

personalist movements, 183-84 
Peru, xxi, 24, 36, 42, 103, 200, 208; 
acceptance of Rio Protocol by, 210; 
border disputes of, with Ecuador, 54, 
202, 207, 209-10, 214; occupation of 
Ecuador by, 31; revolution in, 16, 18; 
rule of Ecuador by, 17; as signer of 
Andean Pact, 200; as signer of Car- 
tagena Agreement, 200; Spanish con- 
quest of, 7; telephone service, 139, 140; 
terrorism in, 237; transfer of Guayaquil 
to, 16; transfer of Mainas and Quijos 
provinces to, 15; war of, with Gran 
Colombia, 18; war with, over border, 
26, 31, 202 
Peru, Viceroyalty of, 18, 104, 208; Ecua- 
dor as part of, 11 
Peruvian Current, 61; effects of, 60 
Petroecuador, 132; responsibilities of, 112 
petroleum, 103; decline, xxiv, 107, 150; 
discovery of, 131 ; effect of discovery of, 
103, 105; exports, 106, 109, 111, 146; 
importance of, in economy, 130; loca- 
tion of, 131; policy, 42-43; price of, 
108, 112, 113, 146, 148; production 
level, 130, 131, 132; refining, 132; 
refining, control and ownership of, 132; 
reserves of, 131; revenues from, 109, 
110, 112-13, 237; revenues for military 
requirements, 214 
Philanthropic Bank, 138 
Pichincha, Battle of, 18, 208-9 
Pichincha, Mount, 67 
Pichincha Province, 74, 123, 178 



Pike, Frederick B., 22, 33 

Pizarro, Francisco, 6; arrival of, in Caja- 
marca, 8; assassination of, 11; back- 
ground of, 7; Cordillera Oriental crossed 
by, 10; execution of Atahualpa by, 9; 
meeting of, with Atahualpa, 8-9; 
strained relations with Almargo, 8; third 
voyage of, 8-11 

Pizarro, Gonzalo, 8, 10; execution of, 11 

Pizarro, Juan, 8 

Placido Caamafio, Jose Maria: as presi- 
dent, 24 

Plaza Gutierrez, Leonidas, xxiv, 27, 33 

Plaza Lasso, Galo, 36, 40, 238; back- 
ground of, 33-34; contributions of, 34; 
ties of, to United States, 33 

PLR. See Liberal Party 

Poland, 37 

police courts, 243 

Police Officers' Higher Training School, 
242 

political candidates, 176; restrictions on, 
178 

political instability, xxiv, 156; causes of, 
3, 27, 29, 156, 184; description of, 3; 
history of, 155 

political interest groups, 188-95 

political parties, xxv, 176, 177-88; coali- 
tions, 183-84; dissolution of, 179; fi- 
nancial assistance for, 177; membership 
in, 178; organizational requirements 
for, 178-79; state protection of, 177 

political propaganda, 179-80 

political struggle: role of armed forces in, 
4 

politics: effect of middle class on, 72; 
party, 184-88; role of regions in, 71 

Ponce Enriquez, Camilo, 35, 180, 184; 
accomplishments of, 35; party or- 
ganized by, 183 

Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Ecua- 
dor, 197 

Popular Alliance (AP), 184 

Popular Democratic Union (UDP), 187 

Popular Democracy (DP), 183, 187 

Popular Front (FP), 193 

population: crude birth rate, 63-64; crude 
death rate, 63; and family planning, 64, 
65-67; fertility rate, 64; growth, effects 
of, 64-65; growth rate, 62-63; life ex- 
pectancy, 64; in 1990, 62; in 2000, 63 

Portoviejo, 26, 57; television stations, 141 

Poveda Burbano, Alfredo, 46, 213 



299 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



poverty: number of families in, 78; rural, 

79; worst areas of, 78 
PRE. See Ecuadorian Roldosist Party 
Prensa Latina, 141 

president (see also executive): as com- 
mander in chief, 207, 215; duties and 
powers, 162-63; election of, 175; legis- 
lative powers of, 163, 165; require- 
ments, 162; order of subrogation for, 
165; prosecution of, 168; restrictions 
on, 165; term of, 157, 162 

press (see also media), 141; foreign wire 
services, 141 

Princeton University advisory mission, 
28-29; accomplishments of, 29 

Proafio Villalba, Leonidas (Bishop), 93 

Progressive Conservative Party (PCP), 
183 

Progressive Party, 24; platform of, 24 

Protocol of Peace, Friendship, and Boun- 
daries. See Rio Protocol 

Protestantism (see also under individual 
denominations): conversion to, 94-96 

provinces: council, 174; elections, 174; 
governed by, 174 

Provincial Electoral Tribunals (TPEs), 
159; as election overseers, 175; func- 
tions of, 176, 179 

PSC. See Social Christian Party 

PSE. See Ecuadorian Socialist Party 

PSRE. See Revolutionary Socialist Party 
of Ecuador 

public demonstrations, 179 

Public Forces, 162, 163, 175; mission of, 
215 

Public Health, Ministry of, 97; emergency 
relief, 232; health care system under, 97 

Public Ministry: components of, 173-74; 
described, 173-74 

Public Municipal Enterprise for Tele- 
phones, Potable Water, and Sewers 
(Etapa), 140 

public sector: components of, 112; em- 
ployment in, 113; expansion of, 112; 
expenditures of, 112 

Public Works and Communications, Min- 
istry of, 112, 140, 232 

Puerto Bolivar, 145 

Puerto Nuevo, 145 

Puerto Viejo, 145 

Puna, 8 

Puna Indians, 5 
Puna Island, 58 



Puruha Indians. 

Putumayo River, 59 

Puyo: defense zone headquarters, 217 

Quayle, Daniel, 199 
Quechua language, 6 
Quevedo, 70, 143 

Quichua (see also Yumbos), 87, 88, 89, 
140 

Quijos Province, 14, 15 

quiteno, 15, 16, 17, 19 

Quiteno Libre, El, 19; assassination of 
founders of, 19 

Quito, 9, 11, 12, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 31, 
40, 67, 138, 155, 157, 162, 170, 172, 
185, 244; air transport, 144; Air War 
College at, 225; as capital of Tawan- 
tinsuyu, 6; Conservative politics in, 3; 
crime rate in, 246; declaration of in- 
dependence by, 17, 208; defense zone 
headquarters, 217; demonstrations in, 
29; destruction of, by Ruminahui, 10; 
development of, 69; economic growth 
in, 46; electric generation in, 133; as 
intellectual center, 16; land use in, 120; 
manufacturing in, 118, 134; metropoli- 
tan police in, 242; migration to, 68-70, 
82, 84; military academy established in, 
212; National Emergency Relief 
Center, 233; National Police head- 
quarters in, 242; naval zone, 221; 
newspapers in, 141, 197; politics in, 
xxii, 156, 180; population of, 69; popu- 
lation growth in, 69-70; prison in, 246; 
radio in, 140, 141; rail service, 142; 
rainfall in, 61; revolt of, against 
Bonaparte, 17; siege of, by Benalcazar, 
10; Sierra regionalism in, 3; slums in, 
67; squatter settlements in, xxii, 69-70; 
stock exchange, 138; student protests 
in, 237; telephone service in, 139, 140; 
television stations, 141; textile indus- 
try in, 136; as trade center, 103; upper 
class, 190, 191 

Quito audiencia, 18; capitulation of, to 
Sucre, 18; described, 11; inaccessibil- 
ity of, 12; struggle for independence in, 
16, 17; territory under, 11-12; under 
Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada, 15 

Quito Chamber of Commerce, 43 

Quito rebellion; crushed, 17; described, 
17 



300 



Index 



Quito-San Lorenzo rail line, 142 
Quito State Charter (1812), 157 
Quitu Indians, 5 



Radical Liberal Party. See Liberal Party 

radio broadcast facilities, 197; AM sta- 
tions, 140; FM stations, 141; lan- 
guages, 140; number of receivers, 140; 
shortwave stations, 141, 197; "Voice 
of the Andes," 141, 197 

rail system, 142; decline in, 142 

Reagan, Ronald, 199, 237 

Red Cross, 232 

reducciones: resettlement of Indians in, 13 
regidores, 12 
regionalism, 3, 156 

Registro Oficial del Estado (Official Register 

of the State), 163, 179 
Reuters, 141 

Revolutionary Movement of the Christian 
Left (MRIC), 187 

Revolutionary Socialist Party of Ecuador 
(PSRE), 182 

rice, 123; production of, 126 

Riobamba, 6, 9, 12, 16, 23, 26; land use 
in, 120; military training in, 219; Na- 
tional Police headquarters in, 242; 
obrajes in, 104 

Rio Protocol, 197; described, 31, 54, 209- 
10; military's refusal to accept, 210; 
renounced by Velasco, 36 

Robles, Francisco: abolition of Indian trib- 
ute, 21; opposition to, 21 

Roca, Vicente Ramon, 20 

Rocafuerte y Rodriguez de Bejarano, Jose 
Vicente: career of, 19-20; contributions 
of, 20; as governor of Guayaquil, 20; 
opposition of, to Flores, 20; as puppet 
ofFlores, 19-20 

Rodriguez Lara, Guillermo, 41, 44; over- 
throw by, of Velasco, 160; overthrow 
of, 43, 160, 213; promises of, 42; re- 
gime of, 41-42, 213 

Roldos Aguilera, Jaime, 4, 44, 45, 155; 
death of, 47; party organized by, 183; 
rivalry of, with Bucaram, 46-47 

roldosista, 183 

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques: influence of works 

of, on Ecuador, 16 
Ruiz de Estrada, Bartolome, 7 
Ruminahui, 10; defeat of, 9 



Salaaca Indians, 88 

Salgado Pesantes, Hernan, 159, 173, 178 

Salinas: Air Force Academy, 225; naval 
base, 221, 222, 234; petroleum in, 131; 
United States air base at, 30, 222 

Salinas Naval Training Base, 222 

Sanders, Thomas G., 189 

San Cristobal Island: naval zone, 221 

San Francisco de Quito, 10 

Sangay, Mount, 57 

San Lorenzo, 142; naval base, 221 

San Martin, Jose de, 17-18 

San Miguel de Tanguara, 8 

Santa Cruz Calahumana, Andres de, 18 

Santa Elena Peninsula, 60, 120; petro- 
leum in, 131 

Santa Elena Province: archaeological sites 
in, 4; oil refineries in, 132 

Santo Domingo, 70 

Santo Tomas, 58 

Saraguro Indians, 86, 88 

Schumacher, Pedro, 26 

Secretariat General: function of, 215; 
members of, 215 

Securities Commission — National Finan- 
cial Corporation, 138; role of, 138 

Senac. See National Communications 
Secretariat 

Senate, 157, 159; military in, 189; reor- 
ganization of, 159; representatives of 
employer groups in, 190 

Sendip. See National Secretariat for Pub- 
lic Information 

serrano economy, 14 

serranos, 14, 29, 37, 67, 68, 69 

servants: subordination of, 71 

service sector, 118, 136-37; parts of, 136 

Seville, 11 

shamans, 89 

sharecroppers: acquisition of land by, 76 
sharecropping, xxiii, 74 
Short-Range Planning, Directorate of, 
166 

shrimp: revenue from, 110; value of, 149 

Shuar Indians, 140 

Shultz, George P., 199 

Sierra, xxi, 10, 12, 54, 190; agriculture in, 
104, 123, 126, 128; archaeological sites 
in, 4; climate in, 59, 51; and Costa, eco- 
nomic distinction between, 71, 103; 
crafts produced in, 78; death of inhabi- 
tants of, by European diseases, 13-14; 
described, 57; elite in, 71; encomienda 



301 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



system in, 121; forestry in, 130; high- 
way transportation through, 143; Indi- 
ans in, 84; landowners in, 191; land 
reform in, 72; land tenure in, 122; land 
use in, 120; lifestyle of, 71; livestock rais- 
ing in, 128-29; migration of peasants 
from, 54, 67, 68-70; mining in, 133; po- 
litics in, 156, 157, 180, 186; population, 
67, 68-70; rainfall in, 61; reflection of 
pre-Columbian Ecuador in, 3; rivers 
and streams in, 58; temperatures in, 61; 
textile industry in, 136; universities in, 
96; volcanos in, 57; white elite in, 53 
Sierra regionalism (see also Quito), 3, 156 
Social Christian Movement (MSC), 35, 
183, 184 

Social Christian Party (PSC), 182, 184 
Social Development, Undersecretariat of, 
166 

Socialist International, 202 
Socialist Party, 238 
Social Welfare, Ministry of, 99, 232 
South American Development Company, 
30 

Soviet Union, 200, 202 

Spain, 208; invasion of, by Napoleon, 16 

Spanish colonizers, 83 

Special Commission on Human Rights 
of the Ecuadorian National Congress: 
human rights complaints investigated 
by, 242, 245-46; prison conditions in- 
vestigated by, 247 

state of emergency: defined, 163 

State Railways Company, 142 

stock exchanges, 138-39 

strikes, 119-20, 194; issues in, 120, 237 

students: decline in impact of, 195; dem- 
onstrations by, 194; role of, in politi- 
cal process, 194-95 

subrogation, order of, 165 

suburbio (squatter settlements), xxii, 69- 
70 

sucre, 115; devaluation of, xxiv, 107, 111, 

116, 150, 237; exchange rate, 115 
Sucre Alcala, Antonio Jose de, 17-18, 

208; death of, 19 
Sucumbfos Province, 186 
suffrage (see also voting), 157, 158; under 

Constitution of 1979, 160 
sugarcane, 104, 123; production of, 126 
Summer Institute of Linguistics, 94 
Superior Courts, 162, 186; duties of, 

171-72 



Supreme Council of Government, 43, 44, 
213 

Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ), 161, 
165, 168, 169, 170, 215, 244; nomina- 
tions to, 171; reforms by, 171; responsi- 
bilities of, 162, 171; role of, in deciding 
constitutionality, 156, 171 

Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), 45, 
159, 160, 161, 167, 169; dissolution of 
political parties by, 179; as election 
overseer, 175; responsibilities of, 175- 
76, 178 

Sweden, 202 

Tamayo, Jose Luis, 27 

TAME. See Ecuadorian Military Air 

Transport 
TASS, 141 

Taura Air Base, 185, 214, 224 

Tawantinsuyu, 5, 9; defeat of, by con- 
quistadors, 84 

TCA. See Contentious Administrative 
Tribunal 

tea, 127 

Technical and Financial Cooperation, 
Directorate of, 166 

telephone system: locations, 13-40; num- 
ber of lines in, 139; problems with, 139; 
quality of, 140; services, 140; trunks, 
140 

television stations, 141, 197 

Terrible Year (1859), 21 

terrorism, 225: by AVC, 237; from 

Colombia, 211 
Texaco-Gulf petroleum concession, 42, 

43, 224 
Texaco Petroleum, 131 
textile industry, 134; location of, 136; 

under Spanish colonial era, 14 
TGC. See Tribunal of Constitutional 

Guarantees 
Third World, 198, 199, 236 
tobacco, 104, 128 
Topa, 5 

Torrijos Herrera, Omar, 47 
tourism, 139 

TPEs. See Provincial Electoral Tribunals 
trade, 148-51; deficit, 110; dependence 

on, 148; in Guayaquil, 14; partners, 

150; in Quito, 103 
Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline, xxiii, 103, 

222; description of, 105; destruction of, 



302 



Index 



by earthquake of 1987, 104, 110, 146; 
repair of, 132; volume carried over, 132 

transportation: air, 143-44; under Gar- 
cia Moreno, 23; highway, 143; infra- 
structure, 113; rail, 142; truck, 143; 
water, 145 

Treasury, 117 

Treaty of 1829, 18 

Treaty of Mapasingue, 21 

Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees 
(TGC), 156, 159, 160, 161, 163, 168, 
171, 172-73; appointments to, 172; 
Constitution interpreted by, 172; 
human rights complaints investigated 
by, 242, 243; members of, 172-73; 
powers of, 173; requirements for, 173; 
rights of, 173 

Tribunal of Crimes, 145 

Troop Training School, 242 

tropical diseases, 99 

trucks, 143 

trucking companies, 143 
Trujillo, Spain, 7, 10 
Tumbes, Peru, 8 
"tuna war," 35, 41, 198, 234 
Tungurahua Province: archaeological 
sites in, 4 

UDP. See Popular Democratic Union 

UGTE. See General Union of Ecuador- 
ian Workers 

Ultimas Noticias, 197 

underemployment, xxiv, 118-19 

UNE. See National Union of Teachers 

unemployment, xxiv, 118-19 

unionization, 192; benefits of, 80; by 
peasants, 74, 76 

United Holland Bank, 138 

United Nations, 197, 200, 201; Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338, 202 

United Press International, 141 

United States, 26, 36, 190, 198, 244; Al- 
faro's affinity for, 26; assistance of, 
fighting narcotics traffic, 244; Depart- 
ment of State, 161; Febres Cordero's 
affinity for, 155; Foreign Trade Act of 
1974, 198; military aid, 210, 218, 234; 
military influence of, 234; military in- 
tervention in Panama, 201; military 
materiel acquired from, 223, 236, 237; 
military training, 234; student protests 
against, 237; as trading partner, 150 



United States Army Command and 
General Staff College, 219 

United States Arms Control and Disar- 
mament Agency (ACDA), 231, 237 

United States Department of State, 197; 
support of, for South American De- 
velopment Company, 30 

United States Drug Enforcement Ad- 
ministration, 244 

United States-Ecuador relations, 198- 
200; basis for, 198; irritants in, 198; 
"tuna war," 34, 41, 198 

United States Military Assistance Pro- 
gram, 223 

United States Military Group, 234 

United States National Guard, 234 

United States Naval Academy, 234 

United States Navy, 244 

United Workers Front (FUT), 48, 193, 
194 

UPP. See People's Patriotic Union 
Urbina, Jose Maria, 20, xxii, 24; eman- 
cipation of slaves by, 21, 209; liberal- 
ism under, 20-21; invasion attempted 
by, 23 

Urbina Jado, Francisco, 27 

Uruguay, 200 

utility infrastructure, 113 



Valdivia culture, 4 

Valverde, Fray Vincente de, 9 

Vargas incident: accusation by, of corrup- 
tion, xxv, 185, 214; abduction of Febres 
Cordero in response to, xxv, 185, 214; 
court martial of, xxv, 185, 214; dismis- 
sal of, xxv, 185, 214; revolts led by, 
xxv, 185, 214 

Vargas Pazzos, Frank, xxv, 185, 214; 
presidential campaign of, xxv; 185 

Vatican: Ecuador's first concordat with, 
22 

Veintemilla, Ignacio de, 209; as presi- 
dent, 24 

Velasco Ibarra, Jose Maria, 30, 33, 42, 
155, 159, 183; autogolpe by, 40, 160, 
212-13; constitution suspended by, 
160; death of, 45; overthrow of, in 
1935, 30, 36, 41; party organized by, 
183; political polarization under, 36; as 
president, 30, 31, 34-35, 35-36, 40; 
problems under, 33; promises of, 



303 



Ecuador: A Country Study 



31-33, 35-36, 37; Rio Protocol re- 
nounced by, 36, 202 

velasquistas, 36, 41, 183 

Venezuela, 10, 18, 130, 198, 201; emer- 
gency assistance of, 233; military aid 
of, to Guayaquil rebellion, 17; relations 
with, 201; withdrawal of, from Con- 
federation of Gran Colombia, 18 

Venezuelans, 209 

vice president: election of, 175; require- 
ments of, 165; restrictions on, 165 
viceroy alty, 11 
Vistazo, 197 

volcanos: active, 58; in islands, 58; in the 
Sierra, 57 

Voltaire: influence of works of, on Ecu- 
ador, 16 

Vote Receiving Committees (JRVs): as 
election overseer, 175; function of, 176 

voting {see also suffrage), 157, 160; be- 
havior, xxii; obligatory, 175 

wage labor, 79 

War of the Pacific, 24 

water transport: ports, 145; routes, 145 



whites, xxi, 84-86, 87, 88; family and kin, 
90-92 

women: discrimination against, 161; in 
military, 226; obligations of, 160; rights 
of, 158, 159, 161 

workers, 54, 80-83; autogestional sector, 
44; description of, 80; divisions in, 80; 
general strike by, in 1923, 28; influence 
of migration on, 82; origins of, 80; po- 
litical influence of, 192-94; rights of, 
119; subordination of, 71; types of, 80 

World Bank, 198; loan from, 110, 148 

World Vision, 94 

World War II, 223, 234; Ecuadorian 
cooperation with Allies in, 30, 210 



yanaperos: described, 74 
Yerovi Indaburu, Clemente, 40 
Yugoslavia, 202 
Yumbos, 89 



zambos, 12 

Zamora-Chinchipe Province, 133 
Zavala Baquerizo, Jorge, 40 



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